• Asia-Pacific Journal of Business Venturing and Entrepreneurship
• /
• v.18 no.1
• /
• pp.203-223
• /
• 2023

Recently, the platform industry is rapidly growing in the global market, and competition is intensifying at the same time. Therefore, in order for domestic platform companies to have global competitiveness in the platform market, it is necessary to study the platform business ecosystem and success factors. However, most of the recent platform-related studies have been theoretical studies on the characteristics of platform business status analysis, platform economy, and indirect network externalities of platforms. Therefore, this study comprehensively analyzed the success factors of Silicon Valley's business ecosystem proposed in previous studies, and at the same time analyzed the success factors extracted from stakeholders in the actual Silicon Valley platform business ecosystem. And based on these factors, an IPA analysis was conducted as a way to propose a success plan to stakeholders in the platform business ecosystem. As a result of the analysis, among the success factors collected through previous studies, manpower, capital, and challenge culture were identified as factors that are relatively well maintained in both importance and satisfaction in Silicon Valley. In the end, it can be seen that the creation of an environment and culture in which Silicon Valley can use it to challenge itself based on excellent human resources and abundant capital contributes the most to the success of Silicon Valley's platform business. On the other hand, although it is of high importance to Silicon Valley's platform corporate ecosystem, the factors that show relatively low satisfaction among stakeholders are 'learning and benchmarking among active companies' and 'strong ties and cooperation between members', and it is analyzed that interest and effort are needed to strengthen these factors in the future. Finally, the systems and policies necessary for market autonomous competition, 'business support service industry', 'name value', and 'spin-off start-up' were important factors in literature research, but the importance and satisfaction of these factors were lowered due to changes in the times and environment. This study has academic implications in that it comprehensively analyzes the success factors of Silicon Valley's business ecosystem proposed in previous studies, and at the same time analyzes the success factors extracted from stakeholders in the actual Silicon Valley platform business ecosystem. In addition, there is another academic implications that importance and satisfaction were simultaneously examined through IPA analysis based on these various extracted factors. As for academic implications, it is meaningful in that it contributed to the formation of the domestic platform ecosystem by providing the government and companies with concrete information on the success factors of the platform business ecosystem and the theoretical grounds for the growth of domestic platform businesses.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
• /
• v.12 no.3
• /
• pp.71-94
• /
• 1990

This paper reviews the rationale of monetary and banking intervention by an outside authority, either the government or the central bank, and seeks to delineate clearly the optimal limits to the monetary and banking deregulation currently underway in Korea as well as on a global scale. Furthermore, this paper seeks to establish an objective and balanced view on the role of the central bank, especially in light of the current discussion on the restructuring of Korea's central bank, which has been severely contaminated by interest-group politics. The discussion begins with the recognition that the modern free banking school and the new monetary economics are becoming formidable challenges to the traditional role of the government or the central bank in the monetary and banking sector. The paper reviews six arguments that have traditionally been presented to support intervention: (1) the possibility of an over-issue of bank notes under free banking instead of central banking; (2) externalities in and the public good nature of the use of money; (3) economies of scale and natural monopoly in producing money; (4) the need for macro stabilization policy due to the instability of the real sector; (5) the external effects of bank failure due to the inherent instability of the existing banking system; and (6) protection for small banknote users and depositors. Based on an analysis of the above arguments, the paper speculates on the optimal role of the government or central bank in the monetary and banking system and the optimal degree of monetary and banking deregulation. By contrast to the arguments for free banking or laissez-faire monetary systems, which become fashionable in recent years, monopoly and intervention by the government or central bank in the outside money system can be both necessary and optimal. In this case, of course, an over-issue of fiat money may be possible due to political considerations, but this issue is beyond the scope of this paper. On the other hand, the issue of inside monies based on outside money could indeed be provided for optimally under market competition by private institutions. A competitive system in issuing inside monies would help realize, to the maxim urn extent possible, external economies generated by using a single outside money. According to this reasoning, free banking activities will prevail in the inside money system, while a government monopoly will prevail in the outside money system. This speculation, then, also implies that the monetary and banking deregulation currently underway should and most likely will be limited to the inside money system, which could be liberalized to the fullest degree. It is also implied that it will be impractical to deregulate the outside money system and to allow market competition to provide outside money, in accordance with the arguments of the free banking school and the new monetary economics. Furthermore, the role of the government or central bank in this new environment will not be significantly different from their current roles. As far as the supply of fiat money continues to be monopolized by the government, the control of the supply of base money and such related responsibilities as monetary policy (argument(4)) and the lender of the last resort (argument (5)) will naturally be assigned to the outside money supplier. However, a mechanism for controlling an over-issue of fiat money by a monopolistic supplier will definitely be called for (argument(1)). A monetary policy based on a certain policy rule could be one possibility. More importantly, the deregulation of the inside money system would further increase the systemic risk inherent in the current fractional banking system, while enhancing the efficiency of the system (argument (5)). In this context, the role of the lender of the last resort would again become an instrument of paramount importance in alleviating liquidity crises in the early stages, thereby disallowing the possibility of a widespread bank run. Similarly, prudential banking supervision would also help maintain the safety and soundness of the fully deregulated banking system. These functions would also help protect depositors from losses due to bank failures (argument (6)). Finally, these speculations suggest that government or central bank authorities have probably been too conservative on the issue of the deregulation of the financial system, beyond the caution necessary to preserve system safety. Rather, only the fullest deregulation of the inside money system seems to guarantee the maximum enjoyment of external economies in the single outside money system.