• Strategy21
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• 통권31호
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• pp.27-56
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• 2013

The United Nations Command (UNC) and the communist North failed to reach an agreement on where the maritime demarcation line should be drawn in the process of signing a truce after the Korean War because of the starkly different positions on the boundary of their territorial waters. As a result, the Armistice Treaty was signed on July 1953 without clarification about the maritime border. In the following month, Commander of the UNC unilaterally declared the Northern Limit Line (NLL) as a complementing measure to the Armistice. Referring to this, North Korea and its followers in South Korea wrongfully argue that the NLL is a "ghost line" that was established not based on the international law. However, one should note that the waters south of the NLL has always been under South Korea's jurisdiction since Korea's independence from Japan on August 15, 1945. There is no need to ask North Korea's approval for declaring the territorial waters that had already been under our sovereign jurisdiction. We do not need North Korea's approval just as we do not need Japan's approval with regard to our sovereign right over Dokdo. The legal status of the NLL may be explained with the following three characteristics. First, the NLL is a de facto maritime borderline that defines the territorial waters under the respective jurisdiction of the two divided countries. Second, the NLL in the West Sea also serves as a de facto military demarcation line at sea that can be likened to the border on the ground. Third, as a contacting line where the sea areas controlled by the two Koreas meet, the NLL is a maritime non-aggression line that was established on the legal basis of the 'acquiescence' element stipulated by the Inter-Korea Basic Agreement (article 11) and the Supplement on the Non-aggression principle (article 10). Particularly from the perspective of the domestic law, the NLL should be understood as a boundary defining areas controlled by temporarily divided states (not two different states) because the problem exists between a legitimate central government (South Korea) and an anti-government group (North Korea). In this sense, the NLL problem should be viewed not in terms of territorial preservation or expansion. Rather, it should be understood as a matter of national identity related to territorial sovereignty and national pride. North Korea's continuous efforts to problematize the NLL may be part of its strategy to nullify the Armistice Treaty. In other words, North Korea tries to take away the basis of the NLL by abrogating the Armistice Treaty and creating a condition in which the United Nations Command can be dissolved. By doing so, North Korea may be able to start the process for the peace treaty with the United States and reestablish a maritime line of its interest. So, North Korea's rationale behind making the NLL a disputed line is to deny the effectiveness of the NLL and ask for the establishment of a new legal boundary. Such an effort should be understood as part of a strategy to make the NLL question a political and military dispute (the similar motivation can be found in Japan's effort to make Dokdo a disputed Island). Therefore, the South Korean government should not accommodate such hidden intentions and strategy of North Korea. The NLL has been the de facto maritime border (that defines our territorial waters) and military demarcation line at sea that we have defended with a lot of sacrifice for the last sixty years. This is the line that our government and the military must defend in the future as we have done so far. Our commitment to the defense of the NLL is not only a matter of national policy protecting territorial sovereignty and jurisdiction; it is also our responsibility for those who were fallen while defending the North-Western Islands and the NLL.

• Strategy21
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• 통권32호
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• pp.123-159
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• 2013

