• Proceedings of the Technology Innovation Conference
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• 2005.02a
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• pp.42-56
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• 2005

Firms cooperating in R&D face a moral hazard problem, because with R&D effort not being observable each partner will focus on its own profit when choosing its effort level. This paper aims to explain the use of optimal license contract for R&D cooperation such as cross-licensing agreement. We argue that in the situations of asymmetric information, the optimal incentive scheme that can solve moral hazard problem is . a linear function of the likelihood ratio. Especially in the case of parallel research, each firm has an extra incentive for cooperative R&D effort, given by the license fee that considers the profit of the cooperating firm, which solely depends on his R&D success if the cooperating firm fails.

• Journal of the Korea Safety Management & Science
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• v.17 no.3
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• pp.143-148
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• 2015

The study examined the relationship between workers' safety awareness, safety performance and the components of the intelligent image analysis system in accordance with preventing the workers from safety hazard in dangerous working area. Based on the safety performance model, we include safety knowledge, safety motivation, safety compliance and safety participation, and we also define three additional factors of the intelligent image analysis system such as functional feature, penalty and incentive by using factor analysis. SEM(Structural Equation Modeling) analyses on the data from the total of 73 workers showed that functional feature of intelligent analysis system and incentive were positively related to safety knowledge and safety motivation. And mediation effects of the relationship were verified to safety compliance and safety participation through safety knowledge as well.

• International conference on construction engineering and project management
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• 2005.10a
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• pp.564-568
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• 2005

Recently, Knowledge Management (KM) has been applied to construction industry. Surprising, there is few studies that address the most fundamental problem in KM: people may prefer not to share their knowledge so as to preserve their intellectual or unique values in the organization. Without the premise of each individual's willingness to share knowledge, there will be no valuable input for the IT system and, thus, no knowledge management at all. This paper aims to model the behavioral dynamics of knowledge sharing and to design an incentive system that may facilitate knowledge sharing for construction companies. In this paper, a game-theory based model will be developed, and the framework for designing an incentive system will be proposed according to the model.

• International Journal of Advanced Culture Technology
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• v.11 no.1
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• pp.103-109
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• 2023

This study examines the association between ownership structure and labor investment efficiency. Specifically, this study investigates whether owner-manager firms, where managers own a large percentage of shares in the firm, involve in more efficient labor investment. Based on the management entrenchment hypothesis, managers are more likely to make labor investment decisions to maximize their private benefits rather than creating value for shareholders, resulting in lower efficiency in labor investment. On the other hand, according to the incentive alignment hypothesis, managers tend to make labor investment decisions that will improve future firm performance as their interests are aligned with those of shareholders. In this situation, owner-manager firms are expected to have higher efficiency in labor investment. Our empirical results show that owner-manager firms engage in more efficient labor investment, which contributes to long-term firm value. This study provides empirical evidence that firms' labor investment behavior can vary depending on the characteristics of the ownership structure.

• Proceedings of the SAREK Conference
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• 2005.06a
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• pp.65-65
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• 2005

• Journal of Energy Engineering
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• v.25 no.1
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• pp.29-42
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• 2016

This study analyzes the economic efficiency of utilizing hot waste water at a thermoelectric power plant, which is part of recent projects supported by the Korean government to foster new energy industry. The author proposes an institution that provides economic incentives to promote the project. Based on a method of calculating Levelized cost of energy (LCOE), this study finds that the LCOE of using hot waste water at power plants is higher than that of oil boiler, biomass and a power plant's auxiliary steam but similar to that of the geothermal system. Also, according to sensitivity analysis on the LCOE of each element in the system of using hot waste water, a distance of heat supply is most sensitive. Therefore, this study shows that when the government devises an incentive-based institution to expand the project of utilizing hot waste water, it is necessary to establish Renewable Energy Certificate (REC) weights that are differentiated by a distance of heat supply.

