• Proceedings of the Korean Operations and Management Science Society Conference
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• 1989.10a
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• pp.88-88
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• 1989

• Journal of Korean Academy of Nursing
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• v.27 no.1
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• pp.169-177
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• 1997

This study aims at empirically clarifying the relationship between power and the interpersonal conflict, including nurses' understanding of their relative power, the causes of interpersonal conflicts with the nurses, and strategies to resolve conflicts, in order to understand how nurses' relative power affect their conflicts. For the empirical survey, the population was defined as all the nurses working at a medical organization in Seoul, Korea. 1083 nurses were selected as the sample for the questionnaire survey and statistical analyses. For the sampling, 32 medical organizations were selected by a stratified random method and sub-samples were arbitrarily drawn from each organization to obtain the final sample of 1083 nurses who responded to the questionnaire designed by the reseacher. According to the result of the study, most nurses experience conflict more than once a month, and 70.4% of the respondents answered that interpersonal conflicts were directly or indirectly caused by power relations. which indicates that they perceive power relations as the main cause of interpersonal conflicts. Nurses experienced the most conflicts with interns and residents(29.7%), then patients and their families(24.3%), higher-positioned nurses(12.3%), nurse colleagues(7.7%), lower-positioned nurses(6.5%), and staff doctors(5.1%). If we classify these into three groups. the frequency of the conflicts, from most frequent to least. is in the order of doctors. nurses, and patients. In terms of relative power, nurses perceive that they have greater power than patients and their families, lower-positioned nurses, and nurse colleagues. In contrast, nurses perceive that they have less power than interns and residents, higher-positioned nurses. and staff doctors. Among these groups. nurses perceive that they have the most power over patients and the least over staff doctors. These results indicate that nurses tend to experience more conflicts with members of groups that are stronger than themselves in terms of relative power, Nurses use positive strategies such as the compromise strategy(32.3%) or the collaboration strategy (20.3%) to manage conflicts, more than other strategies. However, they use avoidance or competition strategy more at the earlier stage, compromise strategy more in the mid stage, and collaboration strategy more at the later stage of the interpersonal conflict. In relation to power, nurses use the collaboration strategy or the compromise strategy more when their perceived power is greater than or equal to their counterpart's, and they use the avoidance strategy or the accommodation strategy if their power is less. In terms of source of power, nurses' perceived relative power is greater in the order of referent power. expert power, reward power, legitimate power. and coercive power. where referent power is perceived as having the greatest power and coercive power is least. Most nurses(69.3%) used their power to resolve a conflict. with positive outcomes. Expert power was used most frequently. Overall. this study strongly indicates that the enhancement of power of nurses to have equal power relations with doctors would heighten the success of conflict resolution, since power is the main cause of conflicts. Specifcally. nurses experience most conflicts with doctors against whom they perceive the greatest gap in power. and the choice of a conflict management strategy depend upon their power relations.

• Strategy21
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• s.30
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• pp.236-262
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• 2012