The purpose of this research paper is to re-valuate the factors that affected the Royal Navy's rearmament and preparation for war by conducting analysis on the discussion held in the Britain on the strategic priorities and Navy's coping measures adopted during the interwar period. After the end of the WWI, each of the military arms of the Britain faced significant difficulty in securing budget and increasing their military power all throughout the interwar period, and the Navy was not an exception. The WWII that got started on September 1939 was the turning point in which this difficulty led to full-fledged crisis. Immensely many criticisms followed after the war and problems were identified when it comes to the Royal Navy's performance during the war. This type of effort to identify problem led to the attempt to analyze whether Royal Navy's preparation for war and rearmament policy during interwar period were adequate, and to identify the root causes of failure. Existing studies sought to find the root cause of failed rearmament from external factors such as the deterioration of the Britain itself or pressure from the Treasury Department to cut the budget for national defense, or sought to detect problems from the development of wrong strategies by the Navy. However, Royal Navy's failed preparation for the war during interwar period is not the result of one or two separate factors. Instead, it resulted due to the diverse factors and situations that the Britain was facing at the time, and due to intricate and complex interaction of these factors. Meanwhile, this research paper focused on the context characterized by 'strategic selection and setting up of priorities' among the various factors to conduct analysis on the Navy's rearmament by linking it with the discussion held at the time on setting up strategic priorities, and sought to demonstrate that the Navy Department's inadequate counter-measures developed during this process waned Royal Navy's position. After the end of WWI, each of the military arms continued to compete for the limited resources and budget all throughout the interwar period, and this type of competition amidst the situation in which the economic situation of Britain was still unstable, made prioritization when it comes to the allocation of resources and setting up of the priorities when it comes to the military power build-up, inevitable. Amidst this situation, the RAF was able to secure resources first and foremost, encouraged by the conviction of some politicians who were affected by the 'theory of aerial threat' and who believed that curtailing potential attack with the Air Force would be means to secure national security at comparatively lower cost. In response, Navy successfully defended the need for the existence of Navy despite the advancement of the aerial power, by emphasizing that the Britain's livelihood depends on trade and on the maintenance of maritime traffic. Despite this counter-measuring logic, however, Navy's role was still limited to the defense of overseas territory and to the fleet run-off instead of sea traffic route production when it comes to the specific power build-up plan, and did not understand the situation in which financial and economic factors gained greater importance when it comes to the setting up of strategic priorities. As a result, Navy's plan to build its powers was met with continual resistance of the Treasury Department, and lost the opportunity to re-gain the status of 'senior service' that it had enjoyed in the past during the competition for strategic prioritization. Given that the strategic and economic situation that Korea faces today is not very different from that of the Britain during the interwar period, our Navy too should leverage the lessons learned from the Royal Navy to make the effort to secure viable position when it comes to the setting of priorities in case of national defense strategy by presenting the basis on why maritime coping should be prioritized among the numerous other threats, and by developing the measures for securing the powers needed effectively amidst the limited resources.

• Strategy21
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• 통권30호
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• pp.236-262
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• 2012

Morgenthau claims that in international relations, there are the economic, political, and military powers that enable a nation to achieve its political and diplomatic goals. This paper explores the possibility of resolving international conflicts with naval power. First, the theoretical and historical perspective, naval power was used as a final resort to force a nation's political or diplomatic objective on an enemy nation when negotiations failed, and this was done through the physical and psychological destruction of the enemy by naval power. But as the use of military power has decreased because of the invention of the nuclear weapon, the existence of a large and capable navy deterrent has become one of the most useful military options among a nation's diplomatic measures. In other words, he focused on the political usefulness of naval power as a deterrent and coercive diplomatic tool for persuading other nations to acquiesce, rather than using naval power and actual military action as a final resort. The reason for this is that compared to army and air force, navy's flexibility, continuity, and the ability to deter are greater. The navy provides excellent accessibility through its wide mobility on the sea, and it has been shown through research that the navy possesses a political usefulness that facilitates the solution of conflicts through presence, naval intervention, and naval blockade. On the other hand, among the factors that could improve the influence of the navy are alliance relations, a reliable and powerful navy, carrots and sticks that it would have to deal with in the case of successful or unsuccessful negotiations, and support from international opinion. On this paper I introduce E.N.Luttwak's naval suasion theory. By the his theory, there are two mode of naval suasion. One is latent naval suasion the other is active suasion. Latent suasion there are deterrent mode and supportive mode. Active naval suasion there are coercive mode and supportive mode. Coercive mode has positive and negative. The limitations of naval suasion have been identified as follows. First, because the objective of the use of naval power is persuading enemy nations, the results are unpredictable. Second, the leaders of all countries possess limited understanding on the complexities of naval power and therefore lack understanding of the usefulness of naval power when choosing options. Third, in case of failure through naval suasion, prestige and reputation of a nation can be damaged. Finally, the following are additional possible research topic. First, a research on the decision making process of choosing naval power as a measure to resolve conflicts is needed. Lastly, research on the size of the navy and types of ships required for efficient naval suasion is needed. Today's world requires cooperative security regime so that middle class navy also requires political use of naval power in solving international conflicts. Therefore, additional research on this topic is needed.

