Presidential Agendas and the Voting Behavior of Presidential Party Representatives: Analysis of Presidential Support Votes in the 111-116th Congresses

미국 대통령 의제에 대한 여당의 투표 행태: 111-116대 의회 여당 하원의원들의 대통령지지투표 분석

  • Received : 2021.05.31
  • Accepted : 2021.06.22
  • Published : 2021.06.30

Abstract

As polarization intensified in the United States, the voting support of the presidential party lawmakers has become the most important source of power for the president. The presidential party has been believed to legalize the president's agenda in a unified government and prevent legislation opposed by the president from being passed by the Congress within a divided government. However, even under party polarization, all the lawmakers and factions of the presidential party have not voted in accordance with the president's policy preferences. Statistical analysis shows that lawmakers who corresponded to the ideology median of the presidential party most strongly supported the president's agendas during the unified government. However, lawmakers with extreme ideologies voted more actively for the president than those with median ones during the divided government. Furthermore, this trend has been amplified regarding ideological factions.

Keywords

References

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