Morgenthau claims that in international relations, there are the economic, political, and military powers that enable a nation to achieve its political and diplomatic goals. This paper explores the possibility of resolving international conflicts with naval power. First, the theoretical and historical perspective, naval power was used as a final resort to force a nation's political or diplomatic objective on an enemy nation when negotiations failed, and this was done through the physical and psychological destruction of the enemy by naval power. But as the use of military power has decreased because of the invention of the nuclear weapon, the existence of a large and capable navy deterrent has become one of the most useful military options among a nation's diplomatic measures. In other words, he focused on the political usefulness of naval power as a deterrent and coercive diplomatic tool for persuading other nations to acquiesce, rather than using naval power and actual military action as a final resort. The reason for this is that compared to army and air force, navy's flexibility, continuity, and the ability to deter are greater. The navy provides excellent accessibility through its wide mobility on the sea, and it has been shown through research that the navy possesses a political usefulness that facilitates the solution of conflicts through presence, naval intervention, and naval blockade. On the other hand, among the factors that could improve the influence of the navy are alliance relations, a reliable and powerful navy, carrots and sticks that it would have to deal with in the case of successful or unsuccessful negotiations, and support from international opinion. On this paper I introduce E.N.Luttwak's naval suasion theory. By the his theory, there are two mode of naval suasion. One is latent naval suasion the other is active suasion. Latent suasion there are deterrent mode and supportive mode. Active naval suasion there are coercive mode and supportive mode. Coercive mode has positive and negative. The limitations of naval suasion have been identified as follows. First, because the objective of the use of naval power is persuading enemy nations, the results are unpredictable. Second, the leaders of all countries possess limited understanding on the complexities of naval power and therefore lack understanding of the usefulness of naval power when choosing options. Third, in case of failure through naval suasion, prestige and reputation of a nation can be damaged. Finally, the following are additional possible research topic. First, a research on the decision making process of choosing naval power as a measure to resolve conflicts is needed. Lastly, research on the size of the navy and types of ships required for efficient naval suasion is needed. Today's world requires cooperative security regime so that middle class navy also requires political use of naval power in solving international conflicts. Therefore, additional research on this topic is needed.

• Journal of Contemporary Eastern Asia
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• v.17 no.1
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• pp.5-26
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• 2018

Joseph S. Nye defined soft power as the power of attraction to affect the behavior of other states through the use of non-coercive instruments including culture, political values and foreign policy. Over the last two decades, environmental issues have grown in importance on the international agenda and become critical components of states' foreign policy-making. This paper aims to analyze environmental foreign policy as a soft power instrument focusing on two major rising powers: China and India. Traditionally, China and India had been reluctant to make any commitments in the field. However, they have shown greater willingness to act in global environmental governance in the past decade. They started playing more active roles in global climate change negotiations and supported a number of initiatives. Their current rise in global environmental governance has even been praised by the international community as the Paris agreement case demonstrated. This study evaluates China's and India's recent efforts in global environmental governance with a focus on climate change negotiations linking their constructive position to their soft power potential. It is argued that environmental issues are used by these two states as foreign policy strategy to gain more influence in international politics. This study finds out that China's climate-related environmental diplomacy has been more ambitious than that of India and thus has been closer to fulfill its potential as a soft power asset.

• Strategy21
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• s.44
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• pp.103-141
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• 2018

As the South China Sea maritime dispute illustrates, when considering the place where maritime claims occur, states do not have many choices to respond to maritime claims in which disputed areas are located far away from the land and are surrounded by the sea. As Mearsheimer (2014) points out, the sea stops power projection. Therefore, in order to adopt coercive as well as peaceful settlement policies to deal with maritime claims, states need to overcome obstacles (the sea) to project power. It means that if states want to conduct a specific foreign policy action, such as negotiating maritime borderlines or arguing sovereignty on islands, they need a tool (naval power) to coerce or to persuade the opponent. However, there are lack of research that studies maritime claims from the perspective of naval power. This research project fills this gap based on naval power. How do relative levels of naval power and (dis) parities of naval power influence the occurrence of MIDs over maritime claims? Naval power is a constitutive element during maritime claims. If disputants over maritime claims have required naval power to project their capability, it means that they have the capability to apply various ways, such as aggressive options including MIDs, to accomplish their goals. So, I argue that when two claimants have enough naval power to project their capabilities, the likelihood of MIDs over maritime claims increases. Given that one or both states have a certain level of naval power, how does relative naval power between two claimants influence the management of maritime claims? Based on the power transition theory, I argue that when the disparities of relative naval power between claimants becomes distinctive, militarized conflicts surrounding maritime territory are less probable. Based on the ICOW project which codes maritime claims from 1900 to 2001, the empirical results of the Poisson models show if both claimants have projectable naval power, the occurrence of MIDs over maritime claims increases. In addition, the result shows that when disputants maintain similar relative naval powers, they are more likely to initiate MIDs over maritime claims. To put it differently, if naval capabilities' gap between two claimants becomes larger, the probability of the occurrence of MIDs decreases.

