• Asia Marketing Journal
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• v.16 no.1
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• pp.35-69
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• 2014

The impact of competition on pricing has been studied in the context of counterfactual merger analyses where expected optimal prices in a hypothetical monopoly are compared with observed prices in an oligopolistic market. Such analyses would typically assume static decision making by consumers and firms and thus have been applied mostly to data obtained from consumer packed goods such as cereal and soft drinks. However such static modeling approach is not suitable when decision makers are forward looking. When it comes to the markets for durable products with indirect network effects, consumer purchase decisions and firm pricing decisions are inherently dynamic as they take into account future states when making purchase and pricing decisions. Researchers need to take into account the dynamic aspects of decision making both in the consumer side and in the supplier side for such markets. Firms in a two-sided market typically subsidize one side of the market to exploit the indirect network effect. Such pricing behaviors would be more prevalent in competitive markets where firms would try to win over the battle for standard. While such qualitative expectation on the relationship between pricing behaviors and competitive structures could be easily formed, little empirical studies have measured the extent to which the distinct pricing structure in two-sided markets depends on the competitive structure of the market. This paper develops an empirical model to measure the impact of competition on optimal pricing of durable products under indirect network effects. In order to measure the impact of exogenously determined competition among firms on pricing, we compare the equilibrium prices in the observed oligopoly market to those in a hypothetical monopoly market. In computing the equilibrium prices, we account for the forward looking behaviors of consumers and supplier. We first estimate a demand function that accounts for consumers' forward-looking behaviors and indirect network effects. And then, for the supply side, the pricing equation is obtained as an outcome of the Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium in pricing. In doing so, we utilize numerical dynamic programming techniques. We apply our model to a data set obtained from the U.S. video game console market. The video game console market is considered a prototypical case of two-sided markets in which the platform typically subsidizes one side of market to expand the installed base anticipating larger revenues in the other side of market resulting from the expanded installed base. The data consist of monthly observations of price, hardware unit sales and the number of compatible software titles for Sony PlayStation and Nintendo 64 from September 1996 to August 2002. Sony PlayStation was released to the market a year before Nintendo 64 was launched. We compute the expected equilibrium price path for Nintendo 64 and Playstation for both oligopoly and for monopoly. Our analysis reveals that the price level differs significantly between two competition structures. The merged monopoly is expected to set prices higher by 14.8% for Sony PlayStation and 21.8% for Nintendo 64 on average than the independent firms in an oligopoly would do. And such removal of competition would result in a reduction in consumer value by 43.1%. Higher prices are expected for the hypothetical monopoly because the merged firm does not need to engage in the battle for industry standard. This result is attributed to the distinct property of a two-sided market that competing firms tend to set low prices particularly at the initial period to attract consumers at the introductory stage and to reinforce their own networks and eventually finally to dominate the market.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.55 no.5
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• pp.214-219
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• 2006

Oligopoly differs from perfect competition and monopoly in that a firm must consider rival firms' behavior to determine its own best policy. This interrelationship among firms is the issue examined in this paper. In the oligopoly market, the complete information market means that each producer has full information about itself, the market, and its rivals. That is, each producer knows the market demand function, its own cost function and the cost functions of rivals. On the other hand, the incomplete information market means that in general each producer lacks full information about the market or its rivals. Here, we assume that each firm doesn't know the cost functions and the strategic biddings of its rivals. The main purpose of this paper is to analyze firm' strategic behaviors and equilibrium in an electricity market with incomplete information. In the case study, the complete information market and the incomplete market are compared at the Nash Equilibrium from the viewpoints of market price, transaction quantities, consumer benefits, and Social Welfare.

• International Commerce and Information Review
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• v.16 no.5
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• pp.3-25
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• 2014

The megatrends of the Korean distribution industry market in 2014 reflect opportunities in parallel import & overseas direct purchase. Korean government addressed that "Monopoly & Oligopoly consumer goods import improvement plan" to stabilizing importing goods prices and domestic consumers' burden relief through accelerating market competition. and moreover it is to improving distribution channel and promoting parallel import market business. The Korean market is very unique in that consumers' real sensory index of open up importation effect level is low, but nominal open up importation effect level is high. This is due to difficulties in creating a proper importing goods distribution market and alternative importing routes are very rare. Thus, the purpose of this study is to analyze the market situation and parallel import to improve Korean government's "Monopoly & Oligopoly consumer goods import improvement plan" policy for the revitalization of the domestic market economy and to boost up a new growth engine industry.

