• East Asian Economic Review
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• 제23권3호
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• pp.285-309
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• 2019

Unlike the popular belief, digital transformation mainly gets stymied by legal and regulatory issues related with legacy institutions in Asia rather than technical difficulties. The real challenges triggered by the PSD2 (Payment Services Directive 2) are how the region would overcome the overly fragmented, centralized, and hierarchical legacy framework to allow necessary changes to respond to the digital single market initiatives as promulgated by the European counterpart. The PSD2 is expected to bring about substantial changes in the payment ecosystem by allowing payment service providers to access customers' accounts and transactions information via API that have been traditionally controlled by banks. This paper suggests an incentive-compatible mechanism design for open collaboration among legacy institutions in the region to help them adapt to the PSD2. As evidenced by case studies in Korea, the Asian equivalent of PSD2 can be implemented and further expanded to create region-wide PCS (payment-clearing-settlement) network by reconnecting the dots of legacy infrastructures. These decentralized, diverse, small payment networks can be further combined with the expanded RTGS-CDS platform to evolve into the next phase of Asian Financial Network.

• 전기학회논문지
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• 제58권3호
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• pp.455-461
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• 2009

This paper proposes Direct Load Control(DLC) operation scheme using a bidding system and the methodology to value proper quantity decided by the DLC program, which is a kind of resources for stabilization of electricity market price during peak times by managing consumer electricity demand. Since DLC program in Korea is based on the contract with the customers participating in this program, it is difficult to anticipate voluntary participation. That is, incentive for participants in DLC program is insufficient. To cope with this point, it is necessary to develop a new market mechanism and market compatible operation scheme for DLC programs. DLC market mechanism is deemed to be equipped with iterative bidding system, independent operation from energy market, and interactive with bidding information on energy market. With this market mechanism, it is important to find the optimal operation point of DLC allowing for the factors of stabilizing the electricity market price and compensating DLC implementation. This paper focuses on the mathematical approaches for the bid-based DLC operation scheme and examines several scenarios for the following technical justifications: 1) stabilization of electricity market price during peak times, 2) elasticity of demand.

• 산학경영연구
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• 제1권
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• pp.115-134
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• 1987

The increased number of organized employees and amount of collective bargaining in the public sector has caused many industrial relations students to pay attention to the compulsory arbitration mechanism. Some of these have criticized the compulsory arbitration on the grounds that it tends to replace collective bargain ing itself. They argue that each party lacks the incentive to concede and compromise that is so necessary in reaching agreements as long as the threat and/or use of strike is unavailable to them. On the other hand, the proponents of the compulsory arbitration maintain that compulsory arbitration carries out a strike like function by imposing the cost of disagreement. This paper is primarily concerned with these contradictory issues. More particularly, an attempt is made to analyze the impact of the compulsory arbitration mechanism upon the collective bargaining process by developing a bargaining model with explicit considerations of the determinants of the concession behavior of each party as a function of the cost of disagreement and the risk willingness relationship between the parties. The analysis in this paper leads to a synthesis of the above competing arguments, and shows that those contradictory views on the effect of the compulsory arbitration are mainly due to their failure to con sider the concession process.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• 제6권12호
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• pp.3133-3151
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• 2012

The optimal price strategy selection of two bounded rational cognitive mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) in a duopoly spectrum sharing market is investigated. The bounded rational operators dynamically compete to sell the leased spectrum to secondary users in order to maximize their profits. Meanwhile, the secondary users' heterogeneous preferences to rate and price are taken into consideration. The evolutionary game theory (EGT) is employed to model the dynamic price strategy selection of the MVNOs taking into account the response of the secondary users. The behavior dynamics and the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) of the operators are derived via replicated dynamics. Furthermore, a reward and punishment mechanism is developed to optimize the performance of the operators. Numerical results show that the proposed evolutionary algorithm is convergent to the ESS, and the incentive mechanism increases the profits of the operators. It may provide some insight about the optimal price strategy selection for MVNOs in the next generation cognitive wireless networks.

