• 상하수도학회지
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• 제24권1호
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• pp.63-72
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• 2010

This study aims to make a decision about the rational option for a multipurpose dams development of the Tumen river basin so that the adjoining countries will effectively deal with the chronic problems and fully satisfy the fast growing demand of water and power. It has been thus far investigated that the interests between North Korea and China closely depend on the selected option, and they are not well compatible with each other. These situations are defined in terms of the cooperative two-person nonzero-sum game. The Nash bargaining model is then applied to contemplate the rational option, considering two scenarios of economic growth of the North Korea. After analyzing the model, it was expected that 1) two multipurpose dams must be cooperatively developed, and 2) their benefits should be allocated according to demand of each country. The authors finally suggest that a cooperative organisation be established to effectively manage the dams beyond the border of the countries.

• 대한전기학회:학술대회논문집
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• 대한전기학회 2000년도 추계학술대회 논문집 학회본부 A
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• pp.3-5
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• 2000

It has been the paradigm of game theory that more than two utilities compete and determine the price and amount of dispatch. In order for this theory to be available on real power system, it is necessary to consider the transmission costs as well as the generation costs. In addition Independent System Operator(ISO) should be able to mitigate the congestion, recover the transmission costs and provide information for long-term capacity investment by devising reasonable pricing schemes for the transmission services. Generators also have to take the transmission costs into account when building the bidding strategies. This paper proposes an approach to analyzing the profit maximizing game considering the transmission cost in a competitive electricity market.

• KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering
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• 제4A권4호
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• pp.243-253
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• 2004

As deregulation evolves, pricing electricity becomes a major issue in the electric power industry. Participants in the competitive marketplace are able to improve their profits substantially by effectively pricing the electricity. In this paper, game theory is applied to analyze price-clearing in the generation bidding competition with the competition modeled as the non-cooperative and complete information game. The result of this analysis can be useful in understanding spot price-clearing of electricity as well as GENCOs' strategic behavior in the competitive electricity market.

• 한국통신학회논문지
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• 제39B권11호
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• pp.790-802
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• 2014

인지무선 기술에서 주사용자의 보호를 위해 부사용자들은 주기적인 센싱 수행을 통해 주사용자의 부재를 판단하게 되고, 부사용자들 간의 협력 센싱을 통해서 향상된 센싱 결과를 얻을 수 있다. 하지만 주사용자에 대한 검출 확률과 오경보 확률에 대한 비용의 트레이드 오프가 존재하기 때문에, 적절한 협력 집단의 규모 유지가 필요하다. 또한 부사용자들은 자신이 현재 사용중인 주파수 대역은 물론 인가 사용자가 나타났을 시에 스위칭 해야 할 후보 채널에 대한 주기적인 센싱이 요구된다. 본 논문에서는 진화게임이론을 이용하여 분산상황 에서의 인밴드 센싱과 아웃밴드 센싱을 고려한 효율적인 그룹 협력 센싱 방법을 제안한다. 진화 게임을 통해서 협력센싱의 전략을 택한 부사용자들의 집단이 ESS(Evolutionary Stable State)상태로 수렴함을 관찰하였고, 학습 알고리즘을 통해 서로간의 정보교환 없이 평형상태로 수렴함을 관찰하였다.

• 수산경영론집
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• 제42권3호
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• pp.31-39
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• 2011

This paper attempts to extend such analysis to the rather more difficult problem of optimal management of transnational fish stocks jointly owned by two countries. Transboundary fish such as Mackerel creates an incentive to harvest fish before a competitor does and leads to over-exploitation. This tendency is especially poignant for transnational stocks since, in the absence of an enforceable, international agreement, there is little or no reason for either government or the fishing industry to promote resource conservation and economic efficiency. In the current paper I examine a game theoretic setting in which cooperative management can provide more benefits than noncooperative management. A dynamic model of Mackerel fishery is combined with Nash's theory of two countries cooperative games. A characteristic function game approach is applied to describe the sharing of the surplus benefits from cooperation and noncooperation. A bioeconomic model was used to compare the economic yield of the optimal strategies for two countries, under joint maximization of net benefits in joint ocean. The results suggest as follows. First, the threat points represent the net benefits for two countries in absence of cooperation. The net benefits to Korea and China in threat points are 2,000 billion won(${\pi}^0_{KO}$) and 1,130 billion won(${\pi}^0_{CH}$). Total benefits are 3,130 billion won. Second, if two countries cooperate one with another, they reach the solution payoffs such as Pareto efficient. The net benefits to Korea and China in Pareto efficient are 2,785 billion won(${\pi}^0_{KO}$) and 1,605 billion won(${\pi}^0_{CH}$) or total benefits of 4,390 billion won : a gain of 1,260 billion won. Third, the different price effects under the two scenarios show that total benefit rise as price increases.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• 제7권6호
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• pp.1379-1397
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• 2013

