• Language and Information
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• v.18 no.2
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• pp.123-140
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• 2014

The aim of this paper is twofold: to identify two types of even if concessive conditionals, standing-ifs and introduced-ifs (Bennett 1982) in terms of whether the truth of the consequent is 'entailed' (the consequent-entailment problem in terms of Lycan 2001); and to analyze these two types of concessive conditionals in a compositional way. Here we argue that, following Guerzoni and Lim (2007), even if conditionals can be analyzed as the cases where even gets its focus in conditionals. We also argue that the consequent-entailment problem can be accounted for in a compositional way if we identify the focus as well as the scope of even in conditionals correctly. We further argue that the analysis presented in this paper supports the scope theory of even, among two theories of even previously proposed in various works. We also consider the possibility where concessive conditionals without even can be analyzed as an extension of the analysis proposed in this paper.

• Asia Pacific Journal of Corpus Research
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• v.3 no.1
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• pp.35-49
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• 2022

This study examines crosslinguistic influence on the use of concessive conditionals by Japanese EFL learners. Contrastive analysis suggests that Japanese native speakers may overuse the concessive conditional even if due to partial similarities to Japanese concessive conditionals, whose formal and semantic restrictions are fewer than those of English concessive conditionals. This hypothesis is tested using data from the written module of the International Corpus Network of Asian Learners of English (ICNALE). Comparison of Japanese native speakers with English native speakers and Chinese native speakers reveals the following trends. First, Japanese native speakers tend to overuse concessive conditionals compared to native speakers, while similar overuse is not observed in Chinese native speaker data. Second, non-nativelike uses of even if appear in contexts allowing the use of concessive conditionals in Japanese. Third, while overuse and infelicitous use of even if is observed at all proficiency levels, formal errors are restricted to learners at lower proficiency levels. These findings suggest that crosslinguistic influence does occur in the use of concessive conditionals, and that its particular realization is affected by L2 proficiency, with formal crosslinguistic influence mediated at an earlier stage than semantic cross-linguistic influence.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.14 no.3
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• pp.85-100
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• 2011

Recently Byeong Deok Lee has denied the validity of the so-called uncontested principle, which says that the indicative conditional implies the material conditional. I show that his denial means that modus ponens is not valid and that the truth-conditions of indicative conditionals are weaker than that of material conditionals. It seems that what made him hold this view is related to some misunderstanding of indicative conditionals.

• Language and Information
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• v.2 no.2
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• pp.53-79
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• 1998

This paper is an attempt to give an account of presupposition inheritance (henceforth PI) in conditionals from a functional-discourse perspective. The focus of study is on how to evaluate the embedded presupposition (EP) nested in the hypothetical world. I propose the view that if the EP satisfies the condition on the presupposition satisfaction, it becomes background information in the relevant world, arguing against the theories which employ simple cancellation or disappearance of those EPs. The discourse processing among discourse participants is to be considered in the light of functional significance for the explication of the contrastive mechanism of presupposition and assertion. I advance a revised model of PI in conditionals and analyze several problematic cases of conditionals, with a particular attention to their DRSs.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.17 no.1
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• pp.197-217
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• 2014

In my previous papers, I have argued that the so-called 'Uncontested Principle' does not hold for indicative conditionals based on inductive reasoning. This is mainly because if we accept that a material conditional '$A{\supset}C$' can be inferred from an indicative conditional based on inductive reasoning '$A{\rightarrow}_iC$', we get an absurd consequence such that we cannot distinguish between claiming 'C' to be probably true and claiming 'C' to be absolutely true on the assumption 'A'. However, in his recent paper "Uncontested Principle and Inductive Argument", Eunsuk Yang objects that my argument is unsuccessful in disputing the Uncontested Principle. In this paper, I show that his objections are irrelevant to my argument against the Uncontested Principle.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.8 no.2
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• pp.59-84
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• 2005

