• East Asian mathematical journal
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• 제31권5호
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• pp.717-725
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• 2015

Velzen introduced the rigid and relaxed dominating set games and showed that the rigid game being balanced is equivalent to the relaxed game being balanced in 2004. After then various variants of dominating set games were introduced and it was shown that for each variant, a rigid game being balanced is equivalent to a relaxed game being balanced. It is natural to ask if for any other variant of dominating set game, the balancedness of a rigid game and the balancedness of a relaxed game are equivalent. In this paper, we show that the answer for the question is negative by considering the rigid and relaxed paired-domination games, which is considered as a variant of dominating set games. We characterize the cores of both games and show that the rigid game being balanced is not equivalent to the relaxed game being balanced. In addition, we study the cores of paired-dominations games on paths and cycles.

• 대한수학회지
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• 제45권3호
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• pp.871-881
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• 2008

In this paper, we study the core stability of the dominating set game which has arisen from the cost allocation problem related to domination problem on graphs. Let G be a graph whose neighborhood matrix is balanced. Applying duality theory of linear programming and graph theory, we prove that the dominating set game corresponding to G has the stable core if and only if every vertex belongs to a maximum 2-packing in G. We also show that for dominating set games corresponding to G, the core is stable if it is large, the game is extendable, or the game is exact. In fact, the core being large, the game being extendable and the game being exact are shown to be equivalent.

• Journal of the Korean Data and Information Science Society
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• 제22권6호
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• pp.1275-1281
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• 2011

Many authors studied cooperative games that arise from variants of dominating set games on graphs. In wireless networks, the connected dominating set is used to reduce routing table size and communication cost. In this paper, we introduce a connected dominating set game to model the cost allocation problem arising from a connected dominating set on a given graph and study its core. In addition, we give a polynomial time algorithm for determining the balancedness of the game on a tree, for finding a element of the core.