• Strategy21
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• s.34
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• pp.5-25
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• 2014

On July 3~4, 2014, the Chinese President Xi Jinping's state visit to Seoul might be seen as a step on the path toward strategic outcomes for both country. For South Korea, Seoul shrewdly retains some degree of self-reliance by balancing between ROK-China strategic cooperative partnership relationship and ROK-US alliance. For China, Beijing appears to put its interests on the Korean Peninsula increasingly within China's larger geopolitical influence. To what extent can ROK-China relationship maintain futuristic strategic cooperative partnership between them? As we observed joint press communiques of the Chinese President Xi Jinping's state visit on July 3, 2014, four agendas of bilateral relationship between Seoul and Beijing can be identified: intractable rivalry between the two great powers, North Korea nuclear issues, disparities of their displeasure with Japan denying the past wrongdoing and enhancing its military capabilities and Chinese imposing of its core interests on its Korea policy. With these evolving strategic environments, however, China and the ROK appear justifiably be pleased with the state of their relations: their strategic cooperative partnership is the cornerstone of peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific or Indo-Pacific region and continues to grow broader and deeper.

• Strategy21
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• s.42
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• pp.154-195
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• 2017

This paper is to analyse conflict between the US and China over the South China Sea and Korea's responses. To this end the paper is composed of 6 chapters titled instruction; the current status of South China Sea sovereignty disputes; changes in US and Chinese maritime security strategies and the strategic values of the South China Sea; key issues and future prospects for US-China conflicts in the South China Sea; South Korea's security and diplomatic responses; and conclusion. The recent East Asian maritime security issue has evolved into a global issue of supremacy between the US and China, beyond conflicts over territorial disputes and demarcation among the countries in the region. China is pursuing offensive ocean policy to expand economic growth. The core of the maritime order that the United States intends to pursue is the freedom of navigation in the oceans and the maintenance of maritime access. China is making artificial islands in the South China Sea, claiming the sovereignty of these islands, building strategic bases in East Asia, and securing routes. The United States has developed several "Freedom of Navigation Operations" to neutralize the declaration of the territorial sea surrounding Chinese artificial islands. We can not be free from marine conflicts in the South China Sea and the East China Sea. Regarding the South China Sea dispute, it is expected that the strategic competition and conflict between the two countries will intensify due to China's failure to make concessions of core interests and adherence to the US compliance with international norms. In the midst of conflict over the South China Sea, we need a harmonious balance between our alliance security and economic diplomacy. We must continue our efforts to strengthen the ROK-US alliance but not to make China an enemy. Considering the significant impacts of the oceans on the survival and prosperity of the nation, we must continue to develop our interest in the oceans, appropriate investments and tactical strategies.

• Journal of Contemporary Eastern Asia
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• v.20 no.2
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• pp.197-209
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• 2021

This article deals with the asymmetrical relations between Australia and China and explores their interdependence, tensions, and societal outlooks. Both countries are dependent on one another for trade to different degrees but attempt to diversify their supply chains. While there is no united position on China in Australia, there has been a bipartisan support for the counter-interference legislation there. The newly established security pact of the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK) and Australia - 'AUKUS' - has brought a new dimension into these tensions and will most likely lead to an arms race. The author explores how a so-called middle power such as Australia balances the related economic and strategic interests and priorities. Although Australia has been vulnerable in its asymmetric relationship with China, it has shown that it is not a passive and helpless actor when facing an economic coercion. The interdependence has become a moderating factor in this strategic stand-off. Additionally, Australia demonstrates its tendency to reinforce its traditional reliance on its previous more powerful allies, the UK and the US.

• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.16 no.3_1
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• pp.107-114
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• 2016

The North Korean regime, Kim Jungun's foreign policy is changed frequently. And their military policy has no gravity. North Korea has developed nuclear weapons and long range missile. Now they have Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile. These activities redound a great threat in Korean peninsula. There are a no possibilities to give up its nuclear weapons and missile development. For the peace in Korean peninsula, we should make North Korea to abandon its nuclear himself through effective sanctions. Now China should effort to control North Korea. To reduce the threat we should coordinate the strategic interests of China and US. This study is to predict the North Korea military activities to analyze "military policies."

