• 한국조경학회지
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• 제48권4호
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• pp.41-54
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• 2020

본 연구는 공동주택의 조경업과 관련한 공사·용역에 대한 입찰실태 분석을 통해 문제점을 파악하고, 개선 방안을 제시하여 투명하고 공정한 입찰시스템 운영을 위한 기초자료로 제공되고자 하였다. 이를 위해 공동 주택 유지관리 이력, 입찰 정보, 전자입찰제 등을 제공하는 '공동주택관리정보시스템(K-apt)'의 자료를 활용하여 조경 분야 공사·용역에 대한 낙찰현황, 낙찰금액, 연중 낙찰 규모와 동향, 공종별 사업자 선정결과 등을 살펴보았다. 그 결과, 한 해 낙찰된 총 건수(36,831건) 중 조경업에 해당하는 건은 4.4%(1,631건)를 차지하고 있으며, 평균 낙찰금액은 약 2,400만 원으로 조사되었다. 건별 낙찰금액 현황으로 조경업 관련 건 중 73%가 3백만 원에서 3천만 원 사이에서 낙찰되었으며, 공종별로는 병충해방제와 유지관리에 해당하는 건이 58.6%를 차지하였다. 월별 낙찰현황으로는 2~4월에 전체 건수의 36%가 집중되었으며, 입찰방법에서는 '일반경쟁입찰'이 59.8%를 차지하였다. 낙찰자 선정방법과 투찰방법에서는 55%가 '최저낙찰제'와 '전자입찰방식'을, 45%가 '적격심사제'와 '직접입찰방식'을 채택한 것으로 나타났다. 입찰 현황에서 도출된 문제점에 대한 개선사항으로 첫째, 현행 '전자입찰방식' 적용 규정에 관한 예외 조항을 최소화하여 전자입찰방식 전면 적용하여 공정한 입찰제도가 운용되도록 한다. 둘째, 공동주택의 녹지환경 품질에 대한 조경 관리 기준을 마련한다. 셋째, 입찰 공고 전 내역서 및 도면 등의 설계 도서를 작성하고, 기초금액을 산출하도록 하는 근거 규정을 마련하여, 사업의 내용을 구체적이고 객관적으로 특정함으로써 공정한 입찰이 가능하도록 한다. 넷째, '사업자 선정지침'의 각종 입찰조건에 대해 선택이 아닌 조건별 세부지침을 마련하여 공정성과 일관성을 확보한다. 이와 같은 연구결과는 공동주택의 조경업 사업자 선정과 조경시설 및 녹지환경 유지관리에 있어 객관적이고 합리적인 기준 마련에 활용될 수 있을 것으로 판단된다.

• 한국주거학회:학술대회논문집
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• 한국주거학회 2009년 춘계학술발표대회 논문집
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• pp.211-216
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• 2009

Bidding systems in the domestic public construction work have been amended many times since the lowest-bidding system was implemented in 1951. However, this hasn't had much success. Competition in technical development among companies has declined as the contracts for buildings are given to company which submits the lowest price without considering traits of projects. In addition, as the construction market turns to the limitless competition system due to FTA(Free Trade Agreement), advanced techniques are needed to promote the national competitive power. Considering the needs of the times, Korean government announced that "Best Value Contract (Design-Bid-Build)" and "Bridging Contracts (Design-Build)" are included to 4 existing bidding systems in October 2007. Thus this study aims to suggest devised the evaluation criteria including major items for evaluating bidders, in order to establish and revitalize the best-value bid system successfully.

• 대한전기학회:학술대회논문집
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• 대한전기학회 2001년도 하계학술대회 논문집 A
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• pp.550-552
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• 2001

The vertically integrated power industry was divided into six generation companies and one market operator, where electricity trading was launched at power exchange. In this environment, the profits of each generation companies are guaranteed according to utilization of their own generation equipments. Especially, the electricity demand shows seasonal and weekly regular pattern, which the some capacity should be provided into ancillary service based on the past demand forecasting error and operating results of electricity market. Namely, if generation cost function is applied to SMP and BLMP as announced the previous day, the available generation capacity of the following day could be optimally distributed, and therefore contract capacity of ancillary service applied to CBP(Cost Based Pool) and TWBP(Two-Way Bidding Pool) is determined. Consequently, it is Possible to use the retained equipments optimally. This paper represents on efficient bidding strategies for generation equipments through the calculation of the contract and the application of each generator cost function based on the past demand forecasting error and market operating data.

• 대한전기학회:학술대회논문집
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• 대한전기학회 2009년도 제40회 하계학술대회
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• pp.569_570
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• 2009

This paper presents a methodology to find the profit maximized Nash Equilibriums of each generator(or GenCo), which considers the Ramp-rate of each generator under a competitive market environment. The ramp-rate of a generator is one of the physical or technical constraints of a generator and means the ability to increase or decrease the output instantaneously. In this paper, we found several Nash Equilibriums of the generation allocation problem through Dynamic Programming in a competitive market. Individual generators participate in a game to maximize its profit through competitions and play a game with bidding strategies of its generation quantities in a spot market.

