• Journal of the Korean Home Economics Association
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• v.45 no.5
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• pp.95-119
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• 2007

The purpose of this study was to investigate the shopping values(utilitarian and hedonic values) sought and the risks(economic, functional, socio-psychological, and privacy) perceived by consumers who participate in Internet auctions by determining the factors that affect their shopping values and risk perceptions. Empirical data were collected by an Internet survey of netizens who were interested in and had experience in Internet auctions. Questionnaires were distributed to the subjects through an Internet survey site and at an Internet auction cafe. A total of 300 questionnaires were analyzed. The results showed that consumers showed a slightly greater pursuit of a utilitarian value than a hedonic outcome in their Internet auction practices; however the outcomes pursued by consumers in their teens and twenties tended to be more hedonic than utilitarian. Consumers with a higher level of innovation, self-confidence in purchase, and need for information searching showed a greater pursuit of utilitarian and hedonic outcomes. The group of consumers with a higher expectation for legal protection pursued a more utilitarian outcome, whereas the group of consumers with higher influence from the reference group pursued a more hedonic outcome. The consumers showed that they perceived functional risk as boing most serious, followed by privacy risk, economic risk, and socio-psychological risk. Subjects with higher degrees of innovation, self-confidence in purchase and self-control perceived economic risk as critical. Functional risk was perceived to be highest in the group of consumers with self-control and a need for information searching, whereas socio-psychological risk was perceived to be highest in the group of consumers showing more self-control. Privacy risk was perceived to be highest in the group of consumers with a higher degree of innovation and lowest in both groups of higher and lower affection. Both economic and privacy risks were perceived to be lower in the group of lower pursuit of a hedonic outcome.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.28 no.1
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• pp.39-59
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• 2019

The Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) has the great ecosystem as all the artificial activities in DMZ have been prohibited over half a century. The ecosystem should be conserved even after the reunification of Korea and hence the conservation plan should be established not after the reunification but before it. It requires a considerable budget to conserve DMZ, considering management of ecology resource, recovery, and research. The objective of this paper is to analyze a fund-raising measure for DMZ conservation, using economic incentives mechanism when multiple developers participate in the auction to get the right to develop North Korean regions, have private information about their sunk costs and pay a part of their profits for the fund. First, we analyze the real option model to decide the optimal investment time. Second, we construct the auction for bidders not to misrepresent their private information, based on Bayesian Nash equilibrium.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.32 no.2
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• pp.144-170
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• 2010

This paper considers the effect of various types of procurement auction system on competition focusing on the rate of successful bidding. We analyze the number of bidders and the rate of successful bids using online procurement data of the Public Procurement Service. The average number of bidders is 301 and the average rate of successful bids is 87.42% while the weighted average rate is 75.13%. These numbers show that there is quite strong competition among bidders and the rate is lower as the expected price is higher. When we analyze the data of price procurement auction, the rate is also shown to be lower as the expected price is higher. Furthermore, the rate decreases as the number of bidders increases which naturally makes the competition stronger. Meanwhile, the analysis finds that the inclusion of the onsite bidding, the PQ(Pre-Qualification) result, or major-10 winning companies cannot explain the rate much in our data. In case of turnkey-alternative, the average rate of successful bidding for 484 cases record 90.20%. The average is 84.89% with 120 alternatives and 91.97% with 364 cases of turnkey. The reason why the rate of turnkey-alternative is lower than that of price procurement auction is the lack of competition as well as the systematic difference. By setting up a model, we are able to explain the difference in rate caused by the respective reason. When we suppose there are 3 bidders in case of price procurement auction for a project that exceeds 100 billion won, the rate is expected to be around 64%. This implies that difference of 26% is caused by the systemic difference and 3% by the lack of competition. Therefore, we conclude that the difference in rate between turnkey-alternative and price procurement auction is caused mainly by the systemic difference. In case of PPP(Public Private Partnership) projects, among 154 projects in total, only 40% has more than 2 bidders that compete. The average number of bidders is 1.88 which is less than 2, and the average rate of successful bids is 90%. In sum, under the price procurement auction, there is strong competition which is reflected by the rate of successful bids. However, there is room to decrease the rate by strengthening the competition under the turnkey-alternative. Also with PPP projects, we expect the rate can be steadily reduced with revived competition among bidders.

