• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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• v.56 no.10
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• pp.1738-1743
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• 2007

This paper addresses the bidding strategies of a pumped-storage hydro plant in an electricity market. Competitive bidding of pumping and generating of a pumped-storage plant is formulated in a game theoretic problem in accordance with the three different ownership of scheduling; Market Operator(MO), generating company(Genco), and combined type of MO and Genco. Optimal conditions for Nash Equilibrium are derived in the form of market prices during the scheduling periods. Simulation results show the different ownership models produce different schedules of pumping and generating, which correspond to the objective of the scheduling owner of a pumped-storage hydro plant.

• Journal of the Korea Society for Simulation
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• v.4 no.1
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• pp.45-57
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• 1995

본 연구는 불확실한 경영환경하에서 전략목표에 영향을 미치는 환경요인을 확인하고, 이를 다시 전략계획 시뮬레이션 모형에 체계적으로 반영하기 위한 새로운 전략계획 시뮬레이션 모형을 제안한다. 본 연구에서 제안하는 전략계획 시뮬레이션 모형은 (1) 환경요인 분석을 위하여 퍼지인식도(Fuzzy Cognitive Map)를 적용하고, (2) 경쟁관계를 체계적으로 반영하기 위하여 미분게임(Differential Game) 모형을 이용한다. 퍼지인식도는 특정 의사결정 문제에 있어서 관련된 여러 개념간의 인과관계를 해석하고 그를 통하여 해당 문제전체에 관한 효과적인 의사결정을 지원하는 소위 구조적 모형화(Structural Modeling)도구의 한 방법이다. 한편, 본 연구에서는 미분게임을 이용하여, 퍼지인식도에 의하여 확인된 환경요인을 변수로 감안하고, 아울러 경쟁관계를 수식화 하므로써 보다 체계적인 시뮬레이션이 가능하다. 제안된 전략계획 수립 시뮬레이션 모형을 동태적 광고모형(dynamic advertising model)에 적용하므로써 보다 효과적인 경영전략계획 수립이 가능함을 보였다.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.51 no.4
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• pp.196-201
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• 2002

An important aspect of the study of power system markets involves the assessment of strategic behavior of participants for maximizing their profits. In models for imperfect competition of a deregulated system, the key tack is to find the Nash equilibrium. When the constraints are not considered in the power market, the equilibrium has the form of a pure strategy. However, the constraints are considered, the equilibrium has the form of a mired strategy. In this paper the bimatrix game approach leer finding a mixed equilibrium is analyzed. The Nash equilibrium of a mixed strategy will be used adequately for the analysis of market power.

• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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• v.59 no.7
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• pp.1226-1231
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• 2010

This paper looks at the influence of Financial Transmission Rights (FTRs) on the market value(Social Welfare; SW) in the competitive electricity market. The transmission line constraints make it difficult to compute the Nash Equilibrium (NE) due to causing a mixed strategy NE instead of a pure strategy NE. Computing a mixed strategy is more complicated in a multi-player game. The aim of this paper are to compute a mixed strategy NE and analyze SW in power transaction with FTRs. This paper introduces a formula and a technique for solving NE of multi-player game with FTRs. In addition, it analyzes the influence of holding of FTRs by generation company on SW and it proposes the SW at NE is influenced by Power Transfer Distribution Factor (PTDF) where holder of FTRs are located. The assertion is verified by calculating the mixed strategy utilizing the Cournot model widely used for studies on FTRs.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.52 no.1
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• pp.62-67
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• 2003

An important aspect of the study of power system markets involves the assessment of strategic behavior of participants for maximizing their profits. In models of imperfect competition of a deregulated electricity system, the key task is to find the Nash equilibrium. In this paper, the bimatrix approach for finding Nash equilibria in electricity markets is investigated. This approach determines pure and mixed equilibria using the complementarity pivot algorithim. The mixed equilibrium in the matrix approach has the equal number of non-zero property. This property makes it difficult to reproduce a smooth continuous distribution for the mixed equilibrium. This paper proposes an algorithm for adjusting the quantization value of discretization to reconstruct a continuous distribution from a discrete one.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.14 no.3
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• pp.3-21
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• 1992