• International Journal of Advanced Culture Technology
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• v.11 no.2
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• pp.82-108
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• 2023

As tension escalates between the US and China, scenarios for maintaining peace in Northeast Asia imply that secondary powers will perceive increasing incentives to reappraise their respective international roles. This analysis proposes that an analysis of France's Cold War role in Europe and the world under President Charles de Gaulle provides insights into conflict management in an increasingly multipolar international political environment. Their respective interests in preventing a so-called new Cold War emerging between the US and China include avoiding its excessive economic costs, if only because China is a massive trade partner. This study engages in theoretical framework-informed process tracing of de Gaulle's role. It explicates the assumptions that functionally underpinned de Gaulle's policy of soft balancing between the US and China. The analysis explores de Gaulle's contribution to the decay of the Cold War. It illuminates de Gaulle's contribution to a regional international environment that made West German Chancellor Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik strategy more feasible politically. This study applies these findings in the formulation of strategy recommendations focusing on Japan. Valid inferences regarding the predominant motivations driving American and Chinese international interaction are necessary for this task. To the extent to which the US and China have entered into a conflict spiral, Japan's hedging towards Washington is further incentivized. Tokyo would necessarily need to convince the Chinese that Japan is no longer Washington's unsinkable aircraft carrier off its coast. Tokyo, like de Gaulle's France, would maintain close relations with Washington, but it would need to project to its interlocutors its commitment to its own strategic autonomy. Tokyo's emphasis on closer relations with liberal democratic Indo-Pacific actors would potentially fit well with a commitment to strategic autonomy to defend the global liberal order.

• The Southeast Asian review
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• v.27 no.3
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• pp.93-135
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• 2017

Due to their geographic proximity to Beijing, the Southeast Asian states under the fallout of the China's growing power are struggling to seek the art of diplomacy to promote their national interests. This study explores why Cambodia previously taking a pro-US strategy after the end of the Cold War has switched to a pro-China one in the context of the rise of G-2 system, the ASEAN regionalism, the country's national interest and Hun Sen's regime legitimation. Theoretically, this study takes a realist constructivist approach and tries to find how realist interests and norms have affected the Hun Sen's regime legitimation. The relationship between China and Cambodia has been deepened by mutual economic interdependence and increasingly stronger Chinese power. Especially, the Chinese massive economic aids and investment have enormously supported the regime legitimation of Hun Sen. On the other hand, The US value diplomacy promoting democracy and human rights has undermined the Hun Sen's legitimacy and strained the two nations' relationship. However, the Hun Sen's pro-China strategy is not to check and balance against US strategic interests and not to recognize the Chinese hegemonic position in Southeast Asia. It is a hedging against the US value diplomacy while maximizing economic and other gains from China. ASEAN has been playing a coordinating role to limit the scope of power politics among big powers and to mitigate its ramifications. Yet, since the US and Chinese interests are so keenly criss-crossing, Cambodia may continue to react to the G-2 system through bilateral relations with them.

• Strategy21
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• s.42
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• pp.318-346
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• 2017

Currently, security environmental instability is getting worse than ever in the East Asia including to Republic of Korea(ROK). Unlike several conventional issues such as maritime dispute -sometimes with islands- and competitions for getting natural resources, contemporary security dilemma issues followed by arms races among states deepens the power gap between strong and weak state within the region. It is notable that the arms races is the East Asia are mainly focused on naval power. As navy is the very possible force that influences neighboring states, submarine power is usually valued for its nature of stealth, mobile and aggression. Moreover, the submarine power is believed to be one of the highest valued weapon system since it shows actual effectiveness for influencing the other states while avoiding direct military conflicts compared to surface power. As a result, all states within the region are accelerating for getting such power these days. Japan, Most of all, is one of the leading state that aims to ensure self-survival and enlarge military influences under the US-Japan alliance by decisively supporting its power to the American containment strategy against China. In this regard, such movement surely sill influence on ROK both directly and indirectly as we sue the common field, the sea. Though, it has lots of restrictions for us to confront them with military forces as such confrontations within US-led alliances is not desirable upon considering current China and nK threats. As a result, ROK needs to limit the realm of alliance within the region while maintaining ROK-US alliance for getting national interests with both legal and justice superiority against Japan. This paper, as a result, is focused on suggesting the way to utilize submarines as a mean of naval power for both current security environments and the rising maritime threats in the East Asia. I concluded to participate ROK submarines in US-led military strategy against China by dispatching them into the East-China Sea and the North-East area of the Korean peninsula to protect both national interests and justice at the same tome. It should be one of the preemptive measure for confronting with neighboring states by utilizing strategic benefits of submarines while strengthening ROK-US alliances upon participating American Containment Strategy against China.

