Why did Kim Jong Un turn his foreign policy upside down in a sudden? US naval blockade became one of candidates for the reason since it had been threatened by Trump administration for the first time in December 2017. Has the blockades worked well like that in the international politic history? This paper reveals the effectiveness of naval blockade on sanctioning in the peacetime. This research analyzes three hypothetical arguments about the naval blockade based on the result of empirical tests with TIES Dataset. First, sanctions by blockading are more effective in gaining political benefits than the other economic sanctions. It was ranked the 4th effective way of sanction out of 9. And 56.3% of pacific naval blockades without packaged economic sanctions were succeeded, whereas the possibility of success increase up to 61.2% when blockade has been imposed in accordance with the other type of economic sanctions. Second, blockades deter military collisions, even war. When it comes to military provocation issue, blockading sanctions gain political interest far more than the other type of economic sanctions. The possibility of the success reaches up to 74%. Also, there wasn't any historical cases of war incurred by blockading sanctions within 5 years after the blockade end. Third, policy makers just need 1.2 years on average to see the end of sanctions when they choose the naval blockade as the method of imposing sanction on the adversary. It is impressively short span of time in achieving political goal compared to the other types of sanctions which are need 9 years on average. North East Asia sea could be the next stage for a naval blockade sooner or later. Because China and Japan not only possess capabilities of blockade but also have will to impose blockades to the others if conditions are set. And even the North Korea with lots of submerging forces could be a blockading threat in the specific area. So, the Republic of Korea has to pay more attention and be prepared for naval blockading sanction.
The future of ROK-US alliance has not been discussed in detail by both governments since early 2000s. However, it is becoming more apparent that ROK-US alliance is facing various daunting challenges. The new administrations both in ROK and US might have different perspectives about the future of alliance. In the process of resolving outstanding North Korean nuclear issue, the alliance can face challenges to change its fundamental features such as halting joint military exercise. ROK-US governments also agreed to transfer wartime operational control as soon as possible. All those factors indicates the growing necessity to articulate the future of ROK-US alliance. ROK and US needs to facilitate to dialogue for future alliance with the possible scenarios of changing security environment such as maintaining status quo, reconciliation of North and South Korea, and entering the reunification stage. In each phase, ROK-US has to develop the goal for the alliance, military institution to implement the alliance, role of USFK, and etc. It is imperative to develop the road map for future ROK-US alliance at this stage to avoid unnecessary folly.
Sang-Keun Cho;In-keun Son;Ki-Won Kim;Kang-Il Seo;Kwonil Kim;Sang-Hyuk Park
The Journal of the Convergence on Culture Technology
/
v.9
no.4
/
pp.277-281
/
2023
Recent aggressive threats by North Korea using small drones have heavily impacted on ROK(Republic of Korea) society and it seems to be agreed that counter-drone systems are required to protect our properties. ROK government has been investigating current counter-drone systems for national important facilities. However, there is no consensus standard to evaluate the systems. This paper is to propose a counter-drone system evaluation framework which is the outcome through RMA(Revolution in Military Affairs) thinking process. The RMA thinking process is currently well-implemented in ROK army to develop future military strategy. The proposed framework has 4 categories - threat analysis of North Korea small drones, convergence of detection, tracking and neutralizing systems, integrated operations and available experts and organization - which have corresponding criteria.
This study is to examine the costumes of Gyeokgu in different situations and to suggest when and how they should be used in historical drama. Gyeokgu is a type of polo game that was played in Korea and it was also known as Gyeokbong and Bonghee. The accounts of the game show that it was played during the South-North period as recorded in Balhaego, Haedongyeoksa, and Goryeosa until the Joseon period. The scenes of Gyeokgu have been shown in some historical dramas in order to make the story exciting or to show the life of royalty. The costume of Gyeokgu in the South-North period should be suggested Danryeong(團領), Bokdu, and Haw(靴) in a formal situation. The Gyeokgu in the Goryeo period was a sport for royalty. So the Gyeokgu costume in the Goryeo period was required to be worn with Danryeong(團領), Bokdu, and Haw(靴) for the kings and military officers in the early Goryeo period and with Cheollik(帖裡), Balip or Huklip(黑笠), and Haw(靴) from the middle of the Goryeo period. Women could wear Chima(skirt), Jeogori(blouse), Pyo, and Li(履) when they play Gyeokgu in the Goryeo period in the historical dramas. The Gyeokgu in the early Joseon period was a sport for the kings. After the king of Sejong, the Gyeokgu became a martial art for the military officers. The costume of Gyeokgu in the Joseon period should be Red Cheollik(紅帖裡), Kwadu, Jonglip, Gwangjodae(廣組帶), Sagu, and Haw(靴) as recorded in Muyedobotongji in the 18th century. The kings, servants, and military officers could wear the Cheollik and should be made in the different Git(collar), shape of the sleeves, and the proportion of the upper part and the underpart in each period properly. When the citizens play Gyeokgu, they could wear Geon(巾), Baji(pants), Jeogori(shirt), and Gipsin in the late Joseon period.
