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A Study on the Problems and Resolutions of Provisions in Korean Commercial Law related to the Aircraft Operator's Liability of Compensation for Damages to the Third Party (항공기운항자의 지상 제3자 손해배상책임에 관한 상법 항공운송편 규정의 문제점 및 개선방안)

  • Kim, Ji-Hoon
    • The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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    • v.29 no.2
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    • pp.3-54
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    • 2014
  • The Republic of Korea enacted the Air Transport Act in Commercial Law which was entered into force in November, 2011. The Air Transport Act in Korean Commercial Law was established to regulate domestic carriage by air and damages to the third party which occur within the territorial area caused by aircraft operations. There are some problems to be reformed in the Provisions of Korean Commercial Law for the aircraft operator's liability of compensation for damages to the third party caused by aircraft operation as follows. First, the aircraft operator's liability of compensation for damages needs to be improved because it is too low to compensate adequately to the third party damaged owing to the aircraft operation. Therefore, the standard of classifying per aircraft weight is required to be detailed from the current 4-tier into 10-tier and the total limited amount of liability is also in need of being increased to the maximum 7-hundred-million SDR. In addition, the limited amount of liability to the personal damage is necessary to be risen from the present 125,000 SDR to 625,000 SDR according to the recent rate of prices increase. This is the most desirable way to improve the current provisions given the ordinary insurance coverage per one aircraft accident and various specifications of recent aircraft in order to compensate the damaged appropriately. Second, the aircraft operator shall be liable without fault to damages caused by terrorism such as hijacking, attacking an aircraft and utilizing it as means of attack like the 9 11 disaster according to the present Air Transport Act in Korean Commercial Law. Some argue that it is too harsh to aircraft operators and irrational, but given they have also some legal duties of preventing terrorism and in respect of helping the third party damaged, it does not look too harsh or irrational. However, it should be amended into exempting aircraft operator's liability when the terrorism using of an aircraft by well-organized terrorists group happens like 9 11 disaster in view of balancing the interest between the aircraft operator and the third party damaged. Third, considering the large scale of the damage caused by the aircraft operation usually aircraft accident, it is likely that many people damaged can be faced with a financial crisis, and the provision of advance payment for air carrier's liability of compensation also needs to be applied to the case of aircraft operator's liability. Fourth, the aircraft operator now shall be liable to the damages which occur in land or water except air according to the current Air Transport Act of Korean Commercial Law. However, because the damages related to the aircraft operation in air caused by another aircraft operation are not different from those in land or water. Therefore, the term of 'on the surface' should be eliminated in the term of 'third parties on the surface' in order to make the damages by the aircraft operation in air caused by another aircraft operation compensable by Air Transport Act of Korean Commercial Law. It is desired that the Air Transport Act in Commercial Law including the clauses related to the aircraft operator's liability of compensation for damages to the third party be developed continually through the resolutions about its problems mentioned above for compensating the third party damaged appropriately and balancing the interest between the damaged and the aircraft operator.

A Study on Modernization of International Conventions Relating to Aviation Security and Implementation of National Legislation (항공보안 관련 국제협약의 현대화와 국내입법의 이행 연구)

