• Korea Trade Review
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• v.43 no.6
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• pp.1-24
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• 2018

This study analyzes the dispute settlement of between arbitration and litigation using a game theoretical approach. Many studies on arbitration have so far focused on the relevant institutions. However, there are few theoretical studies that have focused on the demand side of arbitration. The model presented here suggests conditions under which arbitration form a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium, provided that the players strategically choose a dispute settlement tool. Furthermore, the suggested model is used to analyze simple cases of international commercial dispute cases.

• Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering
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• v.36 no.4
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• pp.77-83
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• 2013

This study is to develop a mathematical analysis model to grasp the behaviors of cartels. Cartels are formed tacitly and cause tremendous damage to consumers in modern society which is composed of advanced industry structure. The government authorities have instituted the leniency programs to respond cartels. However, cartels will continue unless there are legal sanctions against cartels based on an accurate analysis of leniency programs. The proposed cartel equilibrium analysis model is a mathematical behavior model which is based on the existing methods and the prison's dilemma of game theory. Therefore, the model has a form of pay off matrix of two players. We use a iterated polymatrix approximation (IPA) method to deduct a Nash equilibrium point. The model is validated by an empirical analysis as well.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.54 no.9
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• pp.461-466
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• 2005

This paper addresses the bidding strategies of a hydro generator in an electricity market, and their effect on the electricity market in accordance with some parameters: the water volume, the demand elasticity, and the hydro unit performance. The competition of a hydro generator is formulated as a hi-level optimization problem, and the solving scheme for the equilibrium condition is proposed as a set of nonlinear simultaneous equations. The equilibrium of the oligopolistic model is evaluated by comparison with that of a perfect competition model from the viewpoint of a market power. Simulation results show some parameters have an influence on the market power of an electricity market including a hydro generator.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.22 no.4
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• pp.71-80
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• 1997

In this paper, we consider with a market pioneering game among symmetric firms in highly competitive situation. To describe the puzzling situation of timing competition, we construct a dynamic game model and explore the equilibrium solution. As a result, we find a subgame perfect mixed strategy Nash equilibrium conceptually defined by 't$_{0}$ + .elsilon. equilibrium'. Our major finding s include : i) market entry will be occurred in sequential manner even though the condition of each firm is symmetric ii) the optimal timing of market pioneering will be advanced until almost all of the monopolist's profit is dissipated, iii) as the market position of the pioneer is stronger, the timings of the pioneer and the follower are separated, iv) and as the slope of the profit flow is steeper, the entry timing of the two players will be pooled together.

• Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering
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• v.18 no.34
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• pp.15-23
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• 1995

We study how to determine backorder cost at the warehouse in a one-warehouse/N-retailer distribution system such that channel efficiency (minimizing total system costs) is improved. We define backorder costs as compensation that the warehouse pays to the retailer for the number or orders delayed due to stockout at the warehouse. We answer two questions : (1) "Should the warehouse compensate for his backorder\ulcorner" and (2) "Is there any equilibrium for both the warehouse and retailer while they are seeking for their own profits\ulcorner" We show that : (1) "The warehouse should pay backorder costs for the sake of channel efficiency." and (2) "There exists an equilibrium that is infiuenced by the amount of compensation." First, we prove the existence of a mutually acceptable equilibrium for both the warehouse and the retailer, which is different from Nash equilibrium because they independently maximize their respective profits with incomplete information about each other. Second, we prove that the equilibrium moves to a point such that channel efficiency is improved if the warehouse compensates the retailers for his backorders. We show the existence of an optimal compensation that minimizes total system costs. Third, we show that the amount of optimal compensation increases as the ratio of mean lead time for the warehouse to that for the retailer increases.ouse to that for the retailer increases.

• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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• v.56 no.5
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• pp.848-853
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• 2007

This paper presents a methodology of estimating incomplete information in electricity markets for analyzing the gaming behavior of Generating Companies (GENCOs). Each GENCO needs to model its opponents' unknown information of strategic biddings and cost functions. In electricity markets with complete information, each GENCO knows its rivals' payoff functions and tries to maximize its own profit at Nash equilibriurnl Nli) by acknowledging the rivals' cost function. On the other hand, in the incomplete information markets, each GENCO lacks information about its rivals. Load patterns can change continuously due to many factors such as weather, price, contingency, etc. In this paper, we propose the method of the estimation of the opponents' cost function using market price, transaction quantities. and customer load patterns. A numerical example with two GENCOs is illustrated to show the basic idea and effectiveness of the proposed methodology.

• Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering
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• v.32 no.3
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• pp.168-177
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• 2009

The proliferation of the internet and electronic commerce has given the manufacturers the opportunity of direct marketing. This study analyzes the decision of manufacturers regarding whether to sell the products through independent sales company or to sell the products to the consumer directly. To do this, a new demand function is proposed and sub and super games are modeled and analyzed based on the demand function. By analyzing the Nash equilibria, it is shown that the manufacturers' decision of direct or indirect marketing not only depends on the competitiveness between the products but the absolute and relative marketing capabilities of the manufacturers. It is also shown that, in some cases, the manufactures have incentive to rise the competitiveness between the products to maximize the channel profit.

• International Journal of Internet, Broadcasting and Communication
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• v.13 no.1
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• pp.238-242
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• 2021

Game theory has been regarded as a useful theoretical tool for modeling the interactions between distinct entities and thus it has been harnessed in various research field. In particular, research attention has been shown to how to apply game theory to modeling the interactions between malign and benign entities in the field of wireless networks. Although various game theoretic modeling work have been proposed in the field of wireless networks, our proposed work is disparate to the existing work in the sense that we focus on mobile malign node detection problem in static wireless sensor networks. More specifically, we propose a Bayesian game theoretic modeling for mobile malign node detection problem in static wireless sensor networks. In our modeling, we formulate a two-player static Bayesian game with imperfect information such that player 1 is aware of the type of player 2, but player 2 is not aware of the type of player 1. We use four strategies in our static Bayesian game. We obtain Bayesian Nash Equilibria with pure strategies under certain conditions.

• Journal of the Korean Institute of Intelligent Systems
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• v.12 no.6
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• pp.491-496
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• 2002

Multi-objective Optimization Problems(MOPs) are occur more frequently than generally thought when we try to solve engineering problems. In the real world, the majority cases of optimization problems are the problems composed of several competitive objective functions. In this paper, we introduce the definition of MOPs and several approaches to solve these problems. In the introduction, established optimization algorithms based on the concept of Pareto optimal solution are introduced. And contrary these algorithms, we introduce theoretical backgrounds of Nash Genetic Algorithm(Nash GA) and Evolutionary Stable Strategy(ESS), which is the basis of Co-evolutionary algorithm proposed in this paper. In the next chapter, we introduce the definitions of MOPs and Pareto optimal solution. And the architecture of Nash GA and Co-evolutionary algorithm for solving MOPs are following. Finally from the experimental results we confirm that two algorithms based on Evolutionary Game Theory(EGT) which are Nash GA and Co-evolutionary algorithm can search optimal solutions of MOPs.

• International Journal of Control, Automation, and Systems
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• v.2 no.2
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• pp.247-255
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• 2004

The majority of real-world problems encountered by engineers involve simultaneous optimization of competing objectives. In this case instead of single optima, there is a set of alternative trade-offs, generally known as Pareto-optimal solutions. The use of evolutionary algorithms Pareto GA, which was first introduced by Goldberg in 1989, has now become a sort of standard in solving Multiobjective Optimization Problems (MOPs). Though this approach was further developed leading to numerous applications, these applications are based on Pareto ranking and employ the use of the fitness sharing function to maintain diversity. Another scheme for solving MOPs has been presented by J. Nash to solve MOPs originated from Game Theory and Economics. Sefrioui introduced the Nash Genetic Algorithm in 1998. This approach combines genetic algorithms with Nash's idea. Another central achievement of Game Theory is the introduction of an Evolutionary Stable Strategy, introduced by Maynard Smith in 1982. In this paper, we will try to find ESS as a solution of MOPs using our game model based co-evolutionary algorithm. First, we will investigate the validity of our co-evolutionary approach to solve MOPs. That is, we will demonstrate how the evolutionary game can be embodied using co-evolutionary algorithms and also confirm whether it can reach the optimal equilibrium point of a MOP. Second, we will evaluate the effectiveness of our approach, comparing it with other methods through rigorous experiments on several MOPs.