The issue of security on the Korean peninsula is facing the greatest upheaval in 2018 with the inter-Korean summit and the US-North Korea summit. North Korea has pursued the parallel policy developing military and economic at the same time. However, North Korea is changing its route to give up nuclear weapons and focus on the economy through summit talks. Since the change in North Korea is similar to that of Libya in the past, it is necessary to analyze why North Korea is trying to abandon its nuclear program and how the process is flowing compared to the case of Libya. The Libya model was constructed and analyzed in terms of international and domestic perpectives and recognition of the situation by leadership. North Korea's nuclear policy was evaluated based on the Libya model. The nuclear development of Libya and North Korea has caused diplomatic and economic pressures from the international community and ultimately led to instability of the regime. Two countries have tried to abandon nuclear program in order to solve the instability of the regime, also gain the economic reward insead. Libya took economic benefits and secured some of the stability of the regime, but the regime collapsed under the wave of democracy due to the influx of foreign capital and ideas. North Korea will seek diplomatic and economic gains with the example of Libya, but will try to limit as much as possible the culture of democracy and the full opening that can be incidental.
Korea has been a victim of State supporting terrorism by North Korea even before international society realize the terrorism threats because of 9.11 in US. However, state supporting terrorism against South Korea by North Korea went along with East/West Cold War System by US and the Soviet Union. It is because socialism that Kim Il-sung who established a separate government in North Korea with the political, economic, social and military support of the Soviet Union selected as his political ideology justifies terrorism as the tool to complete the proletariat revolution. North Korea's state supporting terrorism is being operated systematically and efficiently by military of North Korea. It gives big worries to international society not only by performing terrorism against Korea but also by dispatching terrorists and exporting terrorism strategies to the third world countries. In this situation, terrorism against Korea has met a new transition point at 9${\cdot}$11 in US. As South Korea is confronting North Korea and the war has not ended but suspended, the alliance between US and Korea is more important than anything else. Because of this Korea decided to support the anti-terrorism wars against Afghanistan and Iraq of US and other western countries and send military force there. The preface of the anti-terrorism war has begun as such. On October 7, 2001, US and UK started to attack Afghanistan and Taleban government in Afghanistan was dethroned on December 7, 2001. US and western countries started a war against Iraq on March 20, 2003. On April 9, 2003 Baghdad, the capital of Iraq fell, and Saddam Hussein al-Majid al-Awja government was expelled. During the process, the terrorism threat against South Korea has expanded to Arab terrorists and terrorism organizations as well as North Korea. Consequently, although Korean government, scholars and working level public servants made discussions and tried to seek countermeasures, the damages are extending. Accordingly, terrorism against Korean companies in overseas after 9${\cdot}$11 were analyzed focusing on Nation, Region, Victimology, and Weapons used for the attacks. Especially, the trend of terrorism against the Korean companies in overseas was discussed by classifying them chronologically such as initiation and termination of anti-terrorism wars against Afghanistan and Iraq, and from the execution of Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein al-Majid al-Awja to December 2010. Through this, possible terrorism incidents after the execution of Osama bin Laden, the leader of Al-Qaeda, on May 2, 2011 were projected and proposals were made for the countermeasures.
We take it for granted that strong sides defeat weaker counterparts, while predicting the outcome of the battles. But in modern war, we can find plenty of evidence that weak sides won against the strong. This phenomenon can be understood logically by the fourth-generation war theory. the North Korean does not give up its unification strategy, which is unification by force, even though its inferior power. It is continuing various political, social and military levels of provocations toward both the international community and South Korea. Recently, North Korea did nuclear test, launched ICBM test, provoked the DMZ, and expecting to continue the provocations of the fourth-generation war level. We have to understand the nature of North Korea's fourth-generation war threats and provocations that it is focusing on. Based on this, have a new understanding of the value of the Homeland Defense Reservists as fundamental measures as the fourth-generation war threat and supplement related systems. We can firmly refuse the balance of power and power shift of the Korean Peninsula through improved Homeland Defense Reservists. As the expected North Korea's the fourth-generation war threats, our Homeland Defense Reservists is a firm will of conduct war, and political-social-economic-military means, it is possible to display as the best alternative.
