• Journal of the military operations research society of Korea
• /
• v.6 no.1
• /
• pp.79-92
• /
• 1980

In cost-only incentive contract the emphasis is the attainment of efficient and effective cost control. In contrast multiple incentives contract correlates contractor's profit motives with the generalized government objective function, the decision variables of which are performance or quality (technical progress), time or schedule (timely development and delivery) and the cost (efficient and effective cost control) Under multiple incentive structure, it is essential to formulate the trade-off curves between cost and performance, which are called iso-fee curves. Trade-off curves depict the combination of cost and performance achievement for which the contractor will be rewarded with the same fee. The basic function of trade-off curves is to show he the contractor will be motivated by incentive arragement to trade off or sacrifice the achievement in one incentive element for the acnievment in another.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
• /
• v.37 no.2
• /
• pp.17-29
• /
• 2012

We examine a mortgage bank's incentive distortion problem when the bank sells its existing loan through MBS(Mortgage-Backed Security), considering the mortgage market structure and varying investors' risk attitude. Main findings in our comparative statics are the followings. The bank's monitoring incentive on the loan sold is distorted downwards when the deposit interest rate is lower than the coupon rate of MBS. Credit enhancement associated with the loan sale may mitigate the incentive distortion problem. However, the downward distortion of monitoring incentive does not disappear unless the credit enhancement, a loan guarantee, is provided up to 100%. Finally as the investors' risk preference changes from risk-neutral to risk-averse type, the incentive distortion problem becomes more severe. At the end, we recommend the introduction of covered bond in order to mitigate the incentive distortion problem, which is inevitable to current pass-through MBS.

• Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering
• /
• v.22 no.52
• /
• pp.21-31
• /
• 1999

This paper considers how to structure the incentive system between a buy and a single supplier of raw materials when early shipments are forbidden. And this paper is used to take the supplier's behavior into account in the buyer's choice of incentives. Combinations of two types of incentives that the buyer might offer are considered : (1) a fixed value incentive and (2) an incentive that decreases in value as time elapses. Given a desired probability of on time delivery, optimal incentives are found by specifying indifference curves for on time delivery and assessing the expected total cost of incentive schemes along that curve. Difficulties of using incentive to achieve 100% on time delivery are considered and two example flow time distributions are presented.

• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
• /
• v.19 no.11
• /
• pp.1-11
• /
• 2019

The purpose of this study is to examine the effects of different group incentive type on performance under two types of interdependence in a task structure. One hundred twenty college and graduate students were recruited and asked to perform group typing task. Each typing groups organized three members. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions: equally-distributed incentive and differentially-distributed under two different task interdependence. In this study, the dependent variable was the number of correctly typed characters. We found the significant interaction effects between group incentive type and task interdependence. Specifically, under interdependent task, the work performance of participants in equally-distributed group incentive condition was higher than the performance in differentially-distributed group incentive condition.

• Proceedings of the Korea Technology Innovation Society Conference
• /
• 2010.11a
• /
• pp.203-212
• /
• 2010

Examining the relation between market structure and the value of innovation is important for competition and STI policy. If the value is large in a specific industry structure, government may lead the industry to take that form to enhance innovation. Our simple calibration in the case of linear demand and constant MC results in the conclusion that the incentive for R&D in the case of major and minor innovation in Cournot competition is less than that of merger and cooperative R&D. This emphasizes again "necessary evil" as a monopoly for innovation.

• International Journal of Advanced Culture Technology
• /
• v.11 no.1
• /
• pp.103-109
• /
• 2023

This study examines the association between ownership structure and labor investment efficiency. Specifically, this study investigates whether owner-manager firms, where managers own a large percentage of shares in the firm, involve in more efficient labor investment. Based on the management entrenchment hypothesis, managers are more likely to make labor investment decisions to maximize their private benefits rather than creating value for shareholders, resulting in lower efficiency in labor investment. On the other hand, according to the incentive alignment hypothesis, managers tend to make labor investment decisions that will improve future firm performance as their interests are aligned with those of shareholders. In this situation, owner-manager firms are expected to have higher efficiency in labor investment. Our empirical results show that owner-manager firms engage in more efficient labor investment, which contributes to long-term firm value. This study provides empirical evidence that firms' labor investment behavior can vary depending on the characteristics of the ownership structure.

