• Journal of the Korean Society of Safety
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• v.30 no.3
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• pp.85-92
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• 2015

This study examined the effects of employers' breach of safety obligation and violation of psychological contract on the workers' safety behaviors and turnover intention. Especially, this study examined a mediating effect of violation of psychological contract on the relationship between employer's breach of safety obligation and workers' safety behavior and turnover. 198 workers were asked to respond to the questionnaires that measured various demographic variables, employers' breach of safety obligation, violation of psychological contract, safety behavior, turnover intention. A hierarchical regression was conducted to identify variables that had significant relationships between employers' breach of safety obligation and employees' safety behavior and turnover intention, and to examine the mediating effect of violation of psychological contract. Results indicated that the employers' breach of safety obligation significantly predicted both workers' safety behaviors and turnover intention. It was also found that the violation of psychological contract was a significant predictor for both workers' safety behavior and turnover intention. In addition, violation of psychological contract was found as mediating effect on the relationship between employers' breach of safety obligation and workers' safety behavior and turnover intention. Based on these results, the implications of this study and suggestions for future research were discussed.

• The Korean Society of Law and Medicine
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• v.15 no.2
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• pp.123-163
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• 2014

As results of analyzing judicial precedents about infection in hospitals in connection with mistakes and causality in medical litigations shows that the Mitigation of Law Principles To Prove responsibility in medical litigation has not been able to play its role compared to its intended purposes. And Major sentiment from those judgments is that a mistake can't be proved only by the fact that certain infection in hospital occurred in connection with hospital infection. Therefore, the number of indirect facts to deny estimation is overwhelmingly high. Like this, especially for hospital infection which is difficult to prove indirect facts themselves to estimate mistake, major sentiment from those judgments have a problem that impute sharing of losses caused by hospital infection to patient. In accordance with the Principles of equitable and proper sharing of losses, it's required to prepare legal interpretation and theoretical methods to largely mitigate patient's responsibility to prove medical mistakes compared to other medical litigations in connection with existing Mitigation of Law Principles To Prove responsibility and conventional theory of estimation. In connection with this, the results of review that duty of safety management in hospital infection cases can be the base of conversion of proving responsibility, the duty that prevent hospital infection, corresponding the duty of safety management in hospital infection is not conventional duty of safety management based on duty of good faith but secondary obligation of medical contract. The breach of duty preventing hospital infection is the violation of medical contract, but there is no logical necessity that convert proving responsibility from the obligation of contract itself. Therefore, the duty of preventing hospital infection from the obligation of medical contract, corresponding the duty of safety management in hospital infection cases cannot be the base of conversion of proving responsibility alone. But, it's still required to conversion of proving responsibility in hospital infection, we need further studies on cases of Germany which applies legal estimation of proving responsibilities in hospital infection.

• Journal of the Korea Safety Management & Science
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• v.15 no.4
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• pp.131-136
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• 2013

Automobile was first introduced in 1903 in South Korea, the masses of the car was carried out rapidly compared to other countries. However, many people were killed in a traffic accidents and economic loss was occurred due to the spread of the automobile. In South Korea, 2012, traffic accident occurred 223,656 times, 5,392 fatality, 344,565 injured people. In the last five years, about 224,000 accidents per year were occurring. In other words, 610 traffic accidents occur and about 15 people pass away in one day. In addition, the proportion of traffic accidents is first place in the OECD countries and it is very high in the world. Understand occurrence tendency of traffic accident, accident frequency rate of the driver who drives more than 10 years was higher than the novice driver. In addition, as a result of examining the cause of the traffic accident, breach of safe driving obligation appears highest case (125,391 times), and followed by signal violation, break safety distance. Therefore, the majority of traffic accidents occurred by the lack of safety awareness of the driver. In this study, prevent the loss of human life and property in traffic disaster, by establish disaster prevention measures that investigated by questionnaire survey and statistical data of the state of consciousness and driving posture in response to the driving history of the driver.

