• Proceedings of the Korean Operations and Management Science Society Conference
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• 2007.11a
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• pp.104-107
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• 2007

In this paper, we propose the coordination scheme in a single-manufacturer-multiple-retailer supply chain system. Traditionally, the bargaining power of the single manufacturer is superior to those of retailers. The business environment supported by the e-business scheme may give rise to new business behavior. The multitude of retailer requests the manufacturer to relax the his unilateral lot-sizing policy while they are willing to compensate more than the manufacturer's expected loss caused by abandon his superior bargaining power. The side payment aggregated by the multiple retailers is transferred to the manufacturer according to the degree of the manufacturer's relaxation from the current unilateral lot-sizing policy.

• Journal of Distribution Science
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• v.10 no.11
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• pp.11-20
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• 2012

Purpose - This study attempts to measure the management performance of a food manufacturer using the BSC as one of the main business management techniques used to achieve the vision of a corporation. Research design, data, methodology - The measurement of business performance of a Japanese food manufacturer was conducted from four perspectives of BSC. Matsui (2005) developed the 'Cross-analysis chart'. Results - First, there were many cases where a minor wastage of raw materials was related to increasing costs. Second, the food manufacturer should try to recover the investment cost through significantly increasing the rate of the facility's operations. Third, reducing personnel expenses could be an important issue in labor-intensive manufacturing. Fourth, customer management was very important in the food manufacturing business. Finally, the food manufacturer should actively consider proposals influencing the food culture to secure high profits in the future. Conclusions - There were many limitations in applying these results to Korean food manufacturers, as this study applied to and analyzed the results in the context of the Japanese food manufacturer.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.34 no.3
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• pp.165-177
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• 2009

The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of the Internet channel introduction on the channel composed of a monopoly manufacturer and an independent physical retailer. This study also examines what would be the best strategy for the Independent physical retailer to respond to the new internet channel entry. The game theoretic model consists of a monopolist manufacturer selling its product through a channel system including one independent physical store before the entry of an internet store. The audition of the internet store to this channel system results in a mixed channel comprised of two different types of channels. The new internet store is launched by the manufacturer. The results show that an Internet channel entry has the following impacts on the existing channel members. First, the manufacturer's internet channel introduction mitigates the double marginalization problem of the traditional channel. Second, the manufacturer could enhance Its channel power by introducing its own internet channel while it diminishes that of the incumbent independent physical retailer. Third, manufacturer's adding a new internet store leads to a higher demand. Finally, with its own internet direct channel, the manufacturer has an opportunity to practice price discrimination. The manufacture leaves only those with a strong preference for the physical store to be served by the Independent physical store. The results suggest that the independent physical store's best strategy to the entry of the manufacturer's Internet channel is to focus on the consumers who are highly loyal to the physical store while maintaining a high retail price.

• Management Science and Financial Engineering
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• v.11 no.2
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• pp.1-17
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• 2005

In this article we consider a supply chain consisting of a risk-sensitive manufacturer and a riskneutral retailer. The manufacturer maximizes her individual expected profit by designing a supply chain coordinating returns contract (SCRC) that consists of (i) a channel coordinating returns policy that maximizes the supply chain joint expected profit, and (ii) a profit sharing arrangement that gives the retailer an expected profit only slightly higher than that in the no returns case so that it is just enough to induce the retailer to accept the SCRC. Thus, the manufacturer captures as high a percentage as possible of the jointly maximum supply chain profit. However, this contract can sometimes lead to the manufacturer's resulting realized profit being lower than that in the no returns case when demand is lower than expected. In this context, even though profit is sufficiently attractive on average, will the risk-sensitive manufacturer ever consider applying a SCRC? Our research raises this question and focuses on designing a SCRC that can significantly increase the probability of the manufacturer's resulting realized profit being at least higher than that in the no returns case.

