• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.32 no.3
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• pp.29-46
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• 2022

Until recently, there has been a circuit split as to whether parties to foreign private arbitral proceedings could seek assistance from the U.S. courts for discovery pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1782. The circuit courts have differed on the issue of whether a private arbitral proceeding may be considered a "proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal" in terms of the statute, which would ultimately allow or disallow judicial assistance in taking of evidence by the U.S. district courts for use in the requested proceedings. While the U.S. Supreme Court has addressed the applicability of §1782 in its Intel decision in 2004, it had not established a test as to what constitutes a foreign or international tribunal for the purposes of §1782, thereby leaving it open for lower courts to continue to interpret §1782 in their own ways, as requests for judicial assistance in taking of evidence are filed. In the recent decision of ZF Auto. US, Inc., v. Luxshare, Ltd., the Supreme Court has finally clarified that in order for an arbitral panel to be a "foreign or international tribunal" under §1782, such panels must exercise governmental authority conferred by one nation or multiple nations. Therefore, private commercial arbitral panels are not "foreign or international tribunal(s)" for the purposes of §1782 because they do not constitute governmental or intergovernmental adjudicative bodies. Such holding is necessary and legitimate for interested parties in international arbitration, as well as, potential parties of arbitration who are contemplating alternative dispute resolution for their dispute(s).

• The Korean Society of Law and Medicine
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• v.18 no.2
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• pp.105-138
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• 2017

This is case comments of several representative legal cases regarding self- determination right of patient. In a case in which an intoxicated patient attempted suicide refusing treatment, the Supreme Court ruled that the medical team's respect for the patient's decision was an act of malpractice, and that in particular medical situations (medical emergencies) the physician's duty to preserve life supersedes the patient's rights to autonomy. Afterwards, at the request of the patient's family, and considering the patient's condition (irrecoverable death stage, etc.) consistent with a persistent vegetative state, the Supreme Court deduced the patient's intention and decide to withdraw life-sustaining treatment. More recently, regarding patients who refuse blood transfusions or other necessary treatment due to religious beliefs, the Supreme Court established a standard of judgment that can be seen as conferring equal value to the physician's duty to respect patient autonomy and to preserve life. An empirical study of legal precedent with regard to cases in which the physician's duty to preserve life conflicts with the patient's autonomy, grounded in respect for human dignity, can reveal how the Court's perspective has reflected the role of the patient as a decision-making subject and ways of respecting autonomy in Korean society, and how the Court's stance has changed alongside changing societal beliefs. The Court has shifted from judging the right to life as the foremost value and prioritizing this over the patient's autonomy, to beginning to at least consider the patient's formally stated or deducible wishes when withholding or withdrawing treatment, and to considering exercises of self determination right based on religious belief or certain other justifications with informed refusal. This will have a substantial impact on medical community going forward, and provide implicit and explicit guidance for physicians who are practicing medicine within this environment.

• The Korean Society of Law and Medicine
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• v.10 no.1
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• pp.263-305
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• 2009

Is it lawful to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment applied to a patient in a terminal condition or permanent unconscious condition? In Korea, there are no such laws or regulations which control affairs related to the withholding or withdrawal life-support treatment and active euthanasia as the Natural Death Act or the Death with Dignity Act in the U. S. A. And in addition there has had no precedent of Supreme Court. Recently Supreme Court has pronounced a historical judgment on a terminal care case. The court allowed the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from a patient in a permanent unconscious state. Fundamentally the court judged that the continuation of that medical treatment would infringe dignity and value of a patient as a human being. And the court required some legal grounds to consider such withdrawal or withholding of medical care lawful. The legal grounds are as follow. First, the patient is in a incurable and irreversible condition and already entered a stage of death. Second, the patient executed a directive, in advance, directing the withholding or withdrawal of life-support treatment in a incurable and irreversible condition or in a terminal condition. Otherwise, at least, the patient's will would be presumed through his/her character, view of value, philosophy, religious faith and career etc. I regard if a patient is in a incurable and irreversible condition or in a terminal condition, the medical contract between a patient and a doctor would be terminated because of the actual impossibility of achievement of it's purpose. So I think the discontinuation of life-sustaining care would be legally allowed without depending on the patient's own will.

