• Strategy21
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• s.30
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• pp.236-262
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• 2012

Morgenthau claims that in international relations, there are the economic, political, and military powers that enable a nation to achieve its political and diplomatic goals. This paper explores the possibility of resolving international conflicts with naval power. First, the theoretical and historical perspective, naval power was used as a final resort to force a nation's political or diplomatic objective on an enemy nation when negotiations failed, and this was done through the physical and psychological destruction of the enemy by naval power. But as the use of military power has decreased because of the invention of the nuclear weapon, the existence of a large and capable navy deterrent has become one of the most useful military options among a nation's diplomatic measures. In other words, he focused on the political usefulness of naval power as a deterrent and coercive diplomatic tool for persuading other nations to acquiesce, rather than using naval power and actual military action as a final resort. The reason for this is that compared to army and air force, navy's flexibility, continuity, and the ability to deter are greater. The navy provides excellent accessibility through its wide mobility on the sea, and it has been shown through research that the navy possesses a political usefulness that facilitates the solution of conflicts through presence, naval intervention, and naval blockade. On the other hand, among the factors that could improve the influence of the navy are alliance relations, a reliable and powerful navy, carrots and sticks that it would have to deal with in the case of successful or unsuccessful negotiations, and support from international opinion. On this paper I introduce E.N.Luttwak's naval suasion theory. By the his theory, there are two mode of naval suasion. One is latent naval suasion the other is active suasion. Latent suasion there are deterrent mode and supportive mode. Active naval suasion there are coercive mode and supportive mode. Coercive mode has positive and negative. The limitations of naval suasion have been identified as follows. First, because the objective of the use of naval power is persuading enemy nations, the results are unpredictable. Second, the leaders of all countries possess limited understanding on the complexities of naval power and therefore lack understanding of the usefulness of naval power when choosing options. Third, in case of failure through naval suasion, prestige and reputation of a nation can be damaged. Finally, the following are additional possible research topic. First, a research on the decision making process of choosing naval power as a measure to resolve conflicts is needed. Lastly, research on the size of the navy and types of ships required for efficient naval suasion is needed. Today's world requires cooperative security regime so that middle class navy also requires political use of naval power in solving international conflicts. Therefore, additional research on this topic is needed.

• Journal of the Korean Society for Marine Environment & Energy
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• v.12 no.2
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• pp.104-110
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• 2009

This study tries to give improvement directions of the law of oil spill focusing on the view that satisfying remuneration for victims should be considered. And it looks through the existing remuneration system provided by P&I Club and IOPC Fund. It also covers with issues related to remuneration in order to find the best for victims. The major contents of this study are as follows. First, the present law of compensation security to Marine oil pollution accident should be revised. Maximum value of remuneration needs to be raised and subjects liable to pay reparation need to be expanded. Second, in case the damage is widely different comparing to similar cases in foreign countries, it's hard to get complete remuneration from international corporations responsible for reparation. That's the reason the national emergency system for oil pollution must be established. Third, this study says the law that certainly defines a liability subject and that the liability is not necessarily caused by fault should be enacted. Last, it suggest that victims should have their object income data to facilitate establishment of the law of compensation for damages from marine oil pollution. To calculate proper remuneration, government should consider to choose one of public organizations as an investigator to damages and should collect accurate statistics relating to fishery. Furthermore, compensation system which can provide rapid reparation to victims needs to established by founding professional maritime organization of arbitration.

• Journal of Korea Port Economic Association
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• v.32 no.2
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• pp.73-90
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• 2016

In Climate change is a global issue that requires global responses. As a key factor in climate change, greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions have attracted increasing attention the international community. One of the crucial global efforts to alleviate climate change is the establishment of an international climate change regime, comprising rules, norms, principles, procedures that are applicable to a wide range of activities. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) received a mandate from the Kyoto Protocol to regulate shipping GHG emissions. However, the IMO Convention and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea also provide regulations on regarding GHG emissions. To execute its mandate, the IMO has developed various regulatory initiatives. In addition, the Chinese government has declared new regulations which designate parts of its coastal waters as emission control areas (ECA). Owing to the growing recognition of the benefits of ECA, ships, including ocean-going vessels that operate in areas near the Pearl River Delta, Yangtze River Delta, and the Bohai Sea will be obliged to use fuel containing less than 0.5% sulfur. China's shipping industry is playing a growing role in the international shipping market, and its response to these initiatives will have a substantial effect on the future application of these regulations. This study analyzed the GHG mandates of the IMO and the Chinese government, and then examines the main outcomes that have been achieved.

