• Journal of Communications and Networks
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• v.18 no.3
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• pp.484-492
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• 2016

Smart grid (SG) technology is now elevating the conventional power grid system to one that functions more cooperatively, responsively, and economically. When applied in an SG the demand side management (DSM) technique can improve its reliability by dynamically changing electricity consumption or rescheduling it. In this paper, we propose a new SG scheduling scheme that uses the DSM technique. To achieve effective SG management, we adopt a mixed pricing strategy based on the Rubinstein-Stahl bargaining game and a repeated game model. The proposed game-based pricing strategy provides energy routing for effective energy sharing and allows consumers to make informed decisions regarding their power consumption. Our approach can encourage consumers to schedule their power consumption profiles independently while minimizing their payment and the peak-to-average ratio (PAR). Through a simulation study, it is demonstrated that the proposed scheme can obtain a better performance than other existing schemes in terms of power consumption, price, average payment, etc.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.51 no.4
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• pp.202-208
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• 2002

In a dynamic game where the players move in a periodical sequence, each player observes the strategy of the others. So the players who move later in a game get to know the moves of others having made before them. Those who move earlier must take this into account in devising their optimal strategy. In the Poolco model, the bidding game is executed periodically. The player participating in the bidding game accumulates the information of its own and others'strategies, and payoffs through the repeated bidding process. Thereby, the players in this game would be able to map out how get the maximum profit, and get closer to the optimal strategy. This paper presents a mathematical modeling for a player to determine his or her optimal strategy at period T, based on the information acquired from the previous rounds for the periods, T-1, T-2, and so on. The proposed modeling is demonstrated with a dynamic fame theory.

• Journal of the military operations research society of Korea
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• v.3 no.1
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• pp.51-82
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• 1977

Decision making is a function of many variables, but among these, human burden (soft-ware) and machine burden (hard-ware) are critical. Decision Maker is rather concerned with the soft-ware and just wants to have machine calculate the quantitative arithmetic involved in the decision-making study, because he is responsible for that decision whether or not he knows details about the techniques used by his staffs. From the point of these considerations, computer-assisted war game model has its significance in military decision making. The major outcome of this model is time-phased FEBA movement. FEBA is moved mainly by the ratio of the Index of Combat Effectiveness (ICE). To calculate ICE, Ground Forces are concerning the Index of Firepower (IFP) of individual weapons and in the case of Air Force, sorties are allocated into each sector, and added to the Ground Force IFP. With the ratio of total ICE, FEBA is moved according to the War Game Tables and process is repeated after consideration of casualties. This model is used by IBM-370/135 in MND computer room and also tested by IBM-3741/3717 established at ROKA HQ.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.5 no.3
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• pp.542-559
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• 2011

Most game-theoretic works of Aloha have emphasized investigating Nash equilibria according to the system state represented by the number of network users and their decisions. In contrast, we focus on the possible change of nodes' utility state represented by delay constraint and decreasing utility over time. These foregone changes of nodes' state are more likely to instigate selfish behaviors in networking environments. For such environment, in this paper, we propose a repeated Bayesian slotted Aloha game model to analyze the selfish behavior of impatient users. We prove the existence of Nash equilibrium mathematically and empirically. The proposed model enables any type of transmission probability sequence to achieve Nash equilibrium without degrading its optimal throughput. Those Nash equilibria can be used as a solution concept to thwart the selfish behaviors of nodes and ensure the system stability.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2001.11b
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• pp.63-66
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• 2001

In the Poolco model, the bidding game is executed periodically. The player participating to the bidding game accumulates the information of others' strategies and payoffs through the repeated process. Thereby, he is able to map out how he gets his maximum profit, and proceed to the optimal strategy region. This paper shows the algorithm for a player to determine his strategy in t period based the information of the game results of t-1, t-2 period. And this algorithm can be formulated by using Dynamic game theory.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.11 no.7
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• pp.3413-3430
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• 2017