• The Korean Society of Law and Medicine
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• v.24 no.4
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• pp.3-36
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• 2023

The main issue in medical malpractice civil litigation is medical negligence and the causal relationship between medical negligence and damages. Regarding the presumption of causality in cases where medical negligence is proven, there is a previous Supreme Court decision 93da52402 on February 10, 1995, but it is difficult to find a case that satisfies the textual requirements of the above decision, and yet, in practice, the above decision is cited. In many cases, causal relationships were assumed, and criticism was consistently raised that it was inconsistent with the text of the above judgment. In its ruling, the Supreme Court reorganized and presented a new legal principle regarding the presumption of causality when medical negligence is proven in a civil lawsuit. According to this, If the patient proves ① the existence of an act that is assessed as a medical negligence, that is, a violation of the duty of care required of an ordinary medical professional at the level of medical care practiced in the field of clinical medicine at the time of medical practice, and ② that the negligence is likely to cause damages to the patient, the burden of proving the causal relationship is alleviated by presuming a causal relationship between medical negligence and damage. Here, the probability of occurrence of damage does not need to be proven beyond doubt from a natural scientific or medical perspective, but if recognizing the causal relationship between the negligence and the damage does not comply with medical principles or if there is a vague possibility that the negligence will cause damage, causality cannot be considered proven. Meanwhile, even if a causal relationship between medical negligence and damage is presumed, the party that performed the medical treatment can overturn the presumption by proving that the patient's damage was not caused by medical negligence. Meanwhile, unlike civil cases, the standard is 'proof beyond reasonable doubt' in criminal cases, and the legal principle of presuming causality does not apply. Accordingly, in a criminal case of professional negligence manslaughter that was decided on the same day regarding the same medical accident, the case was overturned and remanded for not guilty due to lack of proof of a causal relationship between medical negligence and death. The above criminal ruling is a ruling that states that even if 'professional negligence' is recognized in a criminal case related to medical malpractice, the person should not be judged guilty if there is a lack of clear proof of 'causal relationship'.

• The Korean Society of Law and Medicine
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• v.10 no.2
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• pp.309-341
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• 2009

According to a case of Supreme Court's Sentence No. 2009DA17417 (May 21, 2009), the Supreme Court judges that 'the right to life is the ultimate one of basic human rights stipulated in the Constitution, so it is required to very limitedly and conservatively determine whether to discontinue any medical practice on which patient's life depends directly.' In addition, the Supreme Court admits that 'only if a patient who comes to a fatal phase before death due to attack of any irreversible disease may execute his or her right of self-determination based on human respect and values and human right to pursue happiness, it is permissible to discontinue life-sustaining treatment for him or her, unless there is any special circumstance.' Furthermore, the Supreme Court finds that 'if a patient who is attacked by any irreversible disease informs medical personnel of his or her intention to agree on the refusal or discontinuance of life-sustaining treatment in advance of his or her potential irreversible loss of consciousness, it is justifiable that he or she already executes the right of self-determination according to prior medical instructions, unless there is any special circumstance where it is reasonably concluded that his or her physician is changed after prior medical instructions for him or her.' The Supreme Court also finds that 'if a patient remains at irreversible loss of consciousness without any prior medical instruction, he or she cannot express his or her intentions at all, so it is rational and complying with social norms to admit possibility of estimating his or her own intentions on withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment, provided that such a withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment meets his or her interests in view of his or her usual sense of values or beliefs and it is reasonably concluded that he or she could likely choose to discontinue life-sustaining treatment, even if he or she were given any chance to execute his or her right of self-determination.' This judgment is very significant in a sense that it suggests the reasonable orientation of solutions for issues posed concerning withdrawal of meaningless life-sustaining medical efforts. The issues concerning removal of medical instruments for meaningless life-sustaining treatment and discontinuance of such treatment in regard to medical treatment for terminal cases don't seem to be so much big deal when a patient has clear consciousness enough to express his or her intentions, but it counts that there is any issue regarding a patient who comes to irreversible loss of consciousness and cannot express his or her intentions. Therefore, it is required to develop an institutional instrument that allows relevant authority to estimate the scope of physician's medical duties for terminal patients as well as a patient's intentions to withdraw any meaningless treatment during his or her terminal phase involving loss of consciousness. However, Korean judicial authority has yet to clarify detailed cases where it is permissible to discontinue any life-sustaining treatment for a patient in accordance with his or her right of self-determination. In this context, it is inevitable and challenging to make better legislation to improve relevant systems concerning withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment. The State must assure the human basic rights for its citizens and needs to prepare a system to assure such basic rights through legislative efforts. In this sense, simply entrusting physician, patient or his or her family with any critical issue like the withdrawal of meaningless life-sustaining treatment, even without any reasonable standard established for such entrustment, means the neglect of official duties by the State. Nevertheless, this issue is not a matter that can be resolved simply by legislative efforts. In order for our society to accept judicial system for withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment, it is important to form a social consensus about this issue and also make proactive discussions on it from a variety of standpoints.