  • Lee, Kang-Bin
    • The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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    • v.30 no.2
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    • pp.201-248
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    • 2015
  • In Korea the number of unlawful interference act on board aircrafts has been increased continuously according to the growth of aviation demand, and there were 55 incidents in 2000, followed by 354 incidents in 2014, and an average of 211 incidents a year over the past five years. In 1963, a number of states adopted the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (the Tokyo Convention 1963) as the first worldwide international legal instrument on aviation security. The Tokyo Convention took effect in 1969 and, shortly afterward, in 1970 the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft(the Hague Convention 1970) was adopted, and the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation(the Montreal Convention 1971) was adopted in 1971. After 9/11 incidents in 2001, to amend and supplement the Montreal Convention 1971, the Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation(the Beijing Convention 2010) was adopted in 2010, and to supplement the Hague Convention 1970, the Protocol Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft(the Beijing Protocol 2010) was adopted in 2010. Since then, in response to increased cases of unruly behavior on board aircrafts which escalated in both severity and frequency,, the Montreal Protocol which is seen as an amendment to the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft(the Tokyo Convention 1963) was adopted in 2014. Korea ratified the Tokyo Convention 1963, the Hague Convention 1970, the Montreal Convention 1971, the Montreal Supplementary Protocol 1988, and the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosive 1991 which have proven to be effective. Under the Tokyo Convention ratified in 1970, Korea further enacted the Aircraft Navigation Safety Act in 1974, as well as the Aviation Safety and Security Act that replaced the Aircraft Navigation Safety Act in August 2002. Meanwhile, the title of the Aviation Safety and Security Act was changed to the Aviation Security Act in April 2014. The Aviation Security Act is essentially an implementing legislation of the Tokyo Convention and Hague Convention. Also the language of the Aviation Security Act is generally broader than the unruly and disruptive behavior in Sections 1-3 of the model legislation in ICAO Circular 288. The Aviation Security Act has reflected the considerable parts of the implementation of national legislation under the Beijing Convention and Beijing Protocol 2010, and the Montreal Protocol 2014 that are the modernized international conventions relating to aviation security. However, in future, when these international conventions would come into effect and Korea would ratify them, the national legislation that should be amended or provided newly in the Aviation Security Act are as followings : The jurisdiction, the definition of 'in flight', the immunity from the actions against the aircraft commander, etc., the compulsory delivery of the offender by the aircraft commander, etc., the strengthening of penalty on the person breaking the law, the enlargement of application to the accomplice, and the observance of international convention. Among them, particularly the Korean legislation is silent on the scope of the jurisdiction. Therefore, in order for jurisdiction to be extended to the extra-territorial cases of unruly and disruptive offences, it is desirable that either the Aviation Security Act or the general Crime Codes should be revised. In conclusion, in order to meet the intelligent and diverse aviation threats, the Korean government should review closely the contents of international conventions relating to aviation security and the current ratification status of international conventions by each state, and make effort to improve the legislation relating to aviation security and the aviation security system for the ratification of international conventions and the implementation of national legislation under international conventions.

A study on Operation Rules of Korean Air Defence Identification Zone (한국 방공식별구역 운영규칙에 관한 고찰)

  • Kwon, Jong-Pil;Lee, Yeong H.
    • The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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    • v.32 no.2
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    • pp.189-217
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    • 2017
  • Declaration of Air Defense and Identification Zones started with the United States in 1950, which was followed by declaration of KADIZ by the Republic of Korea in 1951. Initial ADIZ were solely linked with air defense missions, but their roles have changed as nations around the globe manifested a tendency to expand their influence over maritime resources and rights. In particular, China declared ADIZ over the East China Sea in October 2013 and forced all passing aircraft to submit flight plan to ATC or military authority, saying failure of submission will be followed by armed engagement. China announced it would declare another zone over the South China Sea despite the ongoing conflict in the area, clearly showing ADIZ's direct connection with territorial claim and EEZ and that it serves as a zone within which a nation can execute its rights. The expanded KADIZ, which was expanded in Dec 15, 2013 in response to Chinese actions, overlaps with the Chinese ADIZ over the East China Sea and the Japanese ADIZ. The overlapping zone is an airspace over waters where not only the Republic of Korea but also of China and Japan argue to be covering their continental shelf and EEZ. Military conventions were signed to prevent contingencies among the neighboring nations while conducting identifications in KADIZ, including the overlapping zone. If such military conventions and practice of air defense identification continue to be respected among states, it is under the process of turning into a regional customary law, although ADIZ is not yet recognized by international law or customary law. Moreover, identification within ADIZ is carried out by military authorities of states, and misguided customary procedures may cause serious negative consequences for national security since it may negatively impact neighboring countries in marking the maritime border, which calls for formulation of operation rules that account for other state activities and military talks among regional stake holders. Legal frameworks need to be in place to guarantee freedom of flights over international seas which UN Maritime Law protects, and laws regarding military aircraft operation need to be supplemented to not make it a requirement to submit flight plan if the aircraft does not invade sovereign airspace. Organizational instructions that require approval of Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff for entrance and exit of ADIZ for military aircraft need to be amended to change the authority to Minister of National Defense or be promoted to a law to be applicable for commercial aircraft. Moreover, in regards to operation and management of ADIZ, transfer of authority should be prohibited to account for its evolution into a regional customary law in South East Asia. In particular, since ADIZ is set over EEZ, military conventions that yield authority related to national security should never be condoned. Among Korea, China, Japan and Russia, there are military conventions that discuss operation and management of ADIZ in place or under negotiation, meaning that ADIZ is becoming a regional customary law in North East Asia region.

