You, Chang Hoon;Kang, Sungwook;Choi, Ji Heon;Kwon, Young Dae
Korea Journal of Hospital Management
/
v.22
no.2
/
pp.58-69
/
2017
Recently, with the increase in the number of private health insurance subscribers, interest in overuse of the medical service is increasing. This study analyzed the impacts of private health insurance (PHI) on medical institution selection in outpatient service utilization among persons with arthritis. In order to control patients' health status, we extracted outpatient episodes with the same disease (KCD6, M13) from Korea Health Panel. The unit of analysis was an outpatient visit with arthritis in 2014 (n=23,363). In the light of insurance coverage, we redefined three type of private health insurance (ex, indemnity, fixed benefit, and non-insured) as a test variable and two type of medical institution (ex, hospital and physician visit) as a dependent variable. We conducted a probit regression analysis to identify the impacts of PHI on medical institution selection controlling for heteroscedasticity. The results of this study showed that the insured with indemnity were more likely to choose hospital departments than clinics (marginal effect=0.0475, p=0.000). The impact of participation of fixed benefit PHI was not as clear as that of indemnity type (marginal effect=0.0162, p=0.047). In conclusion, this study confirmed that PHI, particularly indemnity type has a significant impact on the selection of medical institutions. Healthcare policy makers should consider that PHI not only affects the overall quantitative increase in healthcare utilization, but also influences the selection of medical institutions.
This study investigates the association between financial reporting strategy and the directors' and officers' liability insurance. Since D&O insurance protects officers and directors against the risks of shareholder litigation, it is possible that, because of moral hazard, managers will be more willing to participate in opportunistic financial reporting such as earnings manipulation when they are covered by a generous D&O insurance policy. This paper examines the association between D&O insurance and financial reporting, specifically whether the purchase of D&O insurance affects earnings manipulation. On the other side, the firms engage earnings management are willing to purchase D&O insurance, this study tests whether earnings manipulation affects D&O purchases using listed firms in Korean stock market from 2006 to 2008. This paper finds that firms with higher discretionary accruals are less likely to purchase D&O insurance implies that managers who are participating in earnings manipulation are not willing to purchase D&O insurance. The relation between discretionary accruals and D&O is significantly negative which indicate D&O insurance purchase does not trigger earnings manipulation rather it alleviates opportunistic reporting behavior.
You, Chang Hoon;Kwon, Young Dae;Choi, Ji Heon;Kang, Sungwook
The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
/
v.18
no.1
/
pp.268-276
/
2018
This study examined the effects of indemnity private health insurance on the medical utilization among the Korean adults. The used data were the 2014 survey data of Korea Health Panel, and the number of subjects was 11,436. Authors employed instrumental variable regression model where the instrument variables for controlling for endogeneity of indemnity were the purchasing of private pension and number of family members. The results showed that the number of outpatient visits and the number of hospitalizations for indemnity private health insurance subscribers were higher than non-subscribers. The number of household members and the private pension variables were proved to be appropriate as instrumental variables. This paper recommends the Korean government to monitor and evaluate the effects of indemnity private health insurance on the medical utilization in order to improve the efficiency of health care finance.
Objectives : To identify the effects of supplemental private health insurance on health care utilization and expenditure under the mandatory National Health Insurance(NHI) system in Korea. Methods : The data were collected by the National Cancer Center in Korea. Cancer patients who were newly diagnosed with stomach (ICD code, C16), lung(C33-C34), liver (C22), colorectal cancer(C18-C20) or breast(C50) cancer were included as study subjects. Data were gathered using a structured questionnaire from face-to-face interviews, the hospital Order Communication System (OCS) and medical records. Clinical, socio-demographic and private health insurance related factors were also gathered. The differences of health care utilization and expenditure were compared between those who have private health insurance and those who do not using t-test and multivariable regression analysis. Results : Individuals with private health insurance spent larger inpatient costs than those without, but no differences were found in utilization in other service such as hospital admissions, hospital days and physician visits. Conclusions : We found that private health insurance exerts a significant effect on the health care expenditure in inpatient service. These study results can provide a rational basis to plan a national health policy regarding private health insurance. Further studies are needed to investigate the impacts of private health insurance on cancer patients' outcomes and survival rates.
Following principal-agent relationship between government and funding agency effects on efficiency and management of project, this paper suppose that project management cost rate variable on outsourcing and administration of institution, applies multiple regression analysis and logit analysis by using factors that procurement status of institutional operating expenses and each subordinates scale (Budget, subject number) and method (Top-down/Bottom-up), not a total amount, for examining factors following project efficiency analysis and way of commission. The major variables which effect on efficiency of institution are management cost scale (0.36), institutional operating expenses ratio (-0.47), way of outsourcing, the factors that affect way of outsourcing are portion of project management cost (-38.5) and institutional operating expenses rate (-11.7). This means both legal and financial stability are necessary and it is avoidable moral hazard and adverse selection on principal-agent problem.
Journal of the Korea Society of Computer and Information
/
v.29
no.3
/
pp.191-198
/
2024
Korea is an import and export-oriented economy that relies on shipping transportation, and sea ports play an important role in national economic growth. To secure and maintain the competitiveness of these ports, hardware and software investments are required, but policy support can also be expected to have an effect. This study identified the irrationality of the system by exploratory analysis of the port facility fee discount system for Ulsan Port, an energy hub port, and suggested improvement measures to resolve it.This study analyzed the volume of Ulsan Port and the reduction of port facility usage fees for about 10 years and identified irrational factors that despite a special port for liquid cargo, a considerable reduction for container cargo is concentrated, and even because it was a passing ship, 100% reduction for entrance and clearance fees were provided to them, which could cause serious moral hazard.. As a way to improve the port facility charge discount system at Ulsan Port, this study proposed strengthening support for eco-friendly activities to support containers, adjusting the reduction rate for passing ships, or improving the reduction and exemption application process.
The recent sharp increase in wages has driven many Korean manufacturing firms to move into technology-intensive fields. The task of industrial restructuring is, however, rather difficult for small and medium-sized enterprises (hereafter, "SMEs") which suffer from limited R&D resources. If the R&D activities of SMEs are left unattended, industrial restructuring process may be retarded. Hence, the government-sponsored programs can be justified when used to promote the technological level of SMEs. Because of the limited internal R&D resources of SMEs, in particular human resources, the government-sponsored programs that depend on financial subsidies to stimulate the R&D activities of SMEs may not be recommended. Rather, a more desirable policy is programs to subsidize outside sourcing of SMEs. Basic principles of the program are; (i) that the government should establish R&D laboratories which are specialized in joint researches with SMEs in each industry; (ii) research projects of the laboratories should be funded by SMEs; the government's support covers only fixed costs such as construction costs in order to avoid moral hazard problem. (iii) technology adviser programs sponsored by the government should be improved; geographical distribution is to be expanded and the activities are to be monitored by local governments. Also foreign networks need be strengthened.
Korean Government has supplied small-medium enterprises with various technology financing programs such as R&D grant." loans, equities, guarantees since 1980's. The purpose of this study is to render policy suggestions for policy makers by analysing problems with regard to regulations. The suggestions of this study are such as the following. First, the current three months of the fund formation period should be extended within six months for general partners to have enough time to raise funds in the current tough capital market situation. Second, the government's non priority loss devotion system should keep going to prevent general partner's moral hazard. Third, in order to fulfill the policy purpose that is to create globally well-known companies, the government investment ratio should scale up from the current 20% to 30% of the total fund size in that the stable capital supply for core technology commercialization, industrialization and globalization of companies is achieved. Finally, general partners of the New Growth Engine Fund should showoff their investment abilities to the potential investors such as institutional investors by accumulating all track records and know-hows that prove their specialities and implementing action plans to achieve the best result of their investment. This study provides general considerations of the selection procedure, the government investment ratio, the government priority loss devotion system and so on when formating the public funds.
This paper investigates the possibility of expanding pay-for-performance (P4P) program as a provider payment system, in terms of financial, economical, and political sustainability. In order to expand the sustainable P4P, P4P should have usefulness in terms of economic value as well as efficiency in the financial aspects of health care. More importantly, the P4P would be politically sustainable only when both providers and consumers can accept. Korea's healthcare system seems to have logical ground for the P4P program financially and economically. However, how well the P4P can work remains to be proven in its implementation. After 43 tertiary hospitals applied the P4P program for acute myocardial infarction (AMI) and C-section in 2007, the number of hospitals adopting the P4P program for AMI and C-section has increased to 316 in 2011, and an incentive for hospitals applying the P4P has risen to 2% from 1% of health insurance benefits. This shows that the P4P program introduced by Health Insurance Review and Assessment Service is quite successful. In addition, people are aware of the need for improved P4P program and policy alternatives have been already made. Therefore, it is very important to come up with politically supportable strategies that can make providers and consumers accept the P4P program while maintaining the governance of the existing health insurance policy. To this end, there are some tasks to be considered. First, the expansion of the P4P program should be placed on the agenda of the Health Insurance Policy Review Committee, the highest decision-making body, and a separate agency for P4P planning should be established. Second, for more efficient P4P program, the processes of review and assessment, currently carried out separately, should be integrated into a single process. Third, infrastructure to measure the quality of medical services should be sharply expanded. Fourth, the current paradigm for the assessment should be changed. Lastly, a P4P program for consumers should be considered. Given that the consumers in Korea can use medical services freely, the National Health Insurance Corporation could initiate the P4P program for consumers as a means of controlling excessive use of medical services and adjusting consumer's moral hazard.
This article discussed the characteristics of several Pareto-optimal incentive contracts between owner and labor, more specifically, four situations: reporting output jointly observable by labor ana owner; reporting both output and effort; incorporating other endogenous elements (like capital) that affect the production process and Pareto-optimal fee schedules; and ascertaining the effects of private pre-decision information private- decision information, and per-contact informational asymmetries. Also presented were several extensions of the basic contractual model, and the different components of agency costs associated with labor-owner contractual relations. In a single-period model, the agency problem exists because the uncertainty prevents the owner from using the cash flow to determine unambiguously the labor's action. Holmstrom(1979) suggests that "when the same situation repeats itself over time, the effects of uncertainty tend to be reduced and dystunctional behavior is more accurately revealed, thus alleviating the problem of moral hazard. " Under these conditions, if the labor selects the first-best level of effect in each period, the cash flow will be independent and identically distributed over time. As the number of periods increases, the variance of the labows average output, if he selects the first-best level of effort in each period, gets smaller. Note that for this diversification effect to occur, it is necessary that the owner evaluate the labor's effort over the entire history of his employment, rather than evaluate each period's performance separately. Radner(1980) and Rubinstein and Yaari(1980) consider the extreme case in which there are an infinite number of observations. They show that the owner can eventually detect and systematic shirking on the part of the labor by comparing the labor's average output with what would be expected if the labor had been selecting the first-best level of effort in each period. In a dynamic model with incentive problems we have demonstrated that the labor's second-period compensation will depend on his first-period performance. This allows the owner to diversify away some of the uncertainty surrounding the labor's actions. In addition, this allows the owner to smooth the labor's income over time by spreading the risk of the first-period outcome over both periods. At least some unexplored avenves in this area invite future accounting research: situations where owner has different incompatible objectives and negotiates a contract with labor; circumstances in which owner deals with multiple objectives and negotiates contracts with several labors simultaneously; the value of costly accounting information systems and communication in establishing, Pareto-optimal incentive contracts, and the value and effects of inside information, Thorough theoretical or empirical research on each of these topics not only would increase our knowledge about the role and significance of accounting information but could also provide explanations of the inherent differences among various organizations and in their economic behavior. behavior.
본 웹사이트에 게시된 이메일 주소가 전자우편 수집 프로그램이나
그 밖의 기술적 장치를 이용하여 무단으로 수집되는 것을 거부하며,
이를 위반시 정보통신망법에 의해 형사 처벌됨을 유념하시기 바랍니다.
[게시일 2004년 10월 1일]
이용약관
제 1 장 총칙
제 1 조 (목적)
이 이용약관은 KoreaScience 홈페이지(이하 “당 사이트”)에서 제공하는 인터넷 서비스(이하 '서비스')의 가입조건 및 이용에 관한 제반 사항과 기타 필요한 사항을 구체적으로 규정함을 목적으로 합니다.
제 2 조 (용어의 정의)
① "이용자"라 함은 당 사이트에 접속하여 이 약관에 따라 당 사이트가 제공하는 서비스를 받는 회원 및 비회원을
말합니다.
② "회원"이라 함은 서비스를 이용하기 위하여 당 사이트에 개인정보를 제공하여 아이디(ID)와 비밀번호를 부여
받은 자를 말합니다.
③ "회원 아이디(ID)"라 함은 회원의 식별 및 서비스 이용을 위하여 자신이 선정한 문자 및 숫자의 조합을
말합니다.
④ "비밀번호(패스워드)"라 함은 회원이 자신의 비밀보호를 위하여 선정한 문자 및 숫자의 조합을 말합니다.
제 3 조 (이용약관의 효력 및 변경)
① 이 약관은 당 사이트에 게시하거나 기타의 방법으로 회원에게 공지함으로써 효력이 발생합니다.
② 당 사이트는 이 약관을 개정할 경우에 적용일자 및 개정사유를 명시하여 현행 약관과 함께 당 사이트의
초기화면에 그 적용일자 7일 이전부터 적용일자 전일까지 공지합니다. 다만, 회원에게 불리하게 약관내용을
변경하는 경우에는 최소한 30일 이상의 사전 유예기간을 두고 공지합니다. 이 경우 당 사이트는 개정 전
내용과 개정 후 내용을 명확하게 비교하여 이용자가 알기 쉽도록 표시합니다.
제 4 조(약관 외 준칙)
① 이 약관은 당 사이트가 제공하는 서비스에 관한 이용안내와 함께 적용됩니다.
② 이 약관에 명시되지 아니한 사항은 관계법령의 규정이 적용됩니다.
제 2 장 이용계약의 체결
제 5 조 (이용계약의 성립 등)
① 이용계약은 이용고객이 당 사이트가 정한 약관에 「동의합니다」를 선택하고, 당 사이트가 정한
온라인신청양식을 작성하여 서비스 이용을 신청한 후, 당 사이트가 이를 승낙함으로써 성립합니다.
② 제1항의 승낙은 당 사이트가 제공하는 과학기술정보검색, 맞춤정보, 서지정보 등 다른 서비스의 이용승낙을
포함합니다.
제 6 조 (회원가입)
서비스를 이용하고자 하는 고객은 당 사이트에서 정한 회원가입양식에 개인정보를 기재하여 가입을 하여야 합니다.
제 7 조 (개인정보의 보호 및 사용)
당 사이트는 관계법령이 정하는 바에 따라 회원 등록정보를 포함한 회원의 개인정보를 보호하기 위해 노력합니다. 회원 개인정보의 보호 및 사용에 대해서는 관련법령 및 당 사이트의 개인정보 보호정책이 적용됩니다.
제 8 조 (이용 신청의 승낙과 제한)
① 당 사이트는 제6조의 규정에 의한 이용신청고객에 대하여 서비스 이용을 승낙합니다.
② 당 사이트는 아래사항에 해당하는 경우에 대해서 승낙하지 아니 합니다.
- 이용계약 신청서의 내용을 허위로 기재한 경우
- 기타 규정한 제반사항을 위반하며 신청하는 경우
제 9 조 (회원 ID 부여 및 변경 등)
① 당 사이트는 이용고객에 대하여 약관에 정하는 바에 따라 자신이 선정한 회원 ID를 부여합니다.
② 회원 ID는 원칙적으로 변경이 불가하며 부득이한 사유로 인하여 변경 하고자 하는 경우에는 해당 ID를
해지하고 재가입해야 합니다.
③ 기타 회원 개인정보 관리 및 변경 등에 관한 사항은 서비스별 안내에 정하는 바에 의합니다.
제 3 장 계약 당사자의 의무
제 10 조 (KISTI의 의무)
① 당 사이트는 이용고객이 희망한 서비스 제공 개시일에 특별한 사정이 없는 한 서비스를 이용할 수 있도록
하여야 합니다.
② 당 사이트는 개인정보 보호를 위해 보안시스템을 구축하며 개인정보 보호정책을 공시하고 준수합니다.
③ 당 사이트는 회원으로부터 제기되는 의견이나 불만이 정당하다고 객관적으로 인정될 경우에는 적절한 절차를
거쳐 즉시 처리하여야 합니다. 다만, 즉시 처리가 곤란한 경우는 회원에게 그 사유와 처리일정을 통보하여야
합니다.
제 11 조 (회원의 의무)
① 이용자는 회원가입 신청 또는 회원정보 변경 시 실명으로 모든 사항을 사실에 근거하여 작성하여야 하며,
허위 또는 타인의 정보를 등록할 경우 일체의 권리를 주장할 수 없습니다.
② 당 사이트가 관계법령 및 개인정보 보호정책에 의거하여 그 책임을 지는 경우를 제외하고 회원에게 부여된
ID의 비밀번호 관리소홀, 부정사용에 의하여 발생하는 모든 결과에 대한 책임은 회원에게 있습니다.
③ 회원은 당 사이트 및 제 3자의 지적 재산권을 침해해서는 안 됩니다.
제 4 장 서비스의 이용
제 12 조 (서비스 이용 시간)
① 서비스 이용은 당 사이트의 업무상 또는 기술상 특별한 지장이 없는 한 연중무휴, 1일 24시간 운영을
원칙으로 합니다. 단, 당 사이트는 시스템 정기점검, 증설 및 교체를 위해 당 사이트가 정한 날이나 시간에
서비스를 일시 중단할 수 있으며, 예정되어 있는 작업으로 인한 서비스 일시중단은 당 사이트 홈페이지를
통해 사전에 공지합니다.
② 당 사이트는 서비스를 특정범위로 분할하여 각 범위별로 이용가능시간을 별도로 지정할 수 있습니다. 다만
이 경우 그 내용을 공지합니다.
제 13 조 (홈페이지 저작권)
① NDSL에서 제공하는 모든 저작물의 저작권은 원저작자에게 있으며, KISTI는 복제/배포/전송권을 확보하고
있습니다.
② NDSL에서 제공하는 콘텐츠를 상업적 및 기타 영리목적으로 복제/배포/전송할 경우 사전에 KISTI의 허락을
받아야 합니다.
③ NDSL에서 제공하는 콘텐츠를 보도, 비평, 교육, 연구 등을 위하여 정당한 범위 안에서 공정한 관행에
합치되게 인용할 수 있습니다.
④ NDSL에서 제공하는 콘텐츠를 무단 복제, 전송, 배포 기타 저작권법에 위반되는 방법으로 이용할 경우
저작권법 제136조에 따라 5년 이하의 징역 또는 5천만 원 이하의 벌금에 처해질 수 있습니다.
제 14 조 (유료서비스)
① 당 사이트 및 협력기관이 정한 유료서비스(원문복사 등)는 별도로 정해진 바에 따르며, 변경사항은 시행 전에
당 사이트 홈페이지를 통하여 회원에게 공지합니다.
② 유료서비스를 이용하려는 회원은 정해진 요금체계에 따라 요금을 납부해야 합니다.
제 5 장 계약 해지 및 이용 제한
제 15 조 (계약 해지)
회원이 이용계약을 해지하고자 하는 때에는 [가입해지] 메뉴를 이용해 직접 해지해야 합니다.
제 16 조 (서비스 이용제한)
① 당 사이트는 회원이 서비스 이용내용에 있어서 본 약관 제 11조 내용을 위반하거나, 다음 각 호에 해당하는
경우 서비스 이용을 제한할 수 있습니다.
- 2년 이상 서비스를 이용한 적이 없는 경우
- 기타 정상적인 서비스 운영에 방해가 될 경우
② 상기 이용제한 규정에 따라 서비스를 이용하는 회원에게 서비스 이용에 대하여 별도 공지 없이 서비스 이용의
일시정지, 이용계약 해지 할 수 있습니다.
제 17 조 (전자우편주소 수집 금지)
회원은 전자우편주소 추출기 등을 이용하여 전자우편주소를 수집 또는 제3자에게 제공할 수 없습니다.
제 6 장 손해배상 및 기타사항
제 18 조 (손해배상)
당 사이트는 무료로 제공되는 서비스와 관련하여 회원에게 어떠한 손해가 발생하더라도 당 사이트가 고의 또는 과실로 인한 손해발생을 제외하고는 이에 대하여 책임을 부담하지 아니합니다.
제 19 조 (관할 법원)
서비스 이용으로 발생한 분쟁에 대해 소송이 제기되는 경우 민사 소송법상의 관할 법원에 제기합니다.
[부 칙]
1. (시행일) 이 약관은 2016년 9월 5일부터 적용되며, 종전 약관은 본 약관으로 대체되며, 개정된 약관의 적용일 이전 가입자도 개정된 약관의 적용을 받습니다.