The U.S.-China Relations could be analyzed two perspectives and their basis under major international p olitics theory-power transition with conditions: (1) North Korean's nuclear puzzle, (2) THAAD in the Kor ean Peninsula and (3) the U.S.-ROK Alliance. One perspective is the global order dominates the regional order, and then stable regional order comes out. The other is the regional order dominates the global ord er, and China wages a regional hegemonic conflict against the United States. Consequently, America's o verwhelming leadership in North Korean's nuclear, THAAD and U.S.-ROK Alliance as national power is expected to endure. But China also has expected empowerment and cooperation for the peace and stabilit y on the Korean Peninsula military problems. In this perspective, South Korea needs to pay attention to the changing power distribution and competition between the U.S. and China and needs to strengthen a balancing and harmonious diplomatic strategy, so called 'see-saw diplomacy'.
This thesis is to make an appropriate national defense policy of Republic of Korea through studying the Hegemony Strategy of United States. I searched the theory of hegemony. The hegemony was differently defined by the point of time and region. The strong power nations with the hegemony have been making efforts to maintain their hegemony everytime. I have conclusion that the presence of hegemony once emerged, it brought regional stability in place whether it is coercive or beneficial. The stability and instability of international order IS not exclusively dependent on hegemony. Even if the safety of hegemony cannot guarantee absolute stability of international order, there IS on doubt that the hegemony has enormous impact on that. According to the hegemonic theory, the history of mankind equals to the history of rising and falling hegemony. The international order was changed as the hegemony changes. The United States has been making efforts to maintain her global hegemony during the post cold-war era as well. Taking all these into consideration, relevant military strategy direction able to pursue national interest is that to make up for the relative weakness in the strategic environment. South Korea have to prepare security policy response as following. First, South Korea should build the military force equipped with advanced weapons in military technology sector and solidify military diplomatic relation able to form cooperative relation in wartime. Second, South Korea should make solid Alliance of Korea and U.S. Third, develop and maintain multilateral security cooperation of East Asia. Forth, we could realize that there are means that can neutralize opponent's strong point by seeking one or two and more asymmetry in the aspect of strategy, tactics, and means through asymmetric strategy. Than the military force of South Korea should develop into a force that is able to overcome to the traditional North Korea's threat and new type of conflicts. And the force should have sufficient strength and be deployed to effectively defend the Korean Peninsula. So, we need to establish a denial and defense system against any hostile neighboring country. Therefore, ROK military forces preparing for the future should try to construct a future military power to gradually establish enough strength for self-defense to prepare for a uncertain security environment and when the Korean Peninsula is unified in a future.
So far, the main threat to South Korea was North Korea. That is why South Korea established a strategy based on the threat of North Korea and most of the budget on defense was used to deter North Korea. Even though the neighboring countries(China, Japan, and Russia) are growing as a real threat with abilities and intentions based on their powerful naval forces, South Korea has not yet been able to establish a strategy that regards neighboring countries as a threat. But the decades-old structural mechanism of the Korean security environment is undergoing a radical change on April 27, 2018, through the South-North summit and the Panmunjom Declaration. Under the changing security environment, South Korea was placed in a complicated dilemma that had to deal with threats of two axes(China), three axes(China, Japan), and four axes(Japan, Russia). If the one axis threat(North Korea) is dominated by land threats, the second, third and fourth axis threats are threats from the sea. This paper analyzed the maritime strategy of Korea within the framework of maritime-geopolitics, in other words recognition and expansion of the sphere of maritime. I have designed that the maritime defense space that we can deny from threats is divided into three lines of defense: 1 line (radius 3,000km), 2 lines (2,000km), and 3 lines (1,000km). The three defense zones of the three lines were defined as an active defense(1 line), defensive offense(2 line), active offense(3 line). The three defense zones of the three lines were defined as the sphere of core maritime, As a power to deny the sphere of core maritime, it was analyzed as a maneuvering unit, a nuclear-powered submarine, the establishment of missile strategy, and the fortification of islands station. The marine strategy of South Korea with these concepts and means was defined as 'Offensive Maritime Denial Strategy'.
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