• 한국국방경영분석학회지
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• 제6권1호
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• pp.79-92
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• 1980

In cost-only incentive contract the emphasis is the attainment of efficient and effective cost control. In contrast multiple incentives contract correlates contractor's profit motives with the generalized government objective function, the decision variables of which are performance or quality (technical progress), time or schedule (timely development and delivery) and the cost (efficient and effective cost control) Under multiple incentive structure, it is essential to formulate the trade-off curves between cost and performance, which are called iso-fee curves. Trade-off curves depict the combination of cost and performance achievement for which the contractor will be rewarded with the same fee. The basic function of trade-off curves is to show he the contractor will be motivated by incentive arragement to trade off or sacrifice the achievement in one incentive element for the acnievment in another.

• 한국경영과학회지
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• 제37권2호
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• pp.17-29
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• 2012

We examine a mortgage bank's incentive distortion problem when the bank sells its existing loan through MBS(Mortgage-Backed Security), considering the mortgage market structure and varying investors' risk attitude. Main findings in our comparative statics are the followings. The bank's monitoring incentive on the loan sold is distorted downwards when the deposit interest rate is lower than the coupon rate of MBS. Credit enhancement associated with the loan sale may mitigate the incentive distortion problem. However, the downward distortion of monitoring incentive does not disappear unless the credit enhancement, a loan guarantee, is provided up to 100%. Finally as the investors' risk preference changes from risk-neutral to risk-averse type, the incentive distortion problem becomes more severe. At the end, we recommend the introduction of covered bond in order to mitigate the incentive distortion problem, which is inevitable to current pass-through MBS.

• 산업경영시스템학회지
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• 제22권52호
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• pp.21-31
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• 1999

This paper considers how to structure the incentive system between a buy and a single supplier of raw materials when early shipments are forbidden. And this paper is used to take the supplier's behavior into account in the buyer's choice of incentives. Combinations of two types of incentives that the buyer might offer are considered : (1) a fixed value incentive and (2) an incentive that decreases in value as time elapses. Given a desired probability of on time delivery, optimal incentives are found by specifying indifference curves for on time delivery and assessing the expected total cost of incentive schemes along that curve. Difficulties of using incentive to achieve 100% on time delivery are considered and two example flow time distributions are presented.

• 한국콘텐츠학회논문지
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• 제19권11호
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• pp.1-11
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• 2019

현대 경영환경에서 팀 과업의 증가에 따른 집단성과급의 도입이 일반화되는 추세이다. 선행연구에서 집단성과급의 효과는 과업의 상호의존성에 따라 달라질 수 있다는 논의가 진행되어 왔는데, 이를 실증적으로 분석한 연구는 드물고 결과가 일관적이지 않았다. 또한, 선행연구의 과업구조가 모두 상이했다. 본 연구의 목적은 과업의 상호의존성에 따라 집단 성과급 분배 방식이 수행에 미치는 효과를 검증하는 것이었다. 이를 위해 서울소재 대학 교내 게시판 및 홈페이지를 통하여 대학생 및 대학원생, 교직원 120명을 모집하였고, 120명을 대상으로 실험을 실시하였다. 본 연구에서 사용된 실험 과제는 정해진 양식에 따라 글자, 숫자 그리고 기호를 입력하는 것이었다. 본 연구의 독립변인은 과업의 상호의존성 정도(개인과업과 상호의존과업)와 성과급 분배방식(동등분배 집단 성과급과 차등분배 집단 성과급)이었으며, 종속변인은 정확하게 입력한 문자의 수였다. 실험 설계는 2 × 2 요인설계였으며, 각 집단에 30명씩 무작위로 할당되었다. 분석은 개인차의 영향력을 최소화하기 위해 공변량 분석을 실시하였으며, 전체 회기는 공변량 분석을 위한 사전회기 1회기, 실험회기 4회기 총 5회기였으며, 각 회기는 20분으로 구성되었다. 연구 결과, 개인과업에서 차등분배 성과급과 동등분배 성과급이 수행에 미치는 효과는 거의 동일하게 나타났으나, 상호의존 과업에서는 동등분배 성과급이 차등분배 성과급보다 더 효과적으로 수행을 향상시키는 것으로 나타났다. 이는 과업의 상호의존성에 따라 집단 성과급 효과가 달라 질 수 있음을 시사하는 결과이다.

• 한국기술혁신학회:학술대회논문집
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• 한국기술혁신학회 2010년도 추계 학술대회 논문집
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• pp.203-212
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• 2010

Examining the relation between market structure and the value of innovation is important for competition and STI policy. If the value is large in a specific industry structure, government may lead the industry to take that form to enhance innovation. Our simple calibration in the case of linear demand and constant MC results in the conclusion that the incentive for R&D in the case of major and minor innovation in Cournot competition is less than that of merger and cooperative R&D. This emphasizes again "necessary evil" as a monopoly for innovation.