• 전기학회논문지
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• 제59권12호
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• pp.2143-2149
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• 2010

Market price and curtailment amounts of the Demand Resource Market(DRM) are determined by competition between electricity consumers. An important aspect of the DRM involves the assessment of strategic behavior of participants for maximizing their profits. This paper presents economic equilibrium models for simulating imperfect competition among electricity consumers in the DRM and analyzes the models at Nash Equilibrium of Game Theory. The proposed demand functions and supply functions of DRM are based on the Demand Resource Market Rules in Korean electricity market. Simulation results show that the models are adequate for obtaining Nash Equilibrium of consumers' competitive curtailment.

• 대한전기학회논문지:전력기술부문A
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• 제52권6호
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• pp.333-339
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• 2003

Competition among electric generation companies is a major goal of restructuring in the electricity industry. In electricity market, a huge volume of commodities will be traded through competitive bidding. The choice between uniform and pay-as-bid pricing for electricity auction has been one of most important issues in deregulated electricity market. This paper proposes a constrained Bertrand model for analyzing the electricity auction market of price competition model. The issue of the two pricing rules of uniform and pay-as-bid is studied from the viewpoint of consumer's benefit. This paper also shows that transmission congestion depends on the pricing mechanism. Pay-as-bid pricing gives less possibility of transmission congestion by price competition, and less burden to consumers in the simulation results.

• 대한전기학회논문지:전력기술부문A
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• 제52권6호
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• pp.340-346
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• 2003

This paper presents a game theory application for an analysis of uniform price auction in a simplified competitive electricity market and analyzes the properties of Nash equilibrium for various conditions. We have assumed that each generation firm submits his bid to a market in the form of a sealed bid and the market is operated as a uniform price auction. Two firms are supposed to be the players of the market, and we consider the maximum generation quantity constraint of one firm only. The system demand is assumed to have a linear relationship with market clearing prices and the bidding curve of each firm, representing the price at which he has a willingness to sell his generation quantity, is also assumed to have a linear function. In this paper, we analyze the effects of maximum generation quantity constraints on the Nash equilibrium of the uniform price auction. A simple numerical example with two generation firms is demonstrated to show the basic idea of the proposed methodology.

• 대한전기학회논문지:전력기술부문A
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• 제49권6호
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• pp.266-271
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• 2000

The electric power industries are moving from the conventional monopolistic or vertically integrated environments to deregulated and competitive environments, where each participant is concerned with profit maximization rather than system-wide costs minimization. Consequently, the conventional least-cost approaches for the generation resource schedule can not exactly handle real-world situations. This paper presents a game theory application for analyzing power transactions and market design in a deregulated energy marketplace, where the market participants determine the net profits through the optimal bidding strategies. The demand elasticity of the energy price is considered for the realistic modeling of the deregulated marketplace.

• 대한전기학회:학술대회논문집
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• 대한전기학회 2001년도 추계학술대회 논문집 전력기술부문
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• pp.429-431
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• 2001

The vertically integrated power industry was divided into six generation companies and one market operator, where electricity trading was launched at power exchange. In this environment, the profits of each generation companies are guaranteed according to utilization of their own generation equipments. This paper represents on generator maintenance scheduling and efficient bidding strategies for generation equipments through the calculation of the contract and the application of each generator cost function based on the past demand forecasting error and market operating data.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• 제33권4호
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• pp.143-177
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• 2011

수익형 민간투자사업의 경우 가격요소와 비가격요소를 동시에 고려하는 다차원 경매제도가 시행되고 있다. 본 논문은 수익형 민간투자사업 중 도로사업의 입찰 평가자료를 분석하여 정책적 시사점 및 개선방안을 제시함을 목적으로 한다. 입찰 평가자료 분석 결과, 평가 1위 사업자들의 득점이 증가하고 있는데, 이는 기본점수의 증가와 경쟁의 심화로 인한 것으로 판단된다. 평가 1위 사업자 선정에는 비가격부문에서 발생하는 점수편차가 결정적인 것으로 제시되었다. 또한 최초제안자 우대점수가 높게 설정된 사업의 경우 경쟁이 발생하지 않음도 확인하였다. 가격부문 중 재정지원부문의 점수별 금액은 평균 7.3억원으로 통행료부문의 점수별 금액 24.3억원과 큰 차이를 보였다. 비가격부문의 점수별 금액은 23.0억원 정도로 추정되어 가격부문과는 다소 차이를 나타내었다. 분석결과를 토대로, 최초제안자 우대점수의 적정 수준 유지, 재정지원부문의 평가방식 개선, 기본점수의 재조정 등이 제언되었다.