An Overview of the Rationale of Monetary and Banking Intervention: The Role of the Central Bank in Money and Banking Revisited

화폐(貨幣)·금융개입(金融介入)의 이론적(理論的) 근거(根據)에 대한 고찰(考察) : 중앙은행(中央銀行)의 존립근거(存立根據)에 대한 개관(槪觀)

This paper reviews the rationale of monetary and banking intervention by an outside authority, either the government or the central bank, and seeks to delineate clearly the optimal limits to the monetary and banking deregulation currently underway in Korea as well as on a global scale. Furthermore, this paper seeks to establish an objective and balanced view on the role of the central bank, especially in light of the current discussion on the restructuring of Korea's central bank, which has been severely contaminated by interest-group politics. The discussion begins with the recognition that the modern free banking school and the new monetary economics are becoming formidable challenges to the traditional role of the government or the central bank in the monetary and banking sector. The paper reviews six arguments that have traditionally been presented to support intervention: (1) the possibility of an over-issue of bank notes under free banking instead of central banking; (2) externalities in and the public good nature of the use of money; (3) economies of scale and natural monopoly in producing money; (4) the need for macro stabilization policy due to the instability of the real sector; (5) the external effects of bank failure due to the inherent instability of the existing banking system; and (6) protection for small banknote users and depositors. Based on an analysis of the above arguments, the paper speculates on the optimal role of the government or central bank in the monetary and banking system and the optimal degree of monetary and banking deregulation. By contrast to the arguments for free banking or laissez-faire monetary systems, which become fashionable in recent years, monopoly and intervention by the government or central bank in the outside money system can be both necessary and optimal. In this case, of course, an over-issue of fiat money may be possible due to political considerations, but this issue is beyond the scope of this paper. On the other hand, the issue of inside monies based on outside money could indeed be provided for optimally under market competition by private institutions. A competitive system in issuing inside monies would help realize, to the maxim urn extent possible, external economies generated by using a single outside money. According to this reasoning, free banking activities will prevail in the inside money system, while a government monopoly will prevail in the outside money system. This speculation, then, also implies that the monetary and banking deregulation currently underway should and most likely will be limited to the inside money system, which could be liberalized to the fullest degree. It is also implied that it will be impractical to deregulate the outside money system and to allow market competition to provide outside money, in accordance with the arguments of the free banking school and the new monetary economics. Furthermore, the role of the government or central bank in this new environment will not be significantly different from their current roles. As far as the supply of fiat money continues to be monopolized by the government, the control of the supply of base money and such related responsibilities as monetary policy (argument(4)) and the lender of the last resort (argument (5)) will naturally be assigned to the outside money supplier. However, a mechanism for controlling an over-issue of fiat money by a monopolistic supplier will definitely be called for (argument(1)). A monetary policy based on a certain policy rule could be one possibility. More importantly, the deregulation of the inside money system would further increase the systemic risk inherent in the current fractional banking system, while enhancing the efficiency of the system (argument (5)). In this context, the role of the lender of the last resort would again become an instrument of paramount importance in alleviating liquidity crises in the early stages, thereby disallowing the possibility of a widespread bank run. Similarly, prudential banking supervision would also help maintain the safety and soundness of the fully deregulated banking system. These functions would also help protect depositors from losses due to bank failures (argument (6)). Finally, these speculations suggest that government or central bank authorities have probably been too conservative on the issue of the deregulation of the financial system, beyond the caution necessary to preserve system safety. Rather, only the fullest deregulation of the inside money system seems to guarantee the maximum enjoyment of external economies in the single outside money system.

본고(本稿)서는, 최근 자유금융학파(自由金融學派)와 신화폐경제학과(新貨幣經濟學科)들의 등장으로 화폐(貨幣) 금융문제(金融問題)에서의 자유경쟁(自由競爭) 및 자유방임주의적(自由放任主義的) 사고가 새롭게 확산되고 있는 시점(時點)에서, 정부(政府) 및 중앙은행(中央銀行)의 화폐(貨幣) 금융개입(金融介入)의 이론적(理論的) 근거(根據)와 그에 관련된 논쟁(論爭)을 다음의 6가지 논거(論據)들을 중심으로 개관해 보았다 : (1) 자유금융하(自由金融下)의 銀行券(은행권) 초과발행(超過發行) 가능성(可能性), (2) 화폐사용에 있어서의 외부경제효과(外部經濟效果)와 화폐제도의 공공재적(公共財的) 성격(性格) (3) 화폐발행업무의 규모(規模)의 경제(經濟)와 자연독점적(自然獨占的) 성격(性格), (4) 실물부문(實物部門)의 불안정성(不安定性)과 거시안정화정책(巨視安定化政策)의 필요성, (5) 은행금융시장(銀行金融市場)의 불안정성(不安定性)과 은행파산(銀行破産)의 외부효과(外部效果), (6) 소액거래자(少額去來者) 및 예금자(預金者)의 보호(保護) 이러한 논거들에 의하면 외부화폐(外部貨幣)(outside money)의 공급은 전형적인 공공재이론(公共財理論)이나 기술적(技術的) 독점주장(獨占主張)이 적용되는 경우이기 때문에 외부화폐제도(外部貨幣制度)의 유지에 있어서 정부(政附)나 중앙은행(中央銀行) 독점(獨占) 및 개입(介入)이 불가피하고 또한 바람직하지만, 내부화폐(內部貨幣)(inside money)제도(制度)의 경우는 적절한 최소한의 안전장치만 강구된다면 최근의 자유금융학파(自由金融學派) 및 신화폐경제학과(新貨幣經濟學科)들의 주장과 같이 사적(私的) 자유경쟁(自由競爭)이 보다 활성화되도록 하는 것이 바람직할 것으로 판단된다 . 한편 외부화폐제도(外部貨幣制度)에의 개입(介入)에 따른 (정부(政府) 및) 중앙은행(中央銀行)의 거시통화정책기능(巨視通貨政策機能)은 물론, 보다 자유화(自由化)된 내부화폐제도하(內部貨幣制度下)에서도 중앙은행(中央銀行)의 최종대여자기능(最終貸與者機能)과 미시적(微視的) 감독기능(監督機能)은 동(同) 제도(制度)의 안전성(安全性)을 유지하기 위해 중요한 역할을 할 것으로 보인다.