• Analyses & Alternatives
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• v.7 no.3
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• pp.1-26
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• 2023

This article will analyze and forecast important variables and dynamics in global power politics after the war in Ukraine. It tries to use several perspectives to analyze international relations, particularly liberal internationalism and structural realism. In short, core variables are as follows; First, how is the US-led liberal international order and globalization being adjusted? Second, how will the U.S.-China strategic competition, which is the biggest and structural variable, cause changes in the international order in the future? The third variable, how stable are Sino-Russia relations in the context of a structuring U.S.-China-Russia strategic new triangle? Fourth, to what extent will third middle hedging states outside the U.S. and China be able to exercise strategic autonomy in the face of multipolarization? To summarize, the first of these four variables is the largest basic variable at the global political and economic level in terms of its impact on the international community, and it has been led by the United States. The second variable, in terms of actors, seems to be the most influential structural variable in global competition, and the US-China strategic competition is likely to be a long game. Thus the world will not be able to escape the influence of the competition between the two global powers. For South Korea, this second variable is probably the biggest external variable and dilemma. The third variable, the stability of Sino-Russia relations, determines balance of global power in the 21st century. The U.S.-China-Russia strategic new triangle, as seen in the current war in Ukraine, will operate as the greatest power variable in not only global power competition but also changes in the international order. Just as the U.S. is eager for a Sino-Russia fragmentation strategy, such as a Tito-style wedge policy to manage balance of power in the early years of the Cold War, it needs a reverse Kissinger strategy to reset the U.S.-Russia relationship, in order to push for a Sino-Russia splitting in the 21st century. But with the war in Ukraine, it seems that this fragmentation strategy has already been broken. In the context of Northeast Asia, whether or not the stability of Sino-Russia relations depends not only on the United States, but also on the Korean Peninsula. Finally, the fourth variable is a dependent variable that emerged as a result of the interaction of the above three variables, but simultaneously it remains to be seen that this variable is likely to act as the most dynamic and independent variable that can promote multilateralism, multipolarization, and pan-regionalism of the global international community in the future. Taking into account these four variables together, we can make an outlook on the change in the international order.

• Analyses & Alternatives
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• v.7 no.3
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• pp.115-144
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• 2023

Under the Trump administration, the U.S. has made clear that "China is America's strategic competitor, revisionist power and a major challenge to America's prosperity and security." The Biden administration has largely inherited this perception of China. China has also responded without backing down. Therefore, the U.S.-China strategic competition has become the most important background factor in the international system and has a great impact on the security situation in Northeast Asia. Nevertheless, if you look at the recent process of establishing trilateral security cooperation among ROK, the U.S. and Japan, we can find that ROK's foreign strategy adjustment has played a key role. This is because establishing trilateral security cooperation among ROK, the U.S. and Japan depends on improving ROK-Japan relations. And the Yoon Suk Yeol government is pushing for rapid improvement in ROK-Japan relations regardless of domestic political constraints. The trilateral summit at Camp David laid the groundwork for future cooperation among ROK, the U.S. and Japan in security and other broader areas. China is strongly dissatisfied with the formation of trilateral security cooperation among ROK, the U.S. and Japan. However, this paper argues that although ROK agrees to form trilateral security cooperation with the U.S. and Japan, ROK's strategic objectives are not exactly the same as those of the U.S. and Japan. For example, looking back at the development of the U.S.-Japan alliance after the end of the Cold War, both the U.S. and Japan share similar views and perceptions of China's rise. The real goal of the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance in recent years is also how to cope with China's rise. On the other hand, ROK's previous administrations have been negative about trilateral security cooperation with the U.S. and Japan. This is because ROK's main strategic goal is to reduce or eliminate threats from DPRK rather than respond to China. Faced with increasing DPRK's provocations and threats, more than half of South Koreans are in favor of reinforcing trilateral security cooperation with the U.S. and Japan to contain or mitigate threats from DPRK. As a result, if North Korea's nuclear and missile threats to ROK continue, then ROK's foreign strategy is likely to be to strengthen trilateral security cooperation between the U.S. and Japan to ensure its own safety and survival. If China wants to reduce the strategic pressure from the trilateral security cooperation among ROK, the U.S. and Japan, the best way is to reduce DPRK's provocations and threats to ROK and play a more substantive role in getting DPRK to give up its nuclear program.

• Korea and Global Affairs
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• v.3 no.1
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• pp.151-182
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• 2019

Rise of China has correspondingly seen increased Chinese involvement at global stage and regional levels in different parts of the world. This has attracted claims of strategic competition and rivalry between China and U.S., as China is said to be working towards replacing hitherto U.S. influence. Consequently there have been calls for U.S. to counter increased Chinese involvement to safeguard U.S. influences and interests. This study aims to contribute to this debate by examining the extent to which increased Chinese involvement in Africa has, if any, supplanted U.S. strategic interests in the continent. The study contends that, Chinese involvement in Africa has entailed China creating own niche that does not necessary threaten U.S. interests in the continent as widely portrayed and imagined. This is premised on the fact that, U.S. has historically had relatively minimal strategic interests in Africa as compared to other more strategic parts of the world that China could significantly threaten. Seen in this way, increased Chinese penetration in Africa has not had immediate threats to U.S. core strategic interests, thus explaining U.S. measured response to counter Chinese presence in Africa.