• 융합보안논문지
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• 제14권6_1호
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• pp.57-63
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• 2014

한반도는 탈냉전이라는 역사적 변화에도 불구하고 냉전적 구조가 해제되지 않고 북한의 대남도발은 계속되고 있다. 북한의 천안함 폭침과 연평도 포격도발은 파국적인 남북관계 초래와 동북아 불안정의 요인으로 작용하고 있다. 북한의 도발은 미국과 한국 및 북한 내부 요인이 북한의 의사결정체계에서 복합적으로 작용하여 군사 비군사적 수단에 의해 자행되고 있다. 북한은 한반도의 적화통일이라는 전략기조을 유지하기 때문에 공세적으로 지속될 수밖에 없을 것이다. 북한의 대외정책은 지속성과 상황에 따라 변화하는 양면성을 지니고 있다. 북한 대외정책의 목표와 이념은 비교적 일관성 있게 지속하고 있지만, 정책전개의 전략 전술과 행동 유형에서는 상당한 변화가 있다. 즉, 지속성은 곧 국가 체제유지와 국가 생존 명분의 문제이며, 변화는 지속성과 명분을 유지시키고 발전하기 위한 전술적 종속개념에 해당한다. 합리적인 시각으로 본다면 북한의 대외정책 기조는 군사력과 핵무기 개발을 생존수단으로 삼아 긴장을 조성하여 외교적, 경제적 보상을 얻는 외교방식을 과감하게 탈피하여야 하며 국제사회에 참여하여 하나의 국가로서 국제관례를 지키는 자세를 견지해야 하나 여러 가지 여건상 기존 대외정책 방향을 고수하고 있다.

• 문화기술의 융합
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• 제8권5호
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• pp.453-458
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• 2022

육군은 미래전에 대비하기 위해 2017년부터 도약적 변혁을 추진하였다. 이를 위해, 육군은 2018년 창설된 육군미래혁신연구센터를 중심으로 혁신의 붐을 육군 전체로 확산시켰다. 이 과정에서 육군 구성원들은 전력, 싸우는 개념, 구조 등 미래 핵심역량을 창출할 수 있는 방법론의 필요성을 제기하였다. 육군미래혁신연구센터의 연구진은 이와 같은 현장의 목소리에 부응하기 위해 '군사혁신 사고과정'을 정립하고, 전문가 타당성 평가와 육군혁신학교 적용을 통해 이를 최적화시켜 나갔다. 그 결과, '군사혁신 사고과정'은 육군 기획문서에 필요한 아이디어를 제공했고, 육군 교육체계에 포함되었다. 동시에 육군 연구과제와 KCI급 논문의 연구방법론으로 자리매김하고 있다. 앞으로 '군사혁신 사고과정'은 후속연구를 통해 육군의 군사혁신을 이끄는 이정표 역할을 담당할 것이다.

• 한국콘텐츠학회논문지
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• 제17권10호
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• pp.110-119
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• 2017

국방부(2015)에 의하면, 2015년 군에 입대한 병사들을 대상으로 '군 인성검사'를 실시한 결과, 359,059명 중 49,328명(13.6%)이 '관심군' 및 '위험군'으로 나타났다. 따라서 이러한 병사들이 군 조직에 잘 적응할 수 있도록 하기 위해 개별적으로 적합한 정신적 지원 및 전문적 상담이 가능한 변혁적 리더십을 통하여 사고예방을 모색하고자 하였다. 이를 위해 3야전군사령부 예하부대에서 근무하고 있는 병사 350명을 대상으로 설문조사를 실시하였다. 연구결과, 군 지휘관의 변혁적 리더십은 병사들의 조직몰입에 긍정적인 영향을 미치나 직무만족에는 영향을 미치지 못하는 것으로 나타났다. 그리고 변혁적 리더십은 병사들의 심리적 행복감에 긍정적 영향을 미치고, 심리적 행복감은 조직몰입과 직무만족에 긍정적 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타났다. 또한 심리적 행복감은 변혁적 리더십이 조직몰입과 직무만족에 미치는 영향에서 매개효과가 있는 것으로 나타났다. 이러한 결과는 군 조직에서 병사들의 조직몰입과 직무만족을 향상시키는데 심리적 행복감이 중요하고, 군 지휘관의 변혁적 리더십이 병사들의 심리적 행복감을 증진시키는 조직 환경적 요인으로 작용하고 있음을 시사한다. 즉, 군 조직 내 사고예방을 위해서는 병사들의 특성과 구성원들의 눈높이에 맞는 리더십이 요구된다.

