• Journal of Korean Institute of Industrial Engineers
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• v.13 no.2
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• pp.65-77
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• 1987

Congestion occurs whenever users interfere with each other, while competing for scarce resources. In a congested market, such as a telecommunication service market, users of telecommunication services incur costs in using the service in addition to the price. The user's own time costs involved in learning to use the service, waiting for the service, and making use of the service are typically greater than the price of telecommunication services. A market equilibrium analysis is performed in which a method for user demand aggregation is developed. The effects of price changes on user demands and market demands for congested services are examined. It is found that total market demands may increase as the price for less-congested services increase under certain demand conditions. This suggests that a nonuniform pricing scheme for a congested service may improve the utilization of the congested system. The sign of price cross-elasticity for congested services is show to vary with demand conditions. A possible complementary property of congested services is found and the implication of such a property is discussed. It is argued that such a complementary property may lead to a cross subsidy in a market with congestion. Finally, comparisons between uniform pricing and nonuniform pricing policies are made. A specific numerical example is given to show that a nonuniform pricing policy may be Pareto superior to a uniform pricing policy.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.8 no.7
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• pp.2281-2301
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• 2014

In wireless ad hoc networks the nodes focus on achieving the maximum SINR for efficient data transmission. In order to achieve maximum SINR the nodes culminate in exhausting the battery power for successful transmissions. This in turn affects the successful transmission of the other nodes as the maximum transmission power opted by each node serves as a source of interference for the other nodes in the network. This paper models the choice of power for each node as a non cooperative game where the throughput of the network with respect to the consumption of power is formulated as a utility function. We propose an adaptive pricing scheme that encourages the nodes to use minimum transmission power to achieve target SINR at the Nash equilibrium and improve their net utility in multiuser scenario.

• Management Science and Financial Engineering
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• v.19 no.1
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• pp.11-16
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• 2013

This paper derives an equilibrium asset price when there exist three kinds of traders in financial market: a risk-averse informed trader, noise traders, and risk neutral market makers. This paper is an extended version of Kyle's (1985, Econometrica) continuous time model by introducing insider's risk aversion. We obtain not only the equilibrium asset pricing and market depth parameter but also insider's value function and optimal insider's trading strategy explicitly. The comparative static shows that the market depth (the reciprocal of market pressure) increases with time and volatility of noise traders' trading.

• Journal of Korean Society of Transportation
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• v.20 no.4
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• pp.95-107
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• 2002

Congestion and increasing returns to scale in the use of and in the provision of transportation facilities have been biggest challenges to policy makers. In order to counter these problems and thereby to promote economic efficiency, optimal congestion tax and marginal cost pricing are separately and strongly recommended for each case. In this paper, however, we show that they are valid only in Partial equilibrium context in which only the corresponding market is considered. We set up a formal general equilibrium model and prove that the recommended policies are not in general effective. We continue to give particular examples which show the invalidity of each policy and continue to show that in the same examples, there exist better but unconventional policies. Based on these findings we strongly suggest to employ quantify restricting policy measure or to find second-best pricing policies.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.35 no.4
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• pp.55-79
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• 2010

This study deals with a model for platform competition in a two-sided market. We suppose there are both direct and indirect network externalities between suppliers and users of each platform. Moreover, we suppose that both users and suppliers are distributed in their relative affinity for each platform type. That is, each user [supplier] has his/her own preferential position toward each platform, and users [suppliers] are horizontally differentiated over [0, 1]. And for analytical tractability, some parameters like direct and indirect network externalities are the same across the markets. Given the parameters and the pricing profile, users and suppliers conduct subscription game, where participants select the platform that gives them the highest payoffs. This game proceeds according to a replicator dynamics of the evolutionary game, which is simplified by properly defining gains from participant's strategy in the subscription game. We find that depending on the strength of these network effects, there might either be multiple stable equilibria, at which users and suppliers distribute across both platforms, or one unstable interior equilibrium corresponding to the market tipping in favor of either platform. In both cases, we also consider the pricing power of competing platform providers under the framework of the Stackelberg game. In particular, our study examines the possible effects of the type of competition between platform providers, which may constrain the equilibrium selection in the subscription game.

