• Journal of Electrical Engineering and Technology
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• v.7 no.5
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• pp.681-688
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• 2012

This paper presents the application of Differential Evolution (DE) algorithm to obtain a solution for Bid Based Dynamic Economic Dispatch (BBDED) problem including the transmission losses and to maximize the social profit in a deregulated power system. The IEEE-30 bus test system with six generators, two customers and two trading periods are considered under various bidding strategies in a day-ahead electricity market. By matching the bids received from supplying and distributing entities, the Independent System Operator (ISO) maximize the social profit, (with the choices available). The simulation results of DE are compared with the results of Particle swarm optimization (PSO). The results demonstrate the potential of DE algorithm and show its effectiveness to solve BBDED.

• Industrial Engineering and Management Systems
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• v.8 no.4
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• pp.201-212
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• 2009

This study analyzed the structure of pricing in the automobile auction market by using real trade data. We focused on the bidding behavior of bidders and the contract price of exhibits. First, we proposed a relational framework among exhibits, number of bidders, and the contract price. Next, we utilized a neural network model to estimate the number of bidders and the contract price. Subsequently, we investigated the relationship between the number of bidders and the contact price, and evaluated our method through an analysis that employed verifying data. Lastly, we listed our suggestions for bidding in auction markets.

• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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• v.57 no.1
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• pp.20-24
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• 2008

A bid-based pool(BBP) model is representative of energy market structure in a number of restructured electricity markets. Supply function equilibrium(SFE) models of interaction better match what is explicitly required in the bid formats of typical BBP markets. Many of the results in the SFE literature involve restrictive parametrization of the bid cost functions. In the SFE models, two parameters, intercept and slope, are available for strategic bidding. This paper addresses the realistic competition format that players can choose both parameters arbitrarily. In a fixed demand function, equilibrium conditions for generation company's profit maximization have a degree of freedom, which induces multi-equilibrium. So it is hard to choose a convergent equilibrium. However, consideration of stochastic demand function makes the equilibrium conditions independent each other based on the amount of variance of stochastic demand function. This variance provides the bidding players with incentives to change the slope parameter from an equilibrium for a fixed demand function until the slope parameter equilibrium.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2005.07a
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• pp.807-809
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• 2005

This paper addresses the bidding strategies of a hydro generator in an electricity market, and their effect on the electricity market in accordance with some parameters: the water volume, the demand elasticity, and the hydro unit performance. The competition of a hydro generator is formulated as a hi-level optimization problem, and the solving scheme for the equilibrium condition is proposed as a set of nonlinear simultaneous equations. The equilibrium of the oligopolistic model is evaluated by comparison with that of a perfect competition model from the viewpoint of a market power.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• summer
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• pp.713-715
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• 2004

In an electricity market with an imperfect competition, participants make plans of biddings and transaction strategies to maximize their own profits. The market price and the quantity are concerned with the operation reserve as well as the bidding system and demand curves in an electricity market. This paper presents a model of the combined market , energy market and operating teserve market. The Nash equilibrium is analyzed by using a hi-level optimization , maximization of Social welfare (SW) and maximization of the producers' profits.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.52 no.6
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• pp.333-339
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• 2003

Competition among electric generation companies is a major goal of restructuring in the electricity industry. In electricity market, a huge volume of commodities will be traded through competitive bidding. The choice between uniform and pay-as-bid pricing for electricity auction has been one of most important issues in deregulated electricity market. This paper proposes a constrained Bertrand model for analyzing the electricity auction market of price competition model. The issue of the two pricing rules of uniform and pay-as-bid is studied from the viewpoint of consumer's benefit. This paper also shows that transmission congestion depends on the pricing mechanism. Pay-as-bid pricing gives less possibility of transmission congestion by price competition, and less burden to consumers in the simulation results.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.52 no.6
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• pp.340-346
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• 2003

This paper presents a game theory application for an analysis of uniform price auction in a simplified competitive electricity market and analyzes the properties of Nash equilibrium for various conditions. We have assumed that each generation firm submits his bid to a market in the form of a sealed bid and the market is operated as a uniform price auction. Two firms are supposed to be the players of the market, and we consider the maximum generation quantity constraint of one firm only. The system demand is assumed to have a linear relationship with market clearing prices and the bidding curve of each firm, representing the price at which he has a willingness to sell his generation quantity, is also assumed to have a linear function. In this paper, we analyze the effects of maximum generation quantity constraints on the Nash equilibrium of the uniform price auction. A simple numerical example with two generation firms is demonstrated to show the basic idea of the proposed methodology.

• Journal of the Korean Institute of Intelligent Systems
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• v.14 no.6
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• pp.678-686
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• 2004

This paper presents a new method to securely conduct online sealed-bid auctions with a single auctioneer server The sealed-bid auctions have several vulnerable security problems when they are performed on the Internet. One of such problems is the trust establishment between an auctioneer and bidders who participate in an auction. Several online sealed-bid auction methods have been developed to address this trust problem. The proposed method solves the security problems that would happen in the sealed-bid auction using a blind signature scheme and a contract signature protocol. It prevents the auctioneer from illegally manipulating the bidders' bidding information, repudiating the reception of some bid, manipulating the auction period, and illegally adding or deleting bids. In addition, it keeps the bidders from modifying the bidding information after issuing their bid and doing intentional mistake to invalidate their own bid. The method can be easily implemented using the multiagent architecture.

• Journal of the Korean Society for Railway
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• v.8 no.5
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• pp.460-469
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• 2005

Turnkey contract system is an effective ordering system for the ordering organizations that technical engineers are insufficient for their construction projects. It is possible to reduce project duration and to improve project quality in an integrated contract system between design and construction. However, owners can have a difficulty caused from unitary responsibility system. This study analyzes present situation and problems of turnkey contract system including railway projects. The result includes various methods for improving the system based on the analysis of bid price and selection procedure.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.15 no.2
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• pp.45-61
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• 1990

This study examines shareholder wealth effects in tender offers and attempts to explain abnormal return variations of bidding and target firms at announcement of takeovers using the free cash flow hypothesis of Jensen. On average, bidders with large free cash flows pay higher premia (apparently more than fair market value) to targets than do other bidders with no free cash flows. Thereby, these bidders experience negative wealth effects on announcement of tender offers. Cross-sectional regression analysis suggests that for the subsample of takeover bids where bidders have large free cash flows, the increase in the debt ratio resulting from takeover has a significant positive wealth effect for bidding firm shareholders, while it has no effect in other subsamples. The evidence is consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis.