• Journal of Educational Research in Mathematics
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• v.16 no.3
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• pp.179-198
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• 2006

In This Paper, I call Johnson & Lakoff (1980; 1999)'s Experientialism or Experiential Realism or, Embodied Realism, Nunez(1995; 1997)'s Ecological Naturalism as Experientialism and try to investigate the possibility of their Experientialism to be a philosophy of mathematical education. This possibility is approached in the respect with the problem of objectivism and relativism. I analyzed the epistemological background of embodied cognition first and then mathematical epistemology of experientialism. Experientialism shares its Philosophical position partly with Dewey and Merleau-Ponty. Experientialists deny the traditional hypothesis of philosophy as such separability of subject and object, and of body and rationality and also They have better position of epistemology than that of Hamlyn, and of Social Constructivism. Therefore, They guarantee wider range of mathematical universality than Hamlyn and Social constructivist. I conclude that the possibility of Experientialism to be a philosophy of mathematical education depends on the success of its supporting the practical study on mathematics education.

• Proceedings of the Korea Society of Design Studies Conference
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• 2001.10a
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• pp.60.1-60
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• 2001

• Fashion & Textile Research Journal
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• v.10 no.2
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• pp.191-197
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• 2008

Despite increasing consumption of luxury brands, research about consumption of luxury brands is limited.The purpose of this article is to gain a deeper understanding of important role of intrinsic consumption motivations in consumption of luxury brands. This article investigated the relationships among consumption motivations, conspicuous consumption belief, Product quality belief, and attitude toward consumption of luxury brands using structural equation modeling. The results reveal that, other-oriented consumers were likely to have strong conspicuous consumption belief,whereas consumers with strong self-oriented value tended to place more importance on product quality attribute of luxury brands. Moreover, Consumers who take into account extended-self tended to have strong conspicuous consumption belief while consumer who put more importance on experientialism were more likely to have greater importance on product quality atthbute. And both conspicuous consumption belief and product quality belief influenced positive attitude formation toward luxury brands.

• Journal of the Daesoon Academy of Sciences
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• v.47
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• pp.1-37
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• 2023

This essay seeks to answer the question of how best to understand Korean new religious movements (KNRMs). KNRMs have the characteristics of folk religion, ethno-religion, or popular religion. KNRMs are products of the national consciousness promoted by Korean society during the Late Joseon Dynasty at the turning point of modern Yi-Jing Studies. From the perspective of social evolutionary theory of developmental history, during that period, Joseon (Korea), like China, was faced with a double-edged sword consisting of the strength of tradition and the upheaval of modernity. If the strength of tradition depended on the Yi-Jing Studies to promote national enlightenment toward anti-imperialist aims, then it was equally the case that modernity depended on the sense of urgency to guide the people to secure livelihoods and edification regarding anti-feudalism. In this essay, the KNRMs that appeared during this transition period of Yi-Jing Studies will be a significant focus, and the worldview of Daesoon Thought will be the main focus. As one of the central topics, intensive discussion will be dedicated to the issue of the nature of pre-experientialism (先驗主義) which characterized the Great Opening (開闢). The principles of Daesoon Thought have a religious dimension of realistic awareness that guides the people's lives and edifies them. The process of the Great Opening aims to secure an ontological clock that tracks the Great Itineration of the world toward Daesoon Truth. This in turn as a process establishes the epistemological world of the Reordering Works of Heaven and Earth (天地公事) and reaches the axiological boundary of the future world. The links among the Three Realms is characterized by a pre-experientialist line that experiences the space-time nature of the universe as the Great Opening of the Later World (後天) within the framework of Heaven and Earth. Throughout this course, humans look to enjoy the infinite vitality of the universe from within their own finite vitality. Therefore, Daesoon Thought can overcome perceived reality through pre-experientialist channels such as the Great Opening of the Later World and aim for a state of self-awareness such as the Earthly Paradise. This is an attempt to participate and practice in the actual world rather than pursuing a world of transcendental ideas, and therefore, it tends to be proactive in the world rather than exhibit a passive tendency to be worldliness. In conclusion, the truth of Daesoon Thought, which is characterized by the Great Opening of the Later World, contains a future-oriented outlook that longs for a Nextopia full of hope and promise rather than idealistic fancy towards a Utopia or well-founded dread and disdain towards Dystopia.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.126
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• pp.133-158
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• 2013

The main aim of this paper is to show that Gadamer's notion of historical constraint of interpretation is an unsuccessful theoretical postulation. Gadamer tries to present the limits of knowledge and interpretation in terms of his notion of understanding as an event. According to Gadamer, interpretation is bound to be incomplete by nature, and this leads to the thesis of "the uncertainty of interpretation". Although Gadamer seems to make his case successfully against the objective and ahistorical frame of interpretation, his thesis of the uncertainty of interpretation inevitably brings up the fear of nihilistic relativism. To meet this problem, Gadamer offers a constraint of hermeneutic situation, which is derived from the historicity underlying all forms of our existence. Nevertheless, the notion of historicity as the essence of human life does not seem to explain successfully how the actual content of an interpretation is constrained. Drawing on the experientialist notion of 'the embodied understanding", I suggest that the working constraint of interpretations can be appropriately found in the commonality of human experience which is conspicuous at the bodily and physical level of experience. In sum, interpretations, as part of mental and abstract level of experience, arise out of the bodily and physical level of experience, and at the same time strongly constrained by it.

