• Title/Summary/Keyword: stochastic game

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Mathematical Model for Revenue Management with Overbooking and Costly Price Adjustment for Hotel Industries

  • Masruroh, Nur Aini;Mulyani, Yun Prihantina
    • Industrial Engineering and Management Systems
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    • v.12 no.3
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    • pp.207-223
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    • 2013
  • Revenue management (RM) has been widely used to model products characterized as perishable. Classical RM model assumed that price is the sole factor in the model. Thus price adjustment becomes a crucial and costly factor in business. In this paper, an optimal pricing model is developed based on minimization of soft customer cost, one kind of price adjustment cost and is solved by Lagrange multiplier method. It is formed by expected discounted revenue/bid price integrating quantity-based RM and pricing-based RM. Quantity-based RM consists of two capacity models, namely, booking limit and overbooking. Booking limit, built by assuming uncertain customer arrival, decides the optimal capacity allocation for two market segments. Overbooking determines the level of accepted order exceeding capacity to anticipate probability of cancellation. Furthermore, pricing-based RM models occupancy/demand rate influenced by internal and competitor price changes. In this paper, a mathematical model based on game theoretic approach is developed for two conditions of deterministic and stochastic demand. Based on the equilibrium point, the best strategy for both hotels can be determined.

Optimal Bidding Strategy of Competitive Generators under Price Based Pool (PBP(Price Based Pool) 발전경쟁시장에서의 최적입찰전략수립)

  • Kang, Dong-Joo;Moon, Young-Hwan;Oh, Tae-Kyoo;Kim, Bal-Ho
    • Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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    • 2001.11b
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    • pp.57-59
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    • 2001
  • The restructuring of power industry is still going on all over the world for last several decades. Many kinds of restructuring model has been studied, proposed, and applied. Among those models, power pool is more popular than others. This paper assumes the power pool market structure having competitive generation sector and a new method is presented to build bidding strategy in that market. The utilities participating in the market have the perfect information on their cost and price functions, but they don't know the strategy to be chosen by others. To define one's strategy as a vector, we make utility's cost/price function into discrete step function. An utility knows only his own strategy, so he estimates the other's strategy using stochastic methods. For considering these conditions, we introduce the Bayesian rules and noncooperative game theory concepts. Also additional assumptions are included for simplification of solving process. Each utility builds the strategy to maximize his own expected profit function using noncooperative Bayesian game. A numerical example is given in case study to show essential features of this approach.

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Optimum Strategies in Discrete Red & Black

  • Chul H. Ahn;Sok, Yong-U
    • Communications for Statistical Applications and Methods
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    • v.8 no.1
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    • pp.147-151
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    • 2001
  • In discrete red and black, you can stake any amount s in your possession, but the value of s takes positive integer value. Suppose your goal is N and your current fortune is f, with 0$\frac{1}{2}$ where the house has the advantage over the player, and with the value of p greater than $\frac{1}{2}$ where the player has the advantage over the house. The optimum strategy at any f when p<$\frac{1}{2}$ is to play boldly, which is to bet as much as you can. The optimum strategy when p>$\frac{1}{2}$ is to bet 1 all the time.

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Transit Frequency Optimization with Variable Demand Considering Transfer Delay (환승지체 및 가변수요를 고려한 대중교통 운행빈도 모형 개발)

  • Yu, Gyeong-Sang;Kim, Dong-Gyu;Jeon, Gyeong-Su
    • Journal of Korean Society of Transportation
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    • v.27 no.6
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    • pp.147-156
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    • 2009
  • We present a methodology for modeling and solving the transit frequency design problem with variable demand. The problem is described as a bi-level model based on a non-cooperative Stackelberg game. The upper-level operator problem is formulated as a non-linear optimization model to minimize net cost, which includes operating cost, travel cost and revenue, with fleet size and frequency constraints. The lower-level user problem is formulated as a capacity-constrained stochastic user equilibrium assignment model with variable demand, considering transfer delay between transit lines. An efficient algorithm is also presented for solving the proposed model. The upper-level model is solved by a gradient projection method, and the lower-level model is solved by an existing iterative balancing method. An application of the proposed model and algorithm is presented using a small test network. The results of this application show that the proposed algorithm converges well to an optimal point. The methodology of this study is expected to contribute to form a theoretical basis for diagnosing the problems of current transit systems and for improving its operational efficiency to increase the demand as well as the level of service.