• 제목/요약/키워드: jump size

검색결과 59건 처리시간 0.023초

ULTIMATE 기법을 이용한 부유사 밀도류 전파 수치모의 (A numerical simulation of propagating turbidity currents using the ULTIMATE scheme)

  • 최성욱;최성욱
    • 한국수자원학회논문집
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    • 제50권1호
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    • pp.55-64
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    • 2017
  • 본 연구에서는 ULTIMATE 기법을 이용하여 밀도류 층적분 모형의 해석을 위한 수치모형을 제시하였다. 개발된 모형을 경사부와 평탄부로 이루어진 실내 실험에 적용하여 경사부에 유입된 부유사 밀도류의 전파 특성에 대해 분석하였다. ULTIMATE 기법의 범용제한자로 인하여 밀도류의 선단부가 수치진동 없이 비교적 급한 형태로 전파되는 것을 모의하였다. 그리고 사류로 전파되고 수로 끝에서부터 상류로 변화되는 밀도류의 내부 도수 발생 과정을 재현하였다. 이러한 내부 도수는 ULTIMATE 제한자를 사용하면 Courant 수가 1 미만일 때 안정적으로 모의되는 것을 확인하였다. 또한 밀도류의 전파 속도에 영향을 주는 인자에 대하여 분석하였다. 입자의 크기는 $9{\mu}m$ 이하일 때 밀도류의 전파 속도에 큰 영향을 주지 않는 반면, 부력 흐름률은 확연한 영향을 주는 것을 확인하였다. 마지막으로 부유사 밀도류에 의한 하상변동에 대해 검토하였다. 수치모형으로 부유사 밀도류의 전파에 의한 하상변동을 정량적으로 적절히 모의하였으며, 도수로 인한 부유사 연행의 차이와 이로 인한 하상의 불연속적인 형태를 관찰할 수 있었다.

$BaTiO_{3}$ PTC 서미스터 입계의 전기적인 특성 (The Electrical Characteristics of the Grain Boundary in a $BaTiO_{3}$ PTC Thermistor)

  • 권혁주;이재성;이용수;이동기;이용현
    • 센서학회지
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    • 제1권1호
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    • pp.67-75
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    • 1992
  • $BaTiO_{3}$ PTC 서미스터를 제조하여 그 전기적 특성을 조사하였다. PTC 서미스터의 저항률은 $20^{\circ}C$에서 $200^{\circ}C$까지 $20^{\circ}C$ 간격으로 측정되었다. 이 시편의 ac 복소 임피던스 분석을 통하여 PTC 서미스터의 입계저항, 입계정전용량, bulk 저항 등을 조사하였다. 전자현미경을 사용하여 grain을 확인하고 평균 입경을 구하였으며 측정된 평균 입경은 $3.8{\mu}m$에서 $8.8{\mu}m$까지 되었다. 평균 입경은 소결온도가 높을수록 커지는 경향을 보였으며 최대저항률 증가비는 $4{\times}10^{5}$ 정도였다. Bulk 저항률은 소결온도가 $1340^{\circ}C$ 이상일 경우는 측정온도가 증가함에 따라 감소하였다. 측정온도가 증가할수록 입계저항은 n의 지수함수적으로 증가하였으며, 입계정전용량은 감소하고, 입계의 전위 장벽은 증가하였다. 입계전하밀도는 측정온도가 올라갈수록 증가하였으나, 측정온도가 약 $110^{\circ}C$ 이상일 경우 더 이상 증가하지 않았다.

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Na 및 K 치환에 따른 BaTiO3의 Positive Temperature Coefficient Resistor 특성 (Properties of the Positive Temperature Coefficient Resistor Behavior on the Na and K Doped BaTiO3)

  • 이미재;임태영;김세기;황종희;김진호;서원선
    • 한국재료학회지
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    • 제20권12호
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    • pp.654-660
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    • 2010
  • The influences of Na and K content on the crystal phase, the microstructure and the electrical property of $BaTiO_3$-based thermistors was found to show typical PTC effects. The crystal phase of powder calcined at $1000^{\circ}C$ for 4hrs showed a single phase with $BaTiO_3$, and the crystal structure was transformed from tetragonal to cubic phase according to added amounts of Na and K. In XRD results at $43^{\circ}\sim47^{\circ}$, the $(Ba_{0.858}Na_{0.071}K_{0.071})(Ti_{0.9985}Nb_{0.0015})O_{3-\delta}$ showed (002) and (200) peaks but the $(Ba_{0.762}Na_{0.119}K_{0.119})(Ti_{0.9975}Nb_{0.0025})O_{3-\delta}$ showed (002), (020) and (200) peaks. In sintered bodies, those calcined at $600^{\circ}C$ rather than at $1000^{\circ}C$ were dense, and for certain amounts of Na and K showed rapid decreases in grain size. In relative permittivity, the curie temperature due to the transformation of ferroelectric phase rose with added Na and K but decreased in terms of relative permittivity. In the result of the R-T curve, the sintered bodies have curie temperatures of about $140^{\circ}C$ and the resistivity of sintered bodies have scores of $\Omega{\cdot}cm$; the jump order of sintered bodies was shown to be more than $10^4$ in powder calcined at $1000^{\circ}C$.

