• Journal of Korean Institute of Industrial Engineers
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• v.13 no.2
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• pp.65-77
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• 1987

Congestion occurs whenever users interfere with each other, while competing for scarce resources. In a congested market, such as a telecommunication service market, users of telecommunication services incur costs in using the service in addition to the price. The user's own time costs involved in learning to use the service, waiting for the service, and making use of the service are typically greater than the price of telecommunication services. A market equilibrium analysis is performed in which a method for user demand aggregation is developed. The effects of price changes on user demands and market demands for congested services are examined. It is found that total market demands may increase as the price for less-congested services increase under certain demand conditions. This suggests that a nonuniform pricing scheme for a congested service may improve the utilization of the congested system. The sign of price cross-elasticity for congested services is show to vary with demand conditions. A possible complementary property of congested services is found and the implication of such a property is discussed. It is argued that such a complementary property may lead to a cross subsidy in a market with congestion. Finally, comparisons between uniform pricing and nonuniform pricing policies are made. A specific numerical example is given to show that a nonuniform pricing policy may be Pareto superior to a uniform pricing policy.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2002.11b
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• pp.101-104
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• 2002

With the growing competitive pressure from market participants, utilities, consumer and government, analyses of existing competitive electricity market become more important. The presence of congestion in the transmission system can significantly increase the potential of exercising market power. Since the congestion in the network depends on the several factors. the market power cannot be simply analyzed through the existing indices. This paper presents a systematic analysis on local market power under uniform pricing scheme and provides some mitigation of the strategic market power.

• The Journal of Korean Institute of Communications and Information Sciences
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• v.31 no.8B
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• pp.764-768
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• 2006

Over the years, the widespread proliferation of multimedia services has necessitated the development for an efficient network management. In this paper, we investigate the role of adaptive online pricing mechanism in order to manage effectively the network congestion problem. Our on-line approach is dynamic and flexible that responds to current network conditions. With a simulation study, we demonstrate that our proposed scheme enhances network performance and system efficiency simultaneously under widely diverse traffic load intensities.

• Journal of Korean Society of Transportation
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• v.20 no.4
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• pp.95-107
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• 2002

Congestion and increasing returns to scale in the use of and in the provision of transportation facilities have been biggest challenges to policy makers. In order to counter these problems and thereby to promote economic efficiency, optimal congestion tax and marginal cost pricing are separately and strongly recommended for each case. In this paper, however, we show that they are valid only in Partial equilibrium context in which only the corresponding market is considered. We set up a formal general equilibrium model and prove that the recommended policies are not in general effective. We continue to give particular examples which show the invalidity of each policy and continue to show that in the same examples, there exist better but unconventional policies. Based on these findings we strongly suggest to employ quantify restricting policy measure or to find second-best pricing policies.

• Journal of Communications and Networks
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• v.18 no.3
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• pp.513-522
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• 2016

We propose a mechanism for monitoring load in quality of service (QoS)-enabled wireless networks and show how it can be used for network management as well as for dynamic pricing. Mobile network traffic, especially video, has grown exponentially over the last few years and it is anticipated that this trend will continue into the future. Driving factors include the availability of new affordable, smart devices, such as smart-phones and tablets, together with the expectation of high quality user experience for video as one would obtain at home. Although new technologies such as long term evolution (LTE) are expected to help satisfy this demand, the fact is that several other mechanisms will be needed to manage overload and congestion in the network. Therefore, the efficient management of the expected huge data traffic demands is critical if operators are to maintain acceptable service quality while making a profit. In the current work, we address this issue by first investigating how the network load can be accurately monitored and then we show how this load metric can then be used to provide creative pricing plans. In addition, we describe its applications to features like traffic offloading and user satisfaction tracking.

• Journal of Energy Engineering
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• v.15 no.4 s.48
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• pp.256-276
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• 2006

Transmission congestion is one of the key factors to local market power in competitive electricity markets. Financial transmission rights provide the financia] protection to their holders by paying back the congestion rent. A variety researches have shown that the existing trading mechanisms on transmission right can exacerbate market power. This paper proposes an alternative methodology in mitigating the local market power using the Contingent Transmission Rights on the locational marginal pricing scheme. The proposed methodology was demonstrated with the Optimal Power Flow.

• Journal of Korean Society of Transportation
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• v.22 no.5
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• pp.139-149
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• 2004

As the expansion of road capacity has become impractical in many urban areas, congestion pricing has been widely considered as an effective method to reduce urban traffic congestion in recent years. The principal reason is that the congestion pricing may lead the user equilibrium (UE) flow pattern to system optimum (SO) pattern in road network. In the context of network equilibrium, the link tolls according to the marginal cost pricing principle can user an UE flow to a SO pattern. Thus, the pricing method offers an efficient tool for moving toward system optimal traffic conditions on the network. This paper proposes a continuous network design program (CNDP) in network equilibrium condition, in order to find optimal congestion toll for maximizing net economic benefit (NEB). The model could be formulated as a bi-level program with continuous variable(congestion toll) such that the upper level problem is for maximizing the NEB in elastic demand, while the lower level is for describing route choice of road users. The bi-level CNDP is intrinsically nonlinear, non-convex, and hence it might be difficult to solve. So, we suggest a heuristic solution algorithm, which adopt derivative information of link flow with respect to design parameter, or congestion toll. Two example networks are used for test of the model proposed in the paper.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• summer
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• pp.737-739
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• 2004

The domestic power system established with Cost-Based-Pricing(CBP) from April 2001. The system is a uniform pricing system. System Operator(50) establishes a Price Setting Schedule by the prediction of consumption and the presented bid price(generation cost) of the generation utility. But the Price Setting Schedule doesn't take account of the constraint of the system. This cause a transmission congestion, constrained-on generation and constrained-off generation. This Paper search the way of the increasing efficiency of domestic power system through the redemption of congestion charge.

• Journal of Korea Technology Innovation Society
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• v.9 no.4
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• pp.740-758
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• 2006

This paper is related to the optimal pricing of Internet Backbone Services that are differentiated according to the size of the bandwidth required for applications with different quality sensitivities, Itdiscusses IBP (Internet Backbone Provider) optimal nonlinear pricing process in the presence of a congestion externality in addition to strategic behavior by users. In this scenario, the quality of service provided may reach its socially optimal level irrespective of strategic behavior by users and may be independent of the characteristics of the applications delivered over the Internet.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2003.07a
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• pp.670-672
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• 2003

The market participants make plans of bidding and transaction strategies to maximize their own profits in competitive electricity market. Also, It is concerned with transmission congestion in power market. Two methods are generally used for congestion management;nodal pricing and uplift. The participants will have different strategies for their profits in the two methods. This paper analyzes their equilibrium strategies by using the supply function model and congestion methods.