• Journal of the Korea Safety Management & Science
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• v.14 no.1
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• pp.109-116
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• 2012

It could be debated that the owners were indemnified from the charterers even in respect of the loss of deck cargo caused by the negligence on the part of the owners' servants by a clause 13(b) of NYPE(1993) form, where NYPE(1993) incorporated the Hague/Visby Rules by a paramount clause and did not contained an on deck statement to state or identify what or how much deck cargo was being carried, however the relevant bills of lading all had such statement. The socol 3 of U.K. is a very helpful decision on (1) an on deck statement in bill of lading was sufficient to exclude application of the Hague/Visby Rules to the carriage of deck cargo, as a result, the clause 13(b) should not be null and void by the clause 3(8) of the Hague/Visby Rules (3) the clause 13(b) could not protect the owners from the loss and/or liability caused by negligence and/or breach of the obligation of seaworthiness on the part of the owners, their servants and agents. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to critically analyze the decision in the socol 3, and provide the decision's practical implications in order to prevent legal disputes as to the on deck carriage between the owners and the charterters.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.5
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• pp.53-75
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• 1993

This article is concerned with the comment on "Some New Problems of International Aviation Security-Considerations Forcused on its Legal Aspects". Ever since 1970, in addition to the problem of failure to accept the Tokyo, Hague and Montreal Conventions, there has been also the problem of parties to them, failing to comply with their obligations under the respective treaties, in the form especially of nominal penalties or the lack of any effort to prosecute after blank refusals to extradite. There have also been cases of prolonged detention of aircraft, passengers and hostages. In this regard, all three conventions contain identical clauses which submit disputes between two or more contracting States concerning the interpretation or application of the respective conventions to arbitration or failing agreement on the organization of the arbitration, to the International Court of Justice. To the extent to which contracting States have not contracted out of this undertaking, as I fear they are expressly allowed to do, this promision can be used by contracting States to ensure compliance. But to date, this avenue does not appear to have been used. From this point of view, it may be worth mentioning that there appears to be an alarming trend towards the view that the defeat of terrorism is such an overriding imperative that all means of doing so become, in international law, automatically lawful. In addition, in as far as aviation security is concerned, as in fact it has long been suggested, what is required is the "application of the strictest security measures by all concerned."In this regard, mention should be made of Annex 17 to the Chicago Convention on Security-Safeguarding International Civil Aviation against Acts of Unlawful Intereference. ICAO has, moreover, compiled, for restricted distribution, a Security Manual for Safeguarding Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful Interference, which is highly useful. In this regard, it may well be argued that, unless States members of ICAO notify the ICAO Council of their inability to comply with opecific standards in Annex 17 or any of the related Annexes in accordance with Article 38 of the 1944 Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, their failure to do so can involve State responsibility and, if damage were to insure, their liability. The same applies to breaches of any other treaty obligation. I hope to demonstrate that although modes of international violence may change, their underlying characteristics remain broadly similar, necessitating not simply the adoption of an adequate body of domestic legislation, firm in its content and fairly administered, but also an international network of communication, of cooperation and of coordination of policies. Afurther legal instrument is now being developed by the Legal Committee of ICAO with respect to unlawful acts at International airports. These instruments, however, are not very effective, because of the absence of universal acceptance and the deficiency I have already pointed out. Therefore, States, airports and international airlines have to concentrate on prevention. If the development of policies is important at the international level, it is equally important in the domestic setting. For example, the recent experiences of France have prompted many changes in the State's legislation and in its policies towards terrorism, with higher penalties for terrorist offences and incentives which encourage accused terrorists to pass informations to the authorities. And our government has to tighten furthermore security measures. Particularly, in the case an unarmed hijacker who boards having no instrument in his possession with which to promote the hoax, a plaintiff-passenger would be hard-pressed to show that the airline was negligent in screening the hijacker prior to boarding. In light of the airline's duty to exercise a high degree of care to provide for the safety of all the passengers on board, an acquiescence to a hijacker's demands on the part of the air carrier could constitute a breach of duty only when it is clearly shown that the carrier's employees knew or plainly should have known that the hijacker was unarmed. The general opinion is that the legal oystem could be sufficient, provided that the political will is there to use and apply it effectively. All agreed that the main responsibility for security has to be borne by the governments. A state that supports aviation terrorism is responsible for violation of International Aviation Law. Generally speaking, terrorism is a violation of international law. It violates the sovereign rights of states, and the human rights of the individuals. We have to contribute more to the creation of a general consensus amongst all states about the need to combat the threat of aviation terrorism. I think that aviation terrorism as becoming an ever more serious issue, has to be solved by internationally agreed and closely co - ordinated measures.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.24 no.1
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• pp.59-89
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• 2009

