• Title/Summary/Keyword: military strategy

검색결과 377건 처리시간 0.021초

GNSS 구축 환경변화와 현대무기체계에의 항법기술 사용전략 (Circumstance Change of GNSS & Application Strategy of Navigation Technology for Modem Weapon System)

  • 고광섭
    • 한국정보통신학회논문지
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    • 제14권1호
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    • pp.267-275
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    • 2010
  • 미국, 러시아, 유럽연합 및 중국의 인공위성 항법 시스템 현대화 정책 추진 가속화 및 위성항법 기술 발전으로 2015년까지 무려 100기 정도의 항법 위성이 우주궤도에 배치될 것으로 전망된다. 이러한 각국의 경쟁적인 위성항법 시스템 개발은 현재 GPS 일변도의 전 세계 위성항법 시스템 의존도를 획기적으로 낮출 뿐 아니라 위성항법 신호의 다원화로 민간사용 분야는 물론 군사 분야에서도 많은 변화가 예상된다. 본 연구에서는 급변하는 전 세계 위성항법 시스템구축 환경 변화에 따른 정책 및 기술 특성을 분석하여 미래 인공위성 항법 기술사용 및 국방과학 분야 접목에 대한 우리의 대응전략을 제시하고자 한다.

미래전 승리를 위한 육군의 군사전략과 싸우는 방법 혁신 (Innovation in how to combat the Army's military strategy for future combat victory)

  • 정민섭;남궁승필;박상혁
    • 문화기술의 융합
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    • 제6권3호
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    • pp.105-109
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    • 2020
  • 2050년 미래 육군은 미래의 다양한 위협에 대비하고 초지능·초연결 무기체계를 효과적으로 활용하여 다영역 전장을 지배하고 승리를 달성하기 위한 새로운 개념의 싸우는 방법을 발전시켜야 한다. 미래 육군이 추구해야 할 방향은 다음과 같다. 첫째. 능력에 기초한 적극적·공세적인 군사전략의 수립이다. 둘째, 적 전투의지 마비를 위한 중심 타격 전투이다. 셋째, 다 영역을 활용한 동시 통합 모자이크 전투이다. 넷째, 시공간을 초월한 인공지능 기반의 사이버전이다. 다섯째, 복합 플랫폼 전쟁이다. 결국, 미래의 전쟁은 사이버상에서 보이지 않는 전쟁에 의해 승패가 좌우될 것이다.

"Peaceful Uses" of Outer Space and Japan' s Space Policy

  • Takai, Susumu
    • 항공우주정책ㆍ법학회지
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    • 제spc호
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    • pp.247-270
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    • 2007
  • Space development and utilization must be conducted within a framework of "peaceful uses" principle under Space Treaty. Japan ratified the treaty in 1967, and interpreted "peaceful uses" as "non-military uses" then. A ghost of "peaceful uses" principle has been hung over Japan up to the moment. Japan's space development and utilization has been conducted with genuine academic interest, and therefore Japan did not introduce space infrastructures to national security policy and did not facilitate growth of space industry. When the Cold War ended, Northeast Asian security environment makes Japan difficult to maintain an interpretation as "non-military uses". Besides the change of external security environment, the domestic industry situation and a series of rocket launching failure needed reexamination of Japan's space policy. Japan is gradually changing its space policy, and introducing space infrastructure in a national security policy under a "generalization" theory that gave a broad interpretation of "peaceful uses" principle. Council for Science and Technology Policy (CSTP) adopted a basic strategy of Japan's space policy in 2004. Since then, a long-term report of Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA), an investigation report of Society of Japanese Aerospace Companies (SJAC) and a proposal of Japan Business Federation (JSF) were followed. Japan will promote space development and utilization in national security policy with a "strictly defensive defense" strategy and "non-aggressive uses"principle for protection of life and property of Japanese people and stabilization of East Asian countries.

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A Raid-Type War-Game Model Based on a Discrete Multi-Weapon Lanchester's Law

  • Baik, Seung-Won
    • Management Science and Financial Engineering
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    • 제19권2호
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    • pp.31-36
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    • 2013
  • We propose a war-game model that is appropriate for a raid-type warfare in which, a priori, the maneuver of the attacker is relatively certain. The model is based on a multi-weapon extention of the Lanchester's law. Instead of a continuous time dynamic game with the differential equations from the Lanchester's law, however, we adopt a multi-period model relying on a time-discretization of the Lanchester's law. Despite the obvious limitation that two players make a move only on the discrete time epochs, the pragmatic model has a manifold justification. The existence of an equilibrium is readily established by its equivalence to a finite zero-sum game, the existence of whose equilibrium is, in turn, well-known to be no other than the LP-duality. It implies then that the war-game model dictates optimal strategies for both players under the assumption that any strategy choice of each player will be responded by a best strategy of her opponent. The model, therefore, provides a sound ground for finding an efficient reinforcement of a defense system that guarantees peaceful equilibria.

한국형 전투기(KF-X) AESA 레이다 개발 검증을 위한 점진적인 시험평가 전략 (Progressive Test and Evaluation Strategy for Verification of KF-X AESA Radar Development)

  • 조신영;곽용길;오현석;주혜선;박홍우
    • 한국군사과학기술학회지
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    • 제27권3호
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    • pp.387-394
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    • 2024
  • This paper describes a progressive test and evaluation strategy for verification of Korean Fighter eXperimental (KF-X) AESA(Active Electronically Scanned Array) radar development. Three progressive stages of development test and evaluation were officially performed from simulated test conditions to actual operating conditions according to standards: radar function/performance and avionics integration. KF-X AESA radar development is repeatedly verified by progressive stages consisting of five tests: Roof-lab ground test, System Integration Laboratory(SIL) ground test, Flying Test Bed(FTB) test, KF-X ground test, and KF-X flight test. As a result, the risk factor decreases as stages and tests progress. Therefore, development test and evaluation of KF-X AESA radar are successfully performed at low development risk.

극초음속 미사일이 해양전략에 미치는 영향: 해양통제의 확보와 행사를 중심으로 (Effect of Hypersonic Missiles on Maritime Strategy: Focus on Securing and Exploiting Sea Control)

  • 조성진
    • 해양안보
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    • 제1권1호
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    • pp.241-271
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    • 2020
  • 극초음속 미사일은 전 세계에서 가장 많은 관심을 받는 군사기술이다. 러시아, 중국, 미국이 주도하고 있고 다른 나라 역시 경쟁적으로 동참하고 있다. 극초음속 미사일은 탄도미사일과 순항미사일의 장점을 모두 혼합한 미사일로 기존 방어체계로는 요격이 쉽지 않다. 해군은 기술군으로 과학기술 발전은 해양전략에 많은 영향을 미쳐왔다. 해양전략의 핵심은 해양통제다. 이는 점령보다 해양의 사용권리에 대한 문제이며 확보는 수단이고 행사하는 것이 그 목적이다. 극초음속 미사일은 해양통제의 확보 면에서 제한요인으로 작용한다. 극초음속 미사일의 빠른 속력과 강력한 파괴력은 요격이 어려울 뿐만 아니라 단 한발에도 손상통제가 의미없는 수준의 피해가 발생한다. 이로 인해 해양거부능력이 지리적, 질적으로 향상됨에 따라 해양통제 달성이 어려워 질 것이다. 극초음속 미사일은 해양력투사/방어, 해상교통로 공격/방어라는 해양통제 행사면에서는 각각 기회요인과 제한요인으로 동시에 작용한다.

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시뮬레이션을 활용한 국방수송물류의 민·군 통합 운영 방안 수립 (Development of the Military-3PL Integrated Operation Strategy for National Defense Transportation using Simulation)

  • ;공인택;김재원;서한석;신광섭
    • 한국전자거래학회지
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    • 제24권3호
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    • pp.111-128
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    • 2019
  • 현재 우리 군의 군수품 조달은 육 해 공군이 개별 보급단, 군지사 및 보급창을 중심으로 구성된 물품 조달 체계를 통해 이루어지고 있다. 특히, 납품업체로부터 사용부대까지는 직납의 형태로 배송하고 있어 규모의 경제를 실현하는 데 한계가 있다. 생산원가를 포함한 여러 비용 중 운송비용은 일반관리비용 중 하나로 정의되고, 연 단위 일괄 계약 방식으로 운영된다. 이로 인해 실제 납지 기준의 현실적인 운송비용이 산정될 수 없어 국방 예산 집행의 효율성을 확보하기 어려운 상황이다. 또한, 각 군이 개별적인 조달 체계를 운영하고 있어 유사 시 빠르고 유연하게 대처할 수 없다는 문제점을 가지고 있다. 따라서 본 연구에서는 국방 수송 분야에 민 군 통합 수송 체계를 구축하여 운영의 효과를 이미 검증한 미군의 DTCI(Defense Transportation Coordination Initiative)를 조직구성과 운영 방식 관점에 벤치마킹하고, 이를 우리 군의 운영 상황에 적합한 민 군 통합 운영 체계 수립을 위한 방안을 제안하고자 한다. 새롭게 제안되는 국방 수송 체계의 효과성을 입증하기 위해 과거 실제 납품 실적을 바탕으로 Hub & Spoke 방식을 적용하여 시뮬레이션을 수행하고, 직납 체계와 운송거리 측면에서의 정량적 비교를 수행하였다. 본 연구 결과는 우리 군의 군수품 수송 체계의 효율성을 향상시킬 수 있는 전체 계획 수립의 근거자료로 활용될 수 있을 것이다.