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Eurasian Naval Power on Display: Sino-Russian Naval Exercises under Presidents Xi and Putin (유라시아 지역의 해군 전력 과시: 시진핑 주석과 푸틴 대통령 체제 하에 펼쳐지는 중러 해상합동훈련)

  • Richard Weitz
    • Maritime Security
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    • v.5 no.1
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    • pp.1-53
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    • 2022
  • One manifestation of the contemporary era of renewed great power competition has been the deepening relationship between China and Russia. Their strengthening military ties, notwithstanding their lack of a formal defense alliance, have been especially striking. Since China and Russia deploy two of the world's most powerful navies, their growing maritime cooperation has been one of the most significant international security developments of recent years. The Sino-Russian naval exercises, involving varying platforms and locations, have built on years of high-level personnel exchanges, large Russian weapons sales to China, the Sino-Russia Treaty of Friendship, and other forms of cooperation. Though the joint Sino-Russian naval drills began soon after Beijing and Moscow ended their Cold War confrontation, these exercises have become much more important during the last decade, essentially becoming a core pillar of their expanding defense partnership. China and Russia now conduct more naval exercises in more places and with more types of weapons systems than ever before. In the future, Chinese and Russian maritime drills will likely encompass new locations, capabilities, and partners-including possibly the Arctic, hypersonic delivery systems, and novel African, Asian, and Middle East partners-as well as continue such recent innovations as conducting joint naval patrols and combined arms maritime drills. China and Russia pursue several objectives through their bilateral naval cooperation. The Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation Between the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation lacks a mutual defense clause, but does provide for consultations about common threats. The naval exercises, which rehearse non-traditional along with traditional missions (e.g., counter-piracy and humanitarian relief as well as with high-end warfighting), provide a means to enhance their response to such mutual challenges through coordinated military activities. Though the exercises may not realize substantial interoperability gains regarding combat capabilities, the drills do highlight to foreign audiences the Sino-Russian capacity to project coordinated naval power globally. This messaging is important given the reliance of China and Russia on the world's oceans for trade and the two countries' maritime territorial disputes with other countries. The exercises can also improve their national military capabilities as well as help them learn more about the tactics, techniques, and procedures of each other. The rising Chinese Navy especially benefits from working with the Russian armed forces, which have more experience conducting maritime missions, particularly in combat operations involving multiple combat arms, than the People's Liberation Army (PLA). On the negative side, these exercises, by enhancing their combat capabilities, may make Chinese and Russian policymakers more willing to employ military force or run escalatory risks in confrontations with other states. All these impacts are amplified in Northeast Asia, where the Chinese and Russian navies conduct most of their joint exercises. Northeast Asia has become an area of intensifying maritime confrontations involving China and Russia against the United States and Japan, with South Korea situated uneasily between them. The growing ties between the Chinese and Russian navies have complicated South Korean-U.S. military planning, diverted resources from concentrating against North Korea, and worsened the regional security environment. Naval planners in the United States, South Korea, and Japan will increasingly need to consider scenarios involving both the Chinese and Russian navies. For example, South Korean and U.S. policymakers need to prepare for situations in which coordinated Chinese and Russian military aggression overtaxes the Pentagon, obligating the South Korean Navy to rapidly backfill for any U.S.-allied security gaps that arise on the Korean Peninsula. Potentially reinforcing Chinese and Russian naval support to North Korea in a maritime confrontation with South Korea and its allies would present another serious challenge. Building on the commitment of Japan and South Korea to strengthen security ties, future exercises involving Japan, South Korea, and the United States should expand to consider these potential contingencies.