• International Journal of Advanced Culture Technology
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• 제11권1호
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• pp.103-109
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• 2023

This study examines the association between ownership structure and labor investment efficiency. Specifically, this study investigates whether owner-manager firms, where managers own a large percentage of shares in the firm, involve in more efficient labor investment. Based on the management entrenchment hypothesis, managers are more likely to make labor investment decisions to maximize their private benefits rather than creating value for shareholders, resulting in lower efficiency in labor investment. On the other hand, according to the incentive alignment hypothesis, managers tend to make labor investment decisions that will improve future firm performance as their interests are aligned with those of shareholders. In this situation, owner-manager firms are expected to have higher efficiency in labor investment. Our empirical results show that owner-manager firms engage in more efficient labor investment, which contributes to long-term firm value. This study provides empirical evidence that firms' labor investment behavior can vary depending on the characteristics of the ownership structure.

• 노동경제논집
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• 제23권2호
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• pp.39-59
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• 2000

본 논문에서는 현실적으로 실업보험급여가 수급기간별로 차등지급되기 어렵다는 전제하에 가장 바람직한 실업급여체계가 어떠한 것인가를 분석하고 있다. 특히 법정수급기간과 소득대체율이 실업자들의 구직유인과 소득안정에 대해 미치는 영향을 파악하고, 이에 따라 사회후생을 극대화시킬 수 있는 법정 수급기간 및 소득대체율의 조합을 분석하고 있다. 아울러 본 모형을 통해 적정 실업급여체계를 결정하는 여러 가지 요인들을 도출하고, 그에 의거하여 앞으로 우리나라의 고용보험제도의 개혁 방향을 제시하고 있다.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• 제6권3호
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• pp.67-79
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• 2019

This study examines the impact of corporate governance on capital structure decisions based on a large panel of Chinese listed firms. Using the system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator to control for unobserved heterogeneity, endogeneity, and persistency in capital structure decisions, we document that the ownership structure plays a significant role in determining leverage ratios. More specially, we find that managerial ownership has a positive and significant impact on firms' leverage, consistent with the incentive alignment hypothesis. We also find that managerial ownership only affects the leverage decisions of private firms in the post-2005 split share reform period. State ownership negatively influence leverage decisions implying that SOEs may face fewer restrictions in equity issuance and may receive favourable treatments when applying for seasoned equity ¿nancing, thus use less debt. Furthermore, our results show that while foreign ownership negatively influences leverage decisions, legal person shareholding positively influences firms' leverage decisions only for state controlled firms. We also find that the board structure variables (board size and the proportion of independent directors) do not influence firms' capital structure decisions. Our findings suggest that recent ownership reforms have been successful in terms of providing incentive to managers through managerial shareholdings to take risky financial choices.

• 보건행정학회지
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• 제21권1호
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• pp.132-157
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• 2011

The purpose of this article is to examine the cause of policy non-compliance in the case of pharmaceutical rebates from the perspective of rational choice institutionalism. In Korea, there have been rebates practices between pharmaceutical companies and hospitals since the introduction of the Actual Remuneration System for insured medicine in 1999. The government has chosen the policy means of punishment to eliminate pharmaceutical rebates but the illegal practices are still widespread. Institution in rational choice institutionalism usually reflects the incentives and preferences of actors, and the Actual Remuneration System has resulted in a the lack of procedures to ensure savings on drug expenditures. Pharmaceutical rebates are the product of the institutions which reflect their incentives: the Actual Remuneration System, the current pricing policy for generic drugs, the drug distribution system, and so on. In the end, the problem of the rebates is the consequence of policy non-compliance as actors' rational choice because their incentives lead to opportunistic behaviors. We should therefore understand the incentive structure of policy stakeholders, which is derived from the view of new institutionalism; also, the newly designed Korean drug pricing policy reform must be compatible with the incentive structure.

• 융합경영연구
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• 제11권2호
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• pp.23-32
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• 2023

Purpose: This study examines the effect of full information disclosure on seller profit when there exists information asymmetry between sellers and buyers, focusing on the risk averseness of buyers. By investigating the interaction between product quality and perceived risk through online sales data, we attempt to figure out the incentive structure of full information disclosure specifically when buyers are risk-averse, so that we can suggest more feasible information disclosure strategy to sellers. Research design, data and methodology: Our empirical model analyzes the sales data of collectible goods from a major online seller using Poisson regression. In our model, we have specifically considered risk-averseness of buyers by estimating the interaction effect between the product quality and perceived risk on seller profit, aiming for a more precise empirical analysis on sellers' incentive structure of full disclosure. Results: Our empirical analysis strongly supports the effect of interaction between product quality and perceived risk, showing that the incentive for full disclosure is much stronger when product quality is higher, and vice versa. Therefore, sellers are strongly encouraged to voluntarily reveal product weaknesses when their product quality is higher than average, while it is more profitable to hide any product defects when quality claim is lower than average. Conclusions: This study supports the related literature by confirming economic incentives for full disclosure, and also supplements and strengthens previous studies by presenting that the effect of interaction between product quality and perceived risk strongly affects seller profit. Our unique finding supports both mandatory disclosure and voluntary disclosure arguments and presents practical implications to marketing managers by suggesting that seller's incentive for revealing weaknesses depends on the level of seller's product quality.