• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• 제10권11호
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• pp.5322-5342
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• 2016

In vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) networks, where selfishness degrades node activity, countermeasures for collaboration enforcement must be provided to enable application of a sage and efficient network environment. Because vehicular networks feature both high mobility and various topologies, selfish behavior judgment and establishment of a stable routing protocol become intensely challenging. In this paper, a two-phase-based generous cooperative routing protocol (called GEC) is presented for V2V networks to provide resistance to selfishness. To detect selfish behaving vehicles, a packet forwarding watchdog and an average connection rate based on the multipath weight method are used, where evidence is gathered from different watchdogs. Then, multihop relay decisions are made using a generous cooperative algorithm based on game theory. Finally, through buffering of the multiple end-to-end paths and judicious choice of optimal cooperative routes, route maintenance phase is capable of dealing with congestion and rapidly exchanging traffic. Specifically, it is proved that the GEC is theoretically subgame perfect. Simulation results show that for V2V networks with inherently selfish nodes, the proposed method isolates uncooperative vehicles and is capable of accommodating both the mobility and congestion circumstances by facilitating information dissemination and reducing end-to-end delay.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• 제5권3호
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• pp.542-559
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• 2011

Most game-theoretic works of Aloha have emphasized investigating Nash equilibria according to the system state represented by the number of network users and their decisions. In contrast, we focus on the possible change of nodes' utility state represented by delay constraint and decreasing utility over time. These foregone changes of nodes' state are more likely to instigate selfish behaviors in networking environments. For such environment, in this paper, we propose a repeated Bayesian slotted Aloha game model to analyze the selfish behavior of impatient users. We prove the existence of Nash equilibrium mathematically and empirically. The proposed model enables any type of transmission probability sequence to achieve Nash equilibrium without degrading its optimal throughput. Those Nash equilibria can be used as a solution concept to thwart the selfish behaviors of nodes and ensure the system stability.

• Journal of Communications and Networks
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• 제17권4호
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• pp.440-448
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• 2015

In this paper, we study the problem of selfish behavior of secondary users (SUs) based on cognitive radio (CR) with the presence of primary users (PUs). SUs are assumed to contend on a channel using the carrier sense multiple access with collision avoidance (CSMA/CA) and PUs do not consider transmission of SUs, where CSMA/CA protocols rely on the random deference of packets. SUs are vulnerable to selfish attacks by which selfish users could pick short random deference to obtain a larger share of the available bandwidth at the expense of other SUs. In this paper, game theory is used to study the systematic cheating of SUs in the presence of PUs in multichannel CR networks. We study two cases: A single cheater and multiple cheaters acting without any restraint. We identify the Pareto-optimal point of operation of a network with multiple cheaters and also derive the Nash equilibrium of the network. We use cooperative game theory to drive the Pareto optimality of selfish SUs without interfering with the activity of PUs. We show the influence of the activity of PUs in the equilibrium of the whole network.

• Journal of information and communication convergence engineering
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• 제7권2호
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• pp.148-151
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• 2009

We consider the problem of optimizing the performance of a system with resources shared by non-cooperative users. The worst-cast ratio between the cost of a Nash equilibrium and the optimal cost, called Price of Anarchy, is investigated. It measures the performance degradation due to the users' selfish behavior. As the objective function of the optimization problem, we are concerned in a load balancing measure, which is different from that used in the previous works. Also we consider the Stackelberg scheduling which can assign a fraction of the users to resources while the remaining users are free to act in a selfish manner.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• 제13권3호
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• pp.1481-1501
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• 2019

In opportunistic network, the behavior of a node is autonomous and has social attributes such as selfishness.If a node wants to forward information to another node, it is bound to be limited by the node's own resources such as cache, power, and energy.Therefore, in the process of communication, some nodes do not help to forward information of other nodes because of their selfish behavior. This will lead to the inability to complete cooperation, greatly reduce the success rate of message transmission, increase network delay, and affect the overall network performance. This article proposes a hybrid incentive mechanism (Mim) based on the Reputation mechanism and the Credit mechanism.The selfishness model, energy model (The energy in the article exists in the form of electricity) and transaction model constitute our Mim mechanism. The Mim classifies the selfishness of nodes and constantly pay attention to changes in node energy, and manage the wealth of both sides of the node by introducing the Central Money Management Center. By calculating the selfishness of the node, the currency trading model is used to differentiate pricing of the node's services. Simulation results show that by using the Mim, the information delivery rate in the network and the fairness of node transactions are improved. At the same time, it also greatly increases the average life of the network.