Adams' Thesis, or the so-called equation Pr$(A{\rightarrow}C)$ = Pr(C|A) seems to express a correct relationship between the probabilities of conditionals and conditional probabilities. But D. K. Lewis has proved the remarkable fact that probabilities of conditionals are not conditional probabilities. In this paper 1 present a version of Lewis' triviality results and give an explanation why probabilities of conditionals are not conditional probabilities. A conditional probability of C given A has a peculiar properly in that its probability is insulated from not-A facts: the only thing relevant is the proportion of ways in which A is true which are also ways for C to be true. This peculiarity of conditional probability seems to put the great obstacle in the way of attempting to find a proposition such that its probability of being true systematically coincides with conditional probability of something else.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.15 no.3
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• pp.347-375
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• 2012

In my article published in 2008, I offered an inferentialist account of indicative conditionals. In her recent paper, Professor Seawha Kim raises three objections. First, I misunderstand Sellars-Brandom in that I take only concept-constitutive inferences as materially valid inferences. Second, Sellars and Brandom talk about the common features of all kinds of conditionals including counterfactual conditionals, but I construe their view as the analysis of the indicative conditionals only. Third, either my analysis is incompatible with Sellars-Brandom inferentialism or my analysis is too general. In this paper I argue that Seawha Kim's objections are all based on insufficient understandings of Sellars's and Brandom's views. First, it is Sellars's view that materially valid inferences are restricted within concept-constitutive inferences. Second, neither Sellars nor Brandom proposes a specific theory about the indicative conditional. Instead, they argue for the expressive role of the conditional. What I accept from their views is this expressive role of the conditional. The detailed proposals about the indicative conditional in my aforementioned article are my own. Third, the differences among conditionals have no direct bearing on Sellars-Brandom inferentialism. In addition, the meaning and role of the conditional expression 'if-then' do not require more than what I have argued for it.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.15 no.2
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• pp.273-294
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• 2012

In my previous article "An Inferentialist Account of Indicative Conditionals" and "An Inferentialist Account of Indicative Conditionals and Hasuk Song's Objections", I argued that the so-called Uncontested Principle is not uncontestable. According to the Uncontested Principle, an indicative conditional '$A{\rightarrow}C$' logically implies a material conditional '$A{\supset}C$'. In his recent paper "On the Recent Controversies surrounding the Uncontested Principle" Wonbae Choi presents three objections to my claim. First, my denial of the Uncontested Principle implies rejecting modus ponens. Second, my denial of the Uncontested Principle is tantamount to taking the truth-conditions of an indicative conditional as weaker than those of a material conditional, which are usually taken to be the weakest among conditionals. Third, my view that we can warrantedly assert '$A{\rightarrow}C$' even when 'A ${\therefore}$ C' is inductively justified is based on a misunderstanding of the way in which indicative conditionals are justified. In this paper I argue that Choi's objections are all based on misunderstandings of my view. First, I do not deny the validity of modus ponens (as a form of deductive reasoning). Second, the fact that the inductive warrantability of 'A ${\therefore}$ C' does not imply the truth of '$A{\supset}C$' does not show that the truth-conditions of an indicative conditional is weaker than those of a material conditional. Third, Choi's claim that a contingent conditional '$A{\rightarrow}C$' is true only when 'C' can be deductively derived from 'A' in conjunction with a hidden premiss is not well grounded, nor does it fit the facts.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.12 no.2
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• pp.31-58
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• 2009

This paper defends Stalnaker's theory of indicative conditionals. His theory consists of selection functions and pragmatic constraints. The selection function takes a certain possible world(W) and a proposition(A) to yield a possilble world that is similar to W and in which A is true. And the pragmatic constraints plays role to make selection functions apply just to indicative conditionals. According to Stalnaker, as indicative conditionals has strong truth-value, uncontested principle always holds but passage principle does not always hold. However, his theory can explain why passage principle sometimes holds by means of pragmatic constraints. Also, this paper argues that Stalnaker's theory is the most acceptable one among others, by replying to criticisms suggested by Adamsians and the problem raised by Gibbard and other criticisms.

• Proceedings of the Korean Society for Language and Information Conference
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• 1986.02a
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• pp.39-50
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• 1986