천안함 폭침 이후 북한의 군사도발 양상과 전망 (Trends and Prospects of N. Korea Military Provocations After the Sinking of ROKS Cheon-an)

  • 김성만
    • Strategy21
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    • 통권34호
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    • pp.58-92
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    • 2014
  • Even after S. Korea took 5.24 Measure(24 May 2014), N. Korea has not stopped raising provocations such as the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, electronic and cyber attacks. To make matters worse, the communist country lunched long-range missiles(twice) and conducted 3rd nuclear test, escalating tensions which could possibly lead to an all-out war. Korean Government failed to respond properly. However, escalation into an all-out war was deterred by the CFC immediately carrying out its peacetime duty(CODA). The US made a rapid dispatch of its augmentation forces(Aircraft carrier, nuclear-powered submarine, strategic bomber, F-22) to the Korean Peninsula. In recognition of the importance of the Combined Forces Command, since May 2013 the Park Geun-Hye Administration has been pushing ahead with re-postponement of Wartime Operational Control Transfer(which initially meant the disassembling of the CFC as of 1 December 2015) More recently, there has been a series of unusual indicators from the North. Judging from its inventory of 20 nuclear weapons, 1,000 ballistic missiles and biochemical weapons, it is safe to say that N. Korea has gained at least war deterrence against S. Korea. Normally a nation with nuclear weapons shrink its size of conventional forces, but the North is pursuing the opposite, rather increasing them. In addition, there was a change of war plan by N. Korea in 2010, changing 'Conquering the Korean Peninsula' to 'Negotiation after the seizure of the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area(GSMA)' and establishing detailed plans for wartime projects. The change reflects the chain reaction in which requests from pro-north groups within the South will lead to the proclamation of war. Kim, Jeong-Un, leader of N. Korean regime, sent threatening messages using words such as 'exercising a nuclear preemptive strike right' and 'burning of Seoul'. Nam, Jae-June, Director of National Intelligence Service, stated that Kim, Jung-Un is throwing big talks, saying communization of the entire Korean Peninsula will come within the time frame of 3 years. Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, shared an alarming message that there is a high possibility that the North will raise local provocations or a full-fledged war whenever while putting much emphasis on defense posture. As for the response concept of the Korean Government, it has been decided that 'ROK·US Combined Local Provocation Counter-Measure' will be adopted to act against local provocations from the North. Major provocation types include ▲ violation of the Northern Limit Line(NLL) with mobilization of military ships ▲ artillery provocations on Northwestern Islands ▲ low altitude airborne intrusion ▲ rear infiltration of SOF ▲ local conflicts within the Military Demarcation Line(MDL) ▲ attacking friendly ships by submarines. Counter-measures currently established by the US involves the support from USFK and USFJ. In order to keep the sworn promise, the US is reinforcing both USFK and USFJ. An all-out war situation will be met by 'CFC OPLAN5027' and 'Tailored Expansion Deterrence Forces' with the CFC playing a central role. The US augmentation forces stands at 690,000 troops, some 160 ships, 2,000 aircraft and this comprise 50% of US total forces, which is estimated to be ninefold of Korean forces. The CFC needs to be in center in handling both local provocations and an all-out war situation. However, the combat power of S. Korean conventional forces is approximately around 80% of that of N. Korea, which has been confirmed from comments made by Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, during an interpellation session at the National Assembly. This means that S. Korean forces are not much growing. In particular, asymmetric capabilities of the North is posing a serious threat to the South including WMD, cyber warfare forces, SOF, forces targeting 5 Northwestern Islands, sub-surface and amphibious assault forces. The presence of such threats urgently requires immediate complementary efforts. For complementary efforts, the Korean Government should consider ① reinforcement of Korean forces; putting a stoppage to shrinking military, acquisition of adequate defense budget, building a missile defense and military leadership structure validity review, ② implementation of military tasks against the North; disciplinary measures on the sinking of ROKS Cheon-an/shelling of Yeonpyeong Islands, arrangement of inter-Korean military agreements, drawing lessons from studies on the correlation between aid for N. Korea, execution of inter-Korean Summit and provocations from the North, and ③ bolstering the ROK·US alliance; disregarding wartime operational control transfer plan(disassembling of CFC) and creation of a combined division.