• Korean journal of communication and information
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• v.46
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• pp.511-555
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• 2009

Media-related regulations can be classified into two categories; regulations of individual media contents and regulations regarding the entry to and withdrawal from a certain field. In this dissertation, ownership regulations are regarded as legal and political measures so as to prevent the monopoly and oligopoly of public opinion, and to secure its diversity. Every country has its own regulation model according to its particular media environment. Korea too is obliged to actively respond to its environmental changes, at the same time vitalizing the media industry and protecting consumers' rights and interests. Strong political intentions to protect the public interest is necessary when it comes to media regulation policies, especially in the circumstances that public interest is an industrial priority. As the convergence of broadcasting and telecommunications is leading to a major shift in the media industry, the regulation of cross-media ownership is an issue involving potential conflicts among media-owners, non-governmental organizations and the authorities concerned, depending on their various viewpoints regarding the media industry. In this paper, an attempt was made to search necessity of redefining 'public interest', which is the logic behind the restriction of cross-media ownership, and to reconceptualize issues on the centralization and diversity of media. First, an examination of the actual conditions of newspaper companies was carried out in order to reinvestigate domestic cross-media ownership issues, which is represented by the cross-ownership issue of newspapers and broadcasting stations. Next, the dilemma of policies stimulated by the fusion of media was discussed based on cross-media ownership restrictions, and the need for efficient conflict control was suggested. Finally, proposals on the independency and public confidence of media-related policy-making authorities, the rationalization of regulation models, an itemized discussion on cross-media ownership regulation issues, the elaboration of measures for a balanced development among media were made. It could be found that a number of foreign countries were still facing challenges to prevent monopoly and oligopoly of the public opinion and the industry. A solution to settle disagreements about the dilemma of the media industry, including the cross-media ownership regulation issues, must be arranged on the grounds of 'mutual respect of public interest and industrial interest', In Korea, an ease on the ownership regulations adapting to the change in the media industry may be considered, however the softening of the cross-media ownership regulations must be approached with the utmost care. Paradoxically Relieving cross-media ownership regulations may be considered the foundation of a richer field of journalism, where there is no need for concern over the monopoly and oligopoly of public opinion.

• Korean Journal of Agricultural Science
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• v.15 no.2
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• pp.164-173
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• 1988

This study is to analyse marketing and industrial structure of meat processing industry and to examine it's current situation related to agriculture. For this purpose 1. This paper surveys the history of meat processing industry, and analyses current situation of meat processing industry, based upon economic statistic data. 2. For the research of marketing structure of meat processing products, this paper not only ciassifies into three catagories; the supply of raw meat, main marketing organization, and path, but measures magnitude of Marketing Bill and Farmer's Share practically through statistic data and an on-the-spot survey. 3. This study also attempt to explain the relation of meat processing industry and the other industry and role of meat processing industry is Korean economy by the use of input-output table. The results of the study are as follows; 1. The meat processing industry in Korea produces low quality, and expensive raw meat with limited quality, inefficiency of marketing structure, and unrelated livestock and meat processing industry. 2. Korea market structure of meat processing products has been changed into oligopoly from monopoly by a new corporation entered into monopoly and the size of meat processing market firms has been normalized. 3. Meat processing industry is very important considering with its high back-linkage-effect. In order to develop meat processing industry and marketing, it is essential that operation of intergrated meat market center, meat market center should be efficiently operated. The efficient utilization of domestic resource for raw meat and development of processing technique have to be required, by means of the governmental support.

• Journal of Aerospace System Engineering
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• v.16 no.2
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• pp.1-12
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• 2022

The purpose of this study was to investigate the supply and demand structure of the domestic space industry through analysis of industrial concentration index, by sector and dependence on revenue by customer type. As a result of industrial concentration analysis, in the case of space application, a supply monopoly or oligopoly structure was revealed in fields such as satellite broadcasting, space insurance, and satellite navigation. In the field of space equipment manufacturing, referred to as the traditional space industry, a supply monopoly structure appeared only in the field of launch pads and test facilities. As a result of analyzing the dependence on revenue by customer type, the dependence on the demand in the space application field is diversified among foreign countries, private institutions, and others. However, in the case of space equipment manufacturing, it is highly dependent on the demand of public institutions, and it seems that there is a monopsony structure.