• The Korean Society of Law and Medicine
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• v.15 no.1
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• pp.123-164
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• 2014

Under the new system of 'Separation of pharmaceutical prescription and dispensing' in Korea, which was implemented in 2000, physician could not dispense a medicine, and outpatient should have a physician's prescription filled at a drugstore. After pharmacist makes up outpatient's prescription, National Health Insurance Service(NHIS) pay for outpatient's medicine to pharmacist, except an outpatient's own medicine charge. And NHIS only pay for outpatient's prescription fee to physician and, physician doesn't derive profit from dispensing medicine in itself. Nevertheless, if physician writes out a prescription with violation of 'Criteria for the Medical Care Benefits', NHIS clawed back the payment of outpatient's prescription and medicine from the physician or the medical institution which the physician belongs to. In the past, NHIS's confiscation was in accordance with 'the National Health Care Insurance Act, Article 52, Clause 1'. But, since 2006 when the Supreme Court declared that there was no legal basis on the NHIS's confiscation of outpatient's medicine payment, NHIS had put in a claim for illegal prescriptions on the basis 'the Korean Civil law, Article 750(tort)'. So, Many medical institutions filed civil actions against NHIS. The key point of this actions was whether the issuing outpatient prescriptions with violations of Criteria for the Medical Care Benefits constitute of the law of tort. On this point, the first trial and the second trial took different position. Finally the Supreme Court acknowledged the constitution of the law of tort in 2013. In this paper, the author will review critically the decision of the Supreme Court, and consider the relativeness between the legal effect of Criteria for the Medical Care Benefits and the constitution of the issuing outpatient prescriptions with violations of Criteria for the Medical Care Benefits as the law of tort.

• The Korean Society of Law and Medicine
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• v.13 no.2
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• pp.11-38
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• 2012

The Supreme Court stand in the position in specific lawsuit that it doesn't allow the discretionary not covered service, but recently in revocation suit of fine disposal that is imposed on medical fee of leukemia patient, it altered the existing adjudgement and admitted the discretionary not covered service exceptionally. It put forward the allowable condition roughly in that case. According as this alteration, it has become more important to embody the allowance conditions of exceptions. The Supreme Court presented three things, which are procedural condition, medical condition and subscriber's agreement. Concerning procedural condition, several present conciliation procedures are as follows: medical care benefit arret request, relative value conciliation etc, prior request on anti-cancer drug among chemicals which exceed acceptance criteria, request of non benefit object on common drugs. To be granted the existence of those system, there should be no obstacle to use that. Even if it were so, we should take circumstances into consideration; individual situation is unescapable concerning substance and urgency of the discretionary not covered service, process of the procedure, time required etc. Regarding medical condition, safety and effectiveness will be verified through evaluation procedures of new medical skill. About the necessity, the Supreme Court made clear through a sentence that it allow the discretionary not covered service, in case that needs to treat a patient out of the standard of medical benefit. Strict interpretation is right and it answer the purpose of the sentence that the supreme court permit the discretionary not covered service, exceptionally. We need to differentiate medical necessity and medical validity. Subscriber's agreement should holds true if it entails full explanation, and if it is preliminary, explicit and individual. On this account, it should be difficult to admit that someone agree effectively when he call for the affirmation that he is recipient of medical care. Reasonable expense needs to be a part of review whether the agreement is valid. Meanwhile If we adjust system of medical expense and eventually reorganize a fee for consultation payment system (Fee-for-service controlled by item to DRG (Diagnosis Related Groups)), controversial area of the discretionary not covered service will be decreased and that will guarantee the discretion of the doctor.