독도의 해군력 배치에 관한 국제법적 검토 및 발전방향 - 실효적 지배 개념을 중심으로- (International Law Perspectives of Deploying ROK Naval Power On Dokdo - Focus On Effective Control of Dokdo -)

  • 김남구
    • Strategy21
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    • 통권32호
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    • pp.97-122
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    • 2013
  • The basic stance of the Republic of Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs was 'quiet diplomacy'. However, there had been demands for specific plans for practical protection of Dokdo. In 2011, Prime Minister Kim Hwang Sik mentioned that they are reviewing measures of stationing marines on Dokdo, while on August 10th, 2012, former president Lee Myung Bak visited Dokdo. The visit itself was meaningful as he was the first supreme commander to visit Dokdo. This paper studies on the necessity of naval power on Dokdo to maintain its effective control. The effective control must be done by a national organization in a peaceful and unimpaired method. If so, can stationing naval power, whether directly or indirectly, on Dokdo be considered a violation of 'peaceful' method? A 'peaceful' effective of control meas the right of sovereignty over a territory without other country's protest. In such terms, protecting a territory falls under practicing the right of sovereignty, and therefore does not violate 'peaceful'. In addition, looking at international cases such as Ligitan/Sipadan Case and Pedra Blanca Case, evidences such as 'navy activity', 'flyng ensign', and 'military communication facility installation' was used. In ter case of Yemen-Eritrea dispute over Hanish, methods on effective control over island and sea was also ruled by the installation of military posts and military surveillance activities. Thus, stationing naval power on Dokdo can be a way of maintaining effective control per international law. To station naval poer on Dokdo, Presidential Instruction 24 integrated Defense Guideline Enforcement Ordinance, which is domestic law, must be revised. Reason being, the Enforcement Ordinance states that the navy area of responsibility excluded Ullundo, where Dokdo is under jurisdiction of Ullungdim thus excluding navy control. In addition, considering the diplomatic situation, it is more fut to install navy radar site on Dokdo rather than 'stationing marines'. In other words, enforcing surveillance in the vicinity of Dokdo and installing radar site instead of stationing direct combatants is one way of practicing effective control without stimulating diplomatic disputes.

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해양공간 인식과 확장의 관점에서 본 한국 해양전략의 발전 방향 (Future Direction of ROK Navy's Maritime Strategy based on the Recognition and Expansion of Maritime Sphere)

  • 정광호
    • Strategy21
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    • 통권44호
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    • pp.142-176
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    • 2018
  • So far, the main threat to South Korea was North Korea. That is why South Korea established a strategy based on the threat of North Korea and most of the budget on defense was used to deter North Korea. Even though the neighboring countries(China, Japan, and Russia) are growing as a real threat with abilities and intentions based on their powerful naval forces, South Korea has not yet been able to establish a strategy that regards neighboring countries as a threat. But the decades-old structural mechanism of the Korean security environment is undergoing a radical change on April 27, 2018, through the South-North summit and the Panmunjom Declaration. Under the changing security environment, South Korea was placed in a complicated dilemma that had to deal with threats of two axes(China), three axes(China, Japan), and four axes(Japan, Russia). If the one axis threat(North Korea) is dominated by land threats, the second, third and fourth axis threats are threats from the sea. This paper analyzed the maritime strategy of Korea within the framework of maritime-geopolitics, in other words recognition and expansion of the sphere of maritime. I have designed that the maritime defense space that we can deny from threats is divided into three lines of defense: 1 line (radius 3,000km), 2 lines (2,000km), and 3 lines (1,000km). The three defense zones of the three lines were defined as an active defense(1 line), defensive offense(2 line), active offense(3 line). The three defense zones of the three lines were defined as the sphere of core maritime, As a power to deny the sphere of core maritime, it was analyzed as a maneuvering unit, a nuclear-powered submarine, the establishment of missile strategy, and the fortification of islands station. The marine strategy of South Korea with these concepts and means was defined as 'Offensive Maritime Denial Strategy'.