• Journal of the Korean Society of Safety
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• v.19 no.4 s.68
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• pp.129-134
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• 2004

Educational programs for promoting occupational safety and health have widely been established in advanced countries, such as United States and Germany, in the area of disaster prevention Focused attentions and investments for safety and health education have been placed especially for small and medium sized companies. Recently, information technologies have also been applied for the development and management of educational programs in those countries. It is also worth noting that a wide variety of incentive systems has been implemented for managers and workers to voluntarily Participate in safety and health education. Based on the brief survey on incentive systems in advanced countries, this study proposes two different incentive models, such as 'Supervision Exemption Model for Participants in Safety and Health Education' and 'Compensation Program fur Educational Expenses and Losses', which may efficiently be employed in Korea. These incentive models may contribute to revitalizing the occupational safety and health education which has recently been dwindled due to the changes in governmental regulations.

• Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering
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• v.42 no.4
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• pp.39-48
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• 2019

This paper considers the Prisoner's Dilemma Game in which there exists a dilemma that the best response is that both players are to confess, but doing not confess can give a higher gain to the both players in a social perspective. To resolve such a dilemma in the game, an incentive model to encourage to confess and a penalty model for being imposed when not confessing are introduced, respectively. Then, the conditions are characterized under which incentive or penalty involved in the game's payoffs can make the game rational without a dilemma on both the personal and social perspectives, by taking the payoff values as variables with the incentive and penalty factors. Furthermore, it turns out that the resulting values of incentive and penalty are inversely proportional to each other, and thus, obtaining one of these amounts can provide the other. Simple examples are shown to interpret the theoretical verifications of our models, and randomly generated data based simulation results investigate the tendency of incentive and penalty and the resulting game values for a variety of instances. These results can provide a framework on resolving the dilemma by artificially putting incentive or penalty, although it is careful to apply more generalized real world games.

• Industrial Engineering and Management Systems
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• v.13 no.2
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• pp.129-147
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• 2014

This study proposes an optimal operational policy for a green supply chain (GSC) where a retailer pays an incentive for collection of used products from customers and determines the optimal order quantity of a single product under uncertainty in product demand. A manufacturer produces the optimal order quantity of product using recyclable parts with acceptable quality levels and covers a part of the retailer's incentive from the recycled parts. Here, two scenarios for the product demand are assumed as: the distribution of product demand is known, and only both mean and variance are known. This paper develops mathematical models to find how order quantity, collection incentive of used products and lower limit of quality level for recycling affect the expected profits of each member and the whole supply chain under both a decentralized GSC (DGSC) and an integrated GSC (IGSC). The analysis numerically compares the results under DGSC with those under IGSC for each scenario of product demand. Also, the effect of the quality of the recyclable parts on the optimal decisions is shown. Moreover, supply chain coordination to shift the optimal decisions of IGSC is discussed based on: I) profit ratio, II) Nash bargaining solution, and III) Combination of (I) and (II).

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.34 no.3
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• pp.55-69
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• 2009

It is often to apply revenue sharing models in rental industries which consist of a retailer and a wholesaler. This research analyzed the influences to profit of the supply chain if we adopt the revenue sharing model when the demand is uncertain and price sensitive. We found the conditions of the revenue sharing model to maximize the profit of the supply chain, and identified incentive compatible conditions for revenue sharing. It is proved that vertical integration guarantees maximization of profit for the supply chain. Also we found that it is possible to derive Incentive compatible schemes by controlling ranges of revenue sharing ratios.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2003.07a
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• pp.636-638
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• 2003

This paper presents a new approach which is able to determine the reasonable incentive levels of direct load control using sequential Monte Carlo simulation techniques. The economic analysis needs to determine the reasonable incentive level. However, the conventional methods have been based on the scenario methods because they had not considered all cases of the direct load control situations. To overcome there problems, this paper proposes a new technique using sequential Monte Carlo simulation. The Monte Carlo method is a simple and flexible tool to consider large scale systems and complex models for the components of the system. To show its effectiveness, numerical studies were performed to indicate the possible applications of the proposed technique.

• Health Policy and Management
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• v.27 no.3
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• pp.247-255
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• 2017

Background: South Korea has experienced problems with excessive pharmaceutical expenditures. In 2010, the South Korean government introduced an outpatient prescription incentive program to effectively manage pharmaceutical expenditures. Therefore, we examined the relationship between the outpatient prescription incentive program and pharmaceutical expenditures. Methods: We used data from the Korean National Health Insurance claims database, which included medical claims filed for 22,732 clinics from 2011-2014 to evaluate associated pharmaceutical expenditures. We performed multiple regression analysis and Poisson regression analysis using generalized estimating equation models to examine the associations between outpatient prescription incentives and the outcome variables. Results: The data used in this study consisted of 123,392 cases from 22,372 clinics (average 5.4 periods follow-up). Clinics that had received outpatient prescription incentives in the last period had better cost saving and Outpatient Prescribing Costliness Index (OPCI) (received: proportion of cost saving, ${\beta}=6.8179$; p-value < 0.0001; OPCI, ${\beta}=-0.0227$; p-value < 0.0001; reference = non-received). Moreover, these clinics had higher risk in the provision of outpatient prescription incentive (relative risk, 2.772; 95% confidence interval, 2.720 to 2.824). The associations were higher in clinics that had separate prescribing and dispensing programs, or had professional staff. Conclusion: The introduction of an outpatient prescription incentive program for clinics effectively managed problems with rapid increases of pharmaceutical expenditures in South Korea. However, the pharmaceutical expenditures still increased in spite of the positive impact of the outpatient prescription incentive program. Therefore, healthcare professionals and health policy makers should develop more effective alternatives (i.e., for clinics without separate prescribing and dispensing programs) based on our results.

