• Title/Summary/Keyword: provocations

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North Korean military provocations and the corresponding direction - Focus on the threat that resulted in unequal power wood box mines provocation - (북한군의 군사적 도발 및 대응방향 - 목함 지뢰 도발에 이어진 비대칭전력 위협을 중심으로-)

  • Kim, Gyu Nam
    • Convergence Security Journal
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    • v.15 no.6_1
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    • pp.59-67
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    • 2015
  • Our vision is to see the North and there is a large visual target that the two exchanges and cooperation and unity that put the main enemy of enemies in mind in need. North Korea is the main enemy was illegal invasion June 25, 1950 July 27, 1953 has continued after the armistice join the illegal provocations and cease fire violations so far. August 4, 2015, North Korea was operating by the power differential that operate on an all-out war and declared the initial state after the exhibition gave another provocative DMZ wood box mines. US-ROK military was in the process of real-time detection of the North Korean power operation and the results were broadcast live through the media. Looking at these military provocations on the threat of asymmetrical power of North Korea's military threat, we would like to present how to respond.

Trends and Prospects of N. Korea Military Provocations After the Sinking of ROKS Cheon-an (천안함 폭침 이후 북한의 군사도발 양상과 전망)

  • Kim, Sung-Man
    • Strategy21
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    • s.34
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    • pp.58-92
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    • 2014
  • Even after S. Korea took 5.24 Measure(24 May 2014), N. Korea has not stopped raising provocations such as the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, electronic and cyber attacks. To make matters worse, the communist country lunched long-range missiles(twice) and conducted 3rd nuclear test, escalating tensions which could possibly lead to an all-out war. Korean Government failed to respond properly. However, escalation into an all-out war was deterred by the CFC immediately carrying out its peacetime duty(CODA). The US made a rapid dispatch of its augmentation forces(Aircraft carrier, nuclear-powered submarine, strategic bomber, F-22) to the Korean Peninsula. In recognition of the importance of the Combined Forces Command, since May 2013 the Park Geun-Hye Administration has been pushing ahead with re-postponement of Wartime Operational Control Transfer(which initially meant the disassembling of the CFC as of 1 December 2015) More recently, there has been a series of unusual indicators from the North. Judging from its inventory of 20 nuclear weapons, 1,000 ballistic missiles and biochemical weapons, it is safe to say that N. Korea has gained at least war deterrence against S. Korea. Normally a nation with nuclear weapons shrink its size of conventional forces, but the North is pursuing the opposite, rather increasing them. In addition, there was a change of war plan by N. Korea in 2010, changing 'Conquering the Korean Peninsula' to 'Negotiation after the seizure of the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area(GSMA)' and establishing detailed plans for wartime projects. The change reflects the chain reaction in which requests from pro-north groups within the South will lead to the proclamation of war. Kim, Jeong-Un, leader of N. Korean regime, sent threatening messages using words such as 'exercising a nuclear preemptive strike right' and 'burning of Seoul'. Nam, Jae-June, Director of National Intelligence Service, stated that Kim, Jung-Un is throwing big talks, saying communization of the entire Korean Peninsula will come within the time frame of 3 years. Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, shared an alarming message that there is a high possibility that the North will raise local provocations or a full-fledged war whenever while putting much emphasis on defense posture. As for the response concept of the Korean Government, it has been decided that 'ROK·US Combined Local Provocation Counter-Measure' will be adopted to act against local provocations from the North. Major provocation types include ▲ violation of the Northern Limit Line(NLL) with mobilization of military ships ▲ artillery provocations on Northwestern Islands ▲ low altitude airborne intrusion ▲ rear infiltration of SOF ▲ local conflicts within the Military Demarcation Line(MDL) ▲ attacking friendly ships by submarines. Counter-measures currently established by the US involves the support from USFK and USFJ. In order to keep the sworn promise, the US is reinforcing both USFK and USFJ. An all-out war situation will be met by 'CFC OPLAN5027' and 'Tailored Expansion Deterrence Forces' with the CFC playing a central role. The US augmentation forces stands at 690,000 troops, some 160 ships, 2,000 aircraft and this comprise 50% of US total forces, which is estimated to be ninefold of Korean forces. The CFC needs to be in center in handling both local provocations and an all-out war situation. However, the combat power of S. Korean conventional forces is approximately around 80% of that of N. Korea, which has been confirmed from comments made by Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, during an interpellation session at the National Assembly. This means that S. Korean forces are not much growing. In particular, asymmetric capabilities of the North is posing a serious threat to the South including WMD, cyber warfare forces, SOF, forces targeting 5 Northwestern Islands, sub-surface and amphibious assault forces. The presence of such threats urgently requires immediate complementary efforts. For complementary efforts, the Korean Government should consider ① reinforcement of Korean forces; putting a stoppage to shrinking military, acquisition of adequate defense budget, building a missile defense and military leadership structure validity review, ② implementation of military tasks against the North; disciplinary measures on the sinking of ROKS Cheon-an/shelling of Yeonpyeong Islands, arrangement of inter-Korean military agreements, drawing lessons from studies on the correlation between aid for N. Korea, execution of inter-Korean Summit and provocations from the North, and ③ bolstering the ROK·US alliance; disregarding wartime operational control transfer plan(disassembling of CFC) and creation of a combined division.

