• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.26 no.1
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• pp.61-69
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• 2001

This paper presents a two stage game model which examines the effect of learning-by-doing and spillover. Increases in the firm’s cumulative experience lower its unit cost in future period. However, the firm’s rival also enjoys the experience via spillover. Unlike previous theoretical research model, a cost asymmetric market entry game model is developed between the incumbent firm and new entrant. Mathematical results show that the incumbent firm exploits the learning curve to gain future cost advantage, and that the diffusion of learning to the new entrant induces the incumbent firm to choose decreasing output strategically. As a main result, we show that the relative magnitude between the learning and spillover rate determines the market share ratio of competing firms.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.22 no.4
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• pp.71-80
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• 1997

In this paper, we consider with a market pioneering game among symmetric firms in highly competitive situation. To describe the puzzling situation of timing competition, we construct a dynamic game model and explore the equilibrium solution. As a result, we find a subgame perfect mixed strategy Nash equilibrium conceptually defined by 't$_{0}$ + .elsilon. equilibrium'. Our major finding s include : i) market entry will be occurred in sequential manner even though the condition of each firm is symmetric ii) the optimal timing of market pioneering will be advanced until almost all of the monopolist's profit is dissipated, iii) as the market position of the pioneer is stronger, the timings of the pioneer and the follower are separated, iv) and as the slope of the profit flow is steeper, the entry timing of the two players will be pooled together.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute Of Construction Engineering and Management
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• 2007.11a
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• pp.652-655
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• 2007

Due to stagnation of domestic market, increasing number of domestic construction companies started to make inroads into foreign market recently. Yet compared to domestic market, there are much more risks in the foreign market which companies may confront. So deliberate and rational decision making skills are required. Accordingly, there has been many researches which analyzed the risk of individual markets and also studies covering decision support models. In this study, we suggest a model concerning financial issues when branching out into a new market, specially in the construction companies' point of view. For this we used a real options game which shows real competition status of a new market and deduced a feature of that market, Upon these results, we also suggest a model which helps firms to decide whether investing in the expansion is smart action or not. The model developed in this study is made in specific circumstances of limited conditions. The future study makes more realistic models considering subjects like disproportion in information and generalization of competing companies.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.31 no.3
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• pp.107-125
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• 2006

We introduce a two-stage game theoretic model to support decision making processes for product Positioning and pricing in competitive environment. In the first stage, firms decide on entry and product position, in the second stage, firms compete with price. 'Alpha rule' is used as a choice model. Demand parameters of the choice model are estimated by conjoint analysis. We investigate conditions for the existence of Nash price equilibria in the pricing game. Nash equilibria in the entry and positioning game are produced using a concept of stable sets. An example of the online game industry in Korea is examined.

• Journal of the Korean Society for Computer Game
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• v.31 no.4
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• pp.145-155
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• 2018

This study aims to extract additional elements to the existing game value evaluation using Delphi technique to 23 game experts. As a result of reviewing the characteristics of the development model using the evaluation model of the existing game contents, it was found that the evaluation factor was selected when selecting the content. The Delphi analysis was conducted two times, the first was the expert FGI and the second was the Delphi questionnaire. More detailed elements were presented in the related items such as results, technology transfer and dissemination, and details for promoting commercialization. Through focus group interviews, we extracted additional factors and predicted market size, growth potential, regulatory and market appeal and risk through market analysis of content success in the game industry. This will allow the industry to understand market size, growth potential, regulation, market appeal and risk through a market analysis of its success targets. This study suggests that the proposed evaluation factors can be applied to the entire game and cultural contents industry and will also help to construct market factors such as market value evaluation of contents, goal and goal setting, selection of entry method, and strategic factors.

• The Journal of the Convergence on Culture Technology
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• v.8 no.4
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• pp.303-311
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• 2022

Recently the telemedicine platform firms which have been temporarily permitted since COVID-19 outbreak have increasingly provided online prescription drugs delivery, causing concerns among incumbent providers of medicine, some of whom began to take aggressive actions again them. In this study, using game theoretic market entry - deterrence model, we show that although the incumbent medicine provider can effectively deter entry by the telemedicine platform firms by its preemptive action, accommodation could be a optimal action when telemedicine platform firms already have penetrated the market with their being permitted to do business due to the COVID-19. However, for the incumbent to cooperate for the successful change in the retail market for medicines, policies like placing a ceiling on the maximum number of taking prescriptions by the pharmacists a day in the telemedince platform network, providing favorable exposure of community pharmacists on the telemedicine platform user interface, and allowing community pharmacies to participate as shareholders of the telemedicine platform firms in its initial public opening of capital, are suggested.

