• The Journal of Korean Institute of Communications and Information Sciences
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• v.39C no.4
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• pp.400-406
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• 2014

In this paper, we propose an approach to minimizing total power consumption by deploying multiple clean-up robots simultaneously in a given area. For this, we propose to use the cooperative game theoretic approaches (i.e., Nash bargaining solution (NBS)) such that the robots can optimally and fairly negotiate the area division based on available resources and characteristics of the area, thereby leading to the minimum total power consumption. We define a utility function that includes power consumptions for characteristics of areas and the robots can agree on a utility pair based on the NBS. Simulation results show that the proposed approach can reduce the total average power consumption by 15-30% compared to a random area division approach.

• Journal of Navigation and Port Research
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• v.46 no.3
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• pp.259-268
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• 2022

Unlike the general buyer-supplier relationship, there are cases wherein the bargaining power of suppliers is greater than that of buyers. This relationship can be found especially in the shipbuilding industry. Thus, this paper focused on strategic items presented in Kraljic's study. The purpose of this study was to examine factors influencing buyers' purchase of strategic items in a market wherein the bargaining power of suppliers is superior. Results show that the path coefficient between environment factor and satisfaction factor was the highest. Additionally, the path coefficient between environment factor and reliability factor was the next highest. Also, as a result of analyzing if there is a difference in perception according to the superiority and inferiority of bargaining power perceived by buyers, significant results were found in some path coefficients.

• Journal of Labour Economics
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• v.29 no.3
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• pp.75-112
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• 2006

We found following evidences from our empirical analysis with the Workplace Panel Survey data of the Korea Labor Institute with reference to 'discord hypothesis' which insists that employee participatory high performance work practices would strengthen not only an enterprise focus in labor-management relations but also the enterprise unionism in the labor union system or collective bargaining structures, so they would probably come into conflict with the superenterprise-oriented industrial solidarity spirit in labor unionism. First, even though there are significant positive management performance effects of high performance work practices, especially in case of mining and manufacturing industries, the positive performance effects of employee participatory work practices such as job rotation ratio of workers and 6-sigma activities were much strengthened relatively in case of non-unionized establishments. Second, the superenterprise-oriented collective bargaining system is also found to give very strong and statistically significant negative performance effects to the introduction and implementation of work teams and performance-related payment systems such as profit sharing, group incentive pay system and so on. Although there are some careful reservations in interpreting the results of our analysis because of data insufficiency, they may have important implications that the industrial labor unionism or the superenterprise-oriented collective bargaining practices exercise the bargaining power to make individual firms be negative or feel it nearly impossible to introduce the employee participatory work practices which can be very favorable to improving those management performance.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.23 no.1
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• pp.227-242
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• 2006

This paper analyzes insurance crimes using a game theoretic model. In blackmailing cases involving automobile accidents, insurance criminals deliberately induce innocent drivers(victims) to commit a moving violation such as crossing over the center dividing yellow line, and collide with the victims. After the collision, the criminals and the victims effectively engage in a bargaining game over the amount of the settlement for the damage. Because the penalty for that kind of moving violation is very severe (even criminally prosecuted), the victims do not have much bargaining power. Exploiting the weak bargaining power of the victims, the criminals demand and receive huge compensation (including settlement) from the victims. In the model, it is shown that under the current law agents have perverse incentives leading to insurance crimes. The criminals have incentive to induce car collisions and extract huge settlement from the victims. Based on the analysis, it is suggested that lowering the severity of penalty for certain kind of violation may be needed to prevent insurance crimes, in addition to increasing the crime investigation activities and strengthening punishment for insurance criminals.

• Journal of the Korean Geographical Society
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• v.51 no.5
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• pp.667-690
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• 2016

This paper reviews the evolution process of global production network(GPN) discourse, from its origin to the recent theorization, namely GPN 2.0. In so doing, the discursive formation of global production networks is introduced in comparison with a competing discourse global commodity/value chains, with particular attention to conceptual and analytical lacunae in the latter. This article also outlines how the global production network perspective has become a useful discursive and practical tool that allows the examination of the nexus of global economy, transnational corporations, and regional development. Subsequently, a theoretical dearth in the approach is discussed in reference to key critiques, and in this context Yeung and Coe's recent theorization GPN 2.0, which is centered on casual mechanisms and network configurations is reviewed. This paper suggests that the theory adequately addresses the problem of casuality lacking in its precedented conceptual framework, and that it helps exploring the formation and evolution processes of varied production networks(including intrafirm coordination, interfirm control, strategic partnership, and extrafirm bargaining) in connection with competitive dynamics and risky environments. As a result of the theorization, the difference between GPN and the chain approaches has become more apparent, and the idea of extrafirm bargaining is particularly important in the differentiation. Extrafirm bargaining is seen to be a comprehensive networking form inclusive of such GPN 1.0 analytical concepts as value, embeddeness, and power, and research attentive to, and engaging with, the extrafirm networks is expected to help transcending the chain governance approaches' analytical excess of interfirm linkages and industry-centeredness.