• Journal of KIISE:Information Networking
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• v.33 no.2
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• pp.183-192
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• 2006

This paper analyzes the price-selection problem under priority-based scheduling for QoS (Quality of Service) network services, i.e., how to determine the price associated with each service level. In particular, we focus on the problems with the pricing mechanism based on equilibrium analysis. We claim that the assumptions needed to produce equilibrium nay not hold in some important environments. Specifically, (a) the individual user's impact on the system is not infinitesimal and (b) users do not always have up-to-date global system-status knowledge crucial for optimal user decisions required for equilibrium. These may make the equilibrium models inaccurate in realistic environments. We examine the accuracy of some existing equilibrium methods by using a dynamic model that we have developed for system behavior analysis. The analysis indicates that equilibrium methods fail to model accurately the system behavior in some realistic environments.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.27 no.4
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• pp.11-27
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• 2002

This paper is aimed at surveying the method that supports logical and theoretical back grounds of electricity service pricing, to investigate whether the ESPM can reflect comprehensively the various interests of parties and persons concerned with electricity supply and demand, and analyzing the practical applicability of the model in short-term perspectives. The major findings of this study can be summarized as fellows. First, the ESPM explains what process the equilibrium price is attained through, which is the essential concept and object in evaluating the value of public enterprises or utilities and the price of electricity Second, the ESPM provides the logics and methods that can objectify the discrete price by each electricity user. Third, the ESPM presents theoretical logics and practical methods that can calculate the basic price and the variable price per electricity unit which are key concepts in the two-part tariff. Fourth, the ESPM has powerful practical applicabilities in the reasonable electricity pricing and in the explanation for the balance between parties and persons interested with electricity supply and demand.

• Journal of Information Technology Services
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• v.12 no.3
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• pp.111-126
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• 2013

As the gaps become narrower in interconnection fee and volume rate, the MNOs began to introduce flat pricing for unlimited voice traffic competitively in Korea wireless telecommunication market : 'unlimited talks within intra-network' by the 1st operator, followed by the 3rd operator's 'unlimited talks over all networks'. As a result, subscribers tip in toward the third ranked operator and could bring a substantial change to steadfast market structure over the last decade in Korea. This paper aims to develop a simple economic model to analyze competition with flat pricing for unlimited voice traffic, and to check whether the pricing can be appropriate for the MNOs. The results show that MNOs already step in the necessary conditions to launch flat pricing for voice traffic. It also predicts that the MNOs compete with unlimited talk over all networks and set a single fee in an equilibrium. At present, the MNOs run virtually identical pricing for unlimited talk over all networks, considering their differentiation with respect to service quality, coverage and brand preference.

• Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering
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• v.34 no.3
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• pp.41-48
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• 2011

Recently, the increasing power of distributors has given them the opportunity of introducing private brand (PB) products. Based on the game theory, this study analyzes the decision making of a distributor regarding the optimal pricing and quality strategies for the PB product. By analyzing the game model, it is shown that the pricing mechanism heavily depends not only on the market power of the distributor but on the quality of the PB product. It is also shown that, counter intuitively, as the market power of the distributor increases, the optimal quality of the PB product should be decreased.

• Management Science and Financial Engineering
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• v.2 no.1
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• pp.73-101
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• 1996

We show assets can be classified into diversifiable risks and non-diversifiable risks based on aggregate endowment and spanning so that in equilibrium agents eliminate diversifiable risks which must have zero values. Consequently, the benchmark portfolio that represents a pricing operator should have only a non-diversifiable risk, aggregate endowment should earn a positive risk premium over a riskless asset, and, even in incomplete markets, there should be a pricing operator represented by a function of aggregate endowment if any asset mean-independent of aggregate endowment is diversifiable. These results apply to both the CAPM and a representative agent model.