• Korea and Global Affairs
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• v.3 no.1
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• pp.5-38
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• 2019

After the democratization movement in 1987, korean politics was transformed into three kim's politics by y Kim Yeong-sam, Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-pil. Before the time of three kim's politics, korean politics lasted for one long term, but three kim's politics made possible the peaceful regime change through political party integration and party coalition. The evaluation of three kim's politics coexist both positive and negative. The Positive political effects are diversification of political party composition and stabilization of regime change. Three kim's politics transformed the political party composition of Korea from a two-party system to a multi-party system, made possible a peaceful regime change through the unification of three parties and the DJP coalition. However, the negative political distortions of three kim's politics are the shortening of political parties and the concentration of political ideology. In three kim's politics, political party in Korea has a very short life due to the creation of political parties, the dissolution of political parties, the reorganization of political parties and the integration of political parties. Conservatism and progressive tendencies related three kim's politics were stabilized through Yeongnam region and Honam region. Therefore, three kim's politics means that the proportion of Korean politics is very high. Political effects and distortions derived from three kim's politics have become a challenge for Korean politics to overcome.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.1 no.1
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• pp.9-29
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• 2003

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the political discussion and the success conditions on the digital democracy and issues for introducing e-party of Korean parties, and to propose alternatives for solving these issues. To accomplish this purpose, this paper review actual conditions of the digital politics, analyze on results of e-party driving of Korean parties, review issues for introducing e-party of Korean parties, and propose alternatives for solving these issues. Proposed conditions on digital politics and e-party development will contribute to the prosperity of the Korean politics. In near future, an empirical study on the standpoints of voters politicians will be followed.

• Analyses & Alternatives
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• v.1 no.2
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• pp.2-12
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• 2017

Research on democratic transitions has relatively ignored the question of why some countries experience a regressive form of political pacts, while others do not. This paper develops a simple game-theoretic model to explain the phenomenon of collusive pacts in the process of democratization. Trasformismo is a term that refers to a system of political exchange based on informal clientelistic politics. The existing studies of the politics of trasformismo have emphasized the timing of industrialization and the tradition of strong state as conditions of the politics of trasformismo. However, not every late industrializers and not every strong states experienced some variants of collusive political pacts in their trajectories of democratization. In this paper, I contend that the politics of trasformismo is rather a generalizable pattern of political elites' behavior under particular circumstances. By developing a simple game theoretic model, this paper suggests the conditions under which political actors are likely to collude to a regressive form of political pacts. The model shows that the likelihood of collusion to a regressive form of political pacts is a function of a set of parameters. First, a higher level of incumbency advantage in electoral competition is likely to be associated with a higher probability of collusive political pacts. Second, a higher degree of the monopoly of political representation of political parties without a close link with a variety of societal forces is likely to induce collusive behavior among politicians. Third, the ruling party leader's expectations about the likelihood of a safe extrication are related to collusive political pacts. This paper then engages in a case study of the 1990 three-party merger in South Korea. The 1990 Korean case is interesting in that the ruling party created a new party after having merged with two opposition parties. This case can be considered a result of political maneuver in a context of democratization. The case study suggests the empirical relevance of the game-theoretic model. As the game of trasformismo and the case study of the 1990 three-party merger in South Korea have shown, the collusive political pact was neither determined by a certain stage of economic development nor by a particular cultural systems. Rather, it was a product of the art of trasformismo based on party leaders' rational calculations of the expected likelihood of taking governing power.

• Korean Journal of Legislative Studies
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• v.27 no.3
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• pp.69-106
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• 2021

This paper aims to explain why severe political conflicts and confrontation between the ruling and opposition forces have been continuously caused, focusing on the institutional combination of presidentialism and the two-party system with strong party disciplines, after democratization in South Korea. And this also presents the US as a case in which presidentialism and a two-party system with weak party disciplines were combined once, and the Chile as another case in which presidentialism and a multi-party system with strong party disciplines is combined, respectively, and further analyzes how the chance of consensual politics could be raised in both the countries. In addition, this study suggests a practical implication that, in South Korea also, the political reforms for changes in party system such as the decentralization or democratization in party organizations to enhance the autonomy of individual legislators, or the introduction of runoff system in presidential elections or proportional representation system in parliamentary elections to product a multi-party system, are required for a high chance of consensual politics.

• Journal of the Korean Geographical Society
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• v.47 no.5
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• pp.718-734
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• 2012

This study investigates the interference of politics of regional cleavage in the redistricting for national assembly election and its effects on gerrymandering and malapportionment. Since the Constitutional Assembly election, the argument about gerrymandering and malapportionment continues and the single-member election district with simple plurality system in Korea has aggravated the problem of cleavage and unfairness. Especially, redistrictings for national assembly election in 2008 and 2012 are suspected of gerrymandering by Saenuri party and Democratic United party. Yeongnam region where Saenuri party is dominant and Honam region where Democratic United party is, are over-represented compared to population, while the districts in Gyeonggi-do are under-represented and the need for increasing the number of districts has been ignored. These redistrictings might come from unfair and collusive interference of politics of regional cleavage, and consequently malapportionment has been brought about.

