• International conference on construction engineering and project management
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• 2009.05a
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• pp.827-834
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• 2009

In respond to the demand of an open, fair, transparent, and efficient environment for procurement, many governments have incorporated the use of internet in their procurement systems with online procurement (e-procurement). Given the different policies and laws which have to be complied with, the practice of government e-procurement system varies from one country to another. Thus, experiences in running e-procurement will vary as well. The achievements and obstacles of one country's experience will be a constructive reference for other countries in establishing e-procurement system. In this regard, government e-procurement system practices in two Southeast Asia countries i.e., Thailand and Indonesia particularly in public works are consecutively presented and finally compared in this paper. The government of Thailand has applied Online Auctions (e-Auctions) as the national procurement practice since 2005 and performed the e-Auctions in two types: Reverse Auction and Sealed Bid Auction. Contrary to the common practice of e-procurement, the Thai government, with some rationales, runs the bid documents obtaining manually as well as qualification and technical documents submission and holding the e-Auctions at bidding office. Whereas Indonesian government runs Online Sealed Bid Bidding (e-Procurement) and most of the bidding stages are performed electronically except bid evaluation for both technical and financial. The advantages and drawbacks of these two e-procurement practices are discussed as well as improvements that have to be made for successful of e-procurement.

• Asia pacific journal of information systems
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• v.20 no.3
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• pp.33-49
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• 2010

We empirically examine the impact of online auction knowledge and category-specific knowledge on the final price of online auctions. Specifically, we question how the relationship between buying and selling experiences affects the final prices of online auctions. Related to the trust between buyers and sellers, we examine the multiple interactions between a buyer-seller pairand aim to identify how these repeated transactions influence the final price. To contrast these effects with other product related factors, we focus on so called 'common value' auctions of vintage stamps on eBay, in which the ex-post value of the product is the same among participating agents’ perceived value. Online auction of stamps provides a representative setting to examine the relationship between market experience and the auction participation behavior in the common value auction, as it provides the book value of stamp as well as price variation across individual buyers with different expertise levels. Our analysis of over 3000 stamps auctions on eBay indicates a significantly high frequency of buyer-seller (pair) interactions, thus suggesting a 'relationship view' of auctions. The work validates five hypotheses derived from the existing theory in economics, marketing, and information systems. Through the common-value auction data, we find that seller's online auction experience and category-specific experience favor sellers by increasing the final price. However, buyer's online auction experience does not affect the final price, but buyer's category-specific experience favors buyers by decreasing the final price. We find that the trust between two trading parties increases the final price.

• Proceedings of the CALSEC Conference
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• 2004.02a
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• pp.112-116
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• 2004

· Dynamic Pricing vs. Fixed Pricing Auctions make both buyers and sellers engage in the price discovery process, Auctions of various kinds will replace the fixed pricing model that now pervades much of the web(pmitted)

• The Journal of Society for e-Business Studies
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• v.6 no.2
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• pp.87-99
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• 2001

Along with the rapid emergence of the Internet and e-commerce, online auctions are hitting the spotlights. The inconveniences found in off-line auctions, such as time and place restriction and limited number of items, are solved in the online auction. However, not so many auction sites have integrated auction information systems, which monitor the present status of auctions, resulting in greater inconvenience for the online auction users. Moreover, there is no auction site that suggests the appropriate starting or closing price that is useful for users when they make, their bids, What the online auction users need is an auction system that can solve such problems. This study is purported for solving the problems by designing and implementing a real time auction system that applies the comparison search functions and the agent functions. In other words, an integrated database system using a bidder-oriented agent for providing information is built so that the users can search and compare the information on the item they are interested in and make a faster and more accurate purchase. Also the appropriate starting and closing prices are offered to the sellers and bidders through the integrated system for a closer and more accurate comparison and analysis of the prices. For future work, the product recommendation service, which accurately reflects the bidding patterns, and the methods for studying the multi bidding pattern will be applied to the suggested system to realize a real time auction information system that supports CRM(Customer Relationship Management) .

• Journal of the Korean Data and Information Science Society
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• v.17 no.3
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• pp.795-804
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• 2006

Most internet auction sites open to users the bid history with the ascending order of bid amounts. Whereas eBay.com presents second bid prices, auction.co.kr provides highest bid prices. In this paper, the bidhistory is arranged according to the passage of tim, which can help to understand the situations and trends of bid prices, especially for multiple auctions. This manipulated data can be visualized by using profile plots. The successful bid prices could be estimated based on some prediction models with appropriate prior informations. Both sellers and bidders can be provided useful informations with these statistical analyses, and then fair online auctions in Korea will grow actively and rapidly.

• Electronics and Telecommunications Trends
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• v.38 no.5
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• pp.100-113
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• 2023

This study was aimed to derive implications in terms of competition to establish a reasonable spectrum policy for fifth-generation (5G) spectrum allocation through an in-depth analysis of C-band spectrum auctions. As a result of examining auctions in five countries, namely, Belgium, Sweden, Canada, Brazil, and Hong Kong, we identified various characteristics. First, the minimum bandwidth that is essential for service competition is guaranteed. Second, in Brazil, the network construction cost of mobile network operators is regarded as a part of the spectrum price. Third, a joint allocation of spectrum is permitted in Sweden, and spectrum sharing after allocation for 5G services is allowed in Canada. Finally, the reserved spectrum is provided for new service providers in Belgium and Canada. Our findings may provide insights for establishing policies of 5G spectrum allocation and competition in the telecommunications service market in Korea.