• Knowledge Management Research
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• v.22 no.3
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• pp.31-53
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• 2021

As a communication channel for individuals, social media is affecting various areas such as business, economy, politics, and society. One of the less-studied areas is the law. Therefore, this study collected various information from social media and analyzed its impacts on the legal decisions, especially the Supreme Court decisions in Korea. This study was conducted by compiling information from Internet news articles and public responses. We found that when the negative reactions from the public got higher, the trial duration until the supreme court making the final decisions became shorter. However, we were not able to find the significant relationship between social media reactions and dismissal of appeal nor annulment. Our study would contribute to the information systems and knowledge management research in a sense that the social analytics is applied to the area of legal decisions, instead of using conventional qualitative study methodology. Our study is also meaningful to the practitioners because that big data analytical business can be applied to the field of law by creating a new database for the emerging legal technology. Finally, law makers can think of a better way to standardize the legal decision process to minimize the reverse effects from social media.

• The Korean Society of Law and Medicine
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• v.22 no.1
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• pp.3-23
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• 2021

Telemedicine is a field of medicine in which medicine doctors who are in remote distance can treat the patients using audio, video devices which can help the diagnosis. In medicine, even the face-to-face diagnosis and treatment is the traditional way, the telemedicine could provide the convenient way for the patients in long distance, disabled or anyone who want to be stay ones' home. But telemedicine has the task to maintain the quality of medical cares compare with the traditional medicine. Among the several types of telemedicine, the specific type telemedicine in which the medicine doctors examine, diagnosis and do the prescription to the remotely distanced patients could be defined tele-prescription. Under The Medical Service act, it is unclear that teleprescription could be allowed. The Medical Service Act has introduced the specific clause for the prescription. That clause includes the duty of patients who have to receive the prescriptions directly from medical doctors. Under this clause, the constitutional court had decided the tele-prescription was illegal, but the supreme court has been decided tele-prescription could be legalized under the certain circumstances. But the other supreme court decided the tele-prescription was illegal under the article 34 of presenting Medical Service Act. So to understand the interpretations of Supreme court and Constitutional court decisions for the cases of prescription via telephone, we need to understand the history and presented reasons for the revision of prescription clause and also need to understand the other related clauses in the same act. In conclusion, To consider the values of telemedicine should be the level with the ordinary treatments, It is reasonable to interpret that the presenting Medical Service Act only legalize the telemedicine between doctor to doctor and which is regulated by the telemedicine clause.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.22 no.2
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• pp.53-77
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• 2012

Competence-competence refers to an arbitratorpower to determine whether he or she has jurisdiction to decide a controversy. Although arbitrators power to rule on their own jurisdiction is generally recognized throughout the world, in the United States, neither the courts nor legislative bodies have recognized its significance or the reasoning behind its widespread adoption. Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) is notorious among arbitration statues for its failure to incorporate competence-competence. When courts rule on an issue of competence-competence, it is referred to as a question of who decides the arbitrability of the case. In the United States, the use of competence-competence as a term of art is still limited to scholarly writings. The answer to the competence-competence inquiry is found in an interpretation of section 3 of the FAA which empowers the courts to decide arbitrability issues. The cases of the Supreme Court and most commentators interpreted sections 2 and 3 of the FAA as conferring issues of arbitrability on the federal courts, including the ability to rule on the validity and scope of the arbitral agreement. Traditionally, United States courts have denied the competence-competence to arbitral tribunal. Recently, however, they have confounded the rules by placing primary importance on the arbitration agreement between the parties. The Supreme Court, in a series of cases, has underscored the necessity of giving full effect to the intentions of the parties as expressed in their agreement to arbitrate. The result of the Supreme Court's emphasis on contractualism in determining the issue of arbitrability is most evident in the Courtdecision in the First Options case. Under First Options, courts are to decide arbitrability issues unless there is a clear and unmistakable contractual assignment of these issues to the tribunal itself. The Court is appraised that it has attempted to compromise between contractual freedom in the arbitration setting and the rule of law that is necessary in a society that depends on the concept of ordered liberty. In the decision in Howsam, the Court clarified the definition of arbitrability by attempting to draw a clear line between questions of arbitrability that are to be decided by courts and those matters that bear on the allocation of decisions between courts and arbitrators but are not questions of arbitrability.