We consider a system where a licensed radio spectrum is shared by multiple primary users(PUs) and secondary users(SUs). As the spectrum of interest is licensed to primary network, power and channel allocation must be carried out within the cognitive radio network so that no excessive interference is caused to PUs. For this system, we study the joint beamforming and power allocation problem via game theory in this paper. The problem is formulated as a non-cooperative beamforming and power allocation game, subject to the interference constraints of PUs as well as the peak transmission power constraints of SUs. We design a joint beamforming and power allocation algorithm for maximizing the total throughput of SUs, which is implemented by alternating iteration of minimum mean square error based decision feedback beamforming and a best response based iterative power allocation algorithm. Simulation results show that the algorithm has better performance than an existing algorithm and can converge to a locally optimal sum utility.

• Journal of Communications and Networks
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• 제17권4호
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• pp.440-448
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• 2015

In this paper, we study the problem of selfish behavior of secondary users (SUs) based on cognitive radio (CR) with the presence of primary users (PUs). SUs are assumed to contend on a channel using the carrier sense multiple access with collision avoidance (CSMA/CA) and PUs do not consider transmission of SUs, where CSMA/CA protocols rely on the random deference of packets. SUs are vulnerable to selfish attacks by which selfish users could pick short random deference to obtain a larger share of the available bandwidth at the expense of other SUs. In this paper, game theory is used to study the systematic cheating of SUs in the presence of PUs in multichannel CR networks. We study two cases: A single cheater and multiple cheaters acting without any restraint. We identify the Pareto-optimal point of operation of a network with multiple cheaters and also derive the Nash equilibrium of the network. We use cooperative game theory to drive the Pareto optimality of selfish SUs without interfering with the activity of PUs. We show the influence of the activity of PUs in the equilibrium of the whole network.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• 제9권6호
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• pp.1996-2013
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• 2015

This paper considers a scenario that more D2D users exist in the cell, they compete for cellular resources to increase their own data rates, which may cause transmission interference to cellular users (CU) and the unfairness of resource allocation. We design a resource allocation scheme for selfish D2D users assisted by cooperative relay technique which is used to further enhance the users' transmission rates, meanwhile guarantee the QoS requirement of the CUs. Two transmission modes are considered for D2D users: direct transmission mode and cooperative relay transmission mode, both of which reuses the cellular uplink frequency resources. To ensure the fairness of resource distribution, Nash bargaining theory is used to determine the transmission mode and solve the bandwidth allocation problem for D2D users choosing cooperative relay transmission mode, and coalition formation game theory is used to solve the uplink frequency sharing problem between D2D users and CUs through a new defined "Selfish order". Through theoretical analysis, we obtain the closed Nash bargaining solution under CUs' rate constraints, and prove the stability of the formatted coalition. Simulation results show that the proposed resource allocation approach achieves better performance on resource allocation fairness, with only little sacrifice on the system sum rates.

• ETRI Journal
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• 제33권6호
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• pp.957-960
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• 2011

We present a fair and efficient solution for selfish readers with the Nash bargaining solution (NBS) to mitigate the effects of RFID frequency interference. We compare the NBS with a solution derived by the max log-sum scheme that maximizes total utility and show that for selfish and rational readers, the NBS brings success in bargaining on resource allocation between readers unlike the max log-sum scheme, although the NBS has less total payoff compared to the max log-sum scheme.

• 대한전자공학회:학술대회논문집
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• 대한전자공학회 2000년도 ITC-CSCC -1
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• pp.97-100
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• 2000

In previous research of social dilemma, there is no extended game that the players can select one game out of some social dilemma games. We propose this kind of game as ＂Distributed Social Dilemma＂ In this game, each player tries to acquire the adaptive strategy throughout local interactions. We make use of GA as evolutionary operations. In this paper, our purpose is to examine how the game selection of players influences the evolution of cooperation in distributed social dilemma. In order to examine, we formulate distributed social dilemma by Game Theory and use agent-based simulation that each agent is regard as player