• 한국신뢰성학회지:신뢰성응용연구
• /
• 제11권3호
• /
• pp.293-303
• /
• 2011

Reliability Prediction using MIL-HDBK-217F has some restrictions due to its one modeling basis. One of the restrictions is caused by selecting one operating environment of a system, which is chosen regardless of its detailed conditions, e.g., external impact and vibration. Especially, an equipment, which is installed on a mobile vehicle though its movement is quasi-static, is controversial to designate its environment as ground mobile($G_M$), rather than ground fixed($G_F$). In this paper, failure rates were compared, which are computed using several moving time rates to total operating time. RiAC-HDBK-217Plus was used as the basic calculation model. In addition, $G_F$ conditioned failure rate was evaluated by comparing with that under $G_M$ environment but fixed state.

• 한국국방경영분석학회지
• /
• 제27권2호
• /
• pp.88-109
• /
• 2001

Defense minister of the ROK, Kim Bong-sin suggested that the ROK′s military build-up policy will change from "scenario-based" to "capability-based". Entering the 1990s the ROK′s military build-up policy met difficulties to accomplish its goal, modernizing and strengthening of its force structure and weapon systems because of limited budget. The concept of capability-based military build-up could commit a fault in estimating total amount of defense resources required for force planing. This is because that the total amount of defense resources related to force plan for the 15 years is fixed to embody military strategy. The concept of capability-based military build-up plays a role as a constraint in choosing a military strategy. This has no connection with military build-up. Therefore the resources of mid-term military build-up program and scale of annual defense budget could be affected by the situations of its national economy. In this respect, the scale of annual defense budget and resources could be changed in accordance with national economic condition, however, the total amount of resources required to build-up military force for 15 years, namely resources of military force planing requirement for 15 years, is given already for the accomplishment of military strategy. The purpose of this study is to seek a direction of the ROK′s military build-up policy in a viewpoint of capability-based military build-up.

• Journal of Preventive Medicine and Public Health
• /
• 제52권1호
• /
• pp.66-70
• /
• 2019

Objectives: In the Republic of Korea (ROK), the notified incidence of tuberculosis in foreign-born individuals (NITFBI) has increased recently, as has the rate of multidrug-resistant (MDR) and rifampicin-resistant (RR) tuberculosis in foreigners staying in the ROK. As Jeju Province in ROK has a no-visa entry policy, control programs for NITFBI should be consolidated. The aim was to evaluate the status of NITFBI, with a focus on the distribution of MDR/RR tuberculosis by nationality. Methods: Data on tuberculosis incidence in individuals born in Jeju Province and in foreign-born individuals were extracted from the Korean Statistical Information Service of Statistics Korea, and the Infectious Disease Surveillance Web Statistics of the Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, respectively. Results: Among all notified incident cases of tuberculosis, the proportion of NITFBI increased from 1.46% in 2011 to 6.84% in 2017. China- and Vietnam-born individuals accounted for the greatest proportion of the 95 cases of NITFBI. Seven cases of MDR/RR tuberculosis were found, all involving patients born in China. Conclusions: In Jeju Province, ROK, NITFBI might become more common in the near future. Countermeasures for controlling active tuberculosis in immigrants born in high-risk nations for tuberculosis should be prepared in Jeju Province, since it is a popular tourist destination.

• 융합보안논문지
• /
• 제23권5호
• /
• pp.189-197
• /
• 2023

육군은 육군합성전장훈련체계를 2026년까지 개발하고, 이를 활용하여 사단급 LVC통합훈련을 발전시킬 계획이다. 본 연구에서는 육군합성전장훈련체계에 VR/AR 기술을 적용하여 훈련의 효과와 효율을 향상시킬 수 있는 방안을 제안하였다. 이를 위해, 선진국과 한국군의 국방 분야 VR/AR 기술 활용사례를 분석한 결과, 교육훈련 체계를 실감형으로 전환했을 때 교육훈련의 효과와 효율이 향상될 수 있음을 확인하였다. 이에 따라, VR/AR 기술 적용 대상 국방 교육훈련 과목을 선정하여 제시하였고, 육군합성전장훈련체계에 VR/AR 기술을 적용하기 위한 발전방향을 고찰한 다음, 육군합성전장 훈련체계에 VR/AR 기술을 적용하는 방안을 제안하였다.