• Journal of Educational Research in Mathematics
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• v.15 no.2
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• pp.107-130
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• 2005

The aims of this study are to identify Dewey's theory on mathematics education and to clarify its influence on the modern theories of mathematics education. For this purpose, we have examined Dewey's theory of knowledge named as pragmatism or instrumentalism, and studied the Dewey's theory of education in which he maintained education is the reconstruction of experiences. And then, we have examined Dewey's theory on mathematics education, such as theory of mathematics, purpose of mathematics education, contents of mathematics education, and methods of mathematics education respectively. After that, we have analyzed how his theory on mathematics education is connected with the diverse theories of modern mathematics education, such as Piaget's operational constructivism, Freudenthal's theory of realistic mathematics education, Polya's theory on mathematical problem-solving, and social constructivism. Through this study, we might say that Dewey's theory on mathematics education is a prototype of modern theories of mathematics education and a comprehensive paradigm which is very suggestive to the phenomena of mathematics education.

• Journal of Educational Research in Mathematics
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• v.15 no.4
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• pp.375-399
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• 2005

In this article, I identified many points of commonness and differences at)feared in the fraction units of three conspicuous textbooks -McLellan, MiC and Korea. After that, 1 evaluated these results with reference to more general didactics on which each text-book is based. A background theory of Mc-Lellan's textbook was Dewey's experientialism, and that of MiC was Freudenthal's realistic mathematics education. Through this study, I have reached the fact that these three textbooks could not exhibit the phenomenological wholeness of fraction. Driven by measuring number model which is very abstractive, McLellan's text-book is disregarding the lower level context. MiC textbook, driven by real context, is ignoring higher level model which is close to rational number concept. From an excess of formulation and practice of algorithm, Korea's textbook is overlooking the real context. It is necessary that a textbook which would display the phenomenological wholeness of fraction is developed.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.143
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• pp.67-86
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• 2017

The purpose of this paper is to critically investigate John McDowell's naturalism, and propose an alternative direction of inquiry in order for his naturalism to have a more explanatory cogency. McDowell's main project is to settle a philosophical anxiety that has made traditional philosophy waver between mind and world. If one stands on the world side, he would appeal to "the unintelligible given," and on the other hand, if one stands on the mind side, he would fall into anarchistic relativism. In order to relieve the traditional philosophical anxiety, what McDowell has in mind is to reintroduce an empiricistic intuition into a pragmatic conceptual setting. Although McDowell is successful in that it could avoid methodological difficulties with which traditional philosophy has faced, his discussion seems to give rise to a charge of "the Myth of the Given," presenting perceptual judgement as a model of judgement. I propose that McDowell has yet to account for the relation between perceptual and abstract judgements in a more cogent way, which has been far better explained by the experientialist account of the nature and the structure of the embodied experience.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.116
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• pp.59-78
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• 2010

The main purpose of this paper is to show how the notion of the language-experience correspondence is ill-grounded, and that the notion of 'literal meaning' based on it accordingly goes nowhere. Drawing on the experientialist view, I observed that language itself is a system of signs, and thus is given meaning only by way of symbolization. According to the experientialist account, the meaning of a signifier is given by means of "symbolic mapping." in which a certain portion of experience-content is mapped onto the signifier. And since symbolic mapping is partial by nature, there must come in some breach between the signifier and the experience-content mapped onto it. The partial nature of symbolic mapping repudiates the very notion of correspondence, and accordingly the notion of literal meaning. Rather, meanings are produced by means of the varied distances between the signifier and the mapped experience. In this perspective, the inquiry into the nature and structure of meaning should become part of one into that of symbolic experience. Such an inquiry may not be expected to reach the objectivity of linguistic meaning. Instead, we may be content with the relative stability in communication, which seems to be grounded in the commonality conspicuously observed at the bodily level of human experience.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.152
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• pp.59-79
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• 2019

The main purpose of this paper is to critically examine the intractable problems of Peirce's notion of 'symbol' as a higher and perfect mode of sign, and present a more appropriate account of the higher status of symbol from an experientialist perspective. Peirce distinguished between icon, index, and symbol, and suggested symbol to be a higher mode of sign, in that it additionally requires "interpretation." Within Peirce's picture, the matter of interpretation is to be explained in terms of "interpretant," while icon or index are not. However, Peirce's conception of "interpretant" itself remains fraught with intractable opacities, thereby leaving the nature of symbol in a misty conundrum. Drawing largely on the experientialist account of the nature and structure of symbolic experience, I try to explicate the complexity of symbol in terms of "the symbolic mapping." According to experientialism, our experience consists of two levels, i.e., physical and symbolic. Physical experience can be extended to symbolic level largely by means of "symbolic mapping," and yet is strongly constrained by physical experience. Symbolic mapping is the way in which we map part of certain physical experience onto some other area, thereby understanding the other area in terms of the mapped part of the physical experience. According to this account, all the signs, icon, index, and symbol a la Peirce, are constructed by way of symbolic mapping. While icon and index are constructed by mapping physical level experience onto some signifier(i.e. Peirce's "representamen"), symbol is constructed by mapping abstract level experience onto some signifier. Considering the experientialist account that abstract level of experience is constructed by way of symbolic mapping of physical level of experience, the symbolic mapping of abstract level of experience onto some other area is a secondary one. Thus, symbol, being constructed by way of secondary or more times mapping, becomes a higher level sign. This analysis is based on the idea that explaining the nature of sign is a matter of explaining that symbolic experience, leaving behind Peirce's realist conception of sign as a matter of an event or state of affairs out there. In conclusion, I suggest that this analysis will open up new possibilities for a more appropriate account of the nature of signs, beyond Peirce's complicated riddles.