$BaTiO_3$계 PTC 재료에서 입계 modifier의 역할 (The role of grain boundary modifier in $BaTiO_3$ system for PTCR device)

  • 이준형;조상희
    • 한국재료학회지
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    • 제3권5호
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    • pp.553-561
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    • 1993
  • 본 연구에서는 입계의 성질을 이용한 PTCR 재료에 입계 modifier로서 $Bi_2O_3$를 첨가하고 입계의 미세구조와 결함농도를 변화시켜 이에 따른 소결 및 전기적 특성변화를 TMA, XRD, 복합 임피던스방법 등을 이용하여 해석하였다. 실험 결과 Y이 도우핑된 $BaTiO_3$PTCR 재료에 $Bi_2O_3$를 첨가하였을때 약 0.1mol%까지 고용이 되는 것으로 밝혀졌다. $Bi_2O_3$를 고용한계 이하로 첨가시에는 생성되는 vacancy등의 결함으로 말미암아 $Y-BaTiO_3$의 치밀화가 촉진되었으나, 그 이상 첨가하면 치밀화 뿐만 아니라 결정립 성장도 억제되었다. $Bi_2O_3$의 첨가량에 따라 계내에 존재하는 각 이온의 반경, 결함 반응식 및 격자 탄성 변형 에너지 등을 고려하면 $Y-BaTiO_3$결정립 내부에 Ba와 Ti vacancy가 동시에 생길 수 있어 고온저항이 높아짐을 알 수 있었다. BN은 $BaTiO_3$에 고용이 되지 않는 것으로 밝혀졌으며 $B_2O_3$를 주성분으로한 액상형성으로 인하여 저온에서의 급격한 치밀화가 관찰되었다. 또 Ba-Y-Ti-B-O의 비정질 상이 tripie junction에 존재함으로써 상온저항이 크게 변화하였으며, PTCR jump도 높아졌다.

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점프발생 강도 및 거래시간에 따른 변동성지수의 KOSPI200 일중 점프 예측력에 관한 연구 (A Study of Predictability of VKOSPI on the KOSPI200 Intraday Jumps using different Jump Size and Trading Time)

  • 정대성
    • 경영과정보연구
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    • 제35권1호
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    • pp.273-286
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    • 2016
  • 본 연구는 일중 KOSPI200 시장이 급변하는 시점을 기준으로 변동성지수의 KOSPI200점프를 예측력을 분석하였다. 본 연구의 주요 실증결과는 다음과 같다. 첫째, 변동성지수는 음의 KOSPI200점프에 대한 예측력을 가지는 것으로 나타났다. 변동성지수는 음의 점프 발생 전 정보의 유용성이 양의 점프 발생 시보다 유용한 것으로 나타났다. 둘째, 점프의 크기에 따른 변동성지수의 예측력은 강한 점프 발생보다는 약한 음의 점프에 대해서 높은 것으로 나타났다. 셋째, 변동성지수는 점프 발생 이후의 KOSPI200 수익률의 지속성에 대해서도 정보를 가지는 것으로 나타났다. 최소 6분에서 최대 8분까지 점프시점의 변동성지수에 따라서 점프 발생 후의 KOSPI200 수익률이 변화하는 움직임을 잘 설명해주었다. 넷째, 점프 방향에 따라서 음의 점프에 대해서 변동성지수가 증가하면 증가할수록, 향후 KOSPI200은 지속적으로 하락하게 되고, 양의 점프에 대해서는 변동성지수가 증가하면 증가할수록, KOSPI200은 상승하는 패턴을 보인다. 본 연구의 결과는 점프 예측뿐만 아니라 파생상품의 가격결정, ELW ELS 등 파생결합상품의 변동성위험 헤지 그리고 변동성거래를 이용한 포트폴리오 투자전략 수립 등에 기여할 것으로 기대되어진다.