• The Journal of Society for e-Business Studies
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• v.5 no.1
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• pp.135-158
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• 2000

In recent years, many retail businesses jumped on the Internet auction bandwagon and paid substantially high fees to learn and develop proper business strategies for this new environment. Unlike what most businesses in the real world presume, this research shows that discriminatory-price ascending-bid auctions in a digital economy might be not very beneficial for the sellers on the Internet, if sellers sell the identical digital products through both a typical posted-price market and an auction. Using an extensive technology infrastructure along with suitable incentives and rules for market agents, we found that a discriminatory-price ascending-bid auction, which is the most popular auction mechanism on the Internet, serves consumers better than it does the sellers or producers in the digital economy. That is, the average prices for digital goods in these auctions are substantially lower than the prices in a posted-price market. This shows that it is not so wise for sellers to jump on the bandwagon of Internet auctions, if there is a market place with posted-price mechanisms which sells comparable items, or if a seller does not have special advantages or strategies in this new market institution. Electronic market mechanisms provide powerful means of understanding and measuring consumer characteristics including willingness-to-pay and other demographics for sellers or producers. Many concern that sellers may extract the entire surplus from the market by using customization on the Internet, thus consumers will be worse off in this digital economy. We found that these sellers who can customize their products and prices fail to capture the whole consumers surplus and cannot exercise a monopoly. One major explanation for this phenomenon is that the competition among the sellers prohibits them from charging prices according to customers demand for each product, where switching from one seller to another is not so difficult for the customers, and reselling products among the buyers are prohibited.

• Journal of Science and Technology Studies
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• v.19 no.2
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• pp.1-40
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• 2019

Built upon ethnographic method such as participant observation and in-depth interview, this study analyzes the material culture of electronic flower auctions at Yangjae Flower Market. From the viewpoint of Actor-Network Theory(ANT), this research examines how human actors like dealers and auctioneers interact with nonhuman actors such as market devices and these interactions form networks called "agencement." This research is focused on three main objectives: first, to study how the performance of auctions - i.e. the interactions between auctioneers and dealers - change in the wake of new market devices in the auctions; secondly, to look into what changes artifacts bring to the social relationships between auctioneers and dealers; lastly, to analyze the influence of new market devices on auction price in the market. The results of this research are as follows. First, the appearance of new market devices generates changes in the performance of auctions, which means the change of 'agencement' of flower auctions. Direct interactions between auctioneers and dealers turned into indirect interactions through new market devices. Moreover, the changes in the agencement brought changes to the identity of auctioneers and dealers. Secondly, the new agencement caused by the inflow of new market devices formed the trust between the devices and human actors, which gave rise to the trust in electronic auction and in counterpart actors as well. In addition, new market devices lowered direct interactions between auctioneers and dealers and thus made more equal relationships between the two than before. Lastly, market devices like trading screen reduced the leverage of auctioneers by providing dealers with bidding information previously possessed by auctioneers much openly and dealers were able to decide auction prices in more reasonable and dispassionate manner. Economic agency, power, trust, price, and information in the market is material and sensory.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.10 no.12
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• pp.5616-5642
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• 2016

Different from traditional auctions, electronic auctions provide a platform to allow bidders and auctioneers merchandise to each other over network anytime and anywhere. Auctioneers can publish information of goods, and bidders can choose the interested targets through this bidding platform. To ensure the fairness and security of electronic auctions, Li et al. have proposed a practical electronic auction scheme which can confirm the requirement of strong anonymity, bidding privacy, and secret bidding price. However, we have found out that Li et al.'s scheme may lurk the risk of the denial-of-service attack during the bidding phase in a sealed-bid auction. Thus, we propose a brand-new sealed-bid auction mechanism, in which the essentials of e-auction can be firmly preserved. In particular, each bidder only needs to register at the center once and then can join to multiple plays launched by different auctioneers. Moreover, the correctness of mutual authentication is confirmed according to the BAN logic model.

• Electronics and Telecommunications Trends
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• v.37 no.5
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• pp.70-81
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• 2022

This study derived implications regarding competition policy to establish a reasonable spectrum allocation draft of a 3.7 GHz spectrum band by indepth analysis of 5G spectrum auctions. The following general features were identified by examining auctions of three countries, including the United States, United Kingdom, and Denmark, were completed in 2021. First, securing the minimum bandwidth that is essential for service competition was guaranteed by applying the spectrum cap. Second, a continuous spectrum band was allocated to all mobile network operators. Third, certain requirements were implemented to encourage the expansion of 5G service coverage. The spectrum cap that was implemented in Korea during the most recent spectrum auction was ineffective regarding competition policy. Additionally, it is anticipated that the allocation of 3.7-4.0 GHz spectrum will considerably impact market competition because the continuity of spectrum band is different among mobile service operators. Therefore, it is time to discuss promoting the 5G service competition in Korea by revising related laws.