• Asia-Pacific Journal of Business Venturing and Entrepreneurship
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• v.9 no.1
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• pp.33-50
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• 2014

Though South Korea has world-class volume of Venture Capital Investment, as a share of GDP, early stage venture investments are still short, and investments are concentrated in high technology area and Capital area. Because of the high barriers to entry of the new IPO and M&A market, the venture capital companies undergo difficulties in profit. High-tech ventures face difficulties in raising money from outside investors due to information asymmetry between venture investors and venture companies. To resolve these problems, developed countries's government make a co-funding investment scheme with private sectors and design incentive mechanism such as receiving knowledge of the reputable investors' joint venture. Korean central and local government can benchmark those of things. For example, the expansion of the investment volume with private sector, region-specific matching fund and venture capital's exit path diversification such as M&A through the establishment of a business venture eco-system. At the same time, venture companies are to make an efforts to enhance the ability of screening for venture companies and the value for investment activities through a joint venture investments.

• Korean Institute of Interior Design Journal
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• v.25 no.1
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• pp.93-100
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• 2016

Long-life housing means a housing which structural members (Support) such as columns and floor are maintained for a long period of time and the housing can be used for approximately 100 years by replacing components (Infill) such as walls and furniture. The government established "Certification standards of long-life housing construction" on December 24, 2014, requiring the long-life housing certification for construction of apartment houses for over 1,000 households. However, it is necessary to prepare an incentive measure which could be granted to construction related personnel and housing owners due to the effectiveness of such system and recognition that the initial construction cost of long-life housing is high. The purpose of this study is as follows. First, the reasons and necessity of long-life housing cost increase for each construction company, housing owner, infill component manufacturer and designer which are long-life housing related personnel are determined. The direction of incentive grant for supplying long-life housing based on the determined items is established. The result of this study is as follows. First, a special treatment which is higher than the alleviation of construction standards according to the previous ordinance is necessary for construction companies to secure the business feasibility. Also, incentives such as the provision of service space and wide balcony are necessary to improve the preference level of parceling out. Second, financial incentives such as financial support for housing purchase, reduction and exemption of tax (acquisition tax and registration tax), and support of maintenance cost are required for house owners. Third, it is essential to increase opportunities to participate in the market for infill component manufacturers by applying additional points for PQ. Fourth, it is needed to provide compensation for additional human resource and time at the time of designing to designers by preparing the long-life housing design cost standards.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.23 no.4
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• pp.617-641
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• 2014

Korean electricity market is a Cost-Based Pool (CBP) designed to minimize electricity production cost through cost by providing cost reduction incentives to generators. Generation companies have shown diverse efforts to reduce costs in CBP market such as procuring low-price fuels, installing high efficiency gas turbine and constructing power plants near the heavy-load site. Recently, as a way to improve CBP market, a proposal to exclude no-load cost from System Marginal Price (SMP) and to compensate generators ex post was suggested to Korea Power Exchange. This study analyzes the impact of excluding no-load cost from SMP on the cost reduction incentive of generators. We found that excluding no-load cost from SMP enhances the likelihood of decreasing the cost reduction incentives of LNG combined-cycle generators lying on the price-setting range.

• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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• v.16 no.3
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• pp.1806-1814
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• 2015

The strategy of distributors using a PB(Private Brand) inferior to existing PB to increase choice probability of PB arouses difficulty in terms of cost. Therefore, the aim of this study is to verify incentive and compromise effects of PB using two realistic experimental methods. Looking at the verification results, incentive and compromise effects occurred to show increase in choice probability of PB when a new GB(Generic Brand) was added to NB(National Brand) and PB of a manufacturer. In specific during experiment 1, choice probability of PB, the target, was changed when decoy brand was introduced even if there is a large difference in preference and choice probability of the competitor and target due to characteristics of NB and PB. In experiment 2, incentive effect appeared when PB of competitor was positioned as an inferior alternative to increase choice probability of the company's PB. Strategic implications on the study results, limits of this study, and future directivity were proposed.