• Journal of Korea Port Economic Association
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• v.27 no.2
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• pp.355-372
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• 2011

Various incentive policies for transshipment cargo have been enforced without any evaluation of the effectiveness. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to evaluate the effect of volume incentive on container transshipment cargo. To be different from previous studies, this study tries to quantitatively assess the incentive effects by using econometric techniques. The result derived from the ARIMA type models indicates that the total amount of the increased transshipment cargo during the last 7 years is about one million TEU. In the meanwhile, the multivariate long run equilibrium model implies that the increased transshipment cargo is less than 0.5 million TEU for the 7 years. Furthermore, the structural break tests indicate that the volume incentive does not change the model structures. It means that the effect of volume incentive is not statistically significant. Consequently, the test results conclude the effect of volume incentive on transshipment cargo is not significant although the volume of transshipment cargo is increased to some extent by volume incentive. Considering the magnitude of BPA's expenditure, we doubt the effectiveness of volume incentive. This study, therefore, encourages the port authority to research a more efficient way to induce transshipment cargo rather than focusing on only volume incentives.

• Journal of Korea Port Economic Association
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• v.32 no.3
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• pp.139-154
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• 2016

The port incentive scheme currently implemented in various Korean ports is used as a marketing tool to increase price competitiveness. Typically, ports implement piecemeal imitation strategies to enhance their competitiveness, rather than a precisely designed system. A precise analysis of the effectiveness of a port's system and scheme redesign are lacking because budget allocation is done without input from customers and freight groups. This study models the incentives faced by ports using a linear programming model. We use the Gwangyang port as the base case. Our analysis of the Gwangyang port reveals that there are insufficient incentives implemented when a traditional qualitative analysis is used. We also identify any excess, deficiency, or absence of the incentive effect for each type of customer and freight group. We find the overall budget of the incentive scheme to be more rational when ports allocate funds to minimize port mileage, and allocate 61.77 percent and 38.23 percent of the budget on existing and new (or increased) cargo inventory, respectively. Future studies can build on our work by further considering basic inputs, and by adding a system to estimate the input data of our model to identify constraints and thus provide a more accurate incentive scheme.

• Journal of Technology Innovation
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• v.5 no.1
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• pp.181-205
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• 1997

There has been considerable controversy over the impacts of the tax credit on R&D expenditures in many countries. Korea has adopted various kinds of tax credit system to stimulate private firm' R&D expenditures. Korean government, Recently, is trying to reform tax system to reduce tax credit programmes according to Uruguay Round agreement and in line with OECD policy standards. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effectiveness of current tax credit system on technology innovation in Korea and derive some policy implications over tax reform. In this paper, firstly, I investigate the size of tax reduction effects from each program in theoretical models and simulate the actual rate of individual tax incentive to a unit of R&D expenditure. I find that theoretically the reserve fund for technology development program has given the largest tax reduction effects to private firms irrespective of the R&D incentive system reform. Tax credit on R&D expenditure also has been very effective instrument to firm's tax reduction. Secondly, I try to measure the effectiveness of tax credit through the estimation of effective margianl tax rate between with the system and without the system of credit on R&D expenditure during the tax credit reform periods. I find that the tax credit on R&D has lowered firm's investment cost since the system introduced. I also have strong results that there has been a positive relation between the fluctuation of firm's R&D expenditure and the change of effective marginal tax rate. I suggest that it is better to sustain the system of tax credit on R&D for a while to increase firm's R&D expenditure.

• KIPS Transactions on Computer and Communication Systems
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• v.9 no.12
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• pp.321-332
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• 2020

Decentralized approaches are extensively researched by academia and industry in order to cover up the flaws of existing systems in terms of data privacy. Blockchain and decentralized learning are prominent representatives of a deconcentrated approach. Blockchain is secure by design since the data record is irrevocable, tamper-resistant, consensus-based decision making, and inexpensive of overall transactions. On the other hand, decentralized learning empowers a number of devices collectively in improving a deep learning model without exposing the dataset publicly. To motivate participants to use their resources in building models, a decent and proportional incentive system is a necessity. A centralized incentive mechanism is likely inconvenient to be adopted in decentralized learning since it relies on the middleman that still suffers from bottleneck issues. Therefore, we design an incentive model for decentralized learning applications by leveraging the Ethereum smart contract. The simulation results satisfy the design goals. We also outline the concerns in implementing the presented scheme for sensitive data regarding privacy and data leakage.