• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2006.07a
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• pp.398-399
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• 2006

The procurement of generation and transmission/Distribution capacity in vertically-integrated electric industry is sufficient by facility construction in suitable time. However, the introduction of competitive electricity market increase the efficiency of availability for facilities and fuels. As a result, long-term capacity procurement is required for stable demand-supply balance since it is expected to maintain their generation capacity at a minimum for profit maximization. In this paper, a new long-term capacity procurement mechanism is proposed, which is able to assure supplemental contribution in competitive electricity market.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.55 no.6
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• pp.259-264
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• 2006

This paper addresses the collusive bidding that functions as a potential obstacle to a fully competitive wholesale electricity market. Cooperative game is formulated and the equation of its Nash Equilibrium (NE) is derived on the basis of the supply function model. Gencos' willingness to selectively collude is expressed through a bargain theory. A Collusion Incentive Index(CII) for representing the willingness is defined through computing the Gencos' profits at NE. In order to keep the market non-cooperative, the market operator has to know the highest potentially collusive combination among the Gencos. Another index, which will be called the Collusion Monitoring Index(CMI), is suggested to detect the highest potential collusion and it is calculated using the marginal cost functions of the Gencos without any computation of NE. The effectiveness of CMI for detecting the highest potential collusion is verified through application on many test market cases.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.53 no.6
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• pp.350-357
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• 2004

In a deregulated electricity generation market, the sufficient capacity of transmission lines will promote the competition among generation companies (Gencos). In this paper, we show that Gencos' possession of rights to collect congestion rents may increase the competition effects of the transmission lines. In order for concrete analysis on this effect, a simple symmetric market model is introduced. In this framework, introducing the transmission right to the Gencos has the same strategic effects as increasing the line capacity of the transmission line. Moreover, the amount of effectively increased line capacity is equal to the amount of the line rights. We also show that the asymmetric share of the financial transmission rights may result in an asymmetric equilibrium even for symmetric firms and markets. We also demonstrate these aspects in equal line rights model and single firm line rights model. Finally, a numerical example is provided to show the basic idea of the proposed paper.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2007.07a
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• pp.812-813
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• 2007

The procurement of generation and transmission/Distribution capacity in vertically-integrated electric industry is sufficient by facility construction in suitable time. However, the introduction of competitive electricity market increase the efficiency of availability for facilities and fuels. As a result, long-term capacity procurement is required for stable demand-supply balance since it is expected to maintain their generation capacity at a minimum for profit maximization. In this paper, a new long-term capacity procurement mechanism is constructed, which is able to assure supplemental contribution in competitive electricity market.

• 제어로봇시스템학회:학술대회논문집
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• 2005.06a
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• pp.271-274
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• 2005

Under competitive power markets, various long-term and short-term contracts based on spot price are used by producers and consumers. So an accurate forecasting for spot price allow market participants to develop bidding strategies in order to maximize their benefit. Artificial Neural Network is a powerful method in forecasting problem. In this paper we used Radial Basis Function(RBF) network to forecast spot price. To learn ANN, in addition to price history, we used some other effective inputs such as load level, fuel price, generation and transmission facilities situation. Results indicate that this forecasting method is accurate and useful.

• Korean Medical Education Review
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• v.14 no.2
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• pp.59-63
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• 2012

Current medical students are a distinct new generation who can be distinguished from the previous generation. Therefore, a clear understanding of their characteristics is vital in developing an appropriate educational program for them. The purpose of this article is to explore the characteristics of the current generation of high achieving medical students. Notable characteristics that define this generation include the following: they feel they are special, and they are sheltered, confident, highly optimistic, pressured, conventional, and have a strong desire to achieve. They are the digital generation, who can obtain information through various forms of technology. Furthermore, they are high achieving students in highly competitive educational environments. It has been suggested that various teaching methods be used in the medical school classroom. Using digital methods could be crucial in providing high-quality medical education. Educators should pay more attention to students' psychosocial development and help them to effectively cope with their academic stress.

• Journal of Energy Engineering
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• v.8 no.2
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• pp.265-271
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• 1999

In recent years, the electric utility industry in Korea has undergone fast change. Private power generation has been introduced by competitive bidding to improve economic efficiency and to strengthen the competitive generation market. In these private generation projects, the yearly pattern of purchase price between the utility and IPPs is very important. Currently, the levelized payment schedule is applied to capacity payment, and price escalation rates are reflected to energy payment. In this paper, we Proposed different patterns of payment and analyzed the outcomes. As a result, we found possibility of applying the partial front-loading pattern in Korean market to share the risk of the long-term business. And, the importance of discount rate is also found.

• Journal of Electrical Engineering and Technology
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• v.10 no.4
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• pp.1460-1470
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• 2015

This paper presents an approach to solve the long-term generation expansion planning problem of the restructured electricity industry using an agent-based environment. The proposed model simulates the generation investment decisions taken by a particular agent (i.e. a generating company) in a market environment taking into account its competitors’ strategic investment. The investment decision of a particular company is modeled taking into account that such company has imperfect foresight on the future system development hence electricity prices. The delay in the construction of new plants is also explicitly modeled, in order to compute accurately the yearly revenues of each agent. On top of a conventional energy market, several capacity incentive mechanisms including capacity payment and capacity market are simulated, so as to assess their impact on the investment promotion for generation expansion. Results provide insight on the investment cycles as well as dynamic system behavior of long-term generation expansion planning in a competitive electricity industry.

• Journal of Korean Institute of Industrial Engineers
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• v.40 no.5
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• pp.501-519
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• 2014

An explosive expansion of the use of smart devices such as smart phones and tablet PCs in mobile telecommunications service is bringing about a steep increase of mobile traffic volumes. Mobile network operators or telcos are introducing the $4^{th}$ generation LTE network, which handles traffics more efficiently, to respond such enormously increasing traffics. Meanwhile, it is wondered how LTE contributes to raising a competitive edge of telcos. This paper aims at empirically testing whether the first mover of LTE acquired its competitive advantages. In this paper, we analyzed a number of telcos of 10 major countries. As a result, it turned out that there is no first mover's advantages, that is, the first mover did not have any competitive advantages in market share, profitability, and so on.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.53 no.1
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• pp.67-72
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• 2004

This paper addresses the bidding strategies of generating firms in a competitive market where the firms are provided with payment for generating reactive power. Reactive support for voltage control is an integral and critical part of power system operations. Since reactive support is unbundled in a competitive market under open access transmission, it is treated as one of ancillary services. The operation costs and opportunity costs for reactive support are compensated by payment to the firms, hence their bidding strategies will be affected. The opportunity costs are evaluated from the foregone profits of a generator in making sales in real power market by providing reactive support instead of real power. Game theory approach is used to analysis the transaction strategies of real power by the bimatrix method in this paper. Through computing the Nash equilibrium in a sample system, an incentive of a generator for improving the reactive generating capacity is found to be effective and the variations of the profits are analyzed as the demand power factor changes.