By localizing the production of core parts and intermediate goods previously imported from Japan, Korean firms have been striving to increase their market share and profit in the final goods market in which Japanese firms are dominating. Korean producers' efforts, however, have often been thwarted by Japanese suppliers' "strategic" behavior. This competitive strategy involves Japanese exporters supplying parts and intermediate goods at very high prices until Korean firms must locally develop them, and then setting the prices far below the previous level so that the profitability of localization is dramatically reduced, or even means a loss for the Korean manufacturer. This paper intends to explain the strategic behavior of Japanese firms through the concepts of strategic interactions and joint economies. Strategic interactions can be aggressive or accommodating depending on whether competitors are dealing with strategic substitutes or complements. Joint economies exist in multi-stage competition when competition in the previous state favorably influences "profits" of the ensuing stage. Competiton between Korean and Japanese firms (a two-stage game involving production and technology rivalries) can be characterized by joint economies and strategic substitutes: joint economies since technological improvement results in more profits in the production stage; and strategic substitutes since an increase in marginal profits of one firm brings about a decrease in marginal profits of the other in a duopolitic production stage. This implies that the flood of "low price" Japense substitutes is an almost "natural" phenomenon in the context of the duopolistic market described in this paper. In the technology competition stage, on the other hand, technology development and technology transfer can be either strategic complements or substitutes. This implies that, in typical comparative static analyses, the effect of changes in exogenous variables cannot be expected a priori. Thus it becomes very difficult to determine the desirability of applying various policy measures such as countervailing duties, R&D subsidies, and creating demand for localized products. For these reasons, it is indeed likely that the measures suggested as means of circumventing the strategic behavior of Japanese firms (and enhancing technological development of Korean firms) may not work.

• Asian Journal of Business Environment
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• v.10 no.2
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• pp.5-15
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• 2020

Purpose: This study examines the impact of individual reciprocal preferences on coalition formation. The reciprocal model considers a player's own payoff, the player's perception of others' payoffs, and others' perceptions of the player's payoff. Research design, data and methodology: A reciprocal model is built to illustrate how reciprocity influences individual decisions in a coalition game and its formation. The prediction is examined with experimental evidences from a dictator game and a membership game. Results: The theoretical result suggests that the coalition formation could be unstable due to negative reciprocal kindness. The experimental findings support that negative reciprocal kindness could lead players participating in a coalition, no matter their dominant strategies are. When subjects were essential to make contributions to a coalition, they were more likely to cooperate if they were treated badly. In contrast, when subjects were unnecessary, the reciprocal kindness could enhance cooperative tendencies. Conclusions: This study reveals that the reciprocal behavior could influence individual decisions and reshape the coalition formation. In terms of policy implications, this study has shown that coalition formation could be reshaped by reciprocal prefe rences. Due to the strategic and complicated decision process in an interactive environment, a comprehensive investigation of factors would be required in a climate coalition in practice.

• Journal of Digital Contents Society
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• v.10 no.4
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• pp.615-623
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• 2009

Games are usually composed with several units such as monsters, weapons etc.. There are often intransitive relationships between units, like the one among rock, scissors and paper. Intransitive relationships guarantee the variation of strategy choices while playing. But AIs in many games have been ignored intransitive relationships because decision making with those relationships is complex to model. This paper suggests how to use intransitive relationships to modify influence map. With the modified influence map game AI can make a different decision to win the game. With path-finding technique, this paper shows that the modified influence map makes AI's behaviors better.

• Journal of Korea Game Society
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• v.18 no.6
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• pp.59-68
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• 2018

In spite of its simple rule, Go is one of the most complex strategic board games in the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI). Monte-Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) is an algorithm with best-first tree search, and has used to implement computer Go. We try to find the most promising first move using MCTS for playing a Go game on a board of size smaller than $9{\times}9$ Go board. The experimental result reveals that MCTS prefers to place the first move at the center in case of odd-sized Go boards, and at the central in case of even-sized Go boards.

• Journal of Communications and Networks
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• v.17 no.1
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• pp.75-83
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• 2015

In mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs), nodes are mobile in nature. Collaboration between mobile nodes is more significant in MANETs, which have as their greatest challenges vulnerabilities to various security attacks and an inability to operate securely while preserving its resources and performing secure routing among nodes. Therefore, it is essential to develop an effective secure routing protocol to protect the nodes from anonymous behaviors. Currently, game theory is a tool that analyzes, formulates and solves selfishness issues. It is seldom applied to detect malicious behavior in networks. It deals, instead, with the strategic and rational behavior of each node. In our study,we used the dynamic Bayesian signaling game to analyze the strategy profile for regular and malicious nodes. This game also revealed the best actions of individual strategies for each node. Perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) provides a prominent solution for signaling games to solve incomplete information by combining strategies and payoff of players that constitute equilibrium. Using PBE strategies of nodes are private information of regular and malicious nodes. Regular nodes should be cooperative during routing and update their payoff, while malicious nodes take sophisticated risks by evaluating their risk of being identified to decide when to decline. This approach minimizes the utility of malicious nodes and it motivates better cooperation between nodes by using the reputation system. Regular nodes monitor continuously to evaluate their neighbors using belief updating systems of the Bayes rule.