• Maritime Security
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• v.8 no.1
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• pp.73-102
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• 2024

The recent rise of China has the potential to intensify competition for hegemony between the U.S. and China. China is strengthening its influence in the region through maritime military actions represented by Anti-Access/Area Denial(A2/AD). The U.S. is establishing a new concept of operation to respond to China's A2/AD and achieve superiority in the U.S - China competition. In particular, this study focused on the U.S. Marine Corps' contribution to naval operations as a means of sea denial through Expeditionary Advanced Base Operation(EABO), which mainly centered on islands, and changes to strengthen its influence in the sea. By applying these changes in the U.S. Marine Corps to the ROK Marine Corps, the future direction of the ROK Marine Corps' offensive island area operations that can contribute to joint and naval operations was suggested. This study is meaningful in that it presents the ROK Marine Corps' offensive island area operations using the strategic value of the island from the perspective of sea denial. However, by presenting the direction of operational performance and military power construction / development conceptually, specific discussions of this aspect are needed in the future. I hope that this study will be the starting point.

• Korea and Global Affairs
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• v.2 no.2
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• pp.89-130
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• 2018

This paper is to analyse the development of the U.S.-China relationship and pending issues and implications. To this end the paper is composed of 6 chapters titled instruction; the relationship between the US and China in the early and hostile confrontation period; the relationship of US-Chinese approach/normalization period and the relationship in the 1980s and 1990s; the relationship by mid-2010 since the opening of the G2 era; the US-China relations and major pending issues and implications in the era of Trump-Xi Jinping; and conclusion. The rapid growth of China over the past three decades has changed the existing US-centered international order and has triggered competition between the two countries. The United States and China have become the only countries that regularly hold strategic and economic dialogue, and the topic has also developed into a country that discusses not only bilateral relations but also global issues. The issues of US-China cooperation and conflicts encompass global issues as well as bilateral relations issues. For example, the South China Sea, the North Korean nuclear issue and the THAAD, the economic and financial order, and the Taiwan issue. It is not a matter of another country, but a problem that directly or indirectly leads to Korea's diplomacy, security and economy. In order to prevent 'Korea passing' in the US-China relationship, we need a hedging strategy that maintains and strengthens the strong ROK-US security cooperation and harmonious promotion of ROK-China economic cooperation.

• Strategy21
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• s.38
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• pp.250-286
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• 2015

The main purpose of this article is to provide an understanding on current maritime issues in the Northeast Asia, and thereby help formulating the right strategy for our national security. The article summarizes core arguments in the recently published 『The 21^st Century Maritime Strategies in the Northeast Asia: Dilemma between Competition and Cooperation』. It will help readers to comprehend historical backgrounds as well as recent updates related to maritime issues and strategies in the region. Also, readers may find guidance to conceive their own maritime strategies for the Republic of Korea. Currently, the U.S. is shifting its focus from Atlantic to Pacific, and increasing its naval presence in Asia-Pacific region. Meanwhile, the 21^st century China views the maritime interests as the top priority in its national security and prosperity. PLA Navy's offensive maritime strategies and naval building such as aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines are unprecedented. Japan is another naval power in the region. During the Cold War JMSDF faithfully fulfilled the mission of deterring Soviet navy, and now it is doing its job against China. Lastly, Putin has been emphasizing to build the strong Russia since 2000, and putting further efforts to reinforce current naval capabilities of Pacific Fleet. The keyword in the naval and maritime relations among these powers can be summarized with "competition and cooperation." The recent security developments in the South China Sea(SCS) clearly represent each state's strategic motivations and movements. China shows clear and strong intention to nationalize the islands in SCS by building artificial facilities - possibly military purpose. Obviously, the U.S. strongly opposes China by insisting the freedom of navigation(FON) in international waters as recent USS-Lassen's FON operation indicate. The conflict between China and the U.S. surrounding the SCS seems to be heading towards climax as Russia and Japan are searching for their own national interests within the conflict. Also, the neighboring small and middle powers are calculating their own economic and security interests. This is no exception for us in establishing timely strategies to maximize our own national security. Hopefully, this article leads the readers to the right direction.