Challenges of Republic of Korea Navy : How to Cope with Old and New Threats from North Korea and Others. (북한 및 지역 해양안보 위협 극복과 대한민국 해군발전)

  • Bai, Hyung-Soo
    • Strategy21
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    • s.37
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    • pp.32-64
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    • 2015
  • This paper examines the types and trends of North Korea's military provocations and regional maritime threats against South Korea, and is focusing on the Republic of Korea's naval development and modernizations by the Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN) on future actions, what directions of the ROKN has taken thus far in response, as well as an examination of how the ROKN might respond to vulnerabilities identified throughout modern history. Importantly, this paper does not consider the domestic, bilateral, multilateral, regional and global political dimensions of the situation on the Korean Peninsula; nor does it consider the North Korea's transitional power politics, but including North Korea's nuclear program and submarine-launched ballistic missile developments, as a caveat, this paper is based on open sources in Korean and English language, and thus information concerning provocations is indicative only.

North Korean Leaders' Personality Reflection on Provocation Patterns: Narcissism and Fear

  • Lim, Sora;Ko, Sunghwah
    • Journal of Contemporary Eastern Asia
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    • v.19 no.2
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    • pp.216-233
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    • 2020
  • Over the last 70 years, South Korea has gone through countless provocations from North Korea. Provocation is something that must be delicately calculated before the actual action, since it can be extended to a serious conflict. Among the possible factors, this paper focuses on the leader's characteristic, because 1) under North Korean dictatorship, the leader's thoughts are critical influence to policies and 2) personal characteristic, especially if it is the dictator's, hardly changes even when the external circumstances change. The purpose of this paper is in analyzing the correlations between North Korean leader's characteristics and provocation pattern. First, three generations of Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il, and Kim Jong-un's personal characteristics will be described. Next, particular provocation features in respective leader's period will follow. Lastly, how each leader's characteristic and concerns were reflected on the provocations will be analyzed.

The North Korea's Foreign Policy Stance and Prospect (북한의 대외정책 기조와 전망)

  • Kim, Sung Woo
    • Convergence Security Journal
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    • v.14 no.6_1
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    • pp.57-63
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    • 2014
  • Even though the historical changes of the Cold War, they does not release the Cold War structure in Korean peninsula. And continues North Korea's provocations against South Korea. A factor of instability in Northeast Asia is the causing catastrophic inter-Korean relations and North Korea's Yeonpyeong shelling and provocation of the Cheonan battleship sinking by an explosion. These behaviors have been committed by among the North Korea military. North Korea's provocations made by a complex decision-making system in the United States and North Korea and South Korea. North Korea's aggressive military actions are conducted under the North Korean political system of strategies unification of the Korean peninsula. It has a duality of continuity and change, depending on the situation of a foreign policy in North Korea. If North Korea want maintain structure of their country, they should change the national policy and strategy, tactics and the military action type. North Korea should be a member of international community. As one of the country in the world, North Korea create economic power, nuclear tensions break, and participate in the international community for the peace.