• The Magazine of Kiice
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• v.17 no.1
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• pp.57-63
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• 2016

What will the gaming industry look like in the future? Where is it heading? Most producers, developers, and gamers have been pondering such questions since the very beginning of video games. This paper asserts that the current trend in video games to emphasize rationalization will, in time, bring about an extreme polarization within the game industry. Each year the barriers to entry are becoming lower and the size of the game market is growing, which will bring about an emphasis on who has the power to be recognized in the industry. This paper argues that such trends will, in turn, lead to a power play in which the winner will always be the player with the most monetary power. In time, this prolonged power play is expected to bring about what this discussion refers to as a dystopian model within the game industry.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.12 no.1
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• pp.127-148
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• 1990

A Milgrom-Roberts style signalling model of limit pricing is developed to analyze the possibility and the scope of limit pricing in general, noncooperative oligopolies. The model contains multiple incumbent firms facing a potential entrant and assumes an information asymmetry between incombents and the potential entrant about the market demand. There are two periods in the model. In period 1, n incumbent firms simultaneously and noncooperatively choose quantities. At the end of period 1, the potential entrant observes the market price and makes an entry decision. In period 2, depending on the entry decision of the entrant, n' or (n+1) firms choose quantities again before the game terminates. Since the choice of incumbent firms in period 1 depends on their information about demand, the market price in period 1 conveys information about the market demand. Thus, there is a systematic link between the market price and the profitability of entry. Using Bayes-Nash equilibrium as the solution concept, we find that there exist some demand conditions under which incumbent firms will limit price. In symmetric equilibria, incumbent firms each produce an output that is greater than the Cournot output and induce a price that is below the Cournot price. In doing so, each incumbent firm refrains from maximizing short-run profit and supplies a public good that is entry deterrence. The reason that entry is deterred by such a reduced price is that it conveys information about the demand of the industry that is unfavorable to the entrant. This establishes the possibility of limit pricing by noncooperative oligopolists in a setting that is fully rational, and also generalizes the result of Milgrom and Roberts to general oligopolies, confirming Bain's intuition. Limit pricing by incumbents explained above can be interpreted as a form of credible collusion in which each firm voluntarily deviates from myopic optimization in order to deter entry using their superior information. This type of implicit collusion differs from Folk-theorem type collusions in many ways and suggests that a collusion can be a credible one even in finite games as long as there is information asymmetry. Another important result is that as the number of incumbent firms approaches infinity, or as the industry approaches a competitive one, the probability that limit pricing occurs converges to zero and the probability of entry converges to that under complete information. This limit result confirms the intuition that as the number of agents sharing the same private information increases, the value of the private information decreases, and the probability that the information gets revealed increases. This limit result also supports the conventional belief that there is no entry problem in a competitive market. Considering the fact that limit pricing is generally believed to occur at an early stage of an industry and the fact that many industries in Korea are oligopolies in their infant stages, the theoretical results of this paper suggest that we should pay attention to the possibility of implicit collusion by incumbent firms aimed at deterring new entry using superior information. The long-term loss to the Korean economy from limit pricing can be very large if the industry in question is a part of the world market and the domestic potential entrant whose entry is deterred could .have developed into a competitor in the world market. In this case, the long-term loss to the Korean economy should include the lost opportunity in the world market in addition to the domestic long-run welfare loss.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.34 no.3
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• pp.165-177
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• 2009

The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of the Internet channel introduction on the channel composed of a monopoly manufacturer and an independent physical retailer. This study also examines what would be the best strategy for the Independent physical retailer to respond to the new internet channel entry. The game theoretic model consists of a monopolist manufacturer selling its product through a channel system including one independent physical store before the entry of an internet store. The audition of the internet store to this channel system results in a mixed channel comprised of two different types of channels. The new internet store is launched by the manufacturer. The results show that an Internet channel entry has the following impacts on the existing channel members. First, the manufacturer's internet channel introduction mitigates the double marginalization problem of the traditional channel. Second, the manufacturer could enhance Its channel power by introducing its own internet channel while it diminishes that of the incumbent independent physical retailer. Third, manufacturer's adding a new internet store leads to a higher demand. Finally, with its own internet direct channel, the manufacturer has an opportunity to practice price discrimination. The manufacture leaves only those with a strong preference for the physical store to be served by the Independent physical store. The results suggest that the independent physical store's best strategy to the entry of the manufacturer's Internet channel is to focus on the consumers who are highly loyal to the physical store while maintaining a high retail price.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.17 no.12
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• pp.467-472
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• 2019

Growing smartphone usage in South Korea has also accelerated the pace of development of mobile games, but competition is intensifying as the market grows. As one of the factors for the success of the game in this mobile game market, UI has been presented, suggesting that the design of such mobile game UI should be approached in terms of designing the user's experience, along with its function, aesthetic expression, function-oriented design and information delivery before. In this paper, we propose an effective lobby layout of mobile RPG using experience among UX factors. Through the layout classification of Ernest Adams and Andrew Rollings, we selected 9 mobile RPGs in the 20th place of google play cumulative sales rankings and analyzed the layout of the lobby. As a result, the lobby layout of the game, which led the first market success of the mobile RPG genre, The result was that it became the standard of the boxed game. It can be interpreted that the lobby layout, which is similar to the game used previously by the user, is effective because low entry barriers and learning are unnecessary due to the experience of using the existing RPG. Future studies may produce a common layout of a broad genre if studies are conducted to measure the optimum UX for other genres than RPG.