• Industrial Engineering and Management Systems
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• v.13 no.2
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• pp.231-249
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• 2014

This paper discusses a green supply chain with a manufacturer and a collection trader, and it proposes an optimal production planning for remanufacturing of parts in used products with quality classification errors made by the collection trader. When a manufacturer accepts an order for parts from a retailer and procures used products from a collection trader, the collection trader might have some quality classification errors due to the lack of equipment or expert knowledge regarding quality classification. After procurement of used products, the manufacturer inspects if there are any classification errors. If errors are detected, the manufacturer reclassifies the misclassified (overestimated) used products at a cost. Accordingly, the manufacturer decides to remanufacture from the higher-quality used products based on a remanufacturing ratio or produce parts from new materials. This paper develops a mathematical model to find how quality classification errors affect the optimal decisions for a lower limit of procurement quality of used products and a remanufacturing ratio under the lower limit and the expected profit of the manufacturer. Numerical analysis investigates how quality of used products, the reclassification cost and the remanufacturing cost of used products affect the optimal production planning and the expected profit of a manufacturer.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.17 no.2
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• pp.3-14
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• 1992

The efficiency of marketing channel of distribution between a manufacturer with several customers can be increase by influencing the order quantity of customer. Manufacturer reduces average inventory holding cost by penalizing the large order quantity from the customer. Such a penalty is significant only if the manufacturer's unit inventory holding cost is relatively large. Conditions under which such penalizing can be beneficial to both parties are derived.

• Journal of Distribution Research
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• v.17 no.4
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• pp.29-53
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• 2012

As so many marketers get to use diverse sales promotion methods, manufacturer and retailer in a channel often use them too. In this context, diverse issues on sales promotion management arise. One of them is the issue of unplanned buying. Consumers' unplanned buying is clearly better off for the retailer but not for manufacturer. This asymmetric influence of unplanned buying should be dealt with prudently because of its possibility of provocation of channel conflict. However, there have been scarce studies on the sales promotion management strategy considering the unplanned buying and its asymmetric effect on retailer and manufacturer. In this paper, we try to find a better way for a manufacturer in a channel to promote performance through the retailer's sales promotion efforts when there is potential of unplanned buying effect. We investigate via game-theoretic modeling what is the optimal cost sharing level between the manufacturer and retailer when there is unplanned buying effect. We investigated following issues about the topic as follows: (1) What structure of cost sharing mechanism should the manufacturer and retailer in a channel choose when unplanned buying effect is strong (or weak)? (2) How much payoff could the manufacturer and retailer in a channel get when unplanned buying effect is strong (or weak)? We focus on the impact of unplanned buying effect on the optimal cost sharing mechanism for sales promotions between a manufacturer and a retailer in a same channel. So we consider two players in the game, a manufacturer and a retailer who are interacting in a same distribution channel. The model is of complete information game type. In the model, the manufacturer is the Stackelberg leader and the retailer is the follower. Variables in the model are as following table. Manufacturer's objective function in the basic game is as follows: ${\Pi}={\Pi}_1+{\Pi}_2$, where, ${\Pi}_1=w_1(1+L-p_1)-{\psi}^2$, ${\Pi}_2=w_2(1-{\epsilon}L-p_2)$. And retailer's is as follows: ${\pi}={\pi}_1+{\pi}_2$, where, ${\pi}_1=(p_1-w_1)(1+L-p_1)-L(L-{\psi})+p_u(b+L-p_u)$, ${\pi}_2=(p_2-w_2)(1-{\epsilon}L-p_2)$. The model is of four stages in two periods. Stages of the game are as follows. (Stage 1) Manufacturer sets wholesale price of the first period($w_1$) and cost sharing level of channel sales promotion(${\Psi}$). (Stage 2) Retailer sets retail price of the focal brand($p_1$), the unplanned buying item($p_u$), and sales promotion level(L). (Stage 3) Manufacturer sets wholesale price of the second period($w_2$). (Stage 4) Retailer sets retail price of the second period($p_2$). Since the model is a kind of dynamic games, we try to find a subgame perfect equilibrium to derive some theoretical and managerial implications. In order to obtain the subgame perfect equilibrium, we use the backward induction method. In using backward induction approach, we solve the problems backward from stage 4 to stage 1. By completely knowing follower's optimal reaction to the leader's potential actions, we can fold the game tree backward. Equilibrium of each variable in the basic game is as following table. We conducted more analysis of additional game about diverse cost level of manufacturer. Manufacturer's objective function in the additional game is same with that of the basic game as follows: ${\Pi}={\Pi}_1+{\Pi}_2$, where, ${\Pi}_1=w_1(1+L-p_1)-{\psi}^2$, ${\Pi}_2=w_2(1-{\epsilon}L-p_2)$. But retailer's objective function is different from that of the basic game as follows: ${\pi}={\pi}_1+{\pi}_2$, where, ${\pi}_1=(p_1-w_1)(1+L-p_1)-L(L-{\psi})+(p_u-c)(b+L-p_u)$, ${\pi}_2=(p_2-w_2)(1-{\epsilon}L-p_2)$. Equilibrium of each variable in this additional game is as following table. Major findings of the current study are as follows: (1) As the unplanned buying effect gets stronger, manufacturer and retailer had better increase the cost for sales promotion. (2) As the unplanned buying effect gets stronger, manufacturer had better decrease the cost sharing portion of total cost for sales promotion. (3) Manufacturer's profit is increasing function of the unplanned buying effect. (4) All results of (1),(2),(3) are alleviated by the increase of retailer's procurement cost to acquire unplanned buying items. The authors discuss the implications of those results for the marketers in manufacturers or retailers. The current study firstly suggests some managerial implications for the manufacturer how to share the sales promotion cost with the retailer in a channel to the high or low level of the consumers' unplanned buying potential.