Ways to apply the Strategic Communications to the ROK Navy (한국해군의 전략커뮤니케이션 (SC : Strategic Communication) 적용 방안)

  • Chung, Sam-Man
    • Strategy21
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    • s.41
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    • pp.294-332
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    • 2017
  • The aim of this study is to find ways to apply the strategic communications to the Republic of Korea Navy. It may be a little bit late for the ROK Navy to accommodate the SC in these days because the adoption and implementation of the SC by the Combined Forces Command has already been begun. It was in 2007 when the SC was in place in the CFC. ROK's Ministry of National Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff have also mulled over the SC and begun to apply it in part in the annual exercises such as Key Resolve command post drills and Foal Eagle field training exercise, etc. For the ROK Navy, in addition to those exercises, it is faced with further areas like North Korean maritime provocations and other maritime incidents where its version of SC is needed. As noted, the SC is not intended to deter or defend directly those provocations and incidents, but aims to create conditions favorable to the achievement of the navy's strategic objectives. The ROK Navy has to establish a SC planning center and implementing organizations within the Headquarters to be consistent with its above organizations such as MND, JCS, and CFC that have already applied the SC in part or in entirety. SC center and other related organizations need to be under the control of VCNO and the center needs to be located and administered by the policy division in N-5 at the HQs. The vision of the navy's SC is the winning without combats and the least damages in time of war. In other for the navy to reach the vision, the strategies to be executed are early establishment of SC implementing organizations, forming consensus over the need for the SC within the navy, strengthening core competencies to apply the SC, acquiring the SC experts and making doctrines on the SC. The SC, in addition, in the navy has to be planned and implemented in not only peace time and crisis time but also war time.

Deterrent Strategy in the era of North Korea's WMD and Missile Threats : Challenges and the Ways to go (북 핵·미사일 시대의 억제전략 : 도전과 나아갈 방향)

  • Lee, Sang-Yup
    • Strategy21
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    • s.41
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    • pp.232-260
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    • 2017
  • The purpose of this paper is to open a debate about what kind of deterrent strategy the ROK military should pursue in the era of NK's weapons of mass destruction and missile threats. I argue that the ROK military needs a comprehensive deterrent strategy that reflects the international security situations and trends and that builds on clear understanding of the basic concepts and how deterrence operates. The paper starts with surveying the basic knowledge of deterrence from the perspectives of both theory and practice. Then, it provides explanations on why deterrence against NK can be particularly difficult given the security environment in and around the Korean peninsula. For example, South Korea and North Korea hardly share 'common knowledge' that serves as a basic element for the operation of deterrence. Deterrence against North Korea involves complex situations in that both deterrence and compellence strategies may be relevant particularly to North Korea's WMD and missile threats. It also involves both immediate and general deterrence. Based on the discussion, I suggest several ideas that may serve as guidelines for establishing a deterrent strategy against NK. First, our threats for deterrence should be the ones that can be realized, particularly in terms of the international norms. In other words, they must be considered appropriate among other nations in the international community. Second, there should be separate plans for the different kinds of threats: one is conventional, local provocations and the other is WMD/missile related provocations. Third, we should pursue much closer cooperative relations with the U.S. military to enhance the effectiveness of immediate deterrence in the Korean peninsula. Fourth, the ROK military should aim to accomplish 'smart deterrence' maximizing the benefits of technological superiority. Fifth, the ROK military readiness and structure should be able to deny emerging North Korean military threats such as the submarine-launched ballistic missiles and intercontinental ballistic missiles. Lastly, in executing threats, we should consider that the current action influences credibility and reputation of the ROK, which in turn affect the decisions for future provocations. North Korea's WMD/missile threats may soon become critical strategic-level threats to South Korea. In retrospect, the first debate on building a missile defense system in South Korea dates back to the 1980s. Mostly the debate has centered on whether or not South Korea's system should be integrated into the U.S. missile defense system. In the meantime, North Korea has become a small nuclear power that can threaten the United States with the ballistic missiles capability. If North Korea completes the SLBM program and loads the missiles on a submarine with improved underwater operation capability, then, South Korea may have to face the reality of power politics demonstrated by Thucydides through the Athenians: "The strong do what they have the power to do, the weak accept what they have to accept."