• Journal of Intelligence and Information Systems
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• v.20 no.3
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• pp.93-108
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• 2014

To support business decision making, interests and efforts to analyze and use transaction data in different perspectives are increasing. Such efforts are not only limited to customer management or marketing, but also used for monitoring and detecting fraud transactions. Fraud transactions are evolving into various patterns by taking advantage of information technology. To reflect the evolution of fraud transactions, there are many efforts on fraud detection methods and advanced application systems in order to improve the accuracy and ease of fraud detection. As a case of fraud detection, this study aims to provide effective fraud detection methods for auction exception agricultural products in the largest Korean agricultural wholesale market. Auction exception products policy exists to complement auction-based trades in agricultural wholesale market. That is, most trades on agricultural products are performed by auction; however, specific products are assigned as auction exception products when total volumes of products are relatively small, the number of wholesalers is small, or there are difficulties for wholesalers to purchase the products. However, auction exception products policy makes several problems on fairness and transparency of transaction, which requires help of fraud detection. In this study, to generate fraud detection rules, real huge agricultural products trade transaction data from 2008 to 2010 in the market are analyzed, which increase more than 1 million transactions and 1 billion US dollar in transaction volume. Agricultural transaction data has unique characteristics such as frequent changes in supply volumes and turbulent time-dependent changes in price. Since this was the first trial to identify fraud transactions in this domain, there was no training data set for supervised learning. So, fraud detection rules are generated using outlier detection approach. We assume that outlier transactions have more possibility of fraud transactions than normal transactions. The outlier transactions are identified to compare daily average unit price, weekly average unit price, and quarterly average unit price of product items. Also quarterly averages unit price of product items of the specific wholesalers are used to identify outlier transactions. The reliability of generated fraud detection rules are confirmed by domain experts. To determine whether a transaction is fraudulent or not, normal distribution and normalized Z-value concept are applied. That is, a unit price of a transaction is transformed to Z-value to calculate the occurrence probability when we approximate the distribution of unit prices to normal distribution. The modified Z-value of the unit price in the transaction is used rather than using the original Z-value of it. The reason is that in the case of auction exception agricultural products, Z-values are influenced by outlier fraud transactions themselves because the number of wholesalers is small. The modified Z-values are called Self-Eliminated Z-scores because they are calculated excluding the unit price of the specific transaction which is subject to check whether it is fraud transaction or not. To show the usefulness of the proposed approach, a prototype of fraud transaction detection system is developed using Delphi. The system consists of five main menus and related submenus. First functionalities of the system is to import transaction databases. Next important functions are to set up fraud detection parameters. By changing fraud detection parameters, system users can control the number of potential fraud transactions. Execution functions provide fraud detection results which are found based on fraud detection parameters. The potential fraud transactions can be viewed on screen or exported as files. The study is an initial trial to identify fraud transactions in Auction Exception Agricultural Products. There are still many remained research topics of the issue. First, the scope of analysis data was limited due to the availability of data. It is necessary to include more data on transactions, wholesalers, and producers to detect fraud transactions more accurately. Next, we need to extend the scope of fraud transaction detection to fishery products. Also there are many possibilities to apply different data mining techniques for fraud detection. For example, time series approach is a potential technique to apply the problem. Even though outlier transactions are detected based on unit prices of transactions, however it is possible to derive fraud detection rules based on transaction volumes.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.19 no.1
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• pp.23-43
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• 2010

This article compares two different auction designs for $CO_2$ emission allowances, namely uniform pricing and multiple pricing, in view of market efficiency. Experimental economic method of Buckley et al. (2004) is applied in this analysis. As a result of this analysis as expected, multiple pricing method brings out Winner's curse. It means that uniform pricing method is more efficient than multiple pricing method.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.9 no.9
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• pp.3312-3334
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• 2015

