• Communications of the Korean Mathematical Society
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• v.33 no.1
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• pp.345-360
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• 2018

In finance, barrier options are options contracts with a payoff that depends on whether the price of the underlying asset hits a predetermined barrier level during the option's lifetime. Based on exotic options and random fluctuations of interest rates in the marketplace, we consider discount barrier options with a stochastic interest rate driven by the Hull-White process. This paper derives the closed-form solutions of the discount barrier option and the discount double barrier option using Mellin transform methods and the PDE (partial differential equation) method of images.

• Advances in robotics research
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• v.2 no.3
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• pp.247-257
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• 2018

Various studies have been performed to coordinate robots in transporting objects and different artificial intelligence algorithms have been considered in this field. In this paper, we investigate and solve Multi-Robot Transportation problem by using a combined auction algorithm. In this algorithm each robot, as an agent, can perform the auction and allocate tasks. This agent tries to clear the auction by studying different states to increase payoff function. The algorithm presented in this paper has been applied to a multi-robot system where robots are responsible for transporting objects. Using this algorithm, robots are able to improve their actions and decisions. To show the excellence of the proposed algorithm, its performance is compared with three heuristic algorithms by statistical simulation approach.

• International Journal of Internet, Broadcasting and Communication
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• v.13 no.1
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• pp.243-248
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• 2021

Although many different types of covert channels have been suggested in the literature, there are little work in directly applying game theory to building up covert channel. This is because researchers have mainly focused on tailoring game theory for covert channel analysis, identification, and covert channel problem solving. Unlike typical adaptation of game theory to covert channel, we show that game theory can be utilized to establish a new type of covert channel in IoT devices. More specifically, we propose a covert channel that can be constructed by utilizing the Nash Equilibrium with sensor data collected from IoT devices. For covert channel construction, we set random seed to the value of sensor data and make payoff from random number created by running pseudo random number generator with the configured random seed. We generate I × J (I ≥ 2, J ≥ 2) matrix game with these generated payoffs and attempt to obtain the Nash Equilibrium. Covert channel construction method is distinctly determined in accordance with whether or not to acquire the Nash Equilibrium.

• The Pure and Applied Mathematics
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• v.27 no.4
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• pp.231-249
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• 2020

We present an efficient and robust finite difference method for a two-asset jump diffusion model, which is a partial integro-differential equation (PIDE). To speed up a computational time, we compute a matrix so that we can calculate the non-local integral term fast by a simple matrix-vector operation. In addition, we use bilinear interpolation to solve integral term of PIDE. We can obtain more stable value by using the payoff-consistent extrapolation. We provide numerical experiments to demonstrate a performance of the proposed numerical method. The numerical results show the robustness and accuracy of the proposed method.

• Proceedings of the Korea Inteligent Information System Society Conference
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• 2000.04a
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• pp.207-216
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• 2000

Due to recent growing interest in autonomous software agents and their potential application in areas such as electronic commerce, the autonomous negotiation become more important. Evidence from both theoretical analysis and observations of human interactions suggests that if decision makers have prior information on opponents and furthermore learn the behaviors of other agents from interaction, the overall payoff would increase. We propose a new methodology for a strategy finding process using data mining in autonomous negotiation system ; ANSIA (Autonomous Negotiation System using Intelligent Agent). ANSIA is a strategy based negotiation system. The framework of ANSIA is composed of following component layers : 1) search agent layer, 2) data mining agent layer and 3) negotiation agent layer. In the data mining agent layer, that plays a key role as a system engine, extracts strategy from the historic negotiation is extracted by competitive learning in neural network. In negotiation agent layer, we propose the autonomous negotiation process model that enables to estimate the strategy of opponent and achieve interactive settlement of negotiation. ANISIA is motivated by providing a computational framework for negotiation and by defining a strategy finding model with an autonomous negotiation process.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2000.07a
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• pp.400-402
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• 2000

This paper presents a game theoretic approach for power transactions analysis in a competitive market. The considered competitive power market is regarded as PooICo model, and the participating players are restricted by only two generating entities for simplicity in this paper. The analysis is performed on the basis of marginal cost based relations of bidding price and bidding generations. That is, we assume that the bidding price of each player is determined by the marginal cost when the bidding generation is pre-determined. This paper models the power transaction as a two player game and analyzes by applying the Nash eauilibrium idea. The generalized game model for power transactions covering constant-sum(especially zero-sum), and nonconstant-sum game is developed in this paper. Also, the analysis for each game model are performed in the case studies. Here, we have defined the payoff of each player as the weighted sum of both player's profits.

• Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering
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• v.42 no.4
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• pp.39-48
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• 2019

This paper considers the Prisoner's Dilemma Game in which there exists a dilemma that the best response is that both players are to confess, but doing not confess can give a higher gain to the both players in a social perspective. To resolve such a dilemma in the game, an incentive model to encourage to confess and a penalty model for being imposed when not confessing are introduced, respectively. Then, the conditions are characterized under which incentive or penalty involved in the game's payoffs can make the game rational without a dilemma on both the personal and social perspectives, by taking the payoff values as variables with the incentive and penalty factors. Furthermore, it turns out that the resulting values of incentive and penalty are inversely proportional to each other, and thus, obtaining one of these amounts can provide the other. Simple examples are shown to interpret the theoretical verifications of our models, and randomly generated data based simulation results investigate the tendency of incentive and penalty and the resulting game values for a variety of instances. These results can provide a framework on resolving the dilemma by artificially putting incentive or penalty, although it is careful to apply more generalized real world games.

• Journal of the Ergonomics Society of Korea
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• v.34 no.2
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• pp.103-113
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• 2015

Objective: This study proposes a systematic process to present the analysis methods and solutions of organizational root causes to human errors on the railroad. Background: In fact, organizational root cause such as organizational culture is an important factor in the safety concerns on human errors in the nuclear power plant, railroad and aircraft. Method: The proposed process is as follows: 1) define analysis boundary 2) select human error taxonomy 3) perform accident analysis 4) draw root causes with FGI 5) review root causes analysis with survey 6) chart analysis of root causes, and 7) propose alternatives and solutions. Results: As a result, root causes of the organizations like railroad and nuclear power plant came from the educational problems, violations, payoff system, safety culture and so forth. Conclusion: The proposed process does predict potential railroad accident through retrospect error analysis by building new human error taxonomies and problem solution. Application: This study would contribute to examination of the relationship between human error-based accidents and organizational root causes.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 1999.07c
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• pp.1344-1346
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• 1999

This paper presents a game theoretic approach for power transactions analysis in a competitive market. The considered competitive power market is regarded as PoolCO model, and the participating players are restricted by only two generating entities for simplicity in this paper. The analysis is performed on the basis of marginal cost based relations of bidding price and bidding generations. That is, we assume that the bidding price of each player is determined by the marginal cost when the bidding generation is pre-determined. This paper models the power transaction as a two player game and analyzes by applying the Nash eauilibrium idea. The generalized game model for power transactions covering constant-sum(especially zero-sum), and nonconstant-sum game is developed in this paper. Also, the analysis for each game model are Performed in the case studies. Here, we have defined the payoff of each player as the weighted sum of both player's profits.

• Journal of Families and Better Life
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• v.6 no.1
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• pp.117-129
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• 1988

The purposes of this study are 1) to explore the evaluating attribute of family life- insurance 2) to examine the relationship between evaluation attribute variables and level of consumer satisfaction/ dissatisfaction (CS/D), and 3) to investigate the sociodemographic variables and psychological variables which influence the purchase of life-insurance. The data used in this study include 432 households of 208 life-insurance purchasers and 224 non-purchasers Statistics used for the data analysis are x2, factor analysis, multiple regression and a discriminant analysis. The resulting major findings are as follows; 1) The evaluating attributes are saving function, convenience. economic payoff, safety for future accident, agreement of insurance, and reputation of brand. 2) Among these factors. the most important factors. in CS/D of life-insurance are saving function, and reputation of brand. 3) the purchase of life-insurance has been influenced by such sociodemographic variables as husband's age , family income, and family life-cycle. Psychological variables such as attitude of life, perceived risk, consumer attitude about insurance business did not influence the purchase of life -insurance significantly. As mentioned above, we can conclude that Korean purchasers of life-insurance are using irrational evaluating attributes. Therefore more education of the consumers and more information about life-insurance purchases are necessary. Especially low-income households and first step of family life-cycle families are turned out to need more education as well as more information.