• Journal of Applied Reliability
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• v.15 no.1
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• pp.19-26
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• 2015

The amended law of railway safety in Korea has recently come into effect in order to strengthen the railway safety management system. The new law, which took effect March 1, 2014, will implement stricter oversight of railway companies. As a result, a company that manufactures railroad system or components for domestic use must obtain an approval in accordance with the technical specifications of manufacturer approval. Although Korea had established the legal system in enforcing railway safety, the government wants the companies continue to develop the more improved safety systems until they gain competitive edge on the world class railway manufacturers. This paper presents an in-depth analysis of the technical specifications for manufacturer approval in International Railway Industry Standard (IRIS), which is the global standard. This paper also proposes measures and guidelines that would help Korean manufacturers those who want further develop their safety management systems, as a prerequisite for them to obtain the manufacturer approval.

• Journal of Distribution Science
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• v.18 no.7
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• pp.63-72
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• 2020

Purpose: This study examines the market segmentation and strategy of PT INKA, a rolling stock manufacturer in Indonesia. Research design, data and methodology: The study used the MCDM (Multiple Criteria Decision Making) method specifically the AHP (Analytical Hierarchy Process). The AHP method was applied to identify the target market. This method or approach considers the market attractiveness and competitive strength criteria with quantified parameters. Results: a) Australia, Kenya, Tanzania, New Zealand, and India emerge as the top five target markets; b) There is justification for rolling stock manufacturers to allocate their resources in winning the market share. Conclusion: The main challenge confronting the rolling stock manufacturer is limited resources to acquire a particular market share despite abundant opportunities in this sector. Despite the mastery of technology and long experience in the industry, selecting a target market with multiple criteria could be difficult for an emerging rolling stock manufacturer in South East Asia.

• IE interfaces
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• v.23 no.4
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• pp.327-336
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• 2010

We consider a supply chain consisting of a make-to-order manufacturer and N component suppliers and study the impacts of the number of suppliers on component inventory management. The manufacturer has full information and continuously observes the state of both component inventory level and customer backorders. Based on this information, the manufacturer determines whether or not to place a component purchasing order to a supplier among N suppliers even though some orders are in process by other suppliers. The goal of this paper is to numerically identify the manufacturer's purchasing policy which minimizes the total supply chain cost and the best choice of N. Our model contributes to the current literature in that the problem of simultaneously considering multiple outstanding orders and incorporating order setup cost into the model has not been covered yet. From numerical experiment, we investigate how much the policy with N suppliers can contribute to reducing the supply cost compared to the policy with a single supplier.