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경북 동해안지역 전천후 해양리조트단지 조성방안 연구 (Research on the Development of Ocean Resort Complex in all Seasons at the East Coast of GyeongBuk Province)

  • 이중우;이명권
    • 한국항해항만학회:학술대회논문집
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    • 한국항해항만학회 2009년도 공동학술대회
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    • pp.205-209
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    • 2009
  • 최근 국민소득 규모의 증가, 주 5일제 근무제의 확대에 따른 해외여행기획의 확대, 해외여행비용 부담 감소 및 항공노선 증대 등으로 해외여행은 지속적으로 두 자리 수의 증가 추세인 반면, 물가상승으로 가격경쟁력 상실, 국제적 수준의 관광인프라 부족 및 차별화된 관광매력이 미흡함에 따라 방한 외래객은 낮은 성장률을 나타내고 있다. 경상북도의 동해안 지역은 동해를 연접하여 광역권을 형성하고 있으며, 풍부한 해양자원 및 자연자원, 문화자원 등 다양한 관광자원이 동질적 특성으로 분포해 있어 자원간, 지역간 연계개발을 통해 관광산업의 집적 및 시너지효과를 극대화할 수 있는 지역이다. 동해안 지역의 국제적 성장 가능성과 지역의 자원 개발 잠재력을 토대로 지역간 연계를 강화하는 광역관광권 개발사업의 일환으로 전천후 해양관광휴양단지를 추진함으로써 지역경제 활성화 및 국가균형발전 실현, 나아가 동북아 시대의 환동해권 중심지로의 도약에 기여하고자 한다. 여기서는 해양공간개발 및 활용 선진국의 전천후 해양공간활용실태를 조사 분석하고 해당지자체와 어울리는 해양종합리조트단지의 조성으로 관광휴양단지의 신공간개념을 제시코자 하였다.

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저수지로 유입되는 부유사 밀도류의 수치모의 (Numerical simulation of turbidity currents intruding into a reservoir)

  • 최성욱;반채웅;최성욱
    • 한국수자원학회논문집
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    • 제50권3호
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    • pp.201-210
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    • 2017
  • 본 연구에서는 저수지에 유입된 부유사 밀도류에 의해 유사가 포집되는 현상을 모의하기 위한 수치모형을 제시하였다. 개발된 모형을 Toniolo and Schultz (2005)의 실내 실험에 적용하여, 부유사 밀도류의 전파, 하도형태의 변화, 그리고 댐에 의한 유사의 포집현상을 모의하였다. 삼각주의 전면층에서 침강된 밀도류가 빠르게 댐까지 전파된 후, 댐에 의해 차단되고 두께가 증가되어 상류로 영향을 전파하는 일련의 과정을 모의하였다. 또한, 소류사와 부유사에 의해 저수지 삼각주에서 전면층이 전진하고, 부유사에 의해 기저층의 두께가 상승하는 현상을 잘 모의하였다. 댐 취수구의 높이에 따른 밀도류의 최대 두께와 내부 도수 발생 위치를 확인하였다. 유사 포집 효율은 수치모형으로 실측 결과의 값을 적절히 모의하였으나, 실험의 한계로 인해 댐 취수구의 높이와 포집 효율과의 관계는 찾아볼 수 없었다. 수치모의 결과를 이용하여 유사 포집 효율의 민감도 분석을 수행한 결과 부유사의 입자 크기가 포집 효율에 가장 민감하게 작용하는 것을 확인할 수 있었다.

중국군의 해양작전능력과 한국군의 과제 (PRC Maritime Operational Capability and the Task for the ROK Military)