• Strategy21
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• s.39
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• pp.114-139
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• 2016

Korea and China are neighboring countries with close contacts in many areas from long time ago, and have shared interests in maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, and in deepening economic relationship which has been mutually complementary in their nature. Therefore their bilateral relations has been developed at a remarkable pace to the extent that it can't be better than now. However, the differences in their responses to North Korean nuclear test and ensuing long-range ballistic missile test-fire and the Chinese strong concern on the possible deployment of THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Air Defence) anti-missile system in Korea show that there are some weaknesses in their relations. For example, Korea is not still confident that China would fully implement the sanction measures contained in the UNSC resolution and I argue that Chinese proposal of parallel negotiation of the denuclearization and the replacement of Korean armistice with the Peace Agreement is not much persuasive. In THAAD issue, if Korea comes to conclusion in the future that THAAD is the most effective way to counter North Korean threats, Korea should make every efforts to assure China that Korea-US alliance is not targeting China, and the THAAD is a defensive system, not damaging Chinese security. In the longer-term, deepening strategic distrust and competition between the US and China in this part of East Asia, changing nature of economic cooperation between Korea and China, and the revival of 'great country mentality' by Chinese people together with the rising nationalism in both Korea and China would cast shadow on Korea-China relation in the years ahead, unless properly handled. In this regard, I suggest that the security communications between the two countries be further strengthened, and the tri-lateral dialogue channel be established among the three countries of Korea, the US and China, particularly on North Korean issues. I also suggest the new pattern of economic cooperation be sought, considering the changing economic environment in China, while strengthening the efforts to understand each other through more interactions between the two peoples.

• Strategy21
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• s.38
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• pp.250-286
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• 2015

The main purpose of this article is to provide an understanding on current maritime issues in the Northeast Asia, and thereby help formulating the right strategy for our national security. The article summarizes core arguments in the recently published 『The 21^st Century Maritime Strategies in the Northeast Asia: Dilemma between Competition and Cooperation』. It will help readers to comprehend historical backgrounds as well as recent updates related to maritime issues and strategies in the region. Also, readers may find guidance to conceive their own maritime strategies for the Republic of Korea. Currently, the U.S. is shifting its focus from Atlantic to Pacific, and increasing its naval presence in Asia-Pacific region. Meanwhile, the 21^st century China views the maritime interests as the top priority in its national security and prosperity. PLA Navy's offensive maritime strategies and naval building such as aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines are unprecedented. Japan is another naval power in the region. During the Cold War JMSDF faithfully fulfilled the mission of deterring Soviet navy, and now it is doing its job against China. Lastly, Putin has been emphasizing to build the strong Russia since 2000, and putting further efforts to reinforce current naval capabilities of Pacific Fleet. The keyword in the naval and maritime relations among these powers can be summarized with "competition and cooperation." The recent security developments in the South China Sea(SCS) clearly represent each state's strategic motivations and movements. China shows clear and strong intention to nationalize the islands in SCS by building artificial facilities - possibly military purpose. Obviously, the U.S. strongly opposes China by insisting the freedom of navigation(FON) in international waters as recent USS-Lassen's FON operation indicate. The conflict between China and the U.S. surrounding the SCS seems to be heading towards climax as Russia and Japan are searching for their own national interests within the conflict. Also, the neighboring small and middle powers are calculating their own economic and security interests. This is no exception for us in establishing timely strategies to maximize our own national security. Hopefully, this article leads the readers to the right direction.

• SUVANNABHUMI
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• v.16 no.1
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• pp.205-228
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• 2024

The ASEAN and ROK have played a crucial role in fostering regional peace and economic development. Nevertheless, the recent strategic competition between the US and China has turned the region into a contested arena. The relationship faces challenges due to the ROK's growing alignment with the US, prompting a rising interest in minilateralism as an alternative collaboration model. This paper scrutinizes the impact of ROK's foreign policy behavior, with a focus on minilateralism as a preferred cooperation model with ASEAN. The study centers on BIMP-EAGA, investigating its effectiveness in sustaining collaboration amid geopolitical rivalry. The paper concludes that BIMP-EAGA, as a manifestation of minilateralism, serves as an alternative platform for ROK and ASEAN cooperation. However, the study reveals that the implementation of BIMP-EAGA falls short of expectations. This paper emphasizes the need for greater subregional focus and comprehensive coverage of BIMP-EAGA to truly reflect the shared interests of ASEAN member states.