• Journal of Distribution Research
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• v.4 no.2
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• pp.1-20
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• 1999

This study aims to provide distributors with several implications on the channel strategy by testing factors which influence on the offsetting investment. Medium-sized distributor facing a relatively inferior power can cause profit vulnerability from large manufacurer's opportunistic behaviors. At the same time, we tested the relationship commitment to the relation with manufacturer as another alternative strategy taken by medium-sized distributer. For this research, samples from dealers in oil-petroleum refinery industry were selected and the data was collected using mail survey. The data was analyzed utilizing validity test, reliability test, factor analysis, correlation analysis and LISREL. The major analyzed results are as follows: First, the offsetting investment of preventing loss from manufacturer's opportunism didn't affect medium-sized distributor's sales empirically. Second, the hypothesis that the more the medium-sized distributor's transaction specific assets which they invest in the transactional relationship with manufacturer, the more the safeguard against the expected opportunism of manufacturer was not supported by the results. Third, the more use of coercive power by the manufacturer, the more increase in the perception of expected opportunism of manufacturer by the medium-sized distributor, it make stimulates offsetting investment as safeguard by medium-sized distributor and it has negative effect on developing commitment. Finally, the large manufactures dealing with a medium-sized distributor firm which had a reputation of fairness didn't make offsetting investment as a response for distributor's opportunism.

• Strategy21
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• s.33
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• pp.37-64
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• 2014

The year 2010 has been regarded as a year of China's assertive diplomacy. A series of China's behavior--including China's critical reaction to the U.S. for its sales of weapons to Taiwan, the Dalai Lama's visit to President Obama, China's arbitrary designation of 'core interests' over the South China Sea, China's inordinate reactions to the sinking of the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong bombardment, and China's activities in the Senkaku/Diaoyu island areas--has served as the witnesses to China's assertive diplomacy in 2010. The major causes of China's assertive diplomacy can be summed up by three factors: potential power transition from U.S. to China; emerging China's nationalism; and the recession of the Tao Guang Yang Hui as a diplomatic principle. But a majority of Western sinologists claim that China's assertive diplomacy is defensive in terms of its character. China's neighboring states, however, perceive its assertive diplomacy as diplomatic threat. Due to these states' geographical proximity and capability gaps with China, these neighbors experience difficulties in coping with China's behavior. In particular, China's coercive economic diplomacy, in which China tends to manipulate the neighbors' economic dependency on China for its diplomatic leverage, is a case in point for China's assertive diplomacy. China's assertiveness seems to be continued even after the inauguration of Xi Jinping government. Although the Xi government's diplomatic rhetorics in "New Type of Great Power Relationship" and the "Convention for Neighboring States Policy" sound friendly and cooperative, its subsequent behavior, like unilateral announcement of Chinese Air Defense Identification Zone (CADIZ), does not conform with its rhetoric. Overall, China's assertiveness has been consolidated as a fashion of its diplomacy, and it is likely to continue in its relations with neighbors. As a neighboring state, the ROK should approach to it with more balanced attitude. In addition, it needs to find out a new diplomatic leverage to deal with China in accordance with its security environment, in which China plays a growing role.

• Strategy21
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• s.37
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• pp.65-103
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• 2015