• Journal of Labour Economics
• /
• v.23 no.2
• /
• pp.39-59
• /
• 2000

Given the constraint that the unemployment benefit is not allowed to vary freely over the unemployment duration, this paper examines the optimal UI benefit structure. In particular, identifying the conflicting effects of benefit amount and benefit duration upon incentive and insurance, this paper characterizes the optimal combination of UI benefit amount and duration. Based upon some important factors determining the optimal UI benefit structure that are derived from the model, a set of directions for UI reform in Korea have been proposed.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
• /
• v.6 no.3
• /
• pp.67-79
• /
• 2019

This study examines the impact of corporate governance on capital structure decisions based on a large panel of Chinese listed firms. Using the system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator to control for unobserved heterogeneity, endogeneity, and persistency in capital structure decisions, we document that the ownership structure plays a significant role in determining leverage ratios. More specially, we find that managerial ownership has a positive and significant impact on firms' leverage, consistent with the incentive alignment hypothesis. We also find that managerial ownership only affects the leverage decisions of private firms in the post-2005 split share reform period. State ownership negatively influence leverage decisions implying that SOEs may face fewer restrictions in equity issuance and may receive favourable treatments when applying for seasoned equity ¿nancing, thus use less debt. Furthermore, our results show that while foreign ownership negatively influences leverage decisions, legal person shareholding positively influences firms' leverage decisions only for state controlled firms. We also find that the board structure variables (board size and the proportion of independent directors) do not influence firms' capital structure decisions. Our findings suggest that recent ownership reforms have been successful in terms of providing incentive to managers through managerial shareholdings to take risky financial choices.

• Health Policy and Management
• /
• v.21 no.1
• /
• pp.132-157
• /
• 2011

The purpose of this article is to examine the cause of policy non-compliance in the case of pharmaceutical rebates from the perspective of rational choice institutionalism. In Korea, there have been rebates practices between pharmaceutical companies and hospitals since the introduction of the Actual Remuneration System for insured medicine in 1999. The government has chosen the policy means of punishment to eliminate pharmaceutical rebates but the illegal practices are still widespread. Institution in rational choice institutionalism usually reflects the incentives and preferences of actors, and the Actual Remuneration System has resulted in a the lack of procedures to ensure savings on drug expenditures. Pharmaceutical rebates are the product of the institutions which reflect their incentives: the Actual Remuneration System, the current pricing policy for generic drugs, the drug distribution system, and so on. In the end, the problem of the rebates is the consequence of policy non-compliance as actors' rational choice because their incentives lead to opportunistic behaviors. We should therefore understand the incentive structure of policy stakeholders, which is derived from the view of new institutionalism; also, the newly designed Korean drug pricing policy reform must be compatible with the incentive structure.

• The Journal of Economics, Marketing and Management
• /
• v.11 no.2
• /
• pp.23-32
• /
• 2023

Purpose: This study examines the effect of full information disclosure on seller profit when there exists information asymmetry between sellers and buyers, focusing on the risk averseness of buyers. By investigating the interaction between product quality and perceived risk through online sales data, we attempt to figure out the incentive structure of full information disclosure specifically when buyers are risk-averse, so that we can suggest more feasible information disclosure strategy to sellers. Research design, data and methodology: Our empirical model analyzes the sales data of collectible goods from a major online seller using Poisson regression. In our model, we have specifically considered risk-averseness of buyers by estimating the interaction effect between the product quality and perceived risk on seller profit, aiming for a more precise empirical analysis on sellers' incentive structure of full disclosure. Results: Our empirical analysis strongly supports the effect of interaction between product quality and perceived risk, showing that the incentive for full disclosure is much stronger when product quality is higher, and vice versa. Therefore, sellers are strongly encouraged to voluntarily reveal product weaknesses when their product quality is higher than average, while it is more profitable to hide any product defects when quality claim is lower than average. Conclusions: This study supports the related literature by confirming economic incentives for full disclosure, and also supplements and strengthens previous studies by presenting that the effect of interaction between product quality and perceived risk strongly affects seller profit. Our unique finding supports both mandatory disclosure and voluntary disclosure arguments and presents practical implications to marketing managers by suggesting that seller's incentive for revealing weaknesses depends on the level of seller's product quality.