• 한국정보과학회논문지:시스템및이론
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• 제35권9_10호
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• pp.417-420
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• 2008

우리는 이기적이고 비협조적인 사용자들이 이용하는 시스템의 성능을 최적화하는 문제를 다룬다. 사용자들이 요구하는 작업들은 각각의 속도함수를 가지고 있는 기계들에 스케줄 된다. 여기서 속도함수는 기계에 할당된 작업량에 반비례한다. 시스템의 성능은 기계들이 할당된 작업들의 수행을 끝내는 완료시간의 최대 값으로 평가한다. 이기적인 사용자들은 자신의 작업이 수행될 기계를 고를 수 있고 현재 가장 빠른 기계를 고른다. 그러나 이러한 스케줄은 시스템의 성능을 최적화하지 못한다. 사용자들의 이기적인 행동으로 발생되는 시스템의 성능 저하를 측정하는 기준으로서 Price of Anarchy(PoA)가 소개되었다. 이것은 내쉬 평형의 비용과 최적의 비용의 비율로 정의된다. 이 논문에서 우리는 위 스케줄링 문제에 대한 PoA를 평가한다.

• Asian Journal of Business Environment
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• 제8권2호
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• pp.23-32
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• 2018

Purpose - This study investigated the relationship among cultural disposition (Chemyeon, Noonchi, Woozzul), media use, and attitude toward luxury goods consumption. Research design, data, and methodology - We analyzed online survey data for 300 Korean Women between 20 and 39 years of age who lived in Seoul, capital of South Korea. We used multiple regression analysis to examine the relative influence of cultural orientation on cognition of luxury goods, Sobel test. to determine mediating effect, and a two-way analysis of variance in IBM SPSS 23.0. Results - The finding suggests that cultural disposition (Chemyeon, Noonchi, conspicuous Woozzul) correlated significantly with perceived self-identity, attitude toward luxury goods. The effects of Chemyeon, Noonchi, and selfish Woozzul on the attitude toward luxury goods was fully mediated by perceived self-identity. However, association between conspicuous Woozzul and attitude toward luxury goods was partially mediated by perceived self-identity. Regarding media effects, the results indicate that there were interaction effects between selfish Woozzul and amount of time spent on TV on attitude toward luxury goods, as well as between selfish Woozzul and amount of time spent on Internet. Conclusions - These findings suggest that luxury goods consumption of Korean young women is consumer behavior that reflects individual cultural disposition and media use.

• 대한전기학회:학술대회논문집
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• 대한전기학회 2007년도 심포지엄 논문집 정보 및 제어부문
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• pp.240-242
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• 2007

The game theoretic analysis in wireless networks can be classified into the jamming game of the physical layer, the multiple access game of the medium access layer, the forwarder's dilemma and joint packet forwarding game of the network layer, and etc. In this paper, the game theoretic analysis about the multiple access game that selfish nodes exist in the IEEE 802.11 DCF(Distributed Coordination Function) wireless networks is addressed. In this' wireless networks, the modeling of the CSMA/CA protocol based DCF, the utility or payoff function calculation of the game, the system optimization (using optimization theory or convex optimization), and selection of Pareto-optimality and Nash Equilibrium in game strategies are the important elements for analyzing how nodes are operated in the steady state of system. Finally, the main issues about the game theory in the wireless network are introduced.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• 제6권4호
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• pp.973-988
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• 2012

Delay tolerant networks (DTNs) characterized by the lack of guaranteed end-to-end paths exploit opportunistic data forwarding mechanism, which depends on the hypothesis that nodes are willing to store, carry, and forward the in-transit messages in an opportunistic way. However, this hypothesis might easily be violated by the presence of selfish nodes constrained with energy, bandwidth, and processing power. To address this problem, we propose a practical reputation-based incentive scheme, named PRI, to stimulate honest forwarding and discipline selfish behavior. A novel concept of successful forwarding credential and an observation protocol are presented to cope with the detection of nodes' behavior, and a reputation model is proposed to determine egoistic individuals. The simulation results demonstrate the effectiveness and practicality of our proposal.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• 제6권9호
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• pp.2202-2217
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• 2012

The transmission opportunities between nodes in Delay Tolerant Network (DTNs) are uncertain, and routing algorithms in DTNs often need nodes serving as relays for others to carry and forward messages. Due to selfishness, nodes may ask the source to pay a certain reward, and the reward may be varying with time. Moreover, the reward that the source obtains from the destination may also be varying with time. For example, the sooner the destination gets the message, the more rewards the source may obtain. The goal of this paper is to explore efficient ways for the source to maximize its total reward in such complex applications when it uses the probabilistic two-hop routing policy. We first propose a theoretical framework, which can be used to evaluate the total reward that the source can obtain. Then based on the model, we prove that the optimal forwarding policy confirms to the threshold form by the Pontryagin's Maximum Principle. Simulations based on both synthetic and real motion traces show the accuracy of our theoretical framework. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the performance of the optimal forwarding policy with threshold form is better through extensive numerical results, which conforms to the result obtained by the Maximum Principle.