The objectives of the 1963 Tokyo Convention cover a variety of subjects, with the intention of providing safety in aircraft, protection of life and property on board, and promoting the security of civil aviation. These objectives will be treated as follows: first, the unification of rules on jurisdiction; second, the question of filling the gap in jurisdiction; third, the scheme of maintaining law and order on board aircraft; fourth, the protection of persons acting in accordance with the Convention; fifth, the protection of the interests of disembarked persons; sixth, the question of hijacking of aircraft; and finally some general remarks on the objectives of the Convention. The Tokyo Convention mainly deals with general crimes such as murder, violence, robbery on board aircraft rather than aviation terrorism. The Article 11 of the Convention deals with hijacking in a simple way. As far as aviation terrorism is concerned 1970 Hague Convention and 1971 Montreal Convention cover the hijacking and sabotage respectively. The Problem of national jurisdiction over the offence and the offender was as tangled at the Hague and Montreal Convention, as under the Tokyo Convention. Under the Tokyo Convention the prime base of jurisdiction is the law of the flag (Article 3), but concurrent jurisdiction is also allowed on grounds of: territorial principle, active nationality and passive personality principle, security of the state, breach of flight rules, and exercise of jurisdiction necessary for the performance of obligations under multilateral agreements (Article 4). No Criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law is excluded [Article 3(2)]. However, Article 4 of the Hague Convention(hereafter Hague Article 4) and Article 5 of the Montreal Convention(hereafter Montreal Article 5), dealing with jurisdiction have moved a step further, inasmuch as the opening part of both paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Hague Article 4 and the Montreal Article 5 impose an obligation on all contracting states to take measures to establish jurisdiction over the offence (i.e., to ensure that their law is such that their courts will have jurisdiction to try offender in all the circumstances covered by Hague Article 4 and Montreal Article 5). The state of registration and the state where the aircraft lands with the hijacker still on board will have the most interest, and would be in the best position to prosecute him; the paragraphs 1(a) and (b) of the Hague Article 4 and paragraphs 1(b) and (c) of the Montreal Article 5 deal with it, respectively. However, paragraph 1(b) of the Hague Article 4 and paragraph 1(c) of the Montreal Article 5 do not specify if the aircraft is still under the control of the hijacker or if the hijacker has been overpowered by the aircraft commander, or if the offence has at all occurred in the airspace of the state of landing. The language of the paragraph would probably cover all these cases. The weaknesses of Hague Article 4 and Montreal Article 5 are however, patent. The Jurisdictions of the state of registration, the state of landing, the state of the lessee and the state where the offender is present, are concurrent. No priorities have been fixed despite a proposal to this effect in the Legal Committee and the Diplomatic Conference, and despite the fact that it was pointed out that the difficulty in accepting the Tokyo Convention has been the question of multiple jurisdiction, for the reason that it would be too difficult to determine the priorities. Disputes over the exercise of jurisdiction can be endemic, more so when Article 8(4) of the Hague Convention and the Montreal Convention give every state mentioned in Hague Article 4(1) and Montreal Article 5(1) the right to seek extradition of the offender. A solution to the problem should not have been given up only because it was difficult. Hague Article 4(3) and Montreal Article 5(3) provide that they do not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law. Thus the provisions of the two Conventions create additional obligations on the state, and do not exclude those already existing under national laws. Although the two Conventions do not require a state to establish jurisdiction over, for example, hijacking or sabotage committed by its own nationals in a foreign aircraft anywhere in the world, they do not preclude any contracting state from doing so. However, it has be noted that any jurisdiction established merely under the national law would not make the offence an extraditable one under Article 8 of the Hague and Montreal Convention. As far as international aviation terrorism is concerned 1988 Montreal Protocol and 1991 Convention on Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detention are added. The former deals with airport terrorism and the latter plastic explosives. Compared to the other International Terrorism Conventions, the International Aviation Terrorism Conventions do not have clauses of the passive personality principle. If the International Aviation Terrorism Conventions need to be revised in the future, those clauses containing the passive personality principle have to be inserted for the suppression of the international aviation terrorism more effectively. Article 3 of the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Article 5 of the 1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages and Article 6 of the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation would be models that the revised International Aviation Terrorism Conventions could follow in the future.