• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.22 no.2
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• pp.27-51
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• 2007

The cumulative result of the work by the ICAO Secretariat, the Secretariat Study Group and the Council Special Group on the Modernization of the Rome Convention of 1952 are two draft Conventions, namely: "Draft Convention on Compensation for Damage Caused by Aircraft to Third Parties, in case of Unlawful Interference", and "Draft Convention on Compensation for Damage Caused by Aircraft to Third Parties" The core provisions of the former draft Convention are as follows: The liability of the operator is strict, that is, without the necessity of proof of fault. It would be liable for damage sustained by third parties on condition only that the damage was caused by an aircraft in flight(Article 3). However, such liability is caped based on the weight of the aircraft(Article 4). It is envisaged to create an independent organization called the Supplementary Compensation Mechanism, with the principle purpose to pay compensation to persons suffering damage in the territory of a State Party, and to provide financial support(Article 8). Compensation shall be paid by the SCM to the extent that the total amount of damages exceeds the Article 4 limits(Article 19). The main issues on the farmer draft Convention are relating to breaking away from Montreal Convention 1999, no limits on individual claims but a global limitation on air carrier liability, insurance coverage, cap of operators' strict liability, and Supplementary Compensation Mechanism. The core provisions of the latter draft Convention are as follows: the liability of the operator is strict, up to a certain threshold tentatively set at 250,000 to 500,000 SDRs. Beyond that, the operator is liable for all damages unless it proves that such damage were not due to its negligence or that the damages were solely due to the negligence of another person(Article 3). The provisions relating to the SCM and compensation thereunder do not operate under this Convention, as the operator is potentially for the full amount of damages caused. The main issues on the latter draft Convention are relating to liability limit of operator, and definition of general risks. In conclusion, we urge ICAO to move forward expeditiously on the draft Convention to establish a third party liability and compensation system that can stand ready to protect both third party victims and the aviation industry before another 9/11-scale event occurs.

• Journal of the Society of Disaster Information
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• v.19 no.2
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• pp.395-410
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• 2023

Purpose: The purpose of this study was to analyze the current state of drone terrorism response at such critical national facilities and derive improvements, especially to identify problems in laws and systems to effectively utilize the anti-drone system and present directions for improvement. Method: A qualitative research method was used for this study by analyzing a variety of issues not discussed in existing research papers and policy documents through in-depth interviews with subject matter experts. In-depth interviews were conducted based on 12 semi-structured interviews by selecting 16 experts in the field of anti-drone and terrorism in Korea. The interview contents were recorded with the prior consent of the study participants, transcribed back to the Korean file, and problems and improvement measures were derived through coding. For this, the threats and types were analyzed based on the cases of drone terrorism occurring abroad and measures to establish anti-drone system were researched from the perspective of laws and systems by evaluating the possibility of drone terrorism in the Republic of Korea. Result: As a result of the study, improvements to some of the problems that need to be preceded in order to effectively respond to drone terrorism at critical national facilities in the Republic of Korea, have been identified. First, terminologies related to critical national facilities and drone terrorism should be clearly defined and reflected in the Integrated Defense Act and the Terrorism Prevention Act. Second, the current concept of protection of critical national facilities should evolve from the current ground-oriented protection to a three-dimensional protection concept that considers air threats and the Integrated Defense Act should reflect a plan to effectively install the anti-drone system that can materialize the concept. Third, a special law against flying over critical national facilities should be enacted. To this end, legislation should be enacted to expand designated facilities subject to flight restrictions while minimizing the range of no fly zone, but the law should be revised so that the two wings of "drone industry development" and "protection of critical national facilities" can develop in a balanced manner. Fourth, illegal flight response system and related systems should be improved and reestablished. For example, it is necessary to prepare a unified manual for general matters, but thorough preparation should be made by customizing it according to the characteristics of each facility, expanding professional manpower, and enhancing response training. Conclusion: The focus of this study is to present directions for policy and technology development to establish an anti-drone system that can effectively respond to drone terrorism and illegal drones at critical national facilities going forward.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.24 no.2
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• pp.211-234
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• 2009

North Korea conducted the launcher test, which, as North Korea claimed, belonged to the sovereign rights for the purpose of peaceful utilization and exploration of the outer space. The launching was allegedly done for the sole purpose of putting the satellite into earth orbit, while international community stressed the fact that the orbiting of satellite was not confirmed and that the technology used was not distinct from the purpose of building intercontinental ballistic missile. UN Security Council adopted the resolutions which took the effect that the launching was deemed as the missile launching, not the mere launcher test. North Korea declared the moratorium of suspending its test activity. Controversial issues have been raised regarding whether the launcher itself has the legal status of enjoying the freedom of space flight based upon the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. The resolutions, however, has put forward a binding instrument forbidding the launching. UN Security Council resolutions, however, should be read not as defining the missile test illegal, in that the language of resolutions, such as 'demand', should be considered as not formulating a sort of obligatory act or inact. On the other hand, the resolutions should be read as having binding force with respect to any activity relating to the weapons of mass destruction. The resolution 1718 is written in more specific language such as 'decides that the DPRK shall suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile programme and in this context re-establish its pre-existing commitments to a moratorium on missile launching'. Therefore, the lauching activity of the North Korea is banned by the UN Security Council resolution. It should be noted that the resolution does not include any specific provisions defining the space of activity of the North Korea as illegal. But, the legal effect of the moratorium is not denied as to its launching itself, which is corresponding to the missile test clearisibanned in accordance with the resolutions.