In this paper, a mechanism for spectrum allocation in overlay cognitive radio networks is proposed. In overlay cognitive radio networks, the secondary users (SUs) must first sense the activity of primary users (PUs) to identify unoccupied spectrum bands. Based on their different contributions for the spectrum sensing, the SUs get payoffs that are computed by the fusion center (FC). The unoccupied bands will be auctioned and SUs are asked to bid using payoffs they earned or saved. Coalitions are allowed to form among SUs because each SU may only need a portion of the bands. We formulate the coalition forming process as a coalition forming game and analyze it by game theory. In the coalition formation game, debtor-creditor relationship may occur among the SUs because of their limited payoff storage. A debtor asks a creditor for payoff help, and in return provides the creditor with a portion of transmission time to relay data for the creditor. The negotiations between debtors and creditors can be modeled as a Bayesian game because they lack complete information of each other, and the equilibria of the game is investigated. Theoretical analysis and numerical results show that the proposed auction yields data rate improvement and certain fairness among all SUs.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.11 no.9
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• pp.4197-4219
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• 2017

Cloud computing is a new service to provide dynamic, scalable virtual resource services via the Internet. Cloud market is available to multiple cloud computing resource providers and users communicate with each other and participate in market transactions. However, since cloud computing is facing with more and more security issues, how to complete the allocation process effectively and securely become a problem urgently to be solved. In this paper, we firstly analyze the cloud resource allocation problem and propose a mathematic model based on combinatorial double auction. Secondly, we introduce a trust evaluation mechanism into our model and combine genetic algorithm with simulated annealing algorithm to increase the efficiency and security of cloud service. Finally, by doing the overall simulation, we prove that our model is highly effective in the allocation of cloud resources.

• Smart Media Journal
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• v.7 no.1
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• pp.24-30
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• 2018

Acquisition of the FIDO authentication technology in pursuit of improved security function of the NFC-based 2 factor electronic payment system enabled GenoTech Ch., Ltd. to develop its new service, Gallery-Auction, demoed at Daegu Exhibition. The demonstration was followed by the improvement requests in banner creation & installation, changes in UI, changes in order of operation, etc, which were taken into account for the succeeding update. During the second demonstration held at 'Art: Gwangju: 17,' it analyzed and visualized the number of visitors per hour there.

• The KIPS Transactions:PartB
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• v.8B no.6
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• pp.601-608
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• 2001

The automated assignment of multiple tasks to executing agents is a key problem in the area of multi-agent systems. In many domains, significant savings can be achieved by reallocating tasks among agents with different costs for handling tasks. The automation of task reallocation among self-interested agents requires that the individual agents use a common negotiation protocol that prescribes how they have to interact in order to come to an agreement on "who does what". In this paper, we introduce the multi-agent Traveling Salesman Problem(TSP) as an example of task reallocation problem, and suggest the Vickery auction as an interagent negotiation protocol for solving this problem. In general, auction-based protocols show several advantageous features: they are easily implementable, they enforce an efficient assignment process, and they guarantce an agreement even in scenarios in which the agents possess only very little domain-specific Knowledge. Furthermore Vickrey auctions have the additional advantage that each interested agent bids only once and that the dominant strategy is to bid one′s true valuation. In order to apply this market-based protocol into task reallocation among self-interested agents, we define the profit of each agent, the goal of negotiation, tasks to be traded out through auctions, the bidding strategy, and the sequence of auctions. Through several experiments with sample multi-agent TSPs, we show that the task allocation can improve monotonically at each step and then finally an optimal task allocation can be found with this protocol.

• Smart Media Journal
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• v.6 no.3
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• pp.29-40
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• 2017

Lately weight for smartphone mounted to function for NFC is increasing, rapidly. Because of this, NFC related technology is made by many companies. We developed Gallery-Auction for security enhancements and new services of NFC-based 2 factor electronic payment system. Enhanced security features development of user authentication module through fingerprint recognition to apply FIDO authentication technology and developed electronic contract voice service of Gallery-Auction using TTS(Text to Speech). Therefore we enhanced convenient and simple authentication method and security through NFC mobile electronic payment.