• 무역학회지
• /
• 제43권6호
• /
• pp.1-24
• /
• 2018

본 연구는 개별기업들이 교역활동과정에서 분쟁이 발생할 경우 국제상사간의 분쟁해결도구로써 중재를 선택하는 이유를 게임이론의 관점에서 구성하였다. 중재에 관한 많은 연구들이 진행되어왔지만 중재를 수요자의 입장에서 살펴본 이론 연구는 드물었다. 본 연구에서 제시된 모형은 기업이 분쟁해결도구를 전략적으로 선택할 수 있다는 전제하에서 중재가 완전베이지언 내쉬균형이 되는 조건을 게임의 대가(payoff)를 비교함으로써 찾아보았다. 이를 통해 알 수 있는 것은 첫째, 중재를 사회의 분쟁해결수단으로 고려할 때 분쟁당사자들의 성향에 대해 고려할 필요가 있다는 점, 둘째 중재를 균형전략으로 만드는 중요한 지표 중의 하나는 중재와 소송의 절대이익이 아닌 두 분쟁해결수단을 통해 기대되는 이익의 상대적인 차이가 중요하다는 점을 보일 수 있었다. 마지막으로 간단한 국제상사의 분쟁사례를 통해 이러한 이론이 어떻게 적용되는지를 살펴보았다.

• 산업경영시스템학회지
• /
• 제36권4호
• /
• pp.77-83
• /
• 2013

This study is to develop a mathematical analysis model to grasp the behaviors of cartels. Cartels are formed tacitly and cause tremendous damage to consumers in modern society which is composed of advanced industry structure. The government authorities have instituted the leniency programs to respond cartels. However, cartels will continue unless there are legal sanctions against cartels based on an accurate analysis of leniency programs. The proposed cartel equilibrium analysis model is a mathematical behavior model which is based on the existing methods and the prison's dilemma of game theory. Therefore, the model has a form of pay off matrix of two players. We use a iterated polymatrix approximation (IPA) method to deduct a Nash equilibrium point. The model is validated by an empirical analysis as well.

• 대한전기학회논문지:전력기술부문A
• /
• 제54권9호
• /
• pp.461-466
• /
• 2005

This paper addresses the bidding strategies of a hydro generator in an electricity market, and their effect on the electricity market in accordance with some parameters: the water volume, the demand elasticity, and the hydro unit performance. The competition of a hydro generator is formulated as a hi-level optimization problem, and the solving scheme for the equilibrium condition is proposed as a set of nonlinear simultaneous equations. The equilibrium of the oligopolistic model is evaluated by comparison with that of a perfect competition model from the viewpoint of a market power. Simulation results show some parameters have an influence on the market power of an electricity market including a hydro generator.

• 한국경영과학회지
• /
• 제22권4호
• /
• pp.71-80
• /
• 1997

In this paper, we consider with a market pioneering game among symmetric firms in highly competitive situation. To describe the puzzling situation of timing competition, we construct a dynamic game model and explore the equilibrium solution. As a result, we find a subgame perfect mixed strategy Nash equilibrium conceptually defined by 't$_{0}$ + .elsilon. equilibrium'. Our major finding s include : i) market entry will be occurred in sequential manner even though the condition of each firm is symmetric ii) the optimal timing of market pioneering will be advanced until almost all of the monopolist's profit is dissipated, iii) as the market position of the pioneer is stronger, the timings of the pioneer and the follower are separated, iv) and as the slope of the profit flow is steeper, the entry timing of the two players will be pooled together.

• 산업경영시스템학회지
• /
• 제18권34호
• /
• pp.15-23
• /
• 1995

We study how to determine backorder cost at the warehouse in a one-warehouse/N-retailer distribution system such that channel efficiency (minimizing total system costs) is improved. We define backorder costs as compensation that the warehouse pays to the retailer for the number or orders delayed due to stockout at the warehouse. We answer two questions : (1) "Should the warehouse compensate for his backorder\ulcorner" and (2) "Is there any equilibrium for both the warehouse and retailer while they are seeking for their own profits\ulcorner" We show that : (1) "The warehouse should pay backorder costs for the sake of channel efficiency." and (2) "There exists an equilibrium that is infiuenced by the amount of compensation." First, we prove the existence of a mutually acceptable equilibrium for both the warehouse and the retailer, which is different from Nash equilibrium because they independently maximize their respective profits with incomplete information about each other. Second, we prove that the equilibrium moves to a point such that channel efficiency is improved if the warehouse compensates the retailers for his backorders. We show the existence of an optimal compensation that minimizes total system costs. Third, we show that the amount of optimal compensation increases as the ratio of mean lead time for the warehouse to that for the retailer increases.ouse to that for the retailer increases.

• 전기학회논문지
• /
• 제56권5호
• /
• pp.848-853
• /
• 2007

This paper presents a methodology of estimating incomplete information in electricity markets for analyzing the gaming behavior of Generating Companies (GENCOs). Each GENCO needs to model its opponents' unknown information of strategic biddings and cost functions. In electricity markets with complete information, each GENCO knows its rivals' payoff functions and tries to maximize its own profit at Nash equilibriurnl Nli) by acknowledging the rivals' cost function. On the other hand, in the incomplete information markets, each GENCO lacks information about its rivals. Load patterns can change continuously due to many factors such as weather, price, contingency, etc. In this paper, we propose the method of the estimation of the opponents' cost function using market price, transaction quantities. and customer load patterns. A numerical example with two GENCOs is illustrated to show the basic idea and effectiveness of the proposed methodology.

• 산업경영시스템학회지
• /
• 제32권3호
• /
• pp.168-177
• /
• 2009

The proliferation of the internet and electronic commerce has given the manufacturers the opportunity of direct marketing. This study analyzes the decision of manufacturers regarding whether to sell the products through independent sales company or to sell the products to the consumer directly. To do this, a new demand function is proposed and sub and super games are modeled and analyzed based on the demand function. By analyzing the Nash equilibria, it is shown that the manufacturers' decision of direct or indirect marketing not only depends on the competitiveness between the products but the absolute and relative marketing capabilities of the manufacturers. It is also shown that, in some cases, the manufactures have incentive to rise the competitiveness between the products to maximize the channel profit.

• International Journal of Internet, Broadcasting and Communication
• /
• 제13권1호
• /
• pp.238-242
• /
• 2021

Game theory has been regarded as a useful theoretical tool for modeling the interactions between distinct entities and thus it has been harnessed in various research field. In particular, research attention has been shown to how to apply game theory to modeling the interactions between malign and benign entities in the field of wireless networks. Although various game theoretic modeling work have been proposed in the field of wireless networks, our proposed work is disparate to the existing work in the sense that we focus on mobile malign node detection problem in static wireless sensor networks. More specifically, we propose a Bayesian game theoretic modeling for mobile malign node detection problem in static wireless sensor networks. In our modeling, we formulate a two-player static Bayesian game with imperfect information such that player 1 is aware of the type of player 2, but player 2 is not aware of the type of player 1. We use four strategies in our static Bayesian game. We obtain Bayesian Nash Equilibria with pure strategies under certain conditions.

• 한국지능시스템학회논문지
• /
• 제12권6호
• /
• pp.491-496
• /
• 2002

다목적 함수 최적화 문제(Multi-objective Optimization Problems : MOPs)는 공학적인 문제를 풀고자 할 때 자주 접하게 되는 대표적인 문제 중 하나이다. 공학자들이 다루는 실세계 최적화 문제들은 몇 개의 경합하는 목적 함수(objective function) 들로 이루어진 문제일 경우가 많다. 본 논문에서는 다목적 함수 최적화 문제의 정의를 소개하고 이 문제를 풀기 위한 몇 가지 접근법을 소개한다. 먼저 서론에서는 파레토 최적해(Pareto optimal solution) 의 개념을 이용한 기존의 최적화 알고리즘과 이와는 달리 게임 이론(Game Theory) 으로부터 도출된 최적화 알고리즘인 내쉬 유전자 알고리즘(Nash Genetic Algorithm Nash GA) 그리고 본 논문에서 제안하는 공진화 알고리즘의 기반이 되는 진화적 안정 전략 (Evolutionary Stable Strategy : ESS) 의 이론적 배경을 소개한다. 또 본론에서는 다목적 함수 최적화 문제와 파레토 최적 해의 정의를 소개하고 다목적 함수 최적화 문제를 풀기 위하여 유전자 알고리즘을 진화적 게임 이론(Evolutionary Game Theory : EGT) 에 적용시킨 내쉬 유전자 알고리즘과 본 논문에서 새로이 제안하는 공진화 알고리즘의 구조를 설명하고 이 두 가지 알고리즘을 대표적인 다목적 함수 최적화 문제에 적용하고 결과를 비교 검토함으로써 진화적 게임 이론의 두 가지 아이디어 내쉬의 균형(Equilibrium) 과 진화적 안정전략 에 기반한 최적화 알고리즘들이 다목적 함수 문제의 최적해 를 탐색할 수 있음을 확인한다.

• International Journal of Control, Automation, and Systems
• /
• 제2권2호
• /
• pp.247-255
• /
• 2004

The majority of real-world problems encountered by engineers involve simultaneous optimization of competing objectives. In this case instead of single optima, there is a set of alternative trade-offs, generally known as Pareto-optimal solutions. The use of evolutionary algorithms Pareto GA, which was first introduced by Goldberg in 1989, has now become a sort of standard in solving Multiobjective Optimization Problems (MOPs). Though this approach was further developed leading to numerous applications, these applications are based on Pareto ranking and employ the use of the fitness sharing function to maintain diversity. Another scheme for solving MOPs has been presented by J. Nash to solve MOPs originated from Game Theory and Economics. Sefrioui introduced the Nash Genetic Algorithm in 1998. This approach combines genetic algorithms with Nash's idea. Another central achievement of Game Theory is the introduction of an Evolutionary Stable Strategy, introduced by Maynard Smith in 1982. In this paper, we will try to find ESS as a solution of MOPs using our game model based co-evolutionary algorithm. First, we will investigate the validity of our co-evolutionary approach to solve MOPs. That is, we will demonstrate how the evolutionary game can be embodied using co-evolutionary algorithms and also confirm whether it can reach the optimal equilibrium point of a MOP. Second, we will evaluate the effectiveness of our approach, comparing it with other methods through rigorous experiments on several MOPs.