• Strategy21
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• s.34
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• pp.58-92
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• 2014

Even after S. Korea took 5.24 Measure(24 May 2014), N. Korea has not stopped raising provocations such as the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, electronic and cyber attacks. To make matters worse, the communist country lunched long-range missiles(twice) and conducted 3rd nuclear test, escalating tensions which could possibly lead to an all-out war. Korean Government failed to respond properly. However, escalation into an all-out war was deterred by the CFC immediately carrying out its peacetime duty(CODA). The US made a rapid dispatch of its augmentation forces(Aircraft carrier, nuclear-powered submarine, strategic bomber, F-22) to the Korean Peninsula. In recognition of the importance of the Combined Forces Command, since May 2013 the Park Geun-Hye Administration has been pushing ahead with re-postponement of Wartime Operational Control Transfer(which initially meant the disassembling of the CFC as of 1 December 2015) More recently, there has been a series of unusual indicators from the North. Judging from its inventory of 20 nuclear weapons, 1,000 ballistic missiles and biochemical weapons, it is safe to say that N. Korea has gained at least war deterrence against S. Korea. Normally a nation with nuclear weapons shrink its size of conventional forces, but the North is pursuing the opposite, rather increasing them. In addition, there was a change of war plan by N. Korea in 2010, changing 'Conquering the Korean Peninsula' to 'Negotiation after the seizure of the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area(GSMA)' and establishing detailed plans for wartime projects. The change reflects the chain reaction in which requests from pro-north groups within the South will lead to the proclamation of war. Kim, Jeong-Un, leader of N. Korean regime, sent threatening messages using words such as 'exercising a nuclear preemptive strike right' and 'burning of Seoul'. Nam, Jae-June, Director of National Intelligence Service, stated that Kim, Jung-Un is throwing big talks, saying communization of the entire Korean Peninsula will come within the time frame of 3 years. Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, shared an alarming message that there is a high possibility that the North will raise local provocations or a full-fledged war whenever while putting much emphasis on defense posture. As for the response concept of the Korean Government, it has been decided that 'ROK·US Combined Local Provocation Counter-Measure' will be adopted to act against local provocations from the North. Major provocation types include ▲ violation of the Northern Limit Line(NLL) with mobilization of military ships ▲ artillery provocations on Northwestern Islands ▲ low altitude airborne intrusion ▲ rear infiltration of SOF ▲ local conflicts within the Military Demarcation Line(MDL) ▲ attacking friendly ships by submarines. Counter-measures currently established by the US involves the support from USFK and USFJ. In order to keep the sworn promise, the US is reinforcing both USFK and USFJ. An all-out war situation will be met by 'CFC OPLAN5027' and 'Tailored Expansion Deterrence Forces' with the CFC playing a central role. The US augmentation forces stands at 690,000 troops, some 160 ships, 2,000 aircraft and this comprise 50% of US total forces, which is estimated to be ninefold of Korean forces. The CFC needs to be in center in handling both local provocations and an all-out war situation. However, the combat power of S. Korean conventional forces is approximately around 80% of that of N. Korea, which has been confirmed from comments made by Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, during an interpellation session at the National Assembly. This means that S. Korean forces are not much growing. In particular, asymmetric capabilities of the North is posing a serious threat to the South including WMD, cyber warfare forces, SOF, forces targeting 5 Northwestern Islands, sub-surface and amphibious assault forces. The presence of such threats urgently requires immediate complementary efforts. For complementary efforts, the Korean Government should consider ① reinforcement of Korean forces; putting a stoppage to shrinking military, acquisition of adequate defense budget, building a missile defense and military leadership structure validity review, ② implementation of military tasks against the North; disciplinary measures on the sinking of ROKS Cheon-an/shelling of Yeonpyeong Islands, arrangement of inter-Korean military agreements, drawing lessons from studies on the correlation between aid for N. Korea, execution of inter-Korean Summit and provocations from the North, and ③ bolstering the ROK·US alliance; disregarding wartime operational control transfer plan(disassembling of CFC) and creation of a combined division.