  • 김민석
    • Strategy21
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    • 통권33호
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    • pp.65-112
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    • 2014
  • Recent trends show that the PRC has stepped aside its "army-centered approach" and placed greater emphasis on its Navy and Air Force for a wider range of operations, thereby reducing its ground force and harnessing its economic power and military technology into naval development. A quantitative growth of the PLA Navy itself is no surprise as this is not a recent phenomenon. Now is the time to pay closer attention to the level of PRC naval force's performance and the extent of its warfighting capacity in the maritime domain. It is also worth asking what China can do with its widening naval power foundation. In short, it is time to delve into several possible scenarios I which the PRC poses a real threat. With this in mind, in Section Two the paper seeks to observe the construction progress of PRC's naval power and its future prospects up to the year 2020, and categorize time frame according to its major force improvement trends. By analyzing qualitative improvements made over time, such as the scale of investment and the number of ships compared to increase in displacement (tonnage), this paper attempts to identify salient features in the construction of naval power. Chapter Three sets out performance evaluation on each type of PRC naval ships as well as capabilities of the Navy, Air Force, the Second Artillery (i.e., strategic missile forces) and satellites that could support maritime warfare. Finall, the concluding chapter estimates the PRC's maritime warfighting capability as anticipated in respective conflict scenarios, and considers its impact on the Korean Peninsula and proposes the directions ROK should steer in response. First of all, since the 1980s the PRC navy has undergone transitions as the focus of its military strategic outlook shifted from ground warfare to maritime warfare, and within 30 years of its effort to construct naval power while greatly reducing the size of its ground forces, the PRC has succeeded in building its naval power next to the U.S.'s in the world in terms of number, with acquisition of an aircraft carrier, Chinese-version of the Aegis, submarines and so on. The PRC also enjoys great potentials to qualitatively develop its forces such as indigenous aircraft carriers, next-generation strategic submarines, next-generation destroyers and so forth, which is possible because the PRC has accumulated its independent production capabilities in the process of its 30-year-long efforts. Secondly, one could argue that ROK still has its chances of coping with the PRC in naval power since, despite its continuous efforts, many estimate that the PRC naval force is roughly ten or more years behind that of superpowers such as the U.S., on areas including radar detection capability, EW capability, C4I and data-link systems, doctrines on force employment as well as tactics, and such gap cannot be easily overcome. The most probable scenarios involving the PRC in sea areas surrounding the Korean Peninsula are: first, upon the outbreak of war in the peninsula, the PRC may pursue military intervention through sea, thereby undermining efforts of the ROK-U.S. combined operations; second, ROK-PRC or PRC-Japan conflicts over maritime jurisdiction or ownership over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands could inflict damage to ROK territorial sovereignty or economic gains. The PRC would likely attempt to resolve the conflict employing blitzkrieg tactics before U.S. forces arrive on the scene, while at the same time delaying and denying access of the incoming U.S. forces. If this proves unattainable, the PRC could take a course of action adopting "long-term attrition warfare," thus weakening its enemy's sustainability. All in all, thiss paper makes three proposals on how the ROK should respond. First, modern warfare as well as the emergent future warfare demonstrates that the center stage of battle is no longer the domestic territory, but rather further away into the sea and space. In this respect, the ROKN should take advantage of the distinct feature of battle space on the peninsula, which is surrounded by the seas, and obtain capabilities to intercept more than 50 percent of the enemy's ballistic missiles, including those of North Korea. In tandem with this capacity, employment of a large scale of UAV/F Carrier for Kill Chain operations should enhance effectiveness. This is because conditions are more favorable to defend from sea, on matters concerning accuracy rates against enemy targets, minimized threat of friendly damage, and cost effectiveness. Second, to maintain readiness for a North Korean crisis where timely deployment of US forces is not possible, the ROKN ought to obtain capabilities to hold the enemy attack at bay while deterring PRC naval intervention. It is also argued that ROKN should strengthen its power so as to protect national interests in the seas surrounding the peninsula without support from the USN, should ROK-PRC or ROK-Japan conflict arise concerning maritime jurisprudence. Third, the ROK should fortify infrastructures for independent construction of naval power and expand its R&D efforts, and for this purpose, the ROK should make the most of the advantages stemming from the ROK-U.S. alliance inducing active support from the United States. The rationale behind this argument is that while it is strategically effective to rely on alliance or jump on the bandwagon, the ultimate goal is always to acquire an independent response capability as much as possible.

한국전쟁의 교훈과 대비 -병력수(兵力數) 및 부대수(部隊數)를 중심으로- (The lesson From Korean War)