• 인터넷정보학회논문지
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• 제23권1호
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• pp.77-86
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• 2022

본 연구의 궁극적인 목표인 지능형 해안 경계 체계 구축을 위해, 본 논문에서는 먼저 해안경계 지능화를 위한 AI 학습 모델의 구축 방안을 제시하였다. 우리는 3면이 바다로 이루어져있고 남과 북이 대치하는 상황으로 인해 해안 경계가 중요한 국가적 과업인 나라이다. 국방개혁 2.0에 의해 해안경계를 담당하고 있는 R/D (Radar) 운용인력이 감소하고 복무 기간이 단축되고 있다. 특히, 레이더와 같이 고도의 장비를 다루는 데에는 휴먼 에러가 발생할 개연성은 늘 상존하는 것이다. 해안 경계와 인공지능의 접목은 정부의 인공지능 국가전략의 구현과 확대라는 목표에도 필요 충분한 시점에 와 있다. 지능형 해안 경계 체계 구축을 위한 AI학습 모델 개발의 기능별 방안을 제시하였다. R/D신호 분석 AI모델 개발, 책임해역 분석 AI모델 개발, 표적 관리 자동화 기능으로 구분하였다. 이를 실현하기 위한 3단계 추진 전략을 살펴보았다. 1단계는 AI 학습모델 구축의 통상적인 단계로써, 데이터 수집, 데이터 저장, 데이터 여과, 데이터 정제, 데이터 변환 등이 이루어진다. 2단계에서는 R/D 특성에 기초해 신호분석을 실시하고, 실상과 허상을 분류하는 AI 학습모델 개발을 진행하고, 책임해역을 분석하고, 취약지역/시간 분석을 실시한다. 최종 단계에서는 AI 학습모델의 검증, 가시화 및 시연 등이 이루어진다. 군 무기체계에 AI 기술이 접목돼 지능화된 무기체계로 바뀌는 최초의 성과가 달성된다.

• 해양안보
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• 제3권1호
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• pp.73-114
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• 2021

본 연구는 현실주의의 대표적 이론인 세력균형이론을 기초로 군사력을 국가의 핵심 힘으로 전제하여 동북아시아의 힘의 분포를 살펴본다. 이전 세력균형과 군사력 수준에 관한 연구결과를 고찰하고, 그 연구한 결과를 활용하여 2020년까지 미국, 중국, 러시아, 일본, 한국과 북한의 힘의 변화를 분석하여 2030년경 안보환경을 전망하여 본다. 세력균형이론에서 국가(nation)나 국가군(a group of power) 간에 힘의 균형이 무너지면 전쟁 가능성이 높고, 그 불확실성과 불신이 높은 국제사회에서 생존과 안전을 확보하기 위하여 국가는 힘의 증강(자조, self-help)과 더불어 협력(cooperation)과 동맹(alliance)을 더욱 강화하는 행동을 한다고 본다. 동북아시아의 국가들도 자국의 군사력을 지속 증강하고 있으며, 특히 중국의 급속한 부상으로 국제 안보환경의 급격한 변화에 주변 국가들은 촉각을 세우고 경계심을 늦추지 않고 있다. 중국은 2030년대 중국 창군 100주년과 더불어 '국방 및 군현대화'를 실현하고, 2050년대 건국 100주년에 '세계일류군대건설'을 목표로 하고 있다. 그리고 미국은 국제사회의 협력과 동맹 강화 등 중국 견제에 분주하다. 미국과 중국이 패권경쟁이 진행되고 있는 상황에서 동북아시아의 안보환경과 힘의 역학관계도 서서히 변하고 있다. 세력균형이론에 기초하여 2030년 이후 동북아시아의 힘의 분포 변화와 함의를 살펴보고자 한다.

• 정보기술과데이타베이스저널
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• 제6권1호
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• pp.47-57
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• 1999

CITIS(Contractor Integrated Technical Information Service) is a service standard which specifies guidelines which are required for the fulfillment of a contract between a purchaser and a supplier. It was initiated as a military standard and is now becoming a commercial standard. In this paper, we propose how the guidelines, which were usually developed by Client/Server methods in previous works, can be implemented in WWW environments, and show a prototype which can be used for the confirmation of CAD drawings between contractors(purchaser and provider). We have a hope our study can provide a small foundation for the building of CITIS references.

• Journal of Contemporary Eastern Asia
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• 제16권2호
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• pp.82-92
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• 2017

The Korean state evolved as a distinct entity in a region of major power convergence and conflict. All states, as human constructions, seek sovereignty and life security of their subjects/citizens, and are rotted in organic society. In the Republic of Korea, constitutional order has provided a framework for political action and a succession of regimes - authoritarianism, military dictatorship, and constitutional democracy. Since 1960 two paradigms have undergone a cycle of growth and decline, and a third, since the 2016 candlelight demonstrations in Gwanghwamun, may be the beginnning of a third generation paradigm - populist constitutionalism.