• 대한전기학회:학술대회논문집
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• 대한전기학회 2003년도 추계학술대회 논문집 전력기술부문
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• pp.134-136
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• 2003

The deregulated electricity market is operated with respect to theory of economical efficiency, and therefore, the system operator requires data with fast contingency ranking for security of the bulk power system. This paper compares the weather dependant probabilistic risk index(PRI) with the system performance index for power flow in the IEEE-RBTS. also, the system performance index for power flow presents the power system stability. The probabilistic risk index can be classified into normal weather and adverse weather. This paper proposes calculation method using the probabilistic risk index in determining contingency ranking requiring for security under the deregulated electricity market.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• 제11권12호
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• pp.5803-5819
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• 2017

In this paper, we proposed a contract theory based cooperative spectrum sharing scheme with joint power and bandwidth optimization under asymmetric information, where the primary user (PU) does not know the secondary users' (SUs) private information. To improve performance, PU needs to provide incentives to stimulate nearby SUs to help forward its signal. By using contract theory, PU and SUs' negotiations are modeled as a labor market. PU and SUs act as the employer and employees, respectively. Specifically, SUs provide labor (i.e. the relay power, which can be used for forwarding PU's signal) in exchange for the reward (i.e. the spectrum access bandwidth which can be used for transmitting their own signals). PU needs to overcome a challenge how to balance the relationship between contributions and incentives for the SUs. We study the optimal contract design which consists of relay power and spectrum access bandwidth allocation. We show that the most efficient SUs will be hired by the PU to attend the cooperative communication. PU can achieve the same maximum utility as in the symmetric information scenario. Simulation results confirm that the utility of PU is significantly enhanced with our proposed cooperative spectrum sharing scheme.

• 대한전기학회:학술대회논문집
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• 대한전기학회 2000년도 하계학술대회 논문집 A
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• pp.403-405
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• 2000

This paper presents a N-player game theory application for analyzing power transactions in a deregulated energy marketplace such as PoolCo, where, participants, especially, generating entities, maximize their net profits through optimal bidding strategies (i.e., bidding prices and bidding generations). In this paper, the electricity market for power transactions is modeled as a non-cooperative. N-player game with complete information, where the solution is determined in a continuous strategy domain having recourse to the Nash equilibrium idea.

• 기술혁신학회지
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• 제14권4호
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• pp.1050-1072
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• 2011

글로벌 기술협력은 파트너 간 이해관계 불일치와 기술수준, 문화, 언어 및 각종 거시적 환경여건의 차이로 국내 기업 간 협력보다 훨씬 더 어려운 것이 사실이다. 본 연구는 국제 기술협력에서 제기되는 여러 어려움을 극복하고 성공적인 성과를 도출한 한국전자통신연구원(이하 ETRI)과 Microsoft사의 글로벌 기술협력 사례를 조사 분석하였다. 이를 위해 자원기반이론, 네트워크 이론, 관계마케팅 이론 등의 기술협력 이론을 검토하였다. 아울러 시장지배력 관점에서 두 기관의 협력 동기를 살펴보았다. 양 기관 간 기술협력 심층조사 과정에서 도출된 주요 성공요인들로서 명확한 협력목적, 신뢰에 기반한 소통, 파트너가 의존할 수 있는 핵심역량, 사회문화적 요소 등 환경요인이 도출되었다.

• 대한전기학회논문지:전력기술부문A
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• 제51권12호
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• pp.597-602
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• 2002

The restructuring of power industry is still going on all over the world for last several decades. Many kinds of restructuring model have been studied, proposed, and applied. Among those models, power pool is more popular than other. This paper assumes the power pool market structure having competitive generation sector, and a new method is presented to build a bidding strategy in that market. The utilities participating in the market have the perfect information of their cost and price functions, but they don't know which strategy to be chosen by others. To define one's strategy as a vector, we make utility's cost/price functions into discrete step functions. An utility knows only his own strategy, so he estimates the other's cost/price functions into discrete step functions. An utility knows only his own strategy, so he estimates the other's strategy using Nash equilibrium or stochastic methods. And he also has to forecast the system demand. According to this forecasting result, his payoffs can be changed. Considering these all conditions, we formulate a bidding game problem and apply noncooperative game theory to that problem for the optimal strategy or solution. Some restrictive assumption are added for simplification of solving process. A numerical example is given in Case Study to show essential features and concrete results of this approach.

• 대한전기학회논문지:전력기술부문A
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• 제55권6호
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• pp.259-264
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• 2006

This paper addresses the collusive bidding that functions as a potential obstacle to a fully competitive wholesale electricity market. Cooperative game is formulated and the equation of its Nash Equilibrium (NE) is derived on the basis of the supply function model. Gencos' willingness to selectively collude is expressed through a bargain theory. A Collusion Incentive Index(CII) for representing the willingness is defined through computing the Gencos' profits at NE. In order to keep the market non-cooperative, the market operator has to know the highest potentially collusive combination among the Gencos. Another index, which will be called the Collusion Monitoring Index(CMI), is suggested to detect the highest potential collusion and it is calculated using the marginal cost functions of the Gencos without any computation of NE. The effectiveness of CMI for detecting the highest potential collusion is verified through application on many test market cases.

• KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering
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• 제5A권1호
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• pp.79-84
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• 2005

In many countries, the electric power industry is undergoing significant changes known as deregulation and restructuring. These alterations introduce competition in generation and retail and require open access to the transmission network. The competition of the electric power industry causes many issues to surface. Among them, unbundling of the transmission service is probably the most complicated as it is a single and integrated sector and the transmission revenue requirement must be allocated to market participants in a fair way. In these situations, it is valuable to research the methodologies to allocate transmission usage. The power tracing method offers useful information such as which generators supply a particular load or how much each generator (load) uses a particular transmission line. With this information, we can allocate required transmission revenue to market participants. Recently, several algorithms were proposed for tracing power flow but there is no dominant power tracing method. This paper proposes a power tracing method based on graph theory and complex-current distribution. For practicability, the proposed method for transmission usage allocation is applied to IEEE 30 buses and compared with the method proposed by Felix F.Wu.

• 산업경영시스템학회지
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• 제34권3호
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• pp.41-48
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• 2011

Recently, the increasing power of distributors has given them the opportunity of introducing private brand (PB) products. Based on the game theory, this study analyzes the decision making of a distributor regarding the optimal pricing and quality strategies for the PB product. By analyzing the game model, it is shown that the pricing mechanism heavily depends not only on the market power of the distributor but on the quality of the PB product. It is also shown that, counter intuitively, as the market power of the distributor increases, the optimal quality of the PB product should be decreased.

• 과학기술학연구
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• 제19권2호
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• pp.1-40
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• 2019

이 연구는 참여관찰과 심층인터뷰 등 문화기술지 연구방법을 통하여 양재화훼시장에서 이루어지는 전자경매거래의 물질문화를 분석하였다. 행위자-연결망 이론에 기초하여 중도매인 그리고 경매사와 같은 인간행위자와 시장기기(market devices)와 같은 인공물 간의 감각적, 물질적 상호작용이 어떻게 일어나며, 이를 통하여 그들 간의 네트워크, 즉 아장스망(agencement)이 어떻게 형성되는 지에 대해 분석하였다. 본 연구의 연구결과는 다음과 같다. 전자경매에 따른 새로운 시장기기의 출현으로 인하여 경매 퍼포먼스의 변화가 일어났다. 중도매인과 경매사 간 직접적인 상호작용은 축소되고 시장기기를 통한 간접적인 상호작용은 증가되면서 아장스망이 새롭게 형성되었다. 이러한 아장스망의 변화로 인하여 첫째, 젊은 중도매인 혹은 여성 중도매인의 경매 참여가 과거에 비해 보다 더 용이해졌다. 두 번째, 시장기기에 대한 경매참여자의 신뢰가 상대편 행위자에 대한 신뢰를 가져오고 결국 전자 경매에 대한 신뢰로 이어진다. 나아가 시장기기는 중도매인과 경매사간의 직접적인 상호작용을 줄임으로써 계층적이었던 중도매인과 경매사 간의 관계를 보다 동등한 관계로 변화시켰다. 마지막으로 거래 전광판은 경매사가 독점했던 거래현황정보를 중도매인들에게도 제공함으로써, 경매가격에 대한 경매사의 영향력은 보다 감소시켰고, 경매 라운드간 낙찰가격의 상관관계는 보다 증가되었다. 결국 시장 참여자들의 행위력, 권력, 신뢰 그리고 가격 및 정보들은 물질적이며 감각적이다.

• Ocean and Polar Research
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• 제34권3호
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• pp.349-364
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• 2012

This study focuses on systematic structure of factors, which affect commercialization of ocean science and technology (OST), applying both grounded theory methodology (GTM) and semantic network analysis methodology (SNAM) by using in-depth interviews with 8 specialists previously experienced in the same field. This study further focuses on clarification of the distinctiveness and universality of commercialization factors on OST by comparatively analyzing on the commercialization factors of general sciences and technologies. Using SNAM, it was determined that commercialization success required connected support system, government support, technology marketing, technology power and characteristics of commercialized entities, which were identified as dominant factors. GTM presented an outcome that connected support systems among participants in commercialization and found that research institute strategies are significant factors in the core phenomenon of commercialization, while technology marketing, technology power and market-oriented technology are important conditions. In addition, the factors of technology, market, connection of participants and government support of commercialized entities are shown as equally important factors for commercialization of ocean science and technology. Secondly, SNAM results indicate that ocean science characteristics depend on a network of government support, research institute strategy, organization and manpower, capital power, and technology marketing, as these ocean science characteristics have been identified as significant factors in the GTM study. It has been determined that technology, market and government support should be connected in order for commercialization of ocean science and technology (OST). Moreover, commercialization methods, applied to the marketing of commercialization of ocean science and technology is differentiated from others since commercialization success is more relevant to these factors.