  • 윤일영
    • 안보군사학연구
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    • 통권8호
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    • pp.49-168
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    • 2010
  • Just before the Korean War, the total number of the North Korean troops was 198,380, while that of the ROK(Republic of Korea) army troops 105,752. That is, the total number of the ROK army troops at that time was 53.3% of the total number of the North Korean army. As of December 2008, the total number of the North Korean troops is estimated to be 1,190,000, while that of the ROK troops is 655,000, so the ROK army maintains 55.04% of the total number of the North Korean troops. If the ROK army continues to reduce its troops according to [Military Reform Plan 2020], the total number of its troops will be 517,000 m 2020. If North Korea maintains the current status(l,190,000 troops), the number of the ROK troops will be 43.4% of the North Korean army. In terms of units, just before the Korean War, the number of the ROK army divisions and regiments was 80% and 44.8% of North Korean army. As of December 2008, North Korea maintains 86 divisions and 69 regiments. Compared to the North Korean army, the ROK army maintains 46 Divisions (53.4% of North Korean army) and 15 regiments (21.3% of North Korean army). If the ROK army continue to reduce the military units according to [Military Reform Plan 2020], the number of ROK army divisions will be 28(13 Active Division, 4 Mobilization Divisions and 11 Local Reserve Divisions), while that of the North Korean army will be 86 in 2020. In that case, the number of divisions of the ROK army will be 32.5% of North Korean army. During the Korean war, North Korea suddenly invaded the Republic of Korea and occupied its capital 3 days after the war began. At that time, the ROK army maintained 80% of army divisions, compared to the North Korean army. The lesson to be learned from this is that, if the ROK army is forced to disperse its divisions because of the simultaneous invasion of North Korea and attack of guerrillas in home front areas, the Republic of Korea can be in a serious military danger, even though it maintains 80% of military divisions of North Korea. If the ROK army promotes the plans in [Military Reform Plan 2020], the number of military units of the ROK army will be 32.5% of that of the North Korean army. This ratio is 2.4 times lower than that of the time when the Korean war began, and in this case, 90% of total military power should be placed in the DMZ area. If 90% of military power is placed in the DMZ area, few troops will be left for the defense of home front. In addition, if the ROK army continues to reduce the troops, it can allow North Korea to have asymmetrical superiority in military force and it will eventually exert negative influence on the stability and peace of the Korean peninsular. On the other hand, it should be reminded that, during the Korean War, the Republic of Korea was attacked by North Korea, though it kept 53.3% of troops, compared to North Korea. It should also be reminded that, as of 2008, the ROK army is defending its territory with the troops 55.04% of North Korea. Moreover, the national defense is assisted by 25,120 troops of the US Forces in Korea. In case the total number of the ROK troops falls below 43.4% of the North Korean army, it may cause social unrest about the national security and may lead North Korea's misjudgement. Besides, according to Lanchester strategy, the party with weaker military power (60% compared to the party with stronger military power) has the 4.1% of winning possibility. Therefore, if we consider the fact that the total number of the ROK army troops is 55.04% of that of the North Korean army, the winning possibility of the ROK army is not higher than 4.1%. If the total number of ROK troops is reduced to 43.4% of that of North Korea, the winning possibility will be lower and the military operations will be in critically difficult situation. [Military Reform Plan 2020] rums at the reduction of troops and units of the ground forces under the policy of 'select few'. However, the problem is that the financial support to achieve this goal is not secured. Therefore, the promotion of [Military Reform Plan 2020] may cause the weakening of military defence power in 2020. Some advanced countries such as Japan, UK, Germany, and France have promoted the policy of 'select few'. However, what is to be noted is that the national security situation of those countries is much different from that of Korea. With the collapse of the Soviet Unions and European communist countries, the military threat of those European advanced countries has almost disappeared. In addition, the threats those advanced countries are facing are not wars in national level, but terrorism in international level. To cope with the threats like terrorism, large scaled army trops would not be necessary. So those advanced European countries can promote the policy of 'select few'. In line with this, those European countries put their focuses on the development of military sections that deal with non-military operations and protection from unspecified enemies. That is, those countries are promoting the policy of 'select few', because they found that the policy is suitable for their national security environment. Moreover, since they are pursuing common interest under the European Union(EU) and they can form an allied force under NATO, it is natural that they are pursing the 'select few' policy. At present, NATO maintains the larger number of troops(2,446,000) than Russia(l,027,000) to prepare for the potential threat of Russia. The situation of japan is also much different from that of Korea. As a country composed of islands, its prime military focus is put on the maritime defense. Accordingly, the development of ground force is given secondary focus. The japanese government promotes the policy to develop technology-concentrated small size navy and air-forces, instead of maintaining large-scaled ground force. In addition, because of the 'Peace Constitution' that was enacted just after the end of World War II, japan cannot maintain troops more than 240,000. With the limited number of troops (240,000), japan has no choice but to promote the policy of 'select few'. However, the situation of Korea is much different from the situations of those countries. The Republic of Korea is facing the threat of the North Korean Army that aims at keeping a large-scale military