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International Law on the Flight over the High Seas (공해의 상공비행에 관한 국제법)

  • Kim, Han-Taek
    • The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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    • v.26 no.1
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    • pp.3-30
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    • 2011
  • According to the Article 86 of the United Nations on the Law of the Sea(UNCLOS) the provisions of high seas apply to all parts of the sea that are not included in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State. Article 87 also stipulates the freedom of the high seas. International laws on the flight over the high seas are found as follows; Firstly, as far as the nationality of the aircraft is concerned, its legal status is quite different from the ship where the flags of convenience can be applied practically. There is no flags of convenience of the aircraft. Secondly, according to the Article 95 of UNCLOS warships on the high seas have complete immunity from the jurisdiction of any State other than the flag State. We can suppose that the military(or state) aircraft over the high seas have also complete immunity from the jurisdiction of any State other than the flag State. Thirdly, according to the Article 101 of UNCLOS piracy consists of any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft. We can conclude that piracy can de done by a pirate aircraft as well as a pirate ship. Fourthly, according to the Article 111 (5) of UNCLOS the right of hot pursuit may be exercised only by warships or military aircraft, or other ships or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as being on government service and authorized to that effect. We can conclude that the right of hot pursuit may be exercised only military aircraft, or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as being on government service and authorized to that effect. Fifthly, according to the Article 110 of UNCLOS a warship which encounters on the high seas a foreign ship, is not justified in boarding it unless there is reasonable ground for suspecting that: (a) the ship is engaged in piracy, (b) the ship is engaged in the slave trade, (c) the ship is engaged in an authorized broadcasting and the flag State of the warship has jurisdiction under article 109, (d) the ship is without nationality, or (e) though flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag, the ship is, in reality, of the same nationality as the warship. These provisions apply mutatis mutandis to military aircraft. Sixthly, according to the Article 1 (5)(dumping), 212(pollution from or through the atmosphere), 222(enforcement with respect to pollution from or through the atmosphere) of UNCLOS aircraft as well as ship is very much related to marine pollution. Seventhly, as far as the crime on board aircraft over the high seas is concerned 1963 Convention on the Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft(Tokyo Convention) will be applied, and as for the hijacking over the high seas 1970 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft(Hague Convention) and as for the sabotage over the high seas 1971 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation(Montreal Convention) will be applied respectively. These three conventions recognize the flag state jurisdiction over the crimes on board aircraft over the high seas. Eightly, as far as reconnaissance by foreign aircraft in the high seas toward the coastal States is concerned it is not illegal in terms of international law because its act is done in the high seas. Ninthly as for Air Defence Identification Zone(ADIZ) there are no articles dealing with it in the 1944 Chicago Convention. The legal status of the foreign aircraft over this sea zone might be restricted to the regulations of the coastal states whether this zone is legitimate or illegal. Lastly, the Arctic Sea is the frozen ocean. So the flight over that ocean is the same over the high seas. Because of the climate change the Arctic Sea is getting melted. If the coastal states of the Arctic Sea will proclaim the Exclusive Economic Zone(EEZ) as the ocean is getting melted, the freedom of flight over that ocean will also be restricted to the regulations of the coastal states.

