• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.53 no.1
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• pp.56-66
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• 2004

As deregulation evolves, pricing electricity becomes a major issue in the electric industry. Participants of competitive marketplace are able to improve their profits substantially by adequately pricing the electricity. In this paper, game theory is applied to analyze the price-clearing in the generation bidding competition and the competition is modeled as the noncooperative and complete information. The result of this analysis can be useful in understanding spot price-clearing of electricity and generating entity's strategic behavior in the competitive electricity market.

• KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering
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• v.4A no.4
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• pp.243-253
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• 2004

As deregulation evolves, pricing electricity becomes a major issue in the electric power industry. Participants in the competitive marketplace are able to improve their profits substantially by effectively pricing the electricity. In this paper, game theory is applied to analyze price-clearing in the generation bidding competition with the competition modeled as the non-cooperative and complete information game. The result of this analysis can be useful in understanding spot price-clearing of electricity as well as GENCOs' strategic behavior in the competitive electricity market.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.52 no.6
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• pp.333-339
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• 2003

Competition among electric generation companies is a major goal of restructuring in the electricity industry. In electricity market, a huge volume of commodities will be traded through competitive bidding. The choice between uniform and pay-as-bid pricing for electricity auction has been one of most important issues in deregulated electricity market. This paper proposes a constrained Bertrand model for analyzing the electricity auction market of price competition model. The issue of the two pricing rules of uniform and pay-as-bid is studied from the viewpoint of consumer's benefit. This paper also shows that transmission congestion depends on the pricing mechanism. Pay-as-bid pricing gives less possibility of transmission congestion by price competition, and less burden to consumers in the simulation results.

• KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering
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• v.5A no.4
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• pp.396-402
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• 2005

In an electricity market with imperfect competition, participants devise bidding plans and transaction strategies to maximize their own profits. The market price and the quantity are concerned with the operation reserve as well as the bidding system and demand curves in an electricity market. This paper presents a market model combined by an energy market and an operating reserve market. The competition of the generation producers in the combined market is formulated as a gaming of selecting bid parameters such as intersections and slopes in bid functions. The Nash Equilibrium (NE) is analyzed by using bi-level optimization; maximization of Social Welfare (SW) and maximization of the producers' profits.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• summer
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• pp.710-712
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• 2004

Generation companies(Genco) submit the supply functions as a bidding function to a bid market in a competitive electricity market. The profits of Gencos vary in accordance with the bid functions, so the selection of a bidding function plays a key role in increasing their profits. This paper presents an analysis of the selection of the supply function from the viewpoint of Nash equilibrium(NE). Four types of bidding function parameters are used for analizing the electricity market. The competition of selecting bidding parameters is modeled as subgame and overall game in this research. The NEs in both game are computed by using analytic method and payoff matrix method. It is verified in case studies for the NE of overall game to satisfy the equilibrium condition.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.54 no.4
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• pp.199-204
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• 2005

In an electricity market with an imperfect competition, participants make plans of bidding and transaction strategies to maximize their own profits. The market price and the quantity are concerned with the operation reserve as well as the bidding system and demand curves in an electricity market. This paper presents a market model combined by an energy market and an operating reserve market. The competition of the generation producers in the combined market is formulated as a gaming of selecting bid parameters such as intersections and slopes in bid functions. The Nash Equilibrium(NE) is analyzed by using a hi-level optimization; maximization of Social Welfare(SW) and maximization of the producers' profits.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.54 no.9
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• pp.461-466
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• 2005

This paper addresses the bidding strategies of a hydro generator in an electricity market, and their effect on the electricity market in accordance with some parameters: the water volume, the demand elasticity, and the hydro unit performance. The competition of a hydro generator is formulated as a hi-level optimization problem, and the solving scheme for the equilibrium condition is proposed as a set of nonlinear simultaneous equations. The equilibrium of the oligopolistic model is evaluated by comparison with that of a perfect competition model from the viewpoint of a market power. Simulation results show some parameters have an influence on the market power of an electricity market including a hydro generator.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.53 no.5
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• pp.302-307
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• 2004

As deregulation of power industry is becoming a reality, there has been an intense interest in the strategic bidding for suppliers to maximize their profits. The profit gained by a supplier is related not only to its energy-price bid curve but also to its submitted operational parameters such as generation capacity, etc. So suppliers are willing to use those strategic parameters that can be manipulated by themselves and are effective to their profit. This paper deals with the competition model with compound strategies: generation capacity and bidding curve. The parameter space is modeled by dividing into the two strategies, so the problem is made up of the four types of sub-game in a two player game. This paper analyzes the global Nash Equilibrium (NE) over the whole divisions by computing the sub-game NEs in some divisions and by deriving the best response curves which have discontinuities in other divisions. The global NE is shown to correspond to the Cournot NE where the quantity variable is realized by a constraints of a generation capacity.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.53 no.11
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• pp.630-635
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• 2004

Generation companies(Genco) submit the supply functions as a bidding function to a bid market in a competitive electricity market. The profits of Gencos vary in accordance with the bid functions, so the selection of a bidding function plays a key role in increasing their profits. In order to get a profitable bidding function which is usually linear, it is required to modify adequately the intersection and the slope of a linear supply function. This paper presents an analysis of the selection of the supply function from the viewpoint of Nash equilibrium(NE). Four types of bidding function parameters are used for analizing the electricity market. The competition of selecting bidding parameters is modeled as two level games in this research. One is a subgame where a certain type of parameters is given and the players compete to select values of the underlying parameters. The other is an overall game where the players compete to select a profitable type among the four types of parameters. The NEs in both games are computed by an using analytic method and a payoff matrix method. It is verified in case studies for the NE of overall game to satisfy the equilibrium condition.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.55 no.9
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• pp.392-398
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• 2006

Maintenance scheduling of generating units (MSU) has strategic dimension in an oligopolistic market. Strategic MSU of gencos can affect a market power through capacity withdrawal which is related to bidding strategy in an generation wholesale market. This paper presents a combined framework that models the interrelation between competitive bidding and strategic MSU. The combined game model is represented as some sub-optimization problems of a market operator (MO) and gencos, that should be solved through bi-level optimization scheme. The gradient method with dual variables is also adopted to calculate a Nash Equilibrium (NE) by an iterative update technique in this paper. Illustrative numerical example shows that NE of a supply function equilibrium is obtained properly by using proposed solution technique. The MSU made by MO is compared with that by each genco and that under perfect competition market.