force. In addition, the countries surrounding Korea are also super powers containing strong military forces. Therefore, to cope with the actual threat of present and unspecified threat of future, the importance of maintaining a carefully calculated large-scale military force cannot be denied. Furthermore, when considering the fact that Korea is in a peninsular, the Republic of Korea must take it into consideration the tradition of continental countries' to maintain large-scale military powers. Since the Korean War, the ROK army has developed the technology-force combined military system, maintaining proper number of troops and units and pursuing 'select few' policy at the same time. This has been promoted with the consideration of military situation in the Koran peninsular and the cooperation of ROK-US combined forces. This kind of unique military system that cannot be found in other countries can be said to be an insightful one for the preparation for the actual threat of North Korea and the conflicts between continental countries and maritime countries. In addition, this kind of technology-force combined military system has enabled us to keep peace in Korea. Therefore, it would be desirable to maintain this technology-force combined military system until the reunification of the Korean peninsular. Furthermore, it is to be pointed out that blindly following the 'select few' policy of advanced countries is not a good option, because it is ignoring the military strategic situation of the Korean peninsular. If the Republic of Korea pursues the reduction of troops and units radically without consideration of the threat of North Korea and surrounding countries, it could be a significant strategic mistake. In addition, the ROK army should keep an eye on the fact the European advanced countries and Japan that are not facing direct military threats are spending more defense expenditures than Korea. If the ROK army reduces military power without proper alternatives, it would exert a negative effect on the stable economic development of Korea and peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsular. Therefore, the desirable option would be to focus on the development of quality of forces, maintaining proper size and number of troops and units under the technology-force combined military system. The tableau above shows that the advanced countries like the UK, Germany, Italy, and Austria spend more defense expenditure per person than the Republic of Korea, although they do not face actual military threats, and that they keep achieving better economic progress than the countries that spend less defense expenditure. Therefore, it would be necessary to adopt the merits of the defense systems of those advanced countries. As we have examined, it would be desirable to maintain the current size and number of troops and units, to promote 'select few' policy with increased defense expenditure, and to strengthen the technology-force combined military system. On the basis of firm national security, the Republic of Korea can develop efficient policies for reunification and prosperity, and jump into the status of advanced countries. Therefore, the plans to reduce troops and units in [Military Reform Plan 2020] should be reexamined. If it is difficult for the ROK army to maintain its size of 655,000 troops because of low birth rate, the plans to establish the prompt mobilization force or to adopt drafting system should be considered for the maintenance of proper number of troops and units. From now on, the Republic of Korean government should develop plans to keep peace as well as to prepare unexpected changes in the Korean peninsular. For the achievement of these missions, some options can be considered. The first one is to maintain the same size of military troops and units as North Korea. The second one is to maintain the same level of military power as North Korea in terms of military force index. The third one is to maintain the same level of military power as North Korea, with the combination of the prompt mobilization force and the troops in active service under the system of technology-force combined military system. At present, it would be not possible for the ROK army to maintain such a large-size military force as North Korea (1,190,000 troops and 86 units). So it would be rational to maintain almost the same level of military force as North Korea with the combination of the troops on the active list and the prompt mobilization forces. In other words, with the combination of the troops in active service (60%) and the prompt mobilization force (40%), the ROK army should develop the strategies to harmonize technology and forces. The Korean government should also be prepared for the strategic flexibility of USFK, the possibility of American policy change about the location of foreign army, radical unexpected changes in North Korea, the emergence of potential threat, surrounding countries' demand for Korean force for the maintenance of regional stability, and demand for international cooperation against terrorism. For this, it is necessary to develop new approaches toward the proper number and size of troops and units. For instance, to prepare for radical unexpected political or military changes in North Korea, the Republic of Korea should have plans to protect a large number of refugees, to control arms and people, to maintain social security, and to keep orders in North Korea. From the experiences of other countries, it is estimated that 115,000 to 230,000 troops, plus ten thousands of police are required to stabilize the North Korean society, in the case radical unexpected military or political change happens in North Korea. In addition, if the Republic of Korea should perform the release of hostages, control of mass destruction weapons, and suppress the internal wars in North Korea, it should send 460,000 troops to North Korea. Moreover, if the Republic of Korea wants to stop the attack of North Korea and flow of refugees in DMZ area, at least 600,000 troops would be required. In sum, even if the ROK army maintains 600,000 troops, it may need additional 460,000 troops to prepare for unexpected radical changes in North Korea. For this, it is necessary to establish the prompt mobilization force whose size and number are almost the same as the troops in active service. In case the ROK army keeps 650,000 troops, the proper number of the prompt mobilization force would be 460,000 to 500,000.

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