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A Study on Jurisdiction under the International Aviation Terrorism Conventions (국제항공테러협약의 관할권 연구)

  • Kim, Han-Taek
    • The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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    • v.24 no.1
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    • pp.59-89
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    • 2009
  • The objectives of the 1963 Tokyo Convention cover a variety of subjects, with the intention of providing safety in aircraft, protection of life and property on board, and promoting the security of civil aviation. These objectives will be treated as follows: first, the unification of rules on jurisdiction; second, the question of filling the gap in jurisdiction; third, the scheme of maintaining law and order on board aircraft; fourth, the protection of persons acting in accordance with the Convention; fifth, the protection of the interests of disembarked persons; sixth, the question of hijacking of aircraft; and finally some general remarks on the objectives of the Convention. The Tokyo Convention mainly deals with general crimes such as murder, violence, robbery on board aircraft rather than aviation terrorism. The Article 11 of the Convention deals with hijacking in a simple way. As far as aviation terrorism is concerned 1970 Hague Convention and 1971 Montreal Convention cover the hijacking and sabotage respectively. The Problem of national jurisdiction over the offence and the offender was as tangled at the Hague and Montreal Convention, as under the Tokyo Convention. Under the Tokyo Convention the prime base of jurisdiction is the law of the flag (Article 3), but concurrent jurisdiction is also allowed on grounds of: territorial principle, active nationality and passive personality principle, security of the state, breach of flight rules, and exercise of jurisdiction necessary for the performance of obligations under multilateral agreements (Article 4). No Criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law is excluded [Article 3(2)]. However, Article 4 of the Hague Convention(hereafter Hague Article 4) and Article 5 of the Montreal Convention(hereafter Montreal Article 5), dealing with jurisdiction have moved a step further, inasmuch as the opening part of both paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Hague Article 4 and the Montreal Article 5 impose an obligation on all contracting states to take measures to establish jurisdiction over the offence (i.e., to ensure that their law is such that their courts will have jurisdiction to try offender in all the circumstances covered by Hague Article 4 and Montreal Article 5). The state of registration and the state where the aircraft lands with the hijacker still on board will have the most interest, and would be in the best position to prosecute him; the paragraphs 1(a) and (b) of the Hague Article 4 and paragraphs 1(b) and (c) of the Montreal Article 5 deal with it, respectively. However, paragraph 1(b) of the Hague Article 4 and paragraph 1(c) of the Montreal Article 5 do not specify if the aircraft is still under the control of the hijacker or if the hijacker has been overpowered by the aircraft commander, or if the offence has at all occurred in the airspace of the state of landing. The language of the paragraph would probably cover all these cases. The weaknesses of Hague Article 4 and Montreal Article 5 are however, patent. The Jurisdictions of the state of registration, the state of landing, the state of the lessee and the state where the offender is present, are concurrent. No priorities have been fixed despite a proposal to this effect in the Legal Committee and the Diplomatic Conference, and despite the fact that it was pointed out that the difficulty in accepting the Tokyo Convention has been the question of multiple jurisdiction, for the reason that it would be too difficult to determine the priorities. Disputes over the exercise of jurisdiction can be endemic, more so when Article 8(4) of the Hague Convention and the Montreal Convention give every state mentioned in Hague Article 4(1) and Montreal Article 5(1) the right to seek extradition of the offender. A solution to the problem should not have been given up only because it was difficult. Hague Article 4(3) and Montreal Article 5(3) provide that they do not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law. Thus the provisions of the two Conventions create additional obligations on the state, and do not exclude those already existing under national laws. Although the two Conventions do not require a state to establish jurisdiction over, for example, hijacking or sabotage committed by its own nationals in a foreign aircraft anywhere in the world, they do not preclude any contracting state from doing so. However, it has be noted that any jurisdiction established merely under the national law would not make the offence an extraditable one under Article 8 of the Hague and Montreal Convention. As far as international aviation terrorism is concerned 1988 Montreal Protocol and 1991 Convention on Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detention are added. The former deals with airport terrorism and the latter plastic explosives. Compared to the other International Terrorism Conventions, the International Aviation Terrorism Conventions do not have clauses of the passive personality principle. If the International Aviation Terrorism Conventions need to be revised in the future, those clauses containing the passive personality principle have to be inserted for the suppression of the international aviation terrorism more effectively. Article 3 of the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Article 5 of the 1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages and Article 6 of the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation would be models that the revised International Aviation Terrorism Conventions could follow in the future.

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