With the fast increasing popularity of mobile services, ubiquitous mobile devices with enhanced sensing capabilities collect and share local information towards a common goal. The recent Mobile Crowd Sensing (MCS) paradigm enables a broad range of mobile applications and undoubtedly revolutionizes many sectors of our life. A critical challenge for the MCS paradigm is to induce mobile devices to be workers providing sensing services. In this study, we examine the problem of sensing task assignment to maximize the overall performance in MCS system while ensuring reciprocal advantages among mobile devices. Based on the overlapping coalition game model, we propose a novel workload determination scheme for each individual device. The proposed scheme can effectively decompose the complex optimization problem and obtains an effective solution using the interactive learning process. Finally, we have conducted extensive simulations, and the results demonstrate that the proposed scheme achieves a fair tradeoff solution between the MCS performance and the profit of individual devices.

• ETRI Journal
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• v.34 no.3
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• pp.341-351
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• 2012

We deal with a resource allocation problem for multimedia service discrimination in wireless networks. We assume that a service provider allocates network resources to users who can choose and access one of the discriminated services. To express the rational service selection of users, the utility function of users is devised to reflect both service quality and cost. Regarding the utility function of a service provider, total profit and efficiency of resource usage have been considered. The proposed service discrimination framework is composed of two game models. An outer model is a repeated Stackelberg game between a service provider and a user group, while an inner model is a service selection game among users, which is solved by adopting the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution. Through simulation experiments, we compare the proposed framework with existing resource allocation methods according to user cost sensitivity. The proposed framework performed better than existing frameworks in terms of total profit and fairness.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.15 no.5
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• pp.827-858
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• 2006

The paper presents game theoretic models for self-enforcing coalition formation in order to sustain effective international environmental agreements(IEAs). The model analyzes how the intrinsically strategic nature of a government's environmental policies(the emission allowance standard) calls for rules to sustain an IEA. Focusing on the recent theoretical developments in the infinitely repeated game, the paper introduces some mechanisms to show how self-interested sovereign countries are cooperatively able to maintain an IEA rather than defect to initially profit at the expense of a pollution heaven later on. For a more realistic case needed to sustain an IEA, an optimal international environmental policy with both signatories and non-signatories under imperfect monitoring is also explored. In this extension of the model, the derivation process for a critical discount factor, a trigger price level and the length of punishment period is briefly discussed.

• Journal of Korea Game Society
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• v.21 no.1
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• pp.67-80
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• 2021

The purpose of this study were to develop VR-based cooking serious game(VR-Cook) for students with intellectual disabilities and to validate effectiveness. The VR-Cook was developed using the ASSURE model. Twenty students with intellectual disabilities were participated to verify effectiveness. Ten students were assigned to the experimental group and the others to the control group. The control group received traditional interventions, and the experimental group participated in the intervention combining traditional intervention with VR-Cook. Evaluations were made at three times, and evaluation data were analyzed with repeated two-way ANOVA. The experimental group has improved more than control group in cooking activities and class attitudes.

• Korean Management Science Review
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• v.23 no.3
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• pp.243-257
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• 2006

ITU-T's NgN(Next generation Network) architecture is expected to offer a new Internet platforms such as QoS(Quality of Service) guaranteed services as it overcame the limitations of the existing best-effort Internet architecture. However, policy development crucial for the NgN framework(e.g., interconnections and billing) is lagging far behind technology development. For example, arguments over network neutrality clearly indicate little understanding of the Internet industry structure where diverse providers including ISP and CP coexist. This study employs a network economics approach to predict how the competitive landscape involving various providers will evolve under the traffic-based billing system under the NgN environment. Applied is the non-cooperative game theory, in particular, Stackelberg's repeated game in order to build and analyze model for competition among those providers. We also studied possible impacts that CPs would have on the competitive landscape if they have an option to replace ISP: i.e., CDN(Content Delivery Network) provider. Lastly, based on the model analysis and experiments, presented are their implications to policy development and tile future prospect.