• Lingua Humanitatis
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• v.5
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• pp.109-126
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• 2003

The aim of this paper is to elucidate ancient Chinese philosophy and linguistics through the concept of the Dao. Ancient Chinese thought had developed together with ancient Chinese theories of language and the linguistic features of Classical Chinese. The concept of the Dao served as an intermediary among them. The Dao which ancient Chinese philosophers sought for has several characteristics: ethical normativity, wholeness, dynamicity, non-reducibility. Linguistic studies also revealed them. The following linguistic features of Classical Chinese are the cause and/or the effect of such Dao-based philosophy and linguistics: No explicit subject-predicate sentential structure, no parts of speech, heavy reliance on the word order and context for meaning determination, no explicit distinction between compound words and a sentence, the pictographic or the ideographic features of Chinese graphs, and non-existence of a copula.

• Philosophy of Medicine
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• v.15
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• pp.3-37
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• 2013

George Canguilhem(1904-1995) is one of the rare French philosophers of the 20th century to develop an approach that was shaped by a medical education. For him, medicine is considered as "a technique or an art at the junction of many different sciences, rather than a proper science." The thesis that medicine is a technique is presented not at a practical level, but on an axiological horizon which reflects the totality of humanity. This character of medicine became a motive that concretized Canguilhem's philosophical thinking. Medical knowledge is not an application of physiology, but is derived from clinical observations which are based on the personal experiences of each patient. If medicine were based on scientific knowledge and its practice the very application of this pure knowledge, the patient might be a passive object. However, the patient doesn't remain passive, but reacts to the menace of disease according to attitude that the patient developed over the course of his or her life. Canguilhem characterizes this point as 'normativity', the core of individual life, which eludes positivist medicine. Here appear the essential contents of his vitalism. Although they emphasized the activity of individual living being, other modern French vitalists didn't consider this dimension of norms. Since the normativity in Canguilhem concerns the subjectivity of the first person, it avoids a mechanical form of explanation. Thus Canguilhem's originality is found in his derivation of the essence of medicine from individuality, values and norms.

• Journal of the Korean association of regional geographers
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• v.21 no.3
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• pp.427-449
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• 2015

Network governance can be defined as collaborative process to develop a new socio-political order through civil society centered networking with government and market, and the term 'collaborative governance' can be used in a sense that the basis of governance is collaborative process. In particular, it can be stressed that collaborative governance between regions need double collaborative processes, that is, collaboration between local governments and collaboration between local government and local civil society within a region. Yet, the collaboration as a core element of collaborative governance should not be seen as a pure normativity presupposing confidence and reciprocity, but as a strategy based on competition and antagonism. The normativity implied in the concept of collaborative governance may not realized in actual process, and tends to be mobilized as a rationale for justifying neoliberal strategies. In order to overcome such limits of collaborative governance, the concept of collaborative governance should be reconstructed. This paper suggests that collaborative governance can be seen as hegemonic governing process in a Gramcian sense operating in the government plus civil society, and that, radicalizing Ostrom's concept, it also can be seen as a governing process producing polycentricity by self-regulating subjects. Finally, collaborative governance between regions needs expansion of material basis for economic complementarity and construction of infrastructure as well as a discursive process in order to enhance connectivity between them.

• ETRI Journal
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• v.43 no.4
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• pp.702-716
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• 2021

This work proposes suitable network configurations for single frequency networks (SFNs) with ATSC 1.0 based on network coverage calculations and the laboratory multipath handling performance of commercial receivers. SFNs are widely used for delivering terrestrial digital television services because of their efficient use of the spectrum. In Mexico the analogue television transmissions switch-off occurred on 31 December 2016. Thus it is expected the adopted ATSC 1.0 system will be in force for the next several years despite the recent standardization of the ATSC 3.0 system. As ATSC 1.0 uses 8-VSB modulation the multipath handling capability of receivers is critical for the design of SFNs. The presented network planning results help develop technical normativity for implementing SFNs in Mexico and other countries that use ATSC 1.0. SFNs with transmitter separation up to 130 km are fully covered for outdoor reception mainly due to the directivity of the receiving antenna. Moreover for indoor reception at least 70% of an SFN coverage area can be achieved with a transmitter separation of up to 60 km depending on the radiated power and the transmitter antenna height.

• Journal of Contemporary Eastern Asia
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• v.20 no.1
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• pp.120-133
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• 2021

This paper proposes an interpretation of Charles Ess's pros hen pluralism, especially concerning what constitutes the single end point (hen) toward which the pluralistic viewpoints converge (pros). The single end point, I argue, is constituted by an empirical social reality that obtains in the world at a particular period. In other words, it is the fact that we happen to agree largely and broadly on several ethical issues that serves as the end point in Ess's theory. The reason is that humans happen largely to share the same goals and values qua human beings, such as the desire for communication and cooperation with one another. It is not their rationality, or any other permanent and ideal characteristic, that serves as the source of normativity for human beings, but rather the contingent facts that obtain at a particular place and time, facts that humans happen to agree on. This raises an obvious objection of what to do with those who might cherish a very different set of values. The answer is that the globalized nature of the world today, especially deepened by information technology, makes it increasingly difficult for any groups to remain isolated. This does not imply, however, that disagreements are not possible. On the contrary, disagreements are a part of the whole process from the beginning. At the theoretical level, there is always a need for those who disagree on the theoretical issues rationally to persuade one another. This is also part of the empirical reality referred to earlier.