• 안보군사학연구
• /
• 통권1호
• /
• pp.71-111
• /
• 2003

The key lessons of the very complex modern war can be dangerously misleading to the outsiders. The efforts trying to draw lessons learned from the Iraq War (OIF : Operation Iraqi Freedom) may be biased by the view of point by Americans, because most of war episodes have been come from the Western media coverage. More serious bias can be committed thanks to the differences of warfighting doctrines and military technology between US forces and ROK forces. However, OIF-fought allied commanders and outside military experts said this campaign exemplified 21st-century warfare: swift, agile and decisive, employing overpowering technology to bring relentless violence to bear in many places at once. Even though the campaign evolved differently than anticipated, allied forces regrouped and regained the initiative remarkably quickly, thanks in large part to a new command flexibility, tied to new technology that made possible the more rapid sharing of data. These factors permitted "new air-land dynamic". The things that compel that are good sensors networked with good intelligence disseminated through a robust networking system, which then yields speed. Speed turns out to be a very important factor for conducting "Rapid Decisive Operations" relied on joint "Mass of Effects". ROK forces facing the heaviest ground threat in the world may learn more from Cold War era-typed US Army 3rd Infantry Division (3ID), which operating considerably beyond existing doctrine. 3ID flew its personnel into Kuwait to meet up with equipment already located in the region as pre-positioned stock. During OIF, the division conducted continuous offensive operations over 230km deep battlespace for 21 days. The lessons learned for ROK army to prepare tomorrow's war may be found from 3ID in its training, command and control, task organization, firepower and battlespace management, and logistics.

• Strategy21
• /
• 통권32호
• /
• pp.5-35
• /
• 2013

The purpose of this thesis is to suggest how to plan ROK(Republic of Korea) Navy's strategy concerning to JOAC(Joint Operation Access Concept) and ASB(Air-Sea Battle) concept of US(United States) armed forces. Since 2006, US armed forces has been developing CONOPS(Concepts of Operations), JOAC & ASB. These concepts will not only affect security environment for Korea Peninsula and West Pacific Area, but also will be affected to ROK Navy's Strategy. Therefore, Korea Navy has to consider and review those concepts and should discuss the way to secure peace of Korea Peninsula. JOAC & ASB have been developed for securing operational access ability of US armed forces against enemy forces. A2/AD(Anti-Access, Area-Denial) is the strategy of possible enemy forces against US forces' approaching into the operation area and impede operations within area. US forces had to overcome enemy's A2/AD strategy in coming century to protect national interest and sustain global leadership. The main concept of JOAC & ASB is "Cross-domain Synergy", which means 'to eliminate duplicate and improve joint operability containing space and cyber operation area.' Korea Navy's acceptance of JOAC & ASB without any revising is not a rational choice. Without the amendment some problems can be occurred by the Korea navy's acceptance for the original version of JOAC & ASB. Those are "Missing differences of operation environment between Korea and US", "Impediment from neighbor nations, especially PRC (People's Republic of China)", and "Impediment inside from Korea armed forces". Therefore, Korea Navy has to evaluate and find out the way to solve for JOAC & ASB to apply for their strategy and minimise those possible problems above. This thesis is expected to be the solution.