• KIPS Transactions on Computer and Communication Systems
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• v.12 no.10
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• pp.299-308
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• 2023

As the spectrum shortage problem has accelerated by the emergence of various services, New Radio-Unlicensed (NR-U) has appeared, allowing users who communicated in licensed bands to communicate in unlicensed bands. However, NR-U network users reduce the performance of Wi-Fi network users who communicate in the same unlicensed band. In this paper, we aim to simultaneously maximize the fairness and throughput of the unlicensed band, where the NR-U network users and the WiFi network users coexist. First, we propose an optimal power allocation scheme based on Monte Carlo Policy Gradient of reinforcement learning to maximize the sum of rates of NR-U networks utilizing rate-splitting multiple access in unlicensed bands. Then, we propose a channel occupancy time division algorithm based on sequential Raiffa bargaining solution of game theory that can simultaneously maximize system throughput and fairness for the coexistence of NR-U and WiFi networks in the same unlicensed band. Simulation results show that the rate splitting multiple access shows better performance than the conventional multiple access technology by comparing the sum-rate when the result value is finally converged under the same transmission power. In addition, we compare the data transfer amount and fairness of NR-U network users, WiFi network users, and total system, and prove that the channel occupancy time division algorithm based on sequential Raiffa bargaining solution of this paper satisfies throughput and fairness at the same time than other algorithms.

• Proceedings of the Korea Contents Association Conference
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• 2015.05a
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• pp.55-56
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• 2015

근래에 게임이론 분야에서 진화계산 기법을 사용한 분석은 중요한 이슈이다. 본 논문에서는 교섭게임에서 입자군집최적화와 차분진화알고리즘 간의 공진화 과정을 관찰하고 상호 경쟁에서 얻는 이득을 비교하여 두 알고리즘의 성능을 분석한다. 실험결과 입자군집최적화가 차분진화알고리즘에 비해 교섭게임에서 더 우수한 성능을 보임을 확인하였다.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.22 no.3
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• pp.113-143
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• 1997

Most of the conflict problems between 2 persons can be represented as a bi-matrix game, because player's utilities, in general, are non-zero sum and change according to the progress of game. In the bi-matrix game the equilibrium point set which satisfies the Pareto optimality can be a good bargaining or coordination solution. Under the condition of incomplete information about the risk attitudes of the players, the bargaining or coordination solution depends on additional elements, namely, the players' methods of making inferences when they reach a node in the extensive form of the game that is off the equilibrium path. So the investigation about the players' inference type and its effects on the solution is essential. In addition to that, the effect of an individual's aversion to risk on various solutions in conflict problems, as expressed in his (her) utility function, must be considered. Those kinds of incomplete information make decision maker Bayesian, since it is often impossible to get correct information for building a decision making model. In Baysian point of view, this paper represents an analytic frame for guessing and learning opponent's attitude to risk for getting better reward. As an example for that analytic frame. 2 persons'bi-matrix game is considered. This example explains that a bi-matrix game can be transformed into a kind of matrix game through the players' implicitly cooperative attitude and the need of arbitration.

• Environmental Engineering Research
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• v.21 no.4
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• pp.420-426
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• 2016

Climate change imposes a huge treat on the sustainability of our environment. One of the major reasons for the increasing impacts of climate change is the emission of greenhouse gases. Therefore, cooperative greenhouse gas emission reduction schemes with a general consensus are needed in order to reduce the impacts of climate change. Due to the strong link between greenhouse gas emission and economic development there is disagreement among countries on the designing and implementation of emission reduction plans. In this paper the authors proposed a two-stage concession game to analyze emission reduction plans and determine a balanced emission range that improves the utilities of the bargaining parties. Furthermore the game was applied to a hypothetical example. Our results from the case study indicated that even though the utilities of the bargaining parties is highly affected by emission reductions, after making concessions their utilities can be improved given their emission reductions are within in a certain desirable range. The authors hope that this article provides insights which could be useful for understanding emission reduction plans and their consequences on the negotiating parties.

• The Journal of Korean Institute of Communications and Information Sciences
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• v.35 no.2B
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• pp.269-278
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• 2010

In the clustering protocol, lifetime of the cluster members radically decrease because frequency interference between clusters make every cluster member consume a lot of energy to maintain or increase its transmission rate. In this paper, we analyze the frequency interference among the clusters with the game theory which deals with resource bargaining problems between players, and present a rational power allocation strategy. Both the cases that each cluster tries to selfishly occupy and cooperatively share the resource are analyzed in terms of non-cooperative and cooperative games. In simulation, we compare the cooperative game with non-cooperative game in terms of the node lifetime.