• Journal of the Korean Society for Library and Information Science
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• v.52 no.3
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• pp.193-214
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• 2018

This study aims to analyze enactment of China's old and rare books management. For the purpose, the review on China's legal system and management related to old and rare books were studied. And this study investigated 4 laws, 6 administrative regulations, 4 sector regulations, and 13 administrative normativity papers. Among those, 5 major sources for old and rare books management were identified as follows : 1) China's National Civilization Protection Law in 2013, 2) China's Old and Rare Book Organization Directive in 1989, 3) Regulation on Management of Research, Organization, and Publication of Old and Rare Books in 1986, 4) Standards on Grading Classification of Civilization Collections in 2001, and 5) Provisional Regulation on Civilization Auctioning in 2003. Based on the analysis of these sources, this study deduced implications in terms of Chinese old and rare books management such as the necessity to give considerations to 1) the importance of old and rare books management policy, 2) nationwide old and rare books management, 3) expansion of eduction and training of human resources, 4) establishment of institution specializing in old and rare books, and 5) special management of science of Chinese medicine.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.139
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• pp.47-80
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• 2016

The main aim of this article is to thoroughly illuminate the personality characteristic of "honesty (Redlichkeit)" that Nietzsche presents as one of the major 'virtues' in the sense of 'excelences of character', calling it "the Youngest Virtue". Clearly distinguished from the 'honesty' that conventional morality regards as the highest virtue, this particular trait or inclination Nietzsche has in mind is an affective disposition with a highly complicated structure, which is closely related to 'truth' and 'knowledge'. In this paper, I first analyze what "honesty" (as a Nietzschean excellence of character) consists of. Afterwards, I seek to answer what the evaluative status of the quality in Nietzsche's theory of 'value' understood as what ought to be possessed or pursued, especially, the question of whether or not the disposition is treated as an 'intrinsic' value. Finally and most importantly, I explore the reasons why Nietzsche confers the aforementioned normative significance upon the excellence at issue.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.129
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• pp.23-51
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• 2014

Christine M. Korsgaard believes that constructivism can respond to moral skepticism without depending upon moral realism. The purpose of this paper is to examine Korsgaard's kantian constructivism and her positions on moral realism. According to Korsgaard moral realism cannot answer normative questions in that it sees the function of moral concepts as describing the reality and so accepts the model of applied knowledge for action. In contrast Korsgaard insists that constructivism is better at justifying normativity since it regards moral concepts as representing the solutions to practical problems and so shows that moral principles are necessarily involved in the practical problems of agency. Korsgaard's constructivism has antirealistic elements such as pure proceduralism, the constitutive model to exclude ontological, metaphysical meanings, and the account of human beings as the sources of values. In spite of those antirealistic elements it is difficult to jump to a conclusion that Korsgaard's constructivism is antirealism. Korsgaard, in the early book, The Sources of Normativity, says that kantian constructivism has something to do with a form of realism, or procedural moral realism. And in the following books she argues that constructivism is compatible with realism although she pays attention to the practical implications of constructivism and then sets aside its ontological relevance. That is, Korsgaard does not want that her constructivism results in antirealism. Korsgaard's realism, however, is too weak to be called as realism. There is, also, a question why one would rather take a constructivist approach if one holds on to realism.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• no.114
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• pp.305-335
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• 2016

In the eighteenth century, the scottish philosophers Francis Hutcheson, David Hume and Adam Smith share the idea that morality comes from moral sense, which is a feeling of approval or disapproval of agent's motive and action. However, they have the different views in explaining the mechanism that generates the moral sentiments. Hutcheson takes a moral sense to be a unique mental faculty that is innate to all humans, and regards it as being guaranteed by supernatural apparatus like divine Providence. Hume and Smith reject Hutcheson's concept of internal moral sense and take a stage further Hutcheson's projects of internalisation by naturalizing morality in terms of the principle of sympathy. It is widely held that Hume's moral sentimentalism is essentially similar to Adam Smith's. Though there are important points of contact between Smith's account of sympathy and Hume's, the differences are considerable. The chief of them lies in the fact that Hume grounds our approval of virtue on our recognition of its utility and convention, and Smith does not. Smith grounds our approval of virtue on the impartial spectator's judgment, i.e., conscience. Hence for Smith, the impartial spectator is the one that bridges the gap between particularity and universality and works the vehicle of practical reason. Given this, in this paper, first, I will clarify the difference between Hume's and Adam Smith's understandings of sympathy. Second, I will elucidate how they explain the process to produce the moral sentiments based on their understandings of sympathy. I shall finally explicate in what way Hume's and Smith's theories on sympathy work as moral normativity.