• Strategy21
• /
• 통권41호
• /
• pp.294-332
• /
• 2017

The aim of this study is to find ways to apply the strategic communications to the Republic of Korea Navy. It may be a little bit late for the ROK Navy to accommodate the SC in these days because the adoption and implementation of the SC by the Combined Forces Command has already been begun. It was in 2007 when the SC was in place in the CFC. ROK's Ministry of National Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff have also mulled over the SC and begun to apply it in part in the annual exercises such as Key Resolve command post drills and Foal Eagle field training exercise, etc. For the ROK Navy, in addition to those exercises, it is faced with further areas like North Korean maritime provocations and other maritime incidents where its version of SC is needed. As noted, the SC is not intended to deter or defend directly those provocations and incidents, but aims to create conditions favorable to the achievement of the navy's strategic objectives. The ROK Navy has to establish a SC planning center and implementing organizations within the Headquarters to be consistent with its above organizations such as MND, JCS, and CFC that have already applied the SC in part or in entirety. SC center and other related organizations need to be under the control of VCNO and the center needs to be located and administered by the policy division in N-5 at the HQs. The vision of the navy's SC is the winning without combats and the least damages in time of war. In other for the navy to reach the vision, the strategies to be executed are early establishment of SC implementing organizations, forming consensus over the need for the SC within the navy, strengthening core competencies to apply the SC, acquiring the SC experts and making doctrines on the SC. The SC, in addition, in the navy has to be planned and implemented in not only peace time and crisis time but also war time.

• Strategy21
• /
• 통권43호
• /
• pp.125-174
• /
• 2018

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the status of naval arms race in Northeast Asia. To this end, the scope of the research was limited to national security strategies, maritime strategies and naval strengthening of the United States, China, Russia and Japan. The major powers' active maritime strategies and naval arms race give some strategic implications to the Republic of Korea Navy as follows. First, China and Japan, unlike the past, are actively using submarines in offshore waters including the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, the ROK Navy must successfully promote the Jangbogo-III-class submarine, which is currently constructed, and get a nuclear-powered submarine and P-8 MPA capable of long-range and long-time operations to enhance ASW capability. Second, North Korea's current building submarines capable of loading SLBMs and SLBMs are a new threat to the ROK Navy. The current building KAMD, which focuses on terminal phase defense, cannot effectively respond to North Korea's SLBMs and should be converted to a multi-layered defense system including SM-3 at a mid-course phase. Third, as China militarizes the South China Sea, the instability of the South China Sea is growing. Therefore, the ROK Navy should strengthen its maritime cooperation with the regional countries such as Japan and ASEAN navies to protect SLOC. In conclusion, the ROK Navy needs to build a strong naval power to keep in mind that the 21st century naval rivalry in Northeast Asia is accelerating. The navy must do one's best to protect national strategic and vital interests by strengthening cooperation with regional countries. South Korea is also accelerating its defense reforms in accordance with the pattern of future warfare and the ROK Navy do one's best to have a balanced naval capability capable of actively operating in the offshore waters.

• 안보군사학연구
• /
• 통권1호
• /
• pp.35-70
• /
• 2003

President Lee, Syngman was ROK supreme commander at the Korean war. But, it is doubt that he executed his authority and responsibility by the ROK constitution and law. At the phase of the Korean War conduct, his role may be divided into 'military operation execution one' and 'political-diplomacy one'. He appointed unqualified person to the important position of the national defence, didn't make war execution system, and was not make to meet the war. And, after transferring the ROK force operation commanding authority to the Commander in Chief, UN Command, his role was extremely trivial at the military operation execution phase. Any way, he intended to recover the inferior national strength and military capacity with USA aid, and concentrated his effort toward diplomacy with USA. At last, he succeeded in making a mutual defence treaty and gained a big result to harden Korea national security after war. In sum, president Lee was shrewd politician and diplomat than military leader. And, it can be evaluated that he supplemented the lost part of military affairs side with diplomat one.

• 한국환경복원기술학회지
• /
• 제19권5호
• /
• pp.29-45
• /
• 2016

This study identified vulnerable regions in the national parks of the Republic of Korea (ROK). The potential vulnerable regions were defined as areas showing a decline in forest productivity, low resilience, and high sensitivity to climate variations. Those regions were analyzed with a regression model and trend analysis using the Enhanced Vegetation Index (EVI) data obtained from long-term observed Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer (MODIS) and gridded meteorological data. Results showed the area with the highest vulnerability was Naejangsan National Park in the southern part of ROK where 32.5% ($26.0km^2$) of the total area was vulnerable. This result will be useful information for future conservation planning of forest ecosystem in ROK under environmental changes, especially climate change.