• Management Science and Financial Engineering
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• 제1권1호
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• pp.1-19
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• 1995

In this paper, we analyze an M / M / 1 queueing system where there are incentive conflicts among customers. Self-interested customers' decisions whether to join the system or not may not necessarily induce a socially optimal congestion level. As a way to alleviate the over-congestion, toll imposition was used in Naor's paper [3]. Instead of using a toll mechanism, we study the usefulness of imperfect information on system state (queue size, for example) as a way to reduce the over-congestion by self-interested customers. The main conclusion of this paper is that by purposefully giving fuzzy or imperfect information on the current queue size we can improve the congestion in the system. This result might look contradictory to rough intuition since perfect information should give better performance than imperfect information. We show how this idea is verified. In deriving this result, we use the concept of Nash equilibrium (pure and mixed strategy) as introduced in game theory. In some real situations, using imperfect information is easier to apply than imposing a toll, and thus the result of this paper has practical implications.

• Journal of Electrical Engineering and Technology
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• 제13권6호
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• pp.2203-2211
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• 2018

Capacity payment mechanism has been adopted as the incentive scheme to achieve resource adequacy in Korean electricity market, however, the level of capacity price has been controversial due to its insufficient extent to incur financial loss for certain generators. Therefore, a new method is proposed to estimate the proper level of capacity price incorporating profitability of market participants and resource adequacy in this paper. The proposed method is successfully applied to test system based on Korean power system.

• Management Science and Financial Engineering
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• 제11권3호
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• pp.61-78
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• 2005

The aim of this paper is to identify the barriers to the B2B e-commerce development in China's pharmaceutical industry and to devise an effective strategy for its future development. Built on a detailed investigation of the market structure and recent development of electronic commerce in China's pharmaceutical industry, this paper proposes that the key issue in the development of effective B2B e-commerce business models is the successful transformation of the inter- organizational information systems into electronic marketplaces. In order to ensure the success of such electronic marketplaces, a government driven approach will be needed. In the process, designing an incentive compatible mechanism of coordinating the interest of all the market players will be the prerequisite.

• 지역연구
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• 제14권2호
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• pp.51-64
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• 1998

This paper investigates how the factor inputs of firms are affected by the expectation about land-price increase in the future. We develope a two-factor (land and labor) model, in which expectation about land-price increase plays a key role in determining the "optimal" input level of labor and land. Expecting capital gains from input of the land when land price increases, firms input land up to the point where the marginal productivity of land falls short of the marginal cost of purchasing the land, in order to maximize the "joint-profit". That is, firms have an incentive to use more land than they do when capital gains are not expected. We mean joint-profit by profit in the standard sense plus capital gains. Once the land is input "excessively", the productivity of labor increase and labor is also input more, since land and labor are assumed as complementary in production. This mechanism works in the opposite direction when land price decrease. This paper suggests that land price fluctuation is a major destabilizer of an economy.or destabilizer of an economy.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• 제10권11호
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• pp.5654-5673
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• 2016

Participatory sensing applications rely on recruiting appropriate participants to share their surrounding conditions with others, and have been widely used in many areas like environmental monitoring, health care, and traffic congestion monitoring, etc. In such applications, how to ensure the privacy of a participant is important, since incentive mechanisms are used to maintain their enthusiasm for sustainable participation by offering certain amount of reward. In this paper, we propose a pseudonym-based privacy protection scheme, that takes both privacy protection and user incentives into consideration. The proposed scheme uses the pseudonym mechanism and one-way hash function to achieve user incentives, while protecting their identity. We also show extensive analysis of the proposed scheme to demonstrate that it can meet the security and performance the requirement of a participatory sensing application.

• 한국정보처리학회:학술대회논문집
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• 한국정보처리학회 2009년도 춘계학술발표대회
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• pp.924-927
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• 2009

P2P 시스템은 피어들간의 자발적인 협력에 의해 구성되고 동작한다. 피어들이 파일 공유 시스템에 활발하게 참여하면 공유 파일 수의 증가로 서비스 향상을 가져올 수 있다. 그러나 일부 피어는 자신의 파일을 전혀 공유하지 않고 필요한 파일의 다운로드만 수행한다. 피어의 이와 같은 '무임승차(free riding)'은 다른 피어의 활발한 참여를 감소시키고 P2P 시스템의 서비스를 저하시킨다. 이에 본 논문에서는 파일 공유 시스템에서 피어의 행동을 참조하여 기여도를 계산하고 인센티브를 할당하는 인센티브 메커니즘을 제안하였다. 제안 메커니즘은 피어의 기여도에 따라 대역폭을 인센티브로 할당하여 차별화된 서비스를 제공한다. 본 논문에서는 실험을 통해 인센티브 메커니즘에서 신뢰 피어의 필요성과 피어의 기여도에 따라 서비스가 차별화되는 것을 확인하였다.