• Analyses & Alternatives
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• v.6 no.1
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• pp.69-114
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• 2022

This paper analyzes Taiwan's 「New Southbound Policy」 from the perspective of 'balancing' and 'bandwagoning' in international politics. Specifically, it examines the changes and characteristics of 'Southbound policies' that have continued since the period of the Lee Teng-hui(李登輝) administration, and examines the meaning of the New Southbound Policy promoted by the Tsai Ing-wen(蔡英文) administration. Taiwan's foreign policy has been strongly influenced by external variables such as U.S.-China relations. Previous Taiwanese governments have actively promoted Southbound policies to advance to Southeast Asian countries such as ASEAN with the aim of 'De-Sinicization', but have not achieved much results. This is because variables such as cooperative U.S.-China relations and strong checks from China played a role at the time. In this environment, Taiwan had to pursue an appropriate 'balancing' between the United States, China, and Southeast Asian countries. However, since the inauguration of the Trump administration, strategic competition between the U.S. and China has been maximized, creating a new space for Taiwan's foreign policy. This is because the U.S. valued cooperation with Taiwan in the process of embodying the 'Indo-Pacific Strategy' to curb China's rise. The New Southbound Policy promoted by the Tsai Ing-won administration is different from the existing Southbound policies in that it seeks to link with the U.S. India-Pacific Strategy and attempts to advance to South Asian countries such as India. From an international political point of view, the Tsai Ing-won administration's New Southbound Policy can be interpreted as a 'bandwagoning' to the United States, not a balanced strategy between the U.S. and China. Strategic competition between the U.S. and China is expected to intensify for a considerable period of time in the future, and honeymoon between Taiwan and the U.S. are also expected to continue. Taiwan's bandwagoning strategy, which actively pursues a link between the New Southbound Policy and the India-Pacific Strategy, is also expected to be maintained.

• Journal of International Area Studies (JIAS)
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• v.13 no.1
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• pp.107-133
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• 2009

International relations in the 21st century is featured by boundless competition among nations to secure sufficient energy resources for achieving economic development. Resource diplomacy, therefore, is competitive in its nature, which is derived from the fact that resources of the globe are limited. Chinese recent economic growth has been possible mainly due to its success in resource diplomacy. The Chinese resource diplomacy has shown two different patterns according to target regions. On the one hand, China has pursued multilateral approach to Central Asia region, by which China aimed to secure energy with joint exploration method in the region. Chinese resource diplomacy toward Africa, on the other hand, has been based on bilateral approach combined with unit-centered economic aid to African nations. This difference in Chinese foreign policy pattern seems to be derived from three factors: namely, Chinese strategic considerations on geopolitical condition, regional security sensitivity, and legacies of Chinese long-time non-alignment diplomacy since the 1950s. Whether China is able to maintain the current pattern of resource diplomacy will be depended on how wisely China pursue its relations with two other global powers: Russia in the Central Asia and the U.S. in Africa. In this regard, the Chinese resource diplomacy is expected to work as determining factor of shaping a pattern of tri-lateral strategic relations among the U.S., Russia, and China. Chinese resource diplomacy thus will determine the future direction of the global politics in terms of strategic arrangement.

• Korea Trade Review
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• v.46 no.2
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• pp.141-160
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• 2021

The scale of global FDI has been decreasing since 2016 due to the ongoing US-China trade dispute, the strengthening of FDI inflow screening regulations with concern over strategic technology leaks, and the spread of reshoring trends due to the reinforcement of national preferences. Eventually, the competition to attract FDI between countries is expected to become more intense. Therefore, in order to attract high-quality FDI for Korea that will contribute to the development of the national economy, it is pressing to evaluate and improve the domestic FDI attraction environment. This study aims to analyze which areas of Korea's economic and non-economic environments need improvement for gaining advantage amid the fierce competition to attract FDI between countries, by the relative comparison between Korea and the U.S., and based on the ranking indicated in key FDI attractiveness indices. As a result, improvement is needed in the following areas. First, according to IMD's "World Competitiveness Ranking 2020," Korea was inferior to the US in terms of business efficiency, productivity, finance and business legislation in terms of government efficiency. Second, according to INSEAD's "Global Talent Competitiveness Index 2020," Korea was inferior to the US in terms of internal openness, external openness, employability, lifelong learning, access to growth opportunity, and business and labor landscapes. Third, according to WEF's "Global Competitiveness Index 2019", Korea was inferior to the US in terms of product market, labor market, business dynamism and workforce skills.

• Maritime Security
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• v.7 no.1
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• pp.1-29
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• 2023

For the last 70 years, the U.S.-led bilateral security system, or "Hub-and-Spokes" system, has been applied to Northeast Asia, and the system has been successfully settled in terms of stability and economic achievements of the region. Given the increasing complexity of the security environment of East Asia, it is plausible to consider the possibility of a security system shift from bilateral alliances to collective security. In order to analyze the driver of collective security system, this study developed three factors of formation and development of collective security system - main threat, intensity of the threat, and confidence among countries in the system - by reviewing international political theories related to security cooperation. Comparing the formation, development, and achievements of NATO and SEATO, the study figures out that the existence of the main threat, the high intensity of the threat, and the strong confidence among countries in the security system are the primary drivers for a successful collective security system. Based on the result, the study also analyzed the possibility of a security system shift in East Asia. Considering contemporary international conflicts such as U.S.-China strategic competition, Russia-Ukraine War, and growing threats posed by North Korean nuclear and missiles, the study anticipates that the necessity of a collective security system that will replace the current security system of the region would arise. Still, although some issues between countries should be overcome, the growing intensity of the threats will promote cooperation among countries by improving their confidence.