• KSCE Journal of Civil and Environmental Engineering Research
• /
• v.36 no.4
• /
• pp.667-675
• /
• 2016

The goal of this study is to be used as baseline data for transportation demand management. At the present time the number of registered car and householding car is increasing, so there is a need to analyze the car ownership pattern through household car hold status. Also, it is necessary to analyze the factor of increasing car. The research is proceeded with classifying as the household which is holding private cars or holding passenger cars and non passenger cars based on the result of the research of the household travel survey data. The result of this study is shown as follows. According to car ownership pattern, there are more households holding passenger cars only when they are holding less than 2 cars. Otherwise there are more households holding passenger car and non passenger car when they are holding more than 3 cars. Using the Ordered Logit Model, there are more differences in factors affects holding cars by variables of housing type and household properties.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
• /
• v.3 no.3
• /
• pp.5-15
• /
• 2016

This study examines whether Korean rating agencies such as Korea Investors Service (KIS), National Information & Credit Evaluation (NICE), and Korea Ratings Corporation (KR), incorporate corporate governance into their corporate bond ratings in Korea. We find that the Korean rating agencies assign higher ratings to the bonds issued by Chaebol (Korean business group) affiliated firms. Our results also indicate that those rating agencies give higher ratings to the bonds with greater foreign investor share ownership. Moreover, if the rating agencies value corporate governance, higher rated firms should issue bonds at lower yield to maturity. We discover that Chaebol affiliation is counted favorably by the rating agencies. We find that investors are willing to pay lower risk premium for bonds with higher institutional ownership, but higher risk premium to bonds with greater equity ownership in the form of depository receipts. Therefore, even if the rating agencies and investors in Korea consider corporate governance (Chaebol affiliation and ownership structure) an important determinant in bond ratings and the yields to maturity, they have opposite views on institutional ownership and share ownership in the form of depository receipts.

• International Commerce and Information Review
• /
• v.19 no.1
• /
• pp.257-278
• /
• 2017

The paper examines the ownership structure and the firm value of online firms in the world. Data are gathered by using FACTIVA database for firms in the Dow Jones index for the 2014 fiscal year. The Ordinary Least Squares regressions, the Generalized Linear Model, and the model selection criteria are employed to analyze the relationship between the dependent and the independent variables. The paper tests theories such as the convergence of interest theory, the managerial entrenchment theory, and the eclectic theory. The paper finds that the ownership structure has an influence on the firm value depending on the rank of the large shareholders. While the first large shareholders have a negative association with the firm value, the presence of the second and the third large shareholders have a positive influence on the firm value. The paper also finds that the identity of the largest shareholders whether they are insiders or outsiders have an influence on the firm value. The proportion of shareholding by a large shareholder and her identity are variables which predict a firm value.

• Journal of the Korean Geographical Society
• /
• v.35 no.5
• /
• pp.701-716
• /
• 2000

This study examines patterms of wage inequality across ownership types and its regional structure in post-reform China in order to understand an emerging process of inequality. Using industrial wage data, I explored historical changes of cross-ownership wage inequality and its spatial differentiation during the reform period. This stuy found that pattems of wage inequality need to be understood in the context of changing redistributive economy which shapes state-enterprise relation in china's industrial sector. This relationship in turn determines labor market outcomes during the reform period including wage inequality. Regional structure of cross-ownership wage inequality also needs to be understood in terms of the differentiated process in which reqional wage levels are related to different wage factors. The findings have significant implications for understanding new patterns of soical and spatial inequalities in post-reform China.

• Journal of Industrial Convergence
• /
• v.19 no.5
• /
• pp.13-19
• /
• 2021

In this study, the relationship between R&D investment and firm value was approached from ESG's G(governance) perspective to verify the moderating effect of the corporate governance and ownership structure. To this end, a panel analysis was conducted on a total of 2,825 samples of 405 manufacturing companies listed on the KOSPI market during 2013~2020. The main analysis results are as follows. First of all, we found that R&D investment has a negative impact on firm value, at least in the short term, and that these relationships are moderated by corporate governance and ownership structure. When professional CEO with high level of expertise in business and management does lead R&D investment, the negative impact of R&D investment on firm value is mitigated compared to owner-manager. Also, the stronger the power of outside blockholders, the more transparent the management and disclosure of information, alleviating the information asymmetry between internal and external shareholders, which mitigates the negative impact of R&D investment on firm value. The findings suggest that the factors of ESG may not only have a direct impact on firm value, but also have a moderating effect on firm value.

• The Journal of the Convergence on Culture Technology
• /
• v.9 no.2
• /
• pp.319-325
• /
• 2023

This study investigates the impact of over-investment on the market value of cash holdings. In addition, this paper examines whether the effect of over-investment on the value of cash holdings differs depending on firms' ownership structure. The results show that increase in over-investment reduces the market value of cash holdings. This suggests that investors perceive that over-investment deteriorates future business performance and generates excessive burdens on future cash flows. As a result, they provide negative evaluation on the market value of cash holdings. In addition, the negative impact of over-investment on the market value of cash holdings is more significant for owner manager firms where managers hold a high level of equity. Such empirical results imply that owner manager firms are more likely to use their cash holdings for private interest, therefore, over-investment reduces the cash value to a greater extent. This study provides empirical evidence that the effect of over-investment on the market value of cash holdings varies depending on the characteristics of firms' ownership structure.

• The Research Journal of the Costume Culture
• /
• v.24 no.2
• /
• pp.248-262
• /
• 2016

Most Korean companies in the fashion industry are SMEs, and the role of the CEO and management ownership is important for enhancing the firm's competence and developing strategies. The study aims to examine the effect of management ownership on company financial growth. In particular, the study focuses on the moderating effect of company age and size on Korean fashion SMEs' financial outcomes. Financial data based on company financial statements from 2012 to 2014 was collected by the Data Analysis, Retrieval and Transfer System of Korea's Financial Supervisory Service. A total of 295 companies' (domestic fashion businesses) data was analyzed by the bootstrap method. The median sales value in the financial year 2014 was 47,492,403,958 KRW, and the company size was divided by it. The companies were in business for an average of 20 years. According to the results, the management ownership had a negative effect on Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) for the three-years, and the relationship between the two variables was moderated by company age. Additionally, the interaction effect of management ownership and company age on 3-CAGR was also moderated by company size. When the companies had spent only a few years in business, a negative effect of management ownership for small firms and a positive effect of management ownership on financial growth for medium firms were found. These results suggest that small companies starting business need to manage their company governance structure to make flexible decisions, and after retaining financial growth, the companies can expand their businesses based on strong ownership.

• Journal of Korea Port Economic Association
• /
• v.31 no.3
• /
• pp.41-60
• /
• 2015

This paper investigates whether managerial ownership and foreign ownership have impacts on firm value, using a sample of logistics firms listed on the Korea Stock Exchange between 2008 and 2014. In the Korean economy, family-controlled business groups, known as chaebol, constitute a unique governance system. To acquire investments from controlling shareholders, a logistics firm is likely to be included in family-controlled business groups. Since reform of the governance structure of logistics firms in the South Korea enables shareholder value to be maximized, we analyzed ownership effects on firm value using pooled ordinary least squares. Empirical results showed that there was a significant positive relation between managerial ownership and firm value. This study also found that there was a significant positive relation between foreign ownership and firm value. We thus show that both managerial ownership and foreign ownership can protect shareholders by positively affecting firm values.

• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
• /
• v.12 no.7
• /
• pp.3062-3071
• /
• 2011

This study proposed to compare the performance differences between a manufacturing company and a construction company in accordance with the mutual relations and ownership structures with the management performance based on the increase or decrease of the large shareholders' share-holding ratio (insider ownership, foreign share-holding, institutional investors' share-holding) of a KOSPI listed company in Korea during 10 years(1998-2007). To sum up the research work, first, the increase of foreign share-holding supported the results of previous studies which foreign share-holding has a positive effect on the long term performance by having a positive(+) effect on MTB, and the increase of an insider ownership supported the management entrenchment hypothesis of previous studies by having a negative(-) effect on MTB. However, relations between institutional investors's share-holding and MTB could not find out linkages in spite of the results of previous studies where dealt with the active monitoring hypothesis. Also, to examine the linkages of ROA and the ownership structure, though the increases of foreign share-holding and insider ownership had a positive(+) effect on ROA, the increases of institutional investors' share-holding had a negative(-) effect on it. It showed different analysis results from the active monitoring hypothesis of institutional investors. As a result of verifying whether there is "any difference in the management performances between the construction industry and the manufacturing industry according to the equity structure" which is the second hypothesis, nothing of the insider ownership and whether or not there is the construction industry, foreign share-holding and whether or not there is the construction, and the institutional ownership and whether or not there is the construction industry gave a statistical difference to MTB and ROA. Accordingly, it was possible to find out there is no difference in the management performance between the construction industry and the manufacturing industry based on the ownership structure in spite of different characteristics from the manufacturing industry such as the revenue recognition in ordering, production and accounting.

• Korean Business Review
• /
• v.11
• /
• pp.195-216
• /
• 1998

Ownership of an asset can be identified with the right to exercise "residual control" where the contract is silent about decision rights, or with the right to receive any "residual returns" that remain after contractual. obligations are fulfilled. Although the concept of "ownership" seems reasonably clear in many of the cases, the concepts of residual control and the residual returns that define ownership are actually quite elusive. For large corporations, there is really no single individual who owns both the residual returns and the residual control. Despite the limited qualifications, ownership is clearly. the most common and effective meas to motivate people to create, maintain, and improve the value of assets. In this paper, we try to clarify the relationships among financial structure, ownership, and corporate control with the concept of ownership defined as the residual control and the residual returns, Financial securities are not just claims to part of a firm's net income. They give the security holder certain rights. A careful matching of rights of control and returns can create incentives that increase total value of the firms. In the corporate firms, managers, lenders, and shareholders have different interests. And the financial structure affects how different those interests are and what decisions management will make. Managers are, in general, better informed than investors about the firm's prospects. The financial decisions by managers may affect investors' beliefs and, therefore, the price of shares and the value of the firm.