• Journal of Distribution Science
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• v.4 no.1
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• pp.121-140
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• 2006

This study has explored a number of problems arising from distribution restrictions and the ways to improve efficiency. As matters stand, since the cooperation between larger stores and local retailers is limited due to the nature of the market, the current situations call for bottom up restrictions such as the active promotion of smaller merchants and traditional marketplaces, the enhancement of the competitiveness of smaller merchants and manufacturers through the establishment of a customized consulting support program for individual shops, and the continual support for traditional marketplaces with facilities and management modernization. The government should maintain the optimal balance between the efficiency and effectiveness of the distribution industry through such bottom up restrictions as shown above, rather than the top down restrictions primarily relying on the hurdles to the establishment of stores. The problems raised in this study include: (i) the decline of traditional marketplaces and the alleged over saturation of stores; (ii) the possible abuse of indiscreet restrictive measures; (iii) the harmful effects of the monopoly or oligopoly by larger distributors; and (iv) the lack of systematic programs to promote development. The ways to improve efficiency are: (i) the establishment of the policies to specialize and nurture traditional marketplaces; (ii) the effort to prevent the injury arising from monopoly; (iii) the two tire strategies for the coexistence of larger and smaller businesses; and (iv) the administration of joint sales promotion and training.

• Journal of the Korean Regional Science Association
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• v.31 no.1
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• pp.43-63
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• 2015

This study empirically analyzes the relationship between market structure and R&D activities. Especially, the outcome of R&D activities could be imitated or plagiarized by nearby competitors before it is protected legally through patenting, it would work as a club good and its market structure need to be defined at the geographic level of city, county or ward rather than the whole nation. According to the regression results of this study using Survey on Technology Statistics of Small- and Medium-Sized Firms, individual firms' R&D investment is more active when market structure of area(city, county, or ward)-industry(two-digit industry) is monopolistic or oligopolistic rather than competitive. However, as the variable representing market structure is redefined over a geographic scope of 16 metropolitan areas or provinces, 6 regions, or the whole nation, the relationship between market structure and R&D activities seems to become weak. Moreover, when the R&D expenditure is divided by its source, more active R&D spending in a less competitive market is observed as long as it is procured by internal fund of the firm in question.

• Journal of the Korean Geographical Society
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• v.45 no.5
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• pp.609-627
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• 2010

Finding the ideal location for your business is one of the most critical and important steps you will have to undertake. Otherwise, done in the wrong way you will only end up paying an expensive cost for an unsuitable location. Therefore to select the perfect location for your business, this study makes a reasonable and simple model for retail shops by calculating occupation population for each store applying Huffs "Probability Theory" to Hypermarket in Seoul. Then this study, based on occupation population, has divided every unit section (dong scale) into 4 market types which represent the state of the competitive markets, including monopoly, oligopoly, competitive, and noncompetitive markets. Consequently, the most reasonable place to locate a new store is where it can take most of the customers, that is, a place which can take non-competitive market as much as possible and is distant far enough from competitive market where competition is severe.

• Journal of Korea Trade
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• v.27 no.1
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• pp.79-100
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• 2023

Purpose - The purpose of this study is to analyze the market power of the Korea Container Shipping Market (Intra Asia, Korea-Europe, and Korea-U.S.) to verify the existence of collusion empirically, and to answer whether the joint actions of liner market participants in Korea have formed market dominance for each route. Precisely, it will be verified through the Lerner index as to whether the regional market of Asia is a monopoly, oligopoly, or perfect competition. Design/methodology - This study used a Lerner index adjusted with elasticity presented in the New Imperial Organization (NEIO) studies. NEIO refers to a series of empirical studies that estimate parameters to judge market power from industrial data. This study uses B-L empirical models by Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982). In addition, NEIO research data statistically contain self-regression and stability problems as price and time series data. A dynamic model following Steen and Salvanes' Error Correction Model was used to solve this problem. Findings - The empirical results are as follows. First, λ, representing market power, is nearly zero in all three markets. Second, the Korean shipping market shows low demand elasticity on average. Nevertheless, the markup is low, a characteristic that is difficult to see in other industries. Third, the Korean shipping market generally remains close to perfect competition from 2014 to 2022, but extreme market power appears in a specific period, such as COVID-19. Fourth, there was no market power in the Intra Asia market from 2008 to 2014. Originality/value - Doubts about perfect competition in the liner market continued, but there were few empirical cases. This paper confirmed that the Korea liner market is a perfect competition market. This paper is the first to implement dynamics using ECM and recursive regression to demonstrate market power in the Korean liner market by dividing the shipping market into Deep Sea and Intra Asia separately. It is also the first to prove the most controversial problems in the current shipping industry numerically and academically.