• Strategy21
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• s.31
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• pp.164-189
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• 2013

Last December, the Abe government came back, and it is critical core of Northeast Asia. They visited to Yasukuni Shrine, denied to Korea's invasion and they are denying all of their invasion history. I'm afraid they want to take Dokdo. Dokdo is Korean territory, but Japan politics assert it belongs to them. To make matters worse, they are waiting an opportunity to invade. Ministry of Foreign Affair blue paper and Ministry of Defense white paper have claimed Dokdo as Japanese territory, and many right wing politicians are taking part in the Cabinet. Liberal Democratic Party of Japan is becoming more right wing politicians than before by Japan Restoration Party, and the others also have more right wing ideologies. It can't control Japan right wing political parties. They finally aim to take Dokdo. In this situation, we have to defend Dokdo. Japan must be very important partner for our nation's development. But it is necessary to trust between two countries. Dokdo is effective controlled by Korea. It is the best way how to keep Dokdo. During Dokdo is effective controlled by Korea, the Japanese Government has limited Dokdo's ownership. Now we don't have any way to keep Dokdo except more effective control. We have strategies about Japanese claim of Dokdo's ownership as follows. First, we can overpower Japan right wing politics as Japan conscientious force's ideology. Second, Japan politics say to Dokdo's ownership is based on The San Francisco Treaty. But it is not right. Third, we have to exchange a lot of local government and civic society in Japan. Finally, we must prepare thoroughly to bring the matter to the International Court of Justice.

• American Studies
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• v.44 no.1
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• pp.81-112
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• 2021

As polarization intensified in the United States, the voting support of the presidential party lawmakers has become the most important source of power for the president. The presidential party has been believed to legalize the president's agenda in a unified government and prevent legislation opposed by the president from being passed by the Congress within a divided government. However, even under party polarization, all the lawmakers and factions of the presidential party have not voted in accordance with the president's policy preferences. Statistical analysis shows that lawmakers who corresponded to the ideology median of the presidential party most strongly supported the president's agendas during the unified government. However, lawmakers with extreme ideologies voted more actively for the president than those with median ones during the divided government. Furthermore, this trend has been amplified regarding ideological factions.

• Korean Journal of Legislative Studies
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• v.15 no.1
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• pp.261-290
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• 2009

The primary purpose of this study is to explain the changing nature of Korean Democratic Labor Party, namely the revealed characteristics contrary to the party's original identity, based on empirical framework of so-called "Korean Democratic Labor Party' as a Parliamentary Party". This paper focuses on the unanticipated phenomenon that Korean Democratic Labor Party, in spite of its expectancy as an alternative party model to overcome the challenges of Korean party politics, has lost its characteristics as a mass party but has revealed the characteristics of parliamentary party since it took parliamentary seats in National Assembly.

• 중국학논총
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• no.68
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• pp.141-161
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• 2020

This paper aims to analyze China's political education, which plays a role of vehicle in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) promoting its ideological strategy, in order to figure out the utility of the CCP's ideological strategy. After Reform and Opening Up, the CCP rebuilt and reinforced political education in China according to its ideological strategy. Especially after the Tiananmen incident in 1989, the CCP made nationalism and patriotism as the core part of political education, and expanded its curriculum. Such reinforcement of political education has a advantage in maintaining the CCP's governance by creating a nationalist consensus against the western ideas. Although it can be helpful for the stability of domestic politics, it also has negative possibilities which isolate China in the global community and obstruct China's development.

• Asia-Pacific Journal of Business
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• v.11 no.3
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• pp.217-227
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• 2020

Purpose - Against the backdrop of the recent intense political conflict in Korea's political circles, it is to reveal from an economic point of view the hidden aspects behind the hostile conflict between the two political forces. Design/methodology/approach - This paper is not a normative study to find a solution to political conflict, but a positive study to reveal the mechanism of reciprocity that exists between the two parties of conflict in real politics. Therefore, the analysis is based on game theory methodology. Findings - It is shown that the ruling party should choose a level of preemptive response that is neither insufficient nor excessive if it aims to avoid radical anti-government struggles by opposition parties. We also find that even if the chances of success of the opposition's radical offensive struggle are low, the use of that strategy is not necessarily reduced. In addition, we have obtained comparative static results that do not deviate much from our intuition. What's interesting is that unlike our intuition that the choice of the method will be indifferent if the marginal effects of radical and normal methods of struggle are the same, the opposition party rather chooses the normal method of struggle more often. Research implications or Originality - In forming the analytical model, it reflected the support of the general public following the opposition's struggle against the ruling party in order to capture real politics well in the conflict between the two opposing parties.