A study on overcoming the prospect of North Korea's fourth-generation war threats : Focusing on the Homeland Defense Reservists (북한의 제4세대전쟁 위협전망과 극복방안 연구: 향토예비군 운용 개선을 중심으로)

  • Kim, Yeon Jun
    • Convergence Security Journal
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    • v.16 no.6_1
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    • pp.3-13
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    • 2016
  • We take it for granted that strong sides defeat weaker counterparts, while predicting the outcome of the battles. But in modern war, we can find plenty of evidence that weak sides won against the strong. This phenomenon can be understood logically by the fourth-generation war theory. the North Korean does not give up its unification strategy, which is unification by force, even though its inferior power. It is continuing various political, social and military levels of provocations toward both the international community and South Korea. Recently, North Korea did nuclear test, launched ICBM test, provoked the DMZ, and expecting to continue the provocations of the fourth-generation war level. We have to understand the nature of North Korea's fourth-generation war threats and provocations that it is focusing on. Based on this, have a new understanding of the value of the Homeland Defense Reservists as fundamental measures as the fourth-generation war threat and supplement related systems. We can firmly refuse the balance of power and power shift of the Korean Peninsula through improved Homeland Defense Reservists. As the expected North Korea's the fourth-generation war threats, our Homeland Defense Reservists is a firm will of conduct war, and political-social-economic-military means, it is possible to display as the best alternative.

May 24 Measures and Future North Korea Policy (5.24 대북조치와 향후 대북정책 과제)

  • Kim, Tae-Woo
    • Strategy21
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    • s.34
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    • pp.128-148
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    • 2014
  • In south Korea, the so-called 'conservative-liberal' rivalry over the assessment of the government's North Korean policies is seen to be impeding the road to right policy choices. For example, the liberals accused former President Lee Myung-bak's hardline policy of provoking Pyongyang and leading to a deterioration of inter-Korean relations, while the conservatives appreciated it for helping nurture mutually beneficial inter-Korean relations in the longer term by compelling North Korea to observe international norms. However, such debate over the vices and virtues of Seoul's North Korea policies is hardly meaningful as the measuring sticks used by the liberals and the conservatives are entirely different matters. The two major goals South Korea must pursue with its North Korean policies should be 'peaceful management of division' and 'change in North Korea'. The former is related to maintaining stability within South Korea and promoting co-prosperity with North Korea. For this, the nation needs to engage, encompass and assist the Pyongyang regime. The second goal is also necessary since South Korea, as a divided nation, must seek a unified Korea under the system of democracy and market economies by bringing change in North Korea. For this, South Korea needs powerful leverages with which it can persuade and coerce the North. This means that the nation is destined to simultaneously chase the above-mentioned two goals, while also both recognizing and negating the legitimacy of the North Korean regime. This situation necessitates Seoul to apply flexibility in reconciling with Pyongyang while applying firm principles to sever the vicious circle involving the North's military provocations. The May 25 Measures, which banned trade and economic cooperation with the North except those related to humanitarian assistance, were taken as sanctions against Pyongyang for sinking the South Korean corvette Chonan in March 2010. The Measures were taken by the Seoul government immediately after a multinational investigation team discovered evidence confirming that the South Korean naval ship had been torpedoed by a midget North Korean submarine. Naturally, the May 24 Measures have since then become a major stumbling block in inter-Korean exchange, prompting opposition politicians and concerned entrepreneurs to demand Seoul to unilaterally lift the Measures. Given the significant damages the Measures have inflicted on inter-Korean economic relations, removing them remains as homework for both Koreas. However, the Measures pertains to the 'principles on national security' the Seoul government must adhere to under all circumstances. This is why North Korea's apology and promises not to repeat similar provocations must come first. For now, South Korea has no alternative but to let North Korea solve the problems it has created. South Korea's role is to help the North do so.