This study is an attempt to look into the future role of the ROKN and to provide a strategic way forward with a special focus on naval strategic concept and force planning. To accomplish this goal, this research takes four sequential steps for analysis: 1) assessing the role and utility of naval power of ROKN since its foundation back in 1945; 2) forecasting features of various maritime threats to influence the security of Korea in the future directly or indirectly; 3) identifying the roles to be undertaken by future ROKN; and 4) recommending Korean way of naval force planning and the operational concept of naval power. This study seeks to show that ROKN needs comprehensive role to better serve the nation with respect to national security, national prosperity and development, and future battle-space management. To safeguard the national security of Korea, it suggests three roles: 1) national guard for the peaceful unification; 2) protector of the maritime sovereignty; and 3) suppressor to maritime threats. Three more roles are highlighted for national prosperity: 1) escort of the national economy; 2) guardian for national maritime activities; and 3) contributor to the world peace. These roles need to be closely connected with the role for the battle-space management. This paper addresses the need for a dramatic shift of the central operational domain from land to maritime in the future. This will eventually offer future ROKN a leading role for developing strategic concept and force planning rather than merely a supporting one. This study finally suggests 'balanced' strategy both in concept development and force planning. A balanced force planning is a 'must' rather than an 'option' when considering a division of function between Task Fleets and Area Fleets, constructing cutting-edge conventional forces such as Aegis destroyer, CVs, or submarines, and the mix of high-profile platform and low-profile when composing future fleets. A 'balance' is also needed in operational concept. The fleet should be prepared to fulfill its missions based on two different types of force operation i.e., coercive or cooperative application of the utility of naval force. The findings and recommendations of the study are relevant today, and will be increasingly important in the future to achieve various political goals required by enhancing the utility of naval power.

• Strategy21
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• s.45
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• pp.33-59
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• 2019

There have many research papers to see China's evolution of maritime strategy and naval modernization in terms of its naval mind-set. However, this article focuses on assessing how China uses its all sorts of maritime strength to achieve 'a building maritime great power.' The aim of the article is to introduce a new perspective to this debate by analysing China's diversified ma maritime capabilities and a new way of implementation in maritime security strategy. In recent years, China has been developing not only unpredictable maritime military capabilities but also maritime supporting forces - Coast Guard and Maritime Militia. And recently China adopted up-to-date operational concept aimed at gaining military superiority in Asia-Pacific waters. By taking salami slicing strategy, gray zone strategy and cabbage strategy, China has been trying to exercise surpassing influences in regional maritime area, also in western Pacific region. This article provides a stepping stone to comprehend the aspect of China's recent maritime strategic actions, especially in Yellow Sea. In conclusion, this article suggests some policy recommendations for countering China's coercive maritime strategy. First, Korea should make sure a strategic concept of maritime security, instead of land warfare focused strategic concept. Second, it is needed to set up suitable naval forces for actively responding to neighbor nation's offensive actions.

• Journal of National Security and Military Science
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• s.8
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• pp.239-270
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• 2010

This thesis is to make an appropriate national defense policy of Republic of Korea through studying the Hegemony Strategy of United States. I searched the theory of hegemony. The hegemony was differently defined by the point of time and region. The strong power nations with the hegemony have been making efforts to maintain their hegemony everytime. I have conclusion that the presence of hegemony once emerged, it brought regional stability in place whether it is coercive or beneficial. The stability and instability of international order IS not exclusively dependent on hegemony. Even if the safety of hegemony cannot guarantee absolute stability of international order, there IS on doubt that the hegemony has enormous impact on that. According to the hegemonic theory, the history of mankind equals to the history of rising and falling hegemony. The international order was changed as the hegemony changes. The United States has been making efforts to maintain her global hegemony during the post cold-war era as well. Taking all these into consideration, relevant military strategy direction able to pursue national interest is that to make up for the relative weakness in the strategic environment. South Korea have to prepare security policy response as following. First, South Korea should build the military force equipped with advanced weapons in military technology sector and solidify military diplomatic relation able to form cooperative relation in wartime. Second, South Korea should make solid Alliance of Korea and U.S. Third, develop and maintain multilateral security cooperation of East Asia. Forth, we could realize that there are means that can neutralize opponent's strong point by seeking one or two and more asymmetry in the aspect of strategy, tactics, and means through asymmetric strategy. Than the military force of South Korea should develop into a force that is able to overcome to the traditional North Korea's threat and new type of conflicts. And the force should have sufficient strength and be deployed to effectively defend the Korean Peninsula. So, we need to establish a denial and defense system against any hostile neighboring country. Therefore, ROK military forces preparing for the future should try to construct a future military power to gradually establish enough strength for self-